

The mercantile experience of Ottoman Pera in the century after 1453

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Abstract

This thesis investigates the mercantile experience of Pera under Ottoman rule. Although there is evidence of some decline in Westerner trade after the conquest of Constantinople, the early Ottoman state is observed to be proactive in their approach to regional trade. The argument of the thesis is that the narrative of Ottoman inter-regional ambitions outlined in the “Ottoman Age of Exploration” must be pulled further back in time as the thesis identifies a conscious and active participation in inter-regional trading activity.

The first chapter situates Pera as being an important trading centre taken over by the Ottomans after the conquest of Constantinople in 1453. Byzantine privileges are traced in a similar form under Ottoman rule, effectively continuing pre-established trading norms.

In the second chapter, the Italian notary documents of Pera are used to characterise trade pre-and post conquest. These provide a valuable insight into the daily life of the foreign merchants in their dealings not only with locals and traders, but also overseas participants in local and regional trading activity. The surveys of Istanbul after 1453 show changes in the demographics of the city are traced and its impact on trade and the nature of the early Ottoman Empire

The third chapter situates the Ottomans in Mediterranean diplomacy, focusing on Venetian diplomatic sources. In these sources, the Ottoman relations with foreign states are portrayed as being beyond simply belligerents in the Mediterranean trade circle.

The final chapter explores the role of the Ottomans in the politics and economy of the wider Mediterranean and Black Sea region. Rather than considering the Ottomans as an outsider disruptive force to the eastern Mediterranean, it instead can be seen that the new homogenous Ottoman dominions created trading circles that not only changed the cityscape of Pera but also changed regional and inter-regional trade dynamics.

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List of abbreviations

BOA	Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi
DİA	Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi
İSAM	İslâm Araştırmaları Merkezi
MAD	Maliyeden Müdevver Derfterler
TSMA	Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi
TT	Tapu Tahrir Defterleri
TTK	Türk Tarih Kurumu

Chronology

1444-46	First reign of Ottoman sultan Mehmed II
1446-51	Second reign of Ottoman sultan Murad II.
1451-81	Second reign of Ottoman sultan Mehmed II
29 May 1453	The conquest of Constantinople.
1 June	The surrender of Pera under an 'ahidnāme.
2 June	Sultan Mehmed II, the Conqueror, visits Pera and declares that those Latins who left may return in three months and repossess their homes. If not, they will be confiscated.
1454	George Scholarios appointed Patriarch: registration of the buildings and population.
1455	Two Genoese settlements of Old and New Phokaia on the Anatolian coast seized.
1456	Conquest Enez, a Genoese colony in Western Thrace
1459	Conquest of Serbia and the Morea
1461	Conquest of the empire of Trabzon
1463–79	War with Venice
1468	Conquest of Karaman
1475	Conquest of the Genoese colonies in the Crimea
1481–1512	Reign of Bayezit II
1485–91	War with the Mamluks of Egypt
1499–1503	War with Venice; conquest of Lepanto, Coron, and Modon
1512–20	Reign of Selim I
1514	Selim defeats Shah Ismail at Çaldıran
1516	Conquest of Diyarbakir; annexation of eastern Anatolia; defeat of the Mamluks at Marj Dabık
1517	Battle of Ridaniyya, conquest of Egypt; submission of the sharif of Mecca

Introduction

The argument of this thesis is that from the 1453 conquest of Constantinople onwards, the Ottomans actively participated, or had at least aspirations, in regional and inter-regional trade. Narratives put forward in works such as “The Ottoman Age of Exploration”¹, must be pulled further back in time as there is an identifiable conscious Ottoman participation in regional and inter-regional trade. The “Ottoman Age of Exploration” begins with the 1517 conquest of Egypt by the Sultan Selīm I and the 1571 Battle of Lepanto and the loss of the Ottoman Mediterranean fleet to a coalition of Christian forces is described as “the most crushing naval defeat in their history”.² In this thesis, however, this defeat is placed within a longer durée Ottoman ambition in the participation of inter-regional trade and its associated mercantile method at empire, and not seen, instead, as the terminal climax of Ottoman inter-regional ambitions.

The thesis investigates the nature of the early Ottoman Empire by looking at the case of Pera, an idiosyncratic state within a state and a conspicuous expression of foreign dominance of trading activity in the region of the eastern Mediterranean³ as described by Steven Epstein. By analysing the trading activity of Pera in the century after the 1453 conquest of Constantinople and its relationship with the empire, the position of the early Ottoman Empire can be seen as an intrinsic part of the eastern Mediterranean trading circle and beyond.

¹ Giancarlo Casale, *The Ottoman Age of Exploration* (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010)

² Casale, *The Ottoman Age of Exploration*, p.138; Palmira Brummett, *Mapping the Ottomans: Sovereignty, Territory, and Identity in the Early Modern Mediterranean*. (Cambridge University Press, 2015), p.93; Andrew C Hess, “The Battle of Lepanto and Its Place in Mediterranean History.” *Past & Present*, no. 57 (1972): pp.53–73. But, Suraiya Faruqi, *The Ottoman Empire and the World Around It* (London ; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004), p.38 makes the point that Lepanto was “merely a single episode, well publicized but in no way decisive”

³ Steven Epstein, *Purity Lost: Transgressing Boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean, 1000-1400* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007).

In a review of *European and Islamic Trade*⁴, Eric Dursteler makes the point that for many years one of the accepted views of the Ottoman Empire was that Ottoman-Muslims were not interested or involved in commerce, particularly in or with Christian Europe. The Ottoman expansion was seen as inspired by a sort of cultural imperative of conquest with no meaningful economic overtones. What Ottoman trade did exist between these cultural and religious blocks of the Mediterranean world was carried out by a minority class of subject merchants, particularly Jews, Armenians, and Latin-rite Christians. More recently Halil İnalcık, Maria Pia Pedani Fabric, Palmira Brummet and Cemal Kafadar, have challenged this⁵. They have emphasised the economic rationality and economically based motivations of the Ottoman expansion and have demonstrated conclusively the involvement of Ottoman-Muslim merchants in trade beyond the narrow confines of their state, and with European Christians and Jews.

Maria Pia Pedani Fabris puts forward another counterclaim to the idea that Turks are not merchants. The 'ahidnâme given to the Venetians by Mehmed I in 1416 introduced reciprocal rights for Ottoman's trading in Venetian-ruled areas.⁶ Palmira Brummett work on the "Age of Discovery" and the Ottoman Empire, describes the period beginning with the voyaging empires of Western Europe attempting to capture the revenues of the oriental trade and, in the process, chancing upon and conquering the Americans. In her view, early sixteenth century Ottoman expansion was in large part both inspired and driven by what she calls the "profit motive". Dismissing the idea that "Islamic jihad was foremost in the minds of Ottoman foreign policy planners", she insists that their expansion towards Suez and beyond

⁴ Eric Dursteler, "Review of *European and Islamic Trade in the Early Ottoman State: The Merchants of Genoa and Turkey* by Kate Fleet", *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 32, no. 2 (July 2001): pp. 490–91.

⁵ Cemal Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995.); Maria Pia Pedani Fabris "Between Diplomacy and Trade: Ottoman merchants in Venice." in Suraiya Faroqhi, *Merchants in the Ottoman Empire*, Collection Turcica 15 (Paris : Peeters, 2008) ; Palmira Brummett, *Ottoman Seapower and Levantine Diplomacy in the Age of Discovery*, SUNY Series in the Social and Economic History of the Middle East (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994) ; Halil İnalcık "The Ottoman Turks and the Crusades, 1329-1451." in K.M Setton, M.W. Baldwin, J.N. Hazard, R. L. Wolff, and N.P. Zacour, *A History of the Crusades*. 2nd edition. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969.)

⁶ Pedani Fabris "Between Diplomacy and Trade: Ottoman merchants in Venice."

denoted commercial and economic “intentionality”. Her conclusion is that the Ottoman Empire was at the protectionist, pre-mercantilist stage in the sixteenth century, as characterised by İnalcık, with steps taken toward economic internationality.⁷

Giancarlo Casale in *The Ottoman Age of Exploration*⁸ begins by arguing that the Ottoman “age of exploration” shared four key features with its European counterparts. Casale identifies the shared features based on the timeframe of the Western “Age of Exploration” as being firmly in the sixteenth century only ever going so far back as the Treaty of Tordesillas, signed in 1494 between the crowns of Portugal and Spain and Pope Alexander VI, effectively partitioning the entire world.

This thesis bridges the period between the conquest in 1453 and the sixteenth century Ottoman empire narratives of modern scholarship narratives. It characterises the changing nature of the Ottoman empire as it first took on the inherited modus operandi of the East Roman empire by, most immediately, adopting its longstanding local tradition of privileges. As a result of these inherited norms, the empire actively participated in regional and, had at least aspirations in, inter-regional trade. By conquering Constantinople, the Ottomans in 1453 had become an empire with a direct relationship with the sea and developed their own unique Mediterranean thalassology and method⁹ at empire. The Ottoman ambitions would see it expand its horizons beyond the shores of the Red Sea and into the Indian Ocean.

Observations on Ottoman and foreign trading activity are made based on the daily experience of traders in Pera and the interactions with their rulers. Kate Fleet in her study *European and Islamic Trade in the Early Ottoman State* as well as others including Geo Pistorino in *Genovesi d’Oriente* and Halil İnalcık’s works¹⁰ describe

⁷ Palmira Brummett, *Ottoman Seapower and Levantine Diplomacy in the Age of Discovery*

⁸ Casale, *The Ottoman Age of Exploration*

⁹ Halil İnalcık, “Ottoman Methods of Conquest” in: *Studia Islamica* 2 (1954), pp. 103–129

¹⁰ Halil İnalcık, *Seçme eserleri 2 Devlet-i ‘Aliyye Osmanlı İmparatorluğu üzerine araştırmalar, 1 Klasik dönem (1302-1606), siyasal, kurumsal ve ekonomik gelişim* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2014), p. 125 ; Çiğdem Kafescioğlu,

a decline post-1453 and contemporary accounts certainly recount a desolate city, for example Scholarios who became the Patriarch of the city in 1454, describing a "city of ruins in great part deserted, stricken with poverty".¹¹

Although there is a decline in the city of Pera and Constantinople and in Westerner trade after the conquest, the Ottoman proactive approach in regional trade instead allows the early Ottoman Empire to be seen as a part of, and not an outsider to, the eastern Mediterranean trading circle.

The first chapter situates the idiosyncratic state within a state, Pera, as being part of a pragmatic trading *modus operandi* inherited by the Ottomans after the conquest of Constantinople in 1453. The question of whether the Byzantine privileges can be traced in a similar form under Ottoman rule is explored by looking at the practical Ottoman approach to the use of Islamic law in effectively continuing pre-established trading norms. This chapter analyses treaties before and after the conquest. These treaties, Privileges under the Byzantines and 'ahidnāmes under the Ottomans, would change form and later become the burdensome capitulations so readily identified in later Ottoman historiography.

The discussion around the use of privileges is central to the Ottoman method of empire. The early Byzantine privileges were aimed essentially at reducing tariff discrimination against foreign traders, allowing them to settle internal disputes through legal procedures of their own choice. It was this established tradition that the successive Ottomans took over after 1453. These privileges in the early Ottoman Empire show a continuation between the two empires, at least when it comes to Italian trading activity within the empire.

Pera was the primary example of the importance of privileges in the late Byzantine Empire and early Ottoman Empire, and is therefore central in understanding the

Constantinopolis/Istanbul: Cultural Encounter, Imperial Vision, and the Construction of the Ottoman Capital. (Pennsylvania State University Press, 2009.), p16

¹¹ Kate Fleet, *European and Islamic Trade in the Early Ottoman State: The Merchants of Genoa and Turkey* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). ; Geo Pistarino, *Genovesi d'Oriente* (Genova: Civico istituto colombiano, 1990). ; amongst other works by Halil İnalcık, "The Re-building of Istanbul by Sultan Mehmed The Conqueror," *Cultura Turcica* 4, no. 1–2 (1967).

shift in Western trading activity post-1453. In the period before and after the fall of Constantinople, Pera was a key player in the region's economy in its role as a mercantile hub. Its relationship with both the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires were characterised by the granting of privileges and acting as a bridge between the Black Sea, Levant, and the West through the Latin territories.

The quarter of Constantinople, Pera, granted to the Genoese in the thirteenth century was heavily populated by Italian, Genoese and Venetian, Armenian and Jewish traders. Even though Constantinople's population had significantly decreased during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the city retained a diverse population until the empire's collapse in 1453.

Pera's idiosyncrasy can be characterised twofold, it acted as a state within a state, through the Byzantine privileges and then Ottoman 'ahidnāme but it was also a state outside of a state, known by the Genoese as the *genovesi* in Oltremare. Considered together with other Italian city states, Pera was an expression of the established influence of Western commercial powers. Ottoman Istanbul's relationship with Pera and its foreign merchants was indicative of the unique approach of the Ottoman state to the administration of its territories.

Mehmed II's imperial decree (*amān-nāme*) issued to the Genoese of Pera on 30 May 1453 for their surrender, granted them the right to sell their goods freely, as in all other parts of his lands, exemption from taxes except the *haraç*, a legal authority of their own to deal with the affairs of the merchants, while he granted merchants from Genoa the right to come and go, provided they paid according to law and custom.

After the conquest in 1453, the Genoese merchants of Pera were granted the special status and identity of the *müste'min*¹² allowing them the freedom to trade in Ottoman territories. There existed a complex pluralist legal framework in early Ottoman Istanbul, in which the invaluable role of merchant foreigners, whether transient, the Franks (*Frengis*), or settled, the *dhimmi*s, was recognised and codified putting a practical value on these merchant foreigner's pre-existing primacy over

¹² Müste'min: foreigners protected by 'ahdnames

pre-established trade routes out of Pera to mostly the Black Sea and the eastern Mediterranean. The agreements, guaranteeing privileges to foreigners within the Ottoman domains, not only had commercial, religious, and legal consequences, but also played an important part in the construction of Ottoman self-identity both regionally and locally by recognising the role, and, implicitly, the identity of the merchant foreigner.

From the conquest onwards, the early Ottoman Empire's attempts at positioning itself in the regional economy are observed by treaties, privileges, either renewed or granted anew, Western trading activity and state policy. The time span for this research focuses mainly on the century after 1453, since this is when the decline in Western trade and the policies introduced by the Ottoman state to counteract its affects can be observed but remain relatively open ended. Dates that are of particular relevance include but are not limited to: 1517 conquest of Egypt, 1537 the first significant Ottoman capitulation granted to France by Süleyman the Magnificent, 1581 the setting up of the British Levant Company after the English secured essentially the same trading rights as the French or even the period up to 1573 after which the Ottoman and Venetian empires experienced the longest period of uninterrupted peace.

The position of the Ottoman Empire in the region's trading economy after the conquest of Constantinople in 1453 was not a break with the past. Trade relations established previously in Byzantium with the West continued under the Ottoman state. Considering Pera as a unique example of the importance of privileges in the late Byzantine Empire, the question is why after 1453 there appears to be a decline in Western trade within the Ottoman Empire despite the established tradition of privileges being continued.

The second chapter analyses the published Italian notary documents of Pera to characterise trade in Pera before and after the conquest. Over a hundred notary documents provide a valuable insight into the quotidian of the foreign merchants in their dealings not only with locals and traders but also overseas participants, whether states or individuals, in local and regional trading activity. Contemporary land and population surveys of Istanbul under Ottoman rule are also analysed to

trace changes in the demographics of the city and the resultant impact on trade, relations with foreign states, and the nature of the early Ottoman Empire. Two surveys, one within a couple of years after the conquest and the other two decades after, provide a valuable snapshot to the condition of Pera and Constantinople right after the conquest. The evolution and integration of Pera into an Ottoman capital thereafter is traced, from Pera the *genovesi oltremare* to a Turkish Galata.

The notary documents produced before and after 1453 are a valuable insight into the trading activity of mostly Italian merchants in Pera and their priorities in the production of legal evidential documentation. Most of the notarised documents pertain to the higher value or higher risk activities undertaken by these traders and there is a marked drop in their production after the conquest. However, as such, it is already methodologically difficult to ascertain a net decline in overall trading activity before and after 1453 based on these notarised documents of foreign traders as, although there may be a reduction in foreign higher value and risk activity, the overall trading activity, participated post-1453 by not only foreign merchants but also Ottoman merchants who may be absent from these sources, may remain at a similar level. Certainly, this reduction is an indication of the changing patterns of trade.

The impression from the sources such as the 1455 survey is that the first years after the conquest were difficult for Pera. However, from the later notarial documents, it appears that life for the Genoese of Pera returned to normality and business resumed its normal course.

The evidence presented by the notarial documents after 1453, the successive treaties including 1387 and 1453, and Ottoman policy introduced by Mehmed II, does not necessarily explain the reduction in Western activity in the empire. The position of Pera in the early empire, changes in its population, and the wider question of the reasons behind the seeming decline of Western trade in the Ottoman territories will also be investigated by looking at the surveys of Istanbul.

İnalçık's work on the two surveys, one within a couple of years after the conquest and the other two decades after, provide a valuable snapshot to the condition of Pera, and Constantinople, right after the conquest and its evolution into an Ottoman

capital thereafter. From the 1455 survey, it seems that Ottoman Pera suffered in the early years. The wealthy Genoese and other foreigners had left as fugitives for the safety of Chios amongst other places. Taken together, however, the surveys of 1455 and 1477, do not show what is sometimes described as an exodus of foreigners. Wealthy minorities, namely Jews, Armenians, Greeks remained in Pera. The majority of Italian foreigners, mostly Genoese, chose to stay as Ottoman dhimmis.

The difficulties Pera faced in the early years of Ottoman rule was comparably short in duration. Pera and Constantinople certainly had faced worse traumas in the past, most memorably the 1204 sack of Constantinople. In contradiction to the difficulties, new opportunities are also considered in the scholarship: İnalcık places an emphasis on the effects of the newly connected Bursa markets with Pera. Court (*Kadı*) records from the 1480s to 1500s suggest a new dependence of Pera on the Bursa markets as trade expanded. At the turn of the sixteenth century, Pera's demographics are seen to change with Ottoman subjects, Turks, Greeks, Armenians, and Jews succeeding the Genoese in inter-regional trade, especially after the fall of the Genoese ports in the Crimea as the trade of the Black Sea became vitally important for the growing capital of the empire.

The third chapter uses wider diplomatic sources to understand the pragmatic approach of Ottoman rule of Pera and its implications for its regional trade and draws on the observations made in the first and particularly the second chapter to situate the Ottomans in the Mediterranean. Mehmed II's policies on taxation are also used as evidence for the disruptive outsider characterisation of early Ottoman rule as they would have been a disincentive for Western traders if after the conquest there would have been substantial raises, but the evidence for this is not clear. The treaties agreed in 1387, 1403 and 1430 give no rates but refers to customs being paid by the Genoese according to custom. The rates paid according to treaties in 1475 do not seem to be exceptionally large. Although it could be argued that it is unrealistic to expect there to be no rises in custom charges over the century. There nevertheless does not appear to be any evidence of complaints from the Genoese merchants.

The Relazioni of Venetian and Genoese ambassadors to the Ottoman Empire gives an insight into the reports sent back to the Italian city states on their view of the state of the Empire. Considerable amounts of Relazioni were edited by Eugenio Alberi in the *Relazioni degli ambasciatori Veneti al senato* which contain reports published between 1839 and 1863 in fifteen volumes on relations with European states outside Italy, other Italian states and with the Ottoman Empire from the late 15th century to the early 17th century. These sources are from the later part of the period but give a good impression of Ottoman diplomatic activity. Simone Contarini simplified his role as bailo into two principal areas: ‘The task of bailo in Constantinople for Your Highness seems to me to be contained in two offices: one ambassador, the other consul.’¹³ First and foremost, then, the bailo was present in the Ottoman capital to represent and protect Venetian political interests. To prepare them for their important post, the Senate regularly voted to allow the baili-elect to attend its sessions in order that they might be ‘informed of current public affairs’.¹⁴

The final chapter follows these previous conclusions on Ottoman rule and situates the thesis between narratives of pre- and post-conquest methods of empire. Rather than considering the Ottomans as an outsider disruptive force to the eastern Mediterranean, it instead can be seen that the new homogenous Ottoman dominions create new trading circles that not only change the cityscape of Pera and Constantinople but also both regional and inter-regional trade. Furthermore, the associated formation of a distinctive Ottoman Mediterranean thalassology forewarns of later ambitions at an “Ottoman Age of Exploration”.

An important part of this study is the conclusions it draws on the nature of the Ottoman Empire after the conquest. The onset of the Ottoman advances changed conditions, in which the localised trading economy of Pera, serving a specific need together with Italian city states acting as the middleman, was exposed to wider trading routes through Anatolia. The distinguishing factors and privileges of the Genoese of Pera were eroded as commerce was liberalised, opened to competition,

¹³ Relazione di Simone Contarini’, *Berchet* 1, no. 234 ; *SMar*, reg. 80, c. 124v, 1 Oct. 1622. quoted in Eric R. Dursteler, ‘The Bailo in Constantinople: Crisis and Career in Venice’s Early Modern Diplomatic Corps’, *Mediterranean Historical Review* 16, no. 2 (December 2001), p.3.

¹⁴ Dursteler, ‘The Bailo in Constantinople’, p.3.

as part of the harmonisation process with the time's prevailing currents of the world economy. This period was a precursor to the "Ottoman Age of Exploration" and can be seen as the emergence of the Ottomans as a regional trading power with later, greater, ambitions.

The conclusion of the thesis provides a summary of the observations made on the changes in trading activity in the lead to and after the conquest of 1453 and the creating of new trading circles. It identifies notable early Ottoman ambitions in a pragmatic method at empire that is a facilitator, promoter, and active participant in regional and inter-regional trade. The narrative of Ottoman inter-regional ambitions outlined in the "Ottoman Age of Exploration" must be pulled further back in time as the earlier notable active participation identified in this thesis historicises this age as being part of a longer *durée* Ottoman ambition in the participation of inter-regional trade and its associated mercantile method at empire.

Chapter 1.

The Byzantine and the Ottoman Burgenses Pere

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1.1 Pera: the state within a state

In Weber's "The City"¹⁵ the observation is made as to whether there can be a city described as being an "Islamic city". Although his conclusion is that there is no such entity as an "Islamic city" it subsequently sparked significant debate as to the nature, and classification, of cities. This discussion, of interest, when considering Pera and Istanbul, has been applied to the Ottoman context and to an Ottoman-Turkish city, an Ottoman-Anatolian city, or even a Balkan Ottoman city. Pera and Istanbul's idiosyncratic position in the matter raises a few interpretations as to the terminology of the city. The classification of the city based on religion can certainly be recognised, Frank (*Frengi*) Pera. However, the mercantile – that is particularly its key position linking multiple trading circles and maritime routes – may offer a more insightful and immediately practical description and classification of at least the city of Pera.

This description of the city extends to the question of its denomination, that of Pera or Galata. The choice made to use Pera follows on from the description and classification of the city. A regional mercantile hub, so defined by its trading activity, seeing the city as a trading post and by extension denominating it based on the primary actors of such a city – the Genoese traders – seems most appropriate. It is the merchant foreigner's, the Genoese *Frengi's* (*Ceneviz bazirganlari*), perspective and experience that is being investigated. Their own appellation of the

¹⁵ Max Weber, *The City* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1958) ; Sami Zubaida, "Max Weber's The City and the Islamic City", *Max Weber Studies* 5/6, no. 2/1 (2005), pp.111–118.

city, Pera, (*Notai Genovesi di Magnifica Communita di Pera*) overrides the name adopted most commonly in the Ottoman context, Galata. In short, if the city is to be described and classified as a mercantile, trading city and not by religion and by extension as defined by the ruler, then it is most appropriate to use the term self-ascribed by the main participants of the trade.

The city has been called different names at various times, Sykai, (*Sycae: Incirlik*) then Ioustinianai and later Galata and Pera. Even these two terms are not always clear in what they geographically encompass. They have been used to sometimes describe the walled city on the other side of the Golden Horn to Constantinople, Konstantinopolis or Istanbul, but have also at times, been used to describe a wider settled area of the walled city and its surroundings. In 1403 Clavijo writes¹⁶ that the Genoese, would call the area Pera whereas Galata was preferred by the Greeks. The modern use of Pera and Genoa, confusingly makes a difference between the walled area South of the tower of Galata and north. The south is known as Galata, whereas the northern outskirts become known as Pera (*Peyre* in some notary documents, see Appendix A no [1]) Kerim Bulunur in *Osmanlı Galatası*¹⁷ explains the origin of the term Pera as coming from the Greek for “across” (πέραν) – across the water. The origin of Galata, however, seem vague. Clavijo wrote that it related to those selling milk in the area, the galatas (Γαλατάς).¹⁸

Emperor Michael VIII Palaiologos (r.1259–1261) granted the right to Genoa of its own quarter in Constantinople, on the northern shore of the Golden Horn in Galata (Pera). It became the hub of merchants from Genoa and other Italian republics until the late 16th century, continuing to be such during the Ottoman Empire.

¹⁶ ‘The Genoese call their town Pera, but the Greeks name it Galata. Before the Genoese city came to be founded, there were already buildings made where it was wont to collect the flocks at pasture in these fields. Here they were milked, and the milk brought over to Constantinople for sale: and for this reason, they called the place Galata, for this word signifies the Milking Place in Spanish, since in Greek “Gala” means “milk.”’ Ruy González de Clavijo, *Embassy to Tamerlane 1403- 1406*, trans. Guy le Strange (London: Routledge, 1928), p.91

¹⁷ Kerim İlker Bulunur, *Osmanlı Galatası, 1453-1600*, (Istanbul: Bilge Kültür Sanat, 2014), p.22

¹⁸ Clavijo, *Embassy to Tamerlane 1403- 1406*, p.91

The conquest of Constantinople by the Ottomans in 1453 marked a decisive end of the East Roman, Byzantine, Empire and the transfer of the city to the Ottomans, unequivocally establishing the Empire as a regional power. The Ottomans can therefore be viewed as the successors and the inheritors of the Byzantine empire. Sultan Mehmed II, the Conqueror¹⁹, adopted the title of Caesar²⁰, (*Kayser-i Rûm*), inheriting the traditions of his East Roman predecessors from the last Byzantine Emperor Konstantinos XI Palaiologos.

Territorially occupying critical local and regional trade routes, trading activity would become central to the nature of the Empire. In settling into the eastern Mediterranean region, the Ottomans exploited their inheritance of Byzantine commercial *modus operandi* and pre-existing relationships with the Italian traders and their city states were nurtured. The century following the conquest of Constantinople was that of consolidation and maturing of all aspects of Ottoman rule in the eastern Mediterranean. In particular, it is the practical experience of traders and trading in Ottoman lands that is an observable indicator of the continuities and changes after 1453 and the formation of the Ottoman's own *modus operandi* of Empire.

Constantinople, or Istanbul after the conquest, unique in its geographic and strategic importance, bridged multiple local and regional trading routes. For at least three centuries, the principal trading centre between the local Black Sea, Levant, and the Latin territories, it was also a regional trading centre for the eastern Mediterranean trading circle. Furthermore, Constantinople also had the idiosyncratic presence of a commercial state within a state: Pera, a foreign overseas territory of the Italian trading city-state of Genoa. Pera, under Genoese control, had been part of Byzantine Constantinople for close to two centuries before the conquest. It exemplified the Late Byzantine Empire's struggle for survival and their submission to foreign mercantile pressures. After all, the earlier Crusader period was initiated by a call for help by the Byzantine Emperor in the face of territorial encroachment

¹⁹ Including, but not limited to "Fatih", "Fatih Sultan Mehmed", "Ebû'l-Feth Sultan Mehmed Han", "Fatih-i Kostantiniyye".

²⁰ Halil İnalcık, "Osmanlı Sultanlarının Unvanları (Tıtülatlür) ve Egemenlik Kavramı", *Doğu Batı, Makaleler II*, 2.b., (Ankara : Doğu Batı Yayınları, 2009), p.128

in the east yet resulted in a devastating sack of Constantinople in 1204 and further isolation from the Latin West and the Saljuk East.

Pera, under the Byzantines enjoyed a relationship based on exclusive commercial privileges in what was already a city unique in its geographic and strategic importance. Perhaps surprisingly, this state within a state, and its unique privileged relationship, would be preserved and nurtured after the conquest under the Ottomans. An expression of the commercial regional powers' hold on both Byzantine and successive Ottoman empires, Pera, had also perversely profited from the political weakness of Genoa and acted as a de facto independent state and monopolised access to the Black Sea and the trading of certain goods. This semi-autonomous nature of Pera continued into Ottoman reign. Pera had privileges renewed, and it continued to exist in the Ottoman Empire under the auspices of a practically similar framework, but now under Islamic law.

The century after the conquest saw an observable decline in Western trade in the region. This reduction in trade has been written about in the context of Byzantine decline and the Ottoman outsider invasion and disruption of the local and regional trading circle. Only loosely evidenced by the decreased production of notary documents by the Genoese of Pera this observed decline in Western trade in the region within the century after the conquest also corresponds to a time of new maritime routes.²¹

New trading routes became available after the circumnavigation of the Cape of Good Hope on the southern tip of the African continent in 1488 and the opening up of the Americas to trade after 1492. Observations of Pera at the centre of the

²¹ Eliyahu Ashtor states that while Italian trade in the Ottoman empire continued to flourish after 1453, it was not, after the fall, equal to what it had been before: E. Ashtor, 'Il commercio italiano col Levante e il suo impatto sull'economia tardomedioevale' in *Aspetti della Vita Economica Medioevale. Atti delle Convegno di Studi nel X Anniversario della Morte di Federigo Melis*. Firenze-Pisa-Prato, 10-14 marzo 1984, (Università degli Studi di Firenze: Istituto di Storia Economica : Florence, 1985), p.447; see also Rossana Urbani, 'Note d'archivio sui notai genovesi del' 400: l'attività di Bartolomeo Canessa', *La Berio* 11/1 (1971), p. 11; Ausilia Roccatagliata, 'Nuovi documenti su Pera Genovese', in *Atti del convegno di Studi sui Ceti dirigenti; nelle istituzioni della Repubblica di Genova, Genova 293031, maggio1 giugno 1990*, vol. XI, p. 129 : See Figure (1) Spread of one hundred and twenty-one acts drawn up between 1442 and 1490 in Pera and analysed by Geo Pistarino.

mercantile experience of Istanbul is both indicative of the Ottoman Empire's own attempts at consolidation of already established trade but also the creation of new Ottoman mercantile relationships regionally in the face of expanding world trading circles.

1.2 Privileges: from tradition to burden

The practice of the granting of privileges, fundamental to the diplomacy and economy of the late Byzantine Empire, continued under the successive Ottomans after 1453 as an established tradition and *modus operandi*. From the eleventh century onwards, Byzantium had provided Italian merchants preferential treatment in trade, freeing them from tariffs and even allowing Venetians to maintain law courts of their own. The exemption of customary commercial tolls was a tradition not exclusive to the Byzantines. French and Italian city states had exempted their mutual merchants from such tolls.²² To one degree or another, they also allowed foreign merchants to base their internal affairs on laws of their own.²³ What was unique in the Byzantine case was the over dependence on these privileges for maintaining trading, diplomatic and military relationships. Over time concessions of one sort or another were made to other states and perhaps predictably, foreign merchants came to play a key role in Byzantine commerce.

The Byzantine Empire had always been dependant on the Venetian navy for their safeguarding and throughout its history had a close relationship with the Italian city state. Unlike in Western European Empires, military agreements weren't made between the states as institutions but between named individuals. The Venetians exchanged use of their navy for trading privileges in the Byzantine Empire, usually in the form of tax exemptions giving them an unparalleled advantage compared to the local traders who had to pay tax for the goods they traded.

²² Timur Kuran, *The Long Divergence: How Islamic Law Held Back the Middle East* (Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2011), p.210

²³ Ibid.

By a treaty of 1082 the Venetians pledged to aid the Byzantines militarily, in return for honour titles, payments in cash, and most important of all, the right to trade without the imposition of taxes.²⁴ These key concessions gave Venetian merchants an advantage over their local competitors and allowed Byzantine merchants to be replaced over time. The privileges, however, had to be renewed with every new Emperor, arguably creating a period of instability with each transition of power. The privileges were thus only guaranteed as long as the emperor was in power as he had taken a personal oath that bound him to the arrangement. In Western European empires, such trade and military arrangements were agreed upon between institutions, usually for agreed lengths of time and after they expired, they would be renewed, until then a change in power and leadership would not jeopardise the agreement. By the eleventh century Venice's war fleets had become crucially important for the defence of the Byzantine Empire. In 1081 the Venetians had gone to war against the Norman leader Robert Guiscard to defend the Byzantine city of Durazzo. Emperor Alexios I Komnenos (r. 1081–1118) subsequently rewarded the Venetians with generous trading privileges and quarters of their own in Constantinople.²⁵

Italian merchants flocked to the rich markets of the Byzantine capital making the most of their privileged status.²⁶ By acting like mercenaries, they played to their strengths and profited from the weak navy and army of the Byzantines to amass privileges as long-term investments. Venetians had no interest in land, since their primary interest was trade, and they sought mainly to control the major ports and outposts along the sea routes between Venice and the East. Historically Venice was

²⁴ Thomas F. Madden, James L. Naus, and Vincent Ryan. *Crusades: Medieval Worlds in Conflict*. (London: Routledge, 2019), p.128

²⁵ T. Madden, 'Venice's hostage crisis: diplomatic efforts to secure peace with Byzantium between 1171 and 1184', *Medieval and Renaissance Venice*, ed. E.E. Kittell and T.F. Madden, 1999, pp. 96-108 ; M. Martin, 'The Venetians and the Byzantine Empire before 1204', *Byzantinische Forschungen* 13 (1988), pp.201-14

²⁶ Thomas F Madden, *Enrico Dandolo and the Rise of Venice* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), p.9

a city with very little arable land and so adapted to its shortcomings by concentrating on trade instead of production.²⁷

Venice gained considerable influence in the late eleventh and early twelfth century. So much so that in an attempt to deal them a crippling blow, Emperor Manuel made trading agreements with Genoa in 1169 and with Pisa in 1170 and following these agreements, in 1171 the goods of every Venetian merchant in the empire were confiscated in a single well executed day.²⁸ The Venetians had their revenge in 1204 with the sack of Constantinople during the Fourth Crusade, such was their influence and power that they could steer the direction of the Crusades. On top of that, in accordance with the terms of the *Partitio Romaniae*, the subsequent document to 1204 establishing Latin rule over Constantinople, they received Crete, numerous cities in Thrace, the Peloponnesos, and properties in Constantinople. As a further sign of the extent of their seemingly permanent influence, the Venetian, Thomas Morosini, was elected patriarch of Constantinople.²⁹ The Venetian domination over Byzantium ended decisively with the disastrous military defeat of Latin Rule in 1261.

The Treaty of Nymphaeon³⁰ in 1261 re-established Michael VIII Palaiologos (r. 1259–1282) as the Byzantine Emperor. In 1273 in recognition of Genoese support of Byzantines during the catastrophic Fourth Crusade and the sacking of Constantinople in 1204 that led to the beginning of Latin rule over the city the Republic of Genoa was granted a colony in Constantinople.³¹ Galata or Pera, located on the northern shore of the Golden Horn, was a quarter separated physically from Constantinople proper. “The coastal band stretching from the

²⁷ Frederic C. Lane, *Venice: A Maritime Republic*. (Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), p.7

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p.38

²⁹ Madden, ‘Enrico Dandolo’, p.180

³⁰ Luca Pieralli, *La corrispondenza diplomatica del imperatore bizantino con le potenze estere nel tredicesimo secolo (1204-1283)* (Vatican City, 2006), no. IV, pp. 129-51 ; Camillo Manfroni, 'Le relazioni fra Genova, l'impero bizantino e i Turchi', *Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria*, 28 (1896), pp. 574-858

³¹ D.J. Geanakoplos, *Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West*, 1959, pp. 206-209 ; Nicholas Oikonomides, ‘The Byzantine overlord of Genoese possessions in Romania’ in *Porphyrogenita: Essays on Byzantine History and Culture and the Latin East in honour of Julian Chrysostomides*, ed. Charalambos Dendrinos, Jonathan Harris, Eirene Harvalia-Crook and Judith Herrin (Aldershot, 2003), pp. 235-238

northern shores of the Golden Horn until Tophane and the slopes behind it have been known as Galata since the 8th century. Formerly this area was known as Sycae (Sykai), or as peran en Sykais, which essentially means ‘on opposite shore’.”³² It became, over time, progressively independent from the Byzantines through extracted tax and judicial privileges and took on the characteristics of a state within a state.³³

In order to provide favourable conditions for the activity of its merchants Genoa entered into treaties with the rulers of Byzantium, Armenia, Trebizond, the Golden Horde, Bulgaria, Moldova and other states as well. Genoa received particularly beneficial privileges from Michael VIII, allowing free and tax-exempt trade within the whole territory of Byzantium and was one of the reasons for the rapid boom of Genoese trade in the region in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. The time of the early infiltration and exploitation of the Black Sea trading circle by the Genoese sea merchants coincided with the change in trade routes between the East and the West. Until then, trade routes began from Asia via Bagdad to Egypt and Syria but now had shifted to the southern Black Sea, connecting the state of the Ilkhans and Central Asia with Tabriz and Trebizond.³⁴

Trade missions in the Black sea area was governed from Pera during the late 13th century.³⁵ Another important Genoese trading post became Caffa, its main colony

³² Afife Batur, “Galata and Pera 1 A Short History, Urban Development Architecture and Today,” *The Bulletin of the Istanbul Technical University* vol 55(1), (Istanbul : 2000)

³³ Although the description of Pera, as a colony with an independent state-like status, is best described as a “state within a state” when considered together with the Ottomans, it does not necessarily best reflect the nature of the Ottoman “state” during the period in question. The dynastic nature of the state adopting established Byzantine institutions requires a definition for the nature of the Ottomans after the conquest. The use of the term “state” in the context of the Ottomans in the immediate period after 1453 is problematic. İsmail Tokalak, *Bizans-Osmanlı Sentezi: Bizans Kültürü ve Kurumlarının Osmanlı Üzerindeki Etkisi*, (Istanbul: Gülerboy Yayıncılık, 2006) argues for the continuity of Byzantine institutions in the Ottoman state after the conquest. Colin Imber, *The Ottoman Empire: 1300 – 1650* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002) defines the “Ottoman state” as a “dynastic state”.

³⁴ Şerban Papacostea, *La mer Noire: carrefour des grandes routes intercontinentales, 1204-1453*, Seria ‘Biblioteca de istorie.’ 2 (Bucureşti: Institutul Cultural Român, 2006), pp.40–72

³⁵ M. Balard, ‘Genuenses civitas in extremo Europae: Caffa from the fourteenth to the fifteenth century’, *Medieval Frontiers: Concepts and Practices*, ed. D. Abulafia and N.

in the Northern Black Sea coast which partially took over the functions of Pera and of Genoa itself in administrative and fiscal control over smaller factories. Apart from Caffa other fortified colonies emerged on the Crimean Peninsula in Soldaya (*Sudak*), Cembalo (*Balaklava*), Bosphorus (*Kerch*), as well as along the coast of the Sea of Azov and in Tanais at the outflow of the Don, where the Genoese co-existed with the Venetians. Some of these towns were entirely Genoese with fortified fortresses and had their own military garrison, administrative and financial offices and were governed by a consul. In others there was a separate merchant quarter or separate houses of residing merchants. The colonies created by the Genoese existed until the establishment of the Ottoman Empire. Caffa until 1475, Kilia and Maurocastro (*Moncastron*) until 1484. Only Pera continued to exist for a longer period of time; it had exterritorial powers and its own government, but the last documents issued from there date back to 1490.³⁶

In principle, no privilege extended beyond the reign of the grantor. This in itself is an argument to suggest that these early privileges should be seen as agreements granted by equals subject to withdrawal and thus under the full control of the grantor. In the Byzantine context, it became routine, however, for rulers to reinstate privileges given by their predecessors and the terms would gradually become more and more demanding, losing their unilateral nature, presented by the grantor from a position of strength and instead becoming forceful capitulations to external powers.

It is then necessary to understand why after the conquest, even with what seem to be favourable, terms continued under Ottoman rule, there appears to be a reduction of Westerner trade. Pera as a key port of the Mediterranean, its existence characterised by these privileges in the two empires, would have a unique experience of what seems to be an observable mercantile shift in trading activity.

After those granted by Mehmed II following the conquest of Constantinople, the first significant Ottoman capitulations were those given out by Süleyman the Magnificent (*Kanunî Sultan Süleyman* r. 1520 –1566) notably to France in 1535. In

Berend, 2002, pp. 143-52 ; S.P. Karpov, *L'impero di Trebisonda, Venezia, Genova e Roma 1204-1461: rapporti politici, diplomatici e commerciali*, (Roma : Il Veltro Editrice, 1986)

³⁶ Michel Balard, *La Méditerranée médiévale: Espaces, itinéraires, comptoirs* (Paris: A & J Picard 2006), pp.9-10

1580 the English secured essentially the same trading rights as the French. Other powers, beginning with Holland also received similar privileges and, in a period of rapprochement, Venice, then obtained comparable privileges of their own.³⁷

These were granted at what is traditionally known as the zenith of the Empire. As it were in the Byzantine Empire the privileges, and so in the case of the Ottomans, capitulations, needed renewal whenever a new ruler ascended the throne. Similarly, to privileges, they did not extend beyond the reign of the grantor. These agreements weren't granted from a position of weakness, at least during the earlier period including the time of Süleyman the Magnificent, but were granted from a position of strength in the spirit of alliances.

Legally, the temporary and unilateral grants were not only required to be renewed by every new Sultan, but they were also strictly regulated. When a new Sultan came to power, countries such as England and France would immediately send ambassadors to renew them.

Uniquely, it was the consuls and ambassadors who were directly responsible for petitioning the Ottoman administration in order for their country's merchants to benefit from the privileges. The issuing of a grant, or berat³⁸, was required containing the specific articles of the ahidnâme in question. Merchants or dragomans could not benefit from the privileges in the ahidnâme without these berats that they needed to apply for. These documents contained the specific articles of the ahidnâme in question that exempt them of specific taxes and levies. Most importantly these berats needed renewing as well. Usually, a consul was sent to a port and an application submitted on behalf of the merchant for a berat. The Ottoman administration therefore had full control over who received these berats and would check who the applicants were, their backgrounds, and may not grant them. Unlike the 19th century view of the capitulations as burden to the empire resulting in a free for all for foreign traders, the agreements of the 15th and 16th

³⁷ Timur Kuran, *The Long Divergence: How Islamic Law Held Back the Middle East*. p.213 ; V. L. Menage, "The English Capitulation of 1580," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 12, no.3 (November 1980).

³⁸ Berat: Imperial document issues to foreigners that contained their legal rights and tax exemptions

centuries were highly regulated and controlled affairs. Every time a ship docked into a port, such as Pera, they had to petition for an internal visa, a shipping route document (*sefine yol hükmü or teskire*). Just like the *berats* the consular or ambassador had to go to the ports and submit a petition with the name of the captain and details of the ship and merchandise. Permission would then be granted for the ship or the merchant to travel from one place to another. Backgrounds of all applicants from the empire were checked in Istanbul. Petitions and *berats* show that the process could take weeks and was not necessarily a straightforward rubber stamp. Foreign merchants would be confined to certain places, in the same way as Ottoman traders being confined to certain areas in Italian city states such as the Fondaco dei Turchi in the case of Venice at the time.

These privileges led to a specially defined status for the merchants, *drogomans* and consuls in question. In the case of Pera, there is a clear separation between its fate and that of Constantinople. Pera surrendered to the Ottomans they were not conquered, so their status was different. The Islamic division of the world into well-defined categories of the *Dâr al-Islam*, *Dâr al-Harb* and the third *Dâr al-‘Ahd* led to the assigning of the special statuses to foreigners, as per the *ahidnâme*, in Pera.

Much has been written in Ottoman historiography on the Capitulations. The European term for the capitulations originates from *capitula*, the ornate paragraphs making up the physical treaty. Also called the *imtiyazat* by some scholars with the meaning of privileges. They have been extensively referred to in the context of the history of decline, blamed for the increasing intrusion and control exerted onto the empire by European capital towards the end of the 19th century, blamed ultimately for leading to its collapse. However, blaming the Capitulations for decline based on correlation is dismissing the causation of the wider integration of the 19th century Ottoman economy into European liberal trading principles.

The second half of the 18th century paved the way for a new economic system. Developments in trade, industry and shipping paved the way for British liberalism to replace the mercantilist approach. It is in this context that Capitulations, part of the ‘Free-Trade Agreements’ of the early-nineteenth century, including notably the Baltalimanı Agreement signed in 1838 between the British and Ottoman Empires,

can be seen as part of the harmonisation process with the time's prevailing currents of the world economy.

Based on the later 19th and 20th century memory of the association of the Capitulations with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the capitulations with a small c as an Ottoman commercial practice have been wrongly loaded with the submissive connotation. Timur Kuran, on the other hand, in his controversial book “The Long Divergence” calls the capitulations “reverse discrimination” that had the effect of discriminating on the local populations.³⁹ He argues that thanks to the Capitulations, foreign powers had over the years built up a considerable influence in Ottoman territories and the tradition of the privileges gradually became a burden on the empire.

1.3 Treaties before and after the conquest

Genoa, between the beginning of the fourteenth century and the conquest of Constantinople passed much of the century and a half “in a mess”⁴⁰ fraught with political instability, civil war, and foreign domination. The city was governed under Giovanni Visconti between 1353-1356, in 1396 it fell to France, in 1409 to Teodoro di Monteferrati and several years later, in 1421 it came back under the domination of Milan in the control of Filippo Maria Visconti. And the rest of the time its government was in the hands of the doge, whose hold on power was usually weak. Notably between July and September 1393 there were five successive doges elected democratically through a complex system in which infighting guild members and representatives of traders would choose amongst themselves a doge. However, despite all the downfalls, Genoa managed to be an extremely important commercial player in the Mediterranean and the *Banco di San Giorgio* was to be, by the early sixteenth century, a financial power. From 1453 this bank controlled all the possessions in the Black Sea and Genoese with different financial status and other

³⁹ Kuran, *The Long Divergence*, p.221.

⁴⁰ Fleet, *European and Islamic Trade in the Early Ottoman State*, p.9

merchants who adopted Genoese citizenship deposited their funds in this bank. Political instability at home left the Genoese colonies including Pera, with a much freer hand than might otherwise have been the case in their dealings with the Ottomans.⁴¹

From the early beginnings of the Ottoman state to the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople, the Ottomans and the Genoese maintained close relations. While the Genoese did on occasion take part in various anti-Ottoman endeavours organised by Latin powers, they were not as active in this regard as their main maritime rival Venice, refusing, for example, to join the crusade against Izmir in 1344.⁴² The Genoese were in part instrumental in ensuring that an effort by Genoa, Venice and Byzantium, urged by Pope Innocent VI in 1362-3 did not materialise.⁴³ Even when Genoa was involved with rival powers, this does not always seem to have hampered contacts with the Ottomans, for Genoese sources show that there were frequent exchanges of embassies in the 1380s while Genoa, in 1388, proposed an anti-Ottoman league with Venice and a division of the Mediterranean into spheres of influence between them,⁴⁴ and, in the same year, the Genoese of Pera entered into treaty arrangements with the Hospitallers of Rhodes, the Maona of Chios and Francesco Gattilusio of Mytilene.⁴⁵ As M. Balard has put it, for the Genoese it was more important to maintain the commercial networks in the East than to participate in an alliance of Christendom against the Turks.⁴⁶

Genoese-Ottoman relations were based on mutual interest. The Genoese were essentially pragmatic in their dealings with the Ottomans, something that was no doubt encouraged by the fact that Genoese Ottoman policy was largely dictated by the Genoese on the spot in colonies such as Pera and Chios rather than directed from Genoa itself. Even during the siege of Constantinople, the Genoese of Pera

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Elizabeth Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade, Venetian Crete and the Emirates of Menteshe and Aydin*, (Venice: Library of the Hellenic Institute of Byzantine and Post Byzantine Studies, 1983), p.45

⁴³ Michel Balard, *La Romanie génoise: XIIe - début du XVe siècle Volume I* (Rome: École française de Rome, 1978), pp.85-91

⁴⁴ Zachariadou. *Trade and Crusade*, p.36 ; Balard, *Romanie génoise.*, pp.85-95

⁴⁵ Zachariadou. *Trade and Crusade*, p.74.

⁴⁶ Balard, *Romanie génoise. Volume I*, pp.103-104.

managed to maintain their relations with the Ottomans while, simultaneously, siding with the defenders of the city, sending letters urgently requesting help to Genoa, “ambassadors to the sultan in Edirne to renew treaty relations and express undying friendship, soldiers to Constantinople, oil for Ottoman cannons to the sultan’s camp and betraying Longo Giustiniano’s scheme to set fire to the Turkish ships”.⁴⁷ Relations were such that when Ottoman cannon sank a ship belonging to Genoese merchants of Pera, loaded with merchandise and ready to leave for Italy, the Perotes complained. Explaining that they had not realised that the ship belonged to the Genoese of Pera, taking it rather as belonging to the enemy, the Ottomans assured them that, after the capture of the city, the merchants would be fully indemnified. Once Constantinople had fallen, the Genoese wanted Pera back and to continue trading as before, and were prepared to pay tribute.⁴⁸ Their overriding concern was to ensure freedom of movement and, in particular, access to and from the Black Sea.⁴⁹

Relations between the Ottomans and the Genoese were thus highly developed with a constant exchange of embassies and conclusion of treaties and agreements of one sort or another, the main motivating force behind these relations was money, generated by an active and lucrative commerce.⁵⁰

The Genoese had close relations with the Ottomans early on. In Menteşe (southwestern Anatolia), Genoa had made an alliance with the beylik in 1311 for a joint attack on Rhodes and the surrounding islands, and with Saruhan to whom the Genoese of New Phokaea were paying tribute in return for freedom to trade soon

⁴⁷ Vasile Grecu, ed. *Istoria Turco-Bizantina (1341-1462)* (Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii Populare Romine, 1958) ; English translation by Harry J. Magoulias, *Decline and Fall of Byzantium to the Ottoman Turks* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1975) Doukas chap. 38 ; Fleet, *European and Islamic Trade*, p.12

⁴⁸ L. Balletto, ‘I genovesi e la caduta di Costantinopoli: riflessi negli atti notarili’, in *Nέα Πόλη: Rivista di ricerche byzantinistiche* 1 (2004), pp.267-312 ; L. Balletto, ‘I genovesi e la conquista turca di Costantinopoli (1453): note su Tommaso Spinola e la sua famiglia’, *Acta Historica et Archaeologica Medievalia* 26 (2005), pp.795-833 ; G. Olgiati, ‘Notes on the participation of the Genoese in the defence of Constantinople’, *Macedonian Studies* 6.2 (1989), pp.48-58

⁴⁹ Fleet, *European and Islamic Trade*, p.12.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

after the construction of the new city.⁵¹ Treaties were made between the Genoese and Saruhan in, probably, the late 1340s and with Hızır Bey of Aydın in 1351.⁵² At the end of that year the Genoese requested provisions from Aydın (southwestern Anatolia) for their fleet. The treaty between the Genoese and the Ottoman ruler Murad I, enacted in 1387 exists; although no other Ottoman-Genoese treaty has survived from the fourteenth century, the Genoese are known to have concluded treaties with the Ottomans in the winter of 1351 and in 1389. They were also, together with the Byzantines, the Venetians and the Hospitallers, signatories to the treaty with Bayezid's son Süleyman in 1403.⁵³

When the Ottoman armies besieged the city, and took the surrender of Pera before attacking Constantinople, they did so having already had previously established links with the Genoese of Pera. Interactions between the Ottomans and Pera had taken place as early as the fourteenth century. Mutually benefiting treaties had been signed with even some co-operation during the siege of Constantinople. The immediate signing of a treaty after the conquest by Mehmed II is an indication of the role Pera, its traders and established commercial links, would play in the Ottoman Empire.⁵⁴

In 1387 a treaty was agreed between the Genoese and the Ottomans, amongst other things, granting the Genoese the right to trade in Ottoman lands paying "the usual tax rate"⁵⁵ according to the previous arrangement in former agreements and also giving tax concessions to Ottoman merchants in Pera.⁵⁶ The imperial decree (*amān-nāme*) issued to the Genoese of Pera on 30 May 1453 for the surrender of the city would grant Pera the right to sell their goods freely and with the exemption from

⁵¹ Fleet, *European and Islamic Trade*, p.11 ; G. T. Dennis, "The Byzantine-Turkish treaty of 1403," *Orientalia Cristiana Periodica* 33 (1967), pp.72-88.

⁵² Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, p.58

⁵³ Dennis, "The Byzantine-Turkish treaty of 1403"

⁵⁴ Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, p.58.

⁵⁵ Halil İnalcık, "The 'ahd-Nāme of June 1, 1453 Facsimile and English Translation," in *Essays in Ottoman History* (Istanbul: Eren, 1998), p.276

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ "Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria", XIII (1877) Belgrano, Luigi Tommaso, [appendice] Tavole a corredo della prima serie di documenti riguardanti la colonia di Pera pel socio L.T. Belgrano, tavv. I-XXII, 5-11, doc.10.

taxes. On the first of June 1453, the 'ahidnāme was concluded between the Genoese of Pera and Mehmed II.

The earlier 1387 treaty follows patterns of Italian notary deeds rather than those of an agreement based on the Islamic legal framework. It contains valuable information on trade relations with Genoa. From the treaty it appears that the Ottoman ruler had regular interactions with the Genoese, at least on occasion using a Genoese agent, collected taxes from Genoese merchants trading within the Empire and that these contacts were considered of importance by the Ottomans. The Turkish witnesses to the treaty were high-ranking officials, later, under Bayezid, sent to Pera as representatives of the Sultan. From the Genoese point of view good relations with the Ottomans were important, since they granted Genoese merchants a tax concession.⁵⁷ Further on, in 1451 prior to the conquest of Constantinople, the Genoese made an agreement with Mehmed II. The former wanted to maintain the independence it had had under the Byzantine emperors and the Ottoman ruler had not wanted to use force to conquer the quarter.

Reference in the 1387 treaty to former agreements between the Genoese and the Ottomans shows that established relations had existed between the two for some time. Kate Fleet mentions it is possible that the treaty was not in itself a major one, being more of an agreement over particular points prompted largely because of over-taxing of Murad's agent Giovanni Demerode. In comparison with the 1387 treaty between the Genoese and Ivanko, and existing treaties between Venice and the beyliks of Mentese and Aydın, the 1387 treaty between the Ottomans and the Genoese is surprisingly lacking in detailed clauses. If this is the case it would indicate that treaties or agreements of one sort or another were made fairly frequently to deal with specific issues as they occurred. This in turn indicates an active trade between Turks and Genoese flowing on regardless of wars or other inconveniences.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Kate Fleet, "The Treaty of 1387 between Murād I and the Genoese", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London* 56, no. 1 (January 1993): p.32

⁵⁸ Ibid.

In the first clause of the treaty, Murad and the Genoese ambassadors ratified all agreements made between them and those made between the Genoese and Murad's father Orhan, and undertook to abide by them. It is not possible to trace with certainty the treaties which were agreed on before between the Ottomans and the Genoese in the fourteenth century and it is thought that this is the only one that survived. But it is clear that there were other treaties preceded this one and that there were other earlier official relations between the Genoese and the Turks, though not necessarily the Ottomans. From a Genoese document enacted in Chios in 1364, which shows that treaties and agreements of one sort or another were certainly being made in the period of Murad's reign.⁵⁹

The 1387 treaty sheds an important light on taxes.⁶⁰ The first three clauses state that the Ottomans were to pay a brokerage tax on goods bought or sold in Pera of just over 3% *ad valorem*, except for goods in transit through Pera in which case no tax was to be charged. This exemption for goods in transit was also similarly granted by the Ottoman beyliks of Menteşe and Aydın to the Genoese, and the Venetians were also exempt from paying tax (*comerchium*) on transiting goods in these beyliks. Apart from the brokerage tax, Ottoman merchants were free from taxation on goods bought and sold in Pera. This exemption from tax indicates the importance for Genoese trade of good relations with the Ottomans in this period.⁶¹

The final clause⁶² grants freedom to trade for the Genoese in Ottoman lands paying the usual tax rate according to the arrangement in former agreements although what the former tax arrangements were for the Genoese trading in the Ottoman Empire are not known. The clause also stipulates that the Genoese were to pay the same rate of tax as that paid by the Arabs (or Muslims), Greeks, Venetians and others who were granted a reduced rate.

The fall of Constantinople was without doubt viewed by Latin contemporaries as a disaster of enormous magnitude. Pope Pius II described the fall as the loss of one of

⁵⁹ Ibid., p.21

⁶⁰ Ibid., p.26

⁶¹ Ibid., pp.16-18: The tax charged on Genoese commerce at Pera in 1348 was 32 *karati* per 100 gold *hyperpyra*, or just over 1.33% *ad valorem*, this rate increasing to 33 *karati* at the end of the century.

⁶² Ibid., p.30

the two eyes of the church⁶³. Whilst it appeared at first to galvanise the West and make more urgent calls for concerted action against the Turkish menace, which never materialised, the actual impact of the conquest on economic relations was probably much more limited. Trade would continue under even the most difficult of circumstances. Ottoman policy pursued by Mehmed II in his relations with the Latins shows both the continuity of mercantile policy and the importance attached to such relations.

Mehmed II's imperial decree (*amān-nāme*) issued to the Genoese of Pera on 30 May 1453 for their surrender, granted them the right to sell their goods freely, as in all other parts of his lands, exemption from taxes except the haraç, a legal authority of their own to deal with the affairs of the merchants, while he granted merchants from Genoa the right to come and go, provided they paid according to law and custom.⁶⁴

The continuation of precedence in privileged statuses was also extended to the Venetians, in treaties in 1454 and 1479⁶⁵ after the disastrous war for the Venetians that had begun in 1463.

Two days later, on the first of June 1453, an 'ahidnāme was concluded between the Genoese of Pera and Mehmed II. (Appendix B is Şakiroğlu's transcription of the 'ahidnāme from the document in the Genoese archives):⁶⁶

⁶³ Agostino Pertusi, *La caduta di Costantinopoli*. (Milan, 1976), vol II : *L'eco del mondo*, p.56

⁶⁴ Fleet, *European and Islamic Trade*, p.129

⁶⁵ F. Miklosich and J. Müller, *Acta et Diplomata Graeca Medii Aevi* (Vienna, 1870), vol. III, pp. 29-58

⁶⁶ Mahmut H. Şakiroğlu, "Fatih Sultan Mehmed'in Galatalılar'a Verdiği Fermanın Türkçe Metinleri", *TAD*, XIV (1983), pp.217-219 ; Copies also found in Ezio Bartolini "Cenevre Devlet Arşivindeki Türkçe vesikalar", *Ülkü* VIII/43 (Eylül 1916), pp.47-48 and the *Storia marittima dell'Italia dall'evo antico la nostri giorni*. (Milano : 1947), p.653

⁶⁶ Pertusi, *La caduta di Costantinopoli*, p.372

The original Greek text reads⁶⁷:

“The following is the ‘ahidnāme of the dhimmis of Galata; Mehmed the Conqueror granted it when he conquered Istanbul. It is written in Greek and sealed by the Sultan’s tuğhra.”⁶⁸

The significance of the text being written in Greek and its declaration as an ‘ahidnāme is that the Genoese of Pera are thus declared and given the status of Islamic dhimmi. It is the declaration of a recognised status within the empire, of a different non-Muslim religion. Granted all the rights of any other Ottoman subject, dhimmis are considered Ahl Al-Kitab, the “People of the Book.” and had full autonomy under the leadership of their religious chiefs. Each community exercised jurisdiction over matters of personal status, such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance. So long as they submitted to the Muslim state and paid the cizye, thus being part of a “pact” with the Muslims.

In Islamic law, a harbi from the dar al-harb has no status in the dar al-islam unless granted an amān (protection of life and property) or safe-conduct. Once this is given, the harbi obtains the protected status of a müste’min and can stay in the dar al-islam for up to a year without paying the djizya and kharadj. If they stay longer, they become a dhimmi and are subject to the payments.⁶⁹ The ahidnāmes can be thus seen as an example of the amān, the unilateral protection which any Muslim, man or woman could grant to a foreigner, the beneficiary becoming the müste’min.

This division of the world into two soon led to a third category emerging the dar al-‘ahd or the dar al-sulh. The dar al-‘ahd is a non-Muslim land, which by way of a peace treaty or more accurately an armed truce (*hudna*, *sulh*, ‘*ahd*) with the Muslims, has suspended, for a fixed and specific period of time, the permanent state of war which normally exists between both parties. The non-Muslim party

⁶⁷ Halil İnalcık, “Ottoman Galata 1453-1553” in *Essays in Ottoman History* (Istanbul: Eren, 1998), p.278

⁶⁸ E. Dalleggio d’Alessio, ‘Le texte grec du traité conclu par les Génois de Galata avec Mehmet II le 1er juin 1453’, *Hellenika* 11 (1939), pp.115-24

⁶⁹ Hans Peter Alexander Theunissen, “Ottoman-Venetian Diplomats: The ‘Ahdnames. The Historical Background and the Development of a Category of Political-Commercial Instruments Together with an Annotated Edition of a Corpus of Relevant Documents”, *Electronic Journal of Oriental Studies* 1 (1998), pp.24–27

undertakes to pay the *kharadj*⁷⁰ (being the equivalent of the *djizya*). The *kharadj* is, however, not paid individually but as a tribute by the ruler. The amount of the *kharadj* and the exact political status of the non-Muslim party vis-à-vis the Muslim party is stipulated in the treaty.

In this way the doctrine of a permanent state of war between Muslims and non-Muslims was modified by a more realistic concept, which allowed for the development of peaceful relations with non-Muslim individuals and states outside the *dar al-islam*. The safe-conduct (*amān*, pl. *amānat*) and truce or peace treaty (*hudna*, pl. *hudan*, 'ahd or *sulh*) were the instruments used to establish these peaceful political and commercial relations. These two instruments are closely related to each other.⁷¹

It seems likely that the *amān amm* originally derived from the *amān al-hass*. In *Ottoman-Venetian Diplomats*⁷² Theunissen explains that the *müste'min* would benefit from an *amān al-hass* if they were a *harbi* (from the *dar al-harb*) or an *amān amm* if they were from the *dar al-sulh*. The circumstances under which this development took place are not completely clear. However, in the second half of the twelfth century (or maybe even earlier according to Hans Theunissen), when both political and commercial contacts between Muslims and non-Muslims rapidly increased, the *amān amm*, or general safe-conduct, seems to have been developed as an instrument permitting the initiation of commercial relations between states. This general safe-conduct contained more than the usual pledge of security for a person and his property (as in the *amān hass*). It contained articles concerning commercial privileges. Already in the thirteenth century, the general safe-conduct was an established and fully developed instrument for the concession of commercial privileges by a Muslim ruler to a group of non-Muslims.⁷³

⁷⁰ Since it is Islamic law, Arabic terms have been used. Read *kharadj* as *haraç* and *djizya* as *cizye* in the Ottoman context.

⁷¹ Theunissen, "Ottoman-Venetian Diplomats: The 'Ahdnames. The Historical Background and the Development of a Category of Political-Commercial Instruments Together with an Annotated Edition of a Corpus of Relevant Documents," pp.24–27

⁷² Ibid., p.20

⁷³ Theunissen, "Ottoman-Venetian Diplomats", pp.24–27

An 'ahidnāme, unlike a treaty, is a unilateral pledge or privilege granted to a submitted or friendly group, it is an amān, that is a guarantee of life and property. Due to special conditions, this 'ahd- nāme considered two separate groups in Pera, the first were those permanent inhabitants who agreed to pay the cizye and became Ottoman non-Muslim subjects, thereby achieving special status as dhimmis under the dhimma law of Islam; and secondly, Harbi (at war/external), those Frank, (*Frengi*), merchants who were subjects of Genoa and were residing in the city on a temporary basis for business purposes. The stipulations for the first group were made clear by the repeated phrase line 12, "as is the case in other parts of my dominion" (*gayri memleketlerim gibi deryadan ve kurudan sefer edeler kimesne mâni' ve müzâhim olmiya mu'af ve müsellemler olalar*)⁷⁴. In return for submission and yearly individual payment of the cizye, poll tax, the Sultan enumerated the usual guarantees for the dhimmis, that is, he pledged not to take military action against the city and its inhabitants, recognised their ownership rights of property, and promised security for their people, families, and slaves, free circulation in the Ottoman lands, and the free exercise of their religion in their churches (line 16, *ve yeniçeriliğe oğlan almiyam ve bir kâfiri rızası olmadın müsliman etmiyeler.*) This first group included Greeks, Jews, and Armenians of Pera as well as Genoese.⁷⁵

The second group is distinguished from the first by the term Djeneviz baizirganları⁷⁶, literally, "Genoese merchants" but also traders (*rencberlik*), for whom freedom of trade in the Ottoman territories was guaranteed on the condition that they pay customs dues as required by the regulations. Such non-Muslim foreigners were called müste'min, literally, "those given amān", and were subject to the stipulations of capitulation. These variations only appeared in the Turkish version of the 'ahidnāme and even caused confusion amongst the Genoese of Pera as to which status they were to belong to. The distinction between these two groups is seen in the Ottoman survey of Pera made in 1455, where each individual was to

⁷⁴ İnalçık, "Ottoman Galata 1453-1553", p.284

⁷⁵ İnalçık, "Ottoman Galata", p.221, p.284

⁷⁶ Ibid.

be marked dhimmi, payer of the poll tax, or Frank or Djeneviz, exempt from the cizye.⁷⁷

It is the nuance between the unilateral rather than the bilateral agreement that has been studied by Theunissen and Pedani Fabris. Both distinguished between the different types of ‘ahidnāmes, between the unilateral grants (*berat*) and the “first type of ‘ahidnāme was linked to the idea of truce (*hudna*) and bound both rulers, while the second, with its unilateral character, had been derived from the idea of safe-conduct (*amān*).”⁷⁸ Theunissen in “Ottoman-Venetian Diplomats” presents the historical background and the development of Ottoman-Venetian interactions by focus on the ‘ahidnāme and the transliterations of Venetian capitulations from 1482 to 1641.⁷⁹

‘Ahidnāme documents were the core instruments that formed the legal basis of the commercial and diplomatic relations between them. ‘ahidnāme referred to two types of international documents: peace treaties and the capitulations. Besides political and commercial issues, both types of ‘ahidnāme included a considerable number of articles concerning the diplomatic actors such as the temporary envoys, ambassadors, consuls, their interpreters and employees. The ‘ahidnāme were the primary and most high-ranking documents that determined the rights, duties, extent of authority and personal, economical and judicial privileges. Besides, the application and conclusion process of the ‘ahidnāme brought an intense diplomatic interaction between the Ottomans and the Europeans.

Whilst investigating the Ottoman-Italian city state trade in the fifteenth and sixteenth century, it is invaluable to understand the inter-state relations and their diplomatic basis. In *Ottoman Diplomacy* Yurdusev discusses what he characterises as the prevailing view on Ottoman Diplomacy, in which “the logical conclusion is that there was actually no such thing as Ottoman diplomacy.”⁸⁰ Justified by the definition of diplomacy as the peaceful relations of political bodies that are defined

⁷⁷ İnalçık, “Ottoman Galata”, p.221.

⁷⁸ Pedani Fabris “Between Diplomacy and Trade: Ottoman merchants in Venice.”, p.93

⁷⁹ Theunissen, “Ottoman-Venetian Diplomats”

⁸⁰ A. Nuri Yurdusev, *Ottoman Diplomacy: Conventional or Unconventional?* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp.1–4

in terms of equality and reciprocity, Yurdusev says, this wasn't the case in the Ottoman Empire.

The fundamental mistaken assumption, according to Yurdusev, is that the Ottoman Empire was an Islamic or Shari'a state that conducted its external affairs on the basis of a conception of Dâr al-Islam (the abode of Islam) versus Dâr al-Harb (the abode of the infidels, or War) which involved a permanent state of war. This interpretation that follows the Gunpowder Empire⁸¹ narrative, suggests an Ottoman external policy of constant belligerent expansion. An expansionist polity that could conceive of nothing but a permanent state of war with other polities, little room remained for normal peaceful interactions.⁸²

Yurdusev also argues, that Ottoman diplomacy did not have "conventional", that is to say Western European (Christian), characteristics. He remarks that no residential ambassadors were established abroad to reciprocate the actions of the European states that sent envoys to reside in Istanbul from the beginning of the sixteenth century. In fact, the first Ottoman resident ambassador was established, in London, only in 1793. Not until about the eighteenth century, did the Ottomans recognise the principle of the equality of sovereignties. Ottoman statesmen did not participate in the multilateral conferences that were held from the late fifteenth century onwards. The Ottomans were frequently uncomfortable with the rules of procedure and protocol common in Europe. Though the later ambassadors in Istanbul were granted immunities and privileges under the capitulations, from time to time they were put in the prison of the Seven Towers.⁸³

Instead, in the following centuries, the Ottoman Empire would engage in intense diplomatic relationships with Western Europe as an Eastern and Muslim Empire. A new style of diplomacy was emerging in the Italian city states and later spreading into the other consolidating nation states of Europe. Venice and the other Italian

⁸¹ Marshall G. S. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam : Conscience and History in a World Civilization*, (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1974.) ; William H. McNeill, "The Age of Gunpowder Empires, 1450-1800". In Michael Adas (ed.). *Islamic & European Expansion: The Forging of a Global Order. Journal of Near Eastern Studies*. 44. (Philadelphia : Temple University Press, 1993) pp.103-139

⁸² Yurdusev, *Ottoman Diplomacy*, p.2

⁸³ Ibid.

states' desire for, and persistence in trade with the Ottomans contributed to a new style of diplomacy.⁸⁴

1.4 Pera under Pax Ottomana

Pera after 1453 can be observed to have been disrupted by the Ottoman conquest. Venetian and Genoese traders are known to have fled the city during and right after the period of warfare, and notarial documents produced at this time reduce in number right after the conquest suggesting a dip in trading activity. The city of Constantinople suffered more in terms of destruction. Pera had ultimately submitted to the Ottomans peacefully and immediately signed a treaty granting them protection for lives, property, churches, freedom of trade in all the empire and focus on what taxes they would pay. The inhabitants of Pera also had legal immunity with the ability to have their own law courts, accountable to their own laws and the subjects of foreign nations including France, the Netherlands and England wouldn't have to pay taxes. These are very familiar concepts to 19th century liberal provisions on trade and the guarantee of life and property.

The Ottoman privileges with the Latins was certainly not new to the time of the conquest. The oldest surviving Ottoman privilege granted to Venice is from the year 1403 after failure at the battle of Ankara and the first granted to the Genoese was in 1387⁸⁵ and in May 1390, Bayezid had confirmed Venetian commercial privileges.⁸⁶

According to İnalcık in an article on Ottoman Galata⁸⁷, the inhabitants were divided into two groups, as aforementioned, regarding the 'ahidnâme of 1453. A detailed survey was taken of Pera in 1455, there were those who were considered permanent residents, known as the dhimmi. They had to agree to submit and to pay an annual

⁸⁴ Ibid., pp.10-13

⁸⁵ Dennis, "The Byzantine-Turkish treaty of 1403"

⁸⁶ *I Libri Commemorativi della repubblica di Venezia - regesti*, ed. Riccardo Predelli, 8 vols (Venice, 1876-1914), vol. 3, bk. VIII nos. 341-2, 346, pp. 206-7

⁸⁷ İnalcık, "Ottoman Galata"

poll tax levied on non-Muslim subjects in accordance with Muslim law throughout the Ottoman Empire. “In return for submission and yearly individual payment of the cizye, poll tax, the sultan enumerated the usual guarantees for the dhimmi, that is, he pledged not to take military action against the city and its inhabitants, recognised their ownership rights of property, and promised security for their people, families, and slaves, free circulation in the Ottoman lands, and the free exercise of their religion in their churches.”

The second group consisted of foreigners who were the subjects of other countries such as the Republic of Genoa and were there only temporarily to conduct business. These merchants were guaranteed freedom of trade in Ottoman territories provided they paid the customs duties required by law. However, the Ottoman acceptance of an agreement with the Genoese termed a capitulation meant that these businessmen paid 2% duty instead of the regular 4%. The Genoese had monopolised the overseas trade given its control of the Aegean and the Black Sea and so the population was dependent for its wheat and fish from the Black Sea colonies of the Genoese. But once the Ottomans took over these colonies, the Genoese were no longer needed and the businessmen who were native to these Black Sea towns took over. Still, they benefited from the lower rate of duty.⁸⁸

Whether dhimmis or Genoese merchants (*Ceneviz baizirganları*) in post-conquest Ottoman Pera there existed a complex pluralist legal framework. This was, uniquely, not only due to the recognition of the special status of Dhimmi as per Islamic Sharia Law (Şeriat) but also due to the characteristic parallel application of the Kanun, or secular state law, in the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman’s recognition of the value of separating din-ü devlet, that is religion and state, and their corresponding legal frameworks, produced a separate status the Ceneviz baizirganları⁸⁹, distinct from the Dhimmi, and simultaneously exploiting both the Şeriat and Kanun. “The Genoese traders would come and go and pay their tax as per their habit.” (*Ceneviz bazirgânları deryadan ve kurudan rençberlik idüb geeler ve gideler gümrüklerin âdet üzre vireler*, line 15).

⁸⁸Ibid., p.288

⁸⁹ Bezirgan: traveling merchant

Pera under Pax Ottomana enjoyed a pragmatic application of the Şeriat and Kanun with its own definitions of various recognised statuses. It is important to distinguish the agreements from their predecessors (the Byzantine Privileges) and instead refer to them as ahidnāmes as part of the Ottoman legal framework they belong to.

Chapter 2 Genova oltremare: the experience of Pera under the Ottomans

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2.1 Summary of the sources

This thesis employs a selection of sources of various origins from the local Italian traders' own documents to external diplomatic dispatches, in order to follow the mercantile experience of Pera after the conquest of Istanbul in 1453. The main thrust of the evidence base is formed from the analysis of the published Genoese notary documents to characterise trade before and after the conquest. Over a hundred notary documents provide a valuable insight into the quotidian of the foreign merchants in their dealings not only with locals and traders but also overseas participants, whether states or individuals, in local and regional trading activity.

The notary documents produced before and after 1453 are a valuable insight into the trading activity of mostly Italian merchants in Pera and their priorities in the production legal evidential documentation. Most of the notarised documents pertain to the higher value or higher risk activities undertaken by these traders and there is a marked drop in their production after the conquest. There is a marked reduction in the notarised documents of higher value and higher risk foreign activity. The overall trading activity participated in post-1453 may remain at a similar level. It is worth noting the usual caution of absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. The notary documents mostly pertain to foreign trade and may omit activity by Ottoman merchants who may be absent from these sources. Certainly, this reduction is an indication of the changing patterns of trade and is worth noting. The documents are brief, legal acts divulging very little information about the persons

mentioned. But from what can be gathered, that is profession, to an extent social standing, sometimes origin and places travelled, it is possible to form a bigger picture as to the nature of the Westerner trading activity before and after the conquest.

In his treaties with the Genoese and other Latin trading nations, Mehmed II, *Mehmed-i sâni*, granted concessions and are invaluable in understanding the Empire's attempts at regaining the previous Byzantine mercantile position in the region with Western traders. Mehmed II's policies on taxation are also used as evidence for the disruptive outsider characterisation of early Ottoman rule as they would have been a disincentive for Western traders if after the conquest there would have been substantial raises, but the evidence for this is not clear. The treaties agreed in 1387, 1403 and 1430 give no rates but refers to customs being paid by the Genoese according to custom. The rates paid according to treaties in 1475 do not seem to be exceptionally large. Although it could be argued that it is unrealistic to expect there to be no rises in custom charges over the century. There nevertheless does not appear to be any evidence of complaints from the Genoese merchants.

Earlier treaties between the Genoese and the Ottomans, notably the 1387 treaty, followed the same patterns of Italian notary deeds rather than those agreements based on the Islamic legal framework. From the first line: "In nomine Domini amen." to the format of the last paragraph of the document giving the location, date and witnesses present at the writing of the document, it follows the same pattern seen in the notary documents produced in Pera. These documents show that the Ottomans were inextricably part of the eastern Mediterranean trading circle, recognised and included in contracts and treaties. Although these treaties were written under a Christian framework, they applied to non-Christian traders.

Another important source is İnalcık's work on two land surveys, one within a couple of years after the conquest and the other two decades after, provide a valuable snapshot picture to the condition of Pera, and Constantinople proper, right after the conquest and its evolution into an Ottoman capital thereafter. From the 1455 survey, it seems that Ottoman Pera suffered in the early years. The wealthy

Genoese and other foreigners had left as fugitives for the safety of Chios amongst other places. Taken together, however, the surveys of 1455 and 1477, do not show what is sometimes described as an exodus of foreigners. Wealthy minorities, namely Jews, Armenians, Greeks remained in Pera. The majority of Italian foreigners, mostly Genoese, chose to stay as Ottoman dhimmis. The land and population surveys of Istanbul under Ottoman rule are also analysed to trace changes in the demographics of the city and the resultant impact on trade, relations with foreign states and the nature of the early Ottoman Empire. The evolution of Pera into an Ottoman capital thereafter is traced, from Pera the *genovesi oltremare* to a Turkish Galata.

The third chapter uses diplomatic sources to understand the pragmatic approach of Ottoman rule of Pera and its implications for its regional trade and draws on the observations made in the first and particularly the second chapter to characterise the Ottomans in the Mediterranean beyond simply belligerents. The *Relazioni* of Venetian and Genoese ambassadors to the Ottoman Empire gives an insight into the reports sent back to the Italian city states on their view of the state of the Empire. Considerable amounts of *Relazioni* were edited by E. Alberi in the *Relazioni degli ambasciatori Veneti al senato* which contain reports published between 1839 and 1863 in fifteen volumes on relations with European states outside Italy, other Italian states and with the Ottoman Empire from the late 15th century to the early 17th century. These sources are from the later part of the period but give a good impression of Ottoman diplomatic activity. The National Archives collection of English diplomatic State Papers are also included. The Ottoman references are found within these diplomatic correspondences pertaining to Mediterranean and European state affairs, highlighting the far-reaching impact of the Ottoman entry into the eastern Mediterranean system.

Included amongst these are the *Calendar of State Papers Relating to English Affairs in the Archives of Venice*⁹⁰, *Calendar of State Papers Relating To English*

⁹⁰ *Calendar of State Papers Relating To English Affairs in the Archives of Venice, Volume 1-8* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1864)

*Affairs in the Vatican Archives*⁹¹ *Calendar of State Papers, Spain*⁹² and *Calendar of State Papers Foreign, Elizabeth*⁹³. Called Calendars, these are comprehensive summaries of the original documents, printed in the chronological order but do not always follow the ordering of the documents in the archives, and are used to find the records they describe. The State Papers Venice (SPVenice) are papers relating to British diplomacy held in the archives of Venice, State Papers Vatican (SPVatican), in the Vatican Archives, *Calendar of State Papers, Spain* (SPSpain) in the Spanish Archives and *State Papers Foreign, Elizabeth* (SPForeign) are those held from Elizabeth I deposited at the Public Record Office.

2.2 Notary Documents of Pera

Over a hundred and twenty notary documents provide a valuable insight into the quotidian of the foreign merchants in their dealings not only with locals and traders but also overseas participants, whether states or individuals, in local and regional trading activity. This important source of the Italian trading activity in Pera, from 1408 to 1490, has been transcribed by Geo Pistarino and published in Italian in the Ausilia Roccatagliata, *Notai genovesi in oltremare : atti rogati a Pera e Mitilene / [a cura di] Ausilia Roccatagliata*. (Genova: Università di Genova Istituto di Paleografia e storia medievale, 1982). The documents not only provide information on the legal aspects of Genoese life in Pera, adhering to the practices and procedures of the Genoese legal framework in the period, but they also shed light on the social and economic conditions, trade and navigation, and life in Ottoman Pera in general. The descriptions of each document as written by Geo Pistarino are translated in the Appendix A.

⁹¹ *Calendar of State Papers Relating To English Affairs in the Vatican Archives, Volume 1, 1558-1571*. Edited by J M Rigg. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office 1916)

⁹² "Spain: February 1531, 16-28", in *Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 4 Part 2, 1531-1533*, ed. Pascual de Gayangos (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1882), pp.64-78

⁹³ *Calendar of State Papers Foreign: Elizabeth, Volume 1, 1558-1559*. Edited by Joseph Stevenson. (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office 1863)

The notary documents produced before and after 1453 are a valuable insight into the trading activity of mostly Italian merchants in Pera and their priorities in the production of evidential legal documentation. Most of the notarised documents pertain to higher value or higher risk activities undertaken by these traders and there is a marked drop in their production after the conquest. However, as such, it is already methodologically difficult to ascertain a net decline in overall trading activity before and after 1453 based on these notarised documents alone. There may be a reduction in notarised documents produced by these foreign traders, but these documents of higher value and higher risk trade do not necessarily account for the total overall trading activity. Trade participated in after 1453 by not only foreign merchants but also Ottoman merchants, who may be absent from these sources, may remain at a similar level to before 1453 or even higher. It is safe to say, however, that this reduction is an indication of the milieu of trade after the Ottoman takeover of the city and the new trade routes being established.

Kate Fleet in her study *European and Islamic Trade in the Early Ottoman State* states that “Trade tends to continue under even the most difficult of circumstances.”⁹⁴ and that a decline in Western trade relations due to the conquest per se is unconvincing.⁹⁵ That said, although 1453 is generally not accepted as a break of trade relations between the Ottoman state and those of Western Europe⁹⁶, Fleet recognises that many scholars argue that there was a decline in Western trade

⁹⁴ Fleet, *European and Islamic Trade*, p.122

⁹⁵ Ibid., p.123

⁹⁶ Ibid. ; Geo Pistarino, “La caduta di Costantinopoli: da Pera Genovese a Galata Turca”, in *La Storia Genovese. Atti del Convegno di Studi sui Ceti dirigenti nelle istituzioni della Repubblica di Genova. Genova 121314 Aprile 1984*, vol. V, p.30 ; Geo Pistarino, “Tra i Genovesi dell'Oriente Turco dal tramonto del medioevo al primo tempo dell'età moderna”, in *Atti dell'Accademia Ligure di Scienze e Lettere, annata 1986* (Genoa, 1988), vol. XLIII, pp.204-208 ; Sandra Origone, “Genova e i genovesi tra la fine di Bisanzio e i Turchi”, in *Atti dell'Accademia Ligure di Scienze e Lettere, annata 1986* (Genoa, 1988), vol. XLIII, p.390 ; Sandra Origone, “Chio nel tempo della caduta di Costantinopoli”, in *Saggi e Documenti II*, Civico Istituto Colombiano, Studi e Testi, Serie Storica 3 (Genoa, 1982), vol. I, pp.148-149, 196-197 ; G. Musso, “Nuovi documenti dell'Archivio di Stato di Genova sui Genovesi e il Levante nel secondo quattrocento”, *Rassegna degli Archivi di Stato* 27 (1967), pp.445-464, 479 ; G. Musso, “Fonti documentarie per la storia di Chio dei genovesi”, *La Berio* 8, 3 (1968) 8, p.201 ; Urbani, “Note d'archivio sui notai genovesi del 400: l'attività di Bartolomeo Canessa”, p.11

with the Ottomans after this date.⁹⁷ Eliyahu Ashtor in “Commercio italiano” asserts that while Italian trade in the Ottoman empire continued to flourish after 1453, it was not, after the fall, equal to what it had been before.⁹⁸ Fleet describes a tailing off of Genoese notarial activity connected with trade in the Ottoman empire by the end of the century. Indeed, Pistarino notes, “the Genoese presence as a stable, compact group in Pera-Galata diminished gradually”⁹⁹ confirmed by the later notaii genovesi in the late 1470s and early 1480s.

This view is shared by Jacques Heers, who describes the loss of Pera after 1453 as the end of the Genoese colonial expanse in the straits and an end of Pera's role as a bridgehead between Chios, “capital of the Genoese in the Aegean Sea” and “Caffa, their capital in the Black Sea”.¹⁰⁰ Heers ascribes the Pera as being destined to “inevitable regression, due to the dominance of the Turkish and Greek population and the consolidation of Ottoman institutions”.¹⁰¹ Furthermore, Fleet paints a difficult picture for the Genoese merchants of Pera after the conquest, as merchants fled to the islands and “Turkish looting or appropriation of goods was no doubt disruptive”¹⁰² and “these losses undoubtedly caused great inconvenience, in that they removed the security enjoyed by the Genoese merchants”.¹⁰³ The Ottoman conquest meant “death, capture or disappearance of many Latins and Latin officials”¹⁰⁴ and that “Genoese merchants rushed to the waterfront leaving, deserting their merchandise and homes”¹⁰⁵ and that their safety was threatened.¹⁰⁶

⁹⁷ Geo Pistarino, “The Genoese in Pera - Turkish Galata”, *Mediterranean Historical Review* 1 (1986), p.75 ; L. Balletto, 'Genova sul mare', in *La storia dei genovesi* (Genoa, 1985), 5, p.362 ; Ashtor, “Il commercio italiano col Levante e il suo impatto sull'economia” ; Urbani, 'Bartolomeo Canessa', p.11; Roccatagliata, “Nuovi documenti su Pera Genovese”, p. 129.

⁹⁸ Ashtor, “Il commercio italiano”, p. 447

⁹⁹ Pistarino, “The Genoese in Pera”, p.81 ; Pistarino, 'La caduta di Costantinopoli', p.36

¹⁰⁰ “la perte de Péra et des étroits accentue la séparation entre ce monde colonial génois, tellement en marge déjà de l'univers marchand des Italiens, et celui des îles de la Mer Egée.” in Jacques Heers, *Gênes au XVe siècle. Activité économique et problèmes sociaux* (Paris, 1961), p.366

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Fleet, *European and Islamic Trade*, p.124

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ “...merchants were not so keen on bringing their goods into a city in which they could not guarantee their safety.” in Fleet, *European and Islamic Trade*, p.125

The empirical evidence supporting this reduction is the drop in the production of notarised documents in Pera after 1453 and their rarity in the later years from the late 1470s, finally ending in 1490. Although Pistarino did not exclude the possibility of new discoveries in the future, he concluded that the stable Genoese presence in Pera diminished gradually. A simple graph of trends supports this view:




Figure (1) Spread of one hundred and twenty-one acts drawn up between 1442 and 1490 in Pera and analysed by Geo Pistarino.

This initial graph of the overall trend in production shows, on the face of it, an overall drop in trade in Pera after the conquest, so argued by Pistarino and later authors including Kate Fleet. A more thorough plot, however, reveals an altogether different emphasis on activity and changes perceptions of trading activity in Pera after 1453.




Figure (2) Plot of one hundred and twenty-four acts drawn up between 1408 and 1490 in Pera.

These graphs, although produced from the same data, provide two different illustrations to the foreign trading activity of Pera in the time before and after 1453. Although by looking at the first graph of trends (fig,1) an overall decline in trading activity can be observed, the second graph (fig.2) instead highlights two peaks in an overall unremarkably stable plot. As mentioned previously, the documents are too few and far between, and the overall sample size (n) is too small for any firm statistical relevance. They cannot be used on their own to argue for the decline in trading activity in Pera. Instead, what can clearly be seen, not unexpectedly perhaps, are moments of stress, or peaks in production of notarised documents.

Two dates, 1453 and 1469 are noticeable as peaks in production. Of the thirty-nine documents written during the year of the siege and conquest, twelve pertain to instances of death and the subsequent inventory of assets, an unusual occurrence as there is only one example in the four decades before and only two in the four decades after 1453. This moment of uncertainty is expected and is reflected in the run up to the siege and conquest of the city. The second peak of 1469 is more difficult to explain as there is no clear single event to explain the rise in production

of the documents. Of the twenty-one documents, a significant fourteen were produced during a ten-day period, further stressing the awkwardness of making wider extrapolations of trends based on the limited documents at hand. Whether that year is a statistical anomaly attributed to chance, a notary successfully making their case to draw up documents of exchanges that would otherwise not be recorded, or simply a single bundle of documents surviving together, is up for debate.

The documents are brief, legal acts divulging very little information about the persons mentioned. But from what can be gathered, that is profession, to an extent social standing, sometimes origin and places travelled, it is possible to form a bigger picture as to the nature of the Westerner trading activity before and after the conquest. On one hand, an example is a contract for the resumption of business between Domenico di Bergamo, son of the late Tommaso resident (*burgensis*) of Pera, and Giovanni di Semino di Matteo, Genoese citizen (*civis*), on 25th August 1453 which does not give much information about the individuals, their background or even where they operated from¹⁰⁷. Although there is little to go by in terms of who these individuals were, the resumption of business after the conquest is itself important. Another example of relevant pieces of significant information is the persistence of the old title of *burgensis* of Pera and the use of Turkish currency, (2,758 Ottoman aspers for three kegs of caviar), which began to replace the Byzantine denomination, demonstrating a regularisation of processes after Ottoman takeover of rule.¹⁰⁸

Pistarino noted that the numbers of instances of documents relating to the granting of the power of attorney rose steeply after 1453, which he interpreted as an effort to normalise the business relations between the Genoese of Pera, Caffa and Chios and the “Turkish” rulers.¹⁰⁹ In the forty-five years before the conquest of the city, there are only three recorded appointments of attorney (“*nomina procuratore*”), a seemingly ordinary legal practice with no noticeable significance. The year of the

¹⁰⁷ Ausilia Roccatagliata, *Notai genovesi in oltremare: atti rogati a Pera e Mitilene* (Genova: Università di Genova Istituto di Paleografia e storia medievale, 1982), doc.59

¹⁰⁸ Roccatagliata, *Notai genovesi in oltremare*, doc.53

¹⁰⁹ Pistarino, “The Genoese in Pera”, p.68

conquest, 1453, however, there are ten occurrences and another eighteen in the three decades thereafter. As suggested by Pistarino, the nominations of attorneys in the years after 1453 can be considered to be within the scope of normalising business within Pera after the change in rule. However, the rapid succession of documents being produced granting attorney rights within Pera during 1453, some being written on the same day or on successive days, suggest instead a sense of hurried settling of affairs. Powers of attorney are granted in half the cases explicitly with regards to the maintenance of stores in Pera¹¹⁰ suggesting the potential intention of those granting the rights, in fleeing the city.

This instinctive narrative of fear and turmoil amongst those in Pera in the run up to the siege of Constantinople by the Ottoman from the 6th of April 1453 to the day of the conquest on the 29th May 1453, is somewhat broken, however, by a single initially unremarkable notarial document¹¹¹ drawn up on the 16th of March 1453, that is three weeks before the beginning of the siege, between Adornino de Elianis of Ovada and Lorenzo Spinola of Damiano. In this document, Adornino promises to pay 80 perperi per month until the end of a sizeable debts of 594 perperi and 10 carati. This extraordinary document demonstrates that even weeks before the siege, with the impending doom of Ottoman advance, or, as described a few months later in other documents in a somewhat understated manner, a “precarious political situation”¹¹², long term contracts were still being committed to. The mercantile experience of Pera after 1453 is marked by this resilience of pecuniary interests in the face of seemingly impending religious, social and political catastrophe.

It is a comparatively long document, with heavy legal phraseology. Although written with the express mutual agreement of the two parties “*Acto per pactum expressum inter ipsos contrahentes*”, the use of terms “beg” (*petendi*) and “confess” (*confitetur*) suggests this is an extracted document from the debtor. The sum of 594 perperi and 10 carati is not only a considered and precisely calculated sum, but also repeated throughout the document and the conditions of its regular payment clarified thoroughly. Such a reliance on the local legal procedure illustrates the

¹¹⁰ Roccatagliata, *Notai genovesi in oltremare*. docs: 22, 26, 29, 52 and 57

¹¹¹ Ibid., doc.36

¹¹² Ibid., doc.5

maintaining of perceived notarial authority for the foreseeable future (in this case at least exactly seven and a half months) even with the imminent threat of Ottoman takeover. This can either be considered as a desperate attempt at extracting any possible debts before the potential loss of the city and its state authority or it can be taken instead as demonstrating the lack of perceived threat to the economic activity of Pera under Ottoman conquest and rule. Other documents suggest it is the case of the latter. The document¹¹³ produced before the aforementioned, drawn up three days earlier, is very similar in form. It is not only very specific with regards to the sums owed (231 perperi and 18 carati) but is also highly detailed with regards to its payment (“from the sale of three men’s clothes”). These nuances of the local market perception of unfolding events have not been explored widely.

In a milieu of “market confidence” in the persistence of trading activity, the descriptions of the Ottomans as being a disruptive other, damaging a trading circle, seems, at least from these specific examples, not to be reflecting the whole story. In the run up to the siege and conquest, bizarrely when faced with religious, social, and political catastrophic change, new contracts were being written or old ones extended.

Earlier treaties between the Genoese and the Ottomans, notably the 1387 treaty¹¹⁴, followed the same patterns of Italian notary deeds rather than those agreements based on the Islamic legal framework. From the first line: “*In nomine Domini amen.*” to the format of the last paragraph (paragraph nine) of the document giving the location, date and witnesses present at the writing of the document, it follows the same pattern seen in the notary documents produced in Pera half a century later. These documents demonstrate that the Ottomans were inextricably part of the eastern Mediterranean trading circle, recognised as a legitimate party and included in contracts and treaties. Although these treaties were written under a Christian framework, they applied to non-Christian traders.

The legitimacy and law of these contracts transcend state and religious authority. Their legitimacy came not from a particular state or religion, threatened by another

¹¹³ Ibid., doc.36

¹¹⁴ Fleet, "The Treaty of 1387 between Murād I and the Genoese", p.32

in the case of 1453, but were inherent in their very nature as a commercial practice. They are human activities whose rules of engagement exist by common consensus and are universal. These documents produced weeks before the conquest, even in the face of impending doom, had a legitimacy afforded to them that could outlast mundane states and societies.

From the late 1470s as the Genoese references become rarer, Pistarino notes instead the references to Turks, their institutions and government appear more frequently than before. The Ottoman asper (*akçe*) becomes the dominant currency mentioned overtaking the Caffa asper, lingering at half its value. In the documents the currency referred to perperi as transcribed by Geo Pistarino, or perperos in the originals, are an adaptation of the term for hyperperum or hyperpyron, Greek hyperpyros (ὕπερπυρος) or "burning" (i.e., purged by fire). The perper itself was divided into twenty-four carats or carati. The hyperpyron replaced the previous nomisma (Latin: *solidus*) and by the 1470s the Byzantine currency hyperpyron (or Latin *perper*) had disappeared.¹¹⁵ The first mention of a Turkish currency in the Italian notary documents appear on the 4th of August 1453¹¹⁶ with the “*Cagi Cassani de Manara Teucer*” who sold a Greek slave, Teodoro, for 2,200 “asperorum teucrorum”. This document does not mention who Cassani is beyond his description as a “Teucer”, or Turk, with the title “Cagi”. This title has been translated as either Kadi or Hacı by Kate Fleet in notary documents produced earlier in 1413.¹¹⁷ The document does not shed any light as to the context of the sale of this slave to two Italian parties suggesting the creation of a routine legal document of no exceptional value. Nevertheless, perhaps this unremarkable first mention of a Turkish currency is an indication of the normalised, at least, trading relations between the two sides. It is also notable that this first mention of a Turkish currency after the conquest is described as the “asperorum teucrorum” and that later references, from 1468 onwards¹¹⁸, use two different, but similar, terms interchangeably: the asperos “octomani” or “ottomano”. This change in terminology from Turk (*teucrorum*) to

¹¹⁵ The ‘perpera’ referred to in the notarial deeds were probably silver coins. See S. Bendall and P.J. Donald, *The Later Palaeologan Coinage* (London, 1979), p.13

¹¹⁶ Roccatagliata, *Notai genovesi in oltremare*, doc53

¹¹⁷ Fleet, *European and Islamic Trade*, p.170

¹¹⁸ Roccatagliata, *Notai genovesi in oltremare*, doc.70.

Ottoman (*octomani* or *ottomano*) may also be an indication of the formalisation of legal terminology. It is further acknowledgement of the “Ottoman” state identity and its commercial practice.

The asper of Caffa is the most often mentioned coin in Pera’s notarial documents of 1475 and the following few years, because of the mass of legal matters which originated in Caffa but also left their mark on Pera. Caffa was an important Genoese trading post, the main colony in the Northern Black Sea coast which partially took over the functions of Pera and of Genoa itself in administrative and fiscal control over smaller factories. After the Ottoman takeover of Caffa in 1475, as might be expected, the powers of attorney granted were numerous. Pistarino states in one of these cases, undoubtedly connected to the events in Caffa, Pelegro de Franchis¹¹⁹, acted on behalf of his wife Argentina, being empowered to look after the shops, collect debts and wage lawsuits for his wife’s inheritance from her mother, Caterineta. He transferred the mandate to his brothers Lodisio and Pietro, both Genoese citizens. Another case, although unrelated with Caffa, is a mandate issued by the prior and the monks of Santa Maria della Misericordia della Cisterna to the notary Cristoforo de Canevale, for the care of their business interests in Pera and Constantinople¹²⁰. These are clear examples of the interaction of the two cities in all aspects of daily life but particularly commercial and judicial.¹²¹

Another notarial document marking the important Pera-Caffa connection, is that concerning the inheritance left by Giovannina, daughter of the later Angelo di Montenero, and her daughters Dominigina and Pomelina in 1479.¹²² Serafina, daughter of Giovannina, lived in Constantinople but pursued legal proceedings in the treaty of Caffa (*contracta Caffensium*), while the nephews, Lorenzo Squarciafico and Demetrio de Lorto, the sons of Dominigina and Pomelina respectively, both acted from Pera, the former stood in as witnesses in Pera for the legal cases of the latter. It was the treaty of Caffa that seems to have acted as a link in more than one case between Pera and Caffa and demonstrates the importance of

¹¹⁹ Ibid., doc.92

¹²⁰ Ibid., doc.95.

¹²¹ Pistarino, “The Genoese in Pera”, p.80

¹²² Roccatagliata, *Notai genovesi in oltremare*, docs.121 and 122

the trading as well as familial links between the two. Before the conquest of Caffa in 1472 Genoese merchants still left their families in Genoa and moved to Caffa, such is the case of Antoniotto di Cabella, a successful businessman¹²³ who had left Genoa for Caffa, even at a time when its fate was uncertain and had managed to move to Pera before the fall of Caffa. He brought to Pera a considerable fortune as is seen from his will written at his home in Pera in November 1475 before the customary five Genoese citizen witnesses. The inventory of his possessions in Pera drawn up after his death in the same month is testament of his success in his Genoa – Caffa – Pera exploits.¹²⁴

Those who did remain in the city after the conquest were only from the largest families, the most notable of which were the Adorno, Campofregoso, Cibo, De Franchis, De Nigro, De Nirgono, Doria, Fieschi and Giudice amongst others. This persistent presence was reinforced by the arrival of refugees from Caffa after its conquest by Ahmet Paşa in June 1475. It is also marked by a gap in the series of notarial documents sometime after the conquest of Caffa, in October 1475, Caffa was under Ottoman rule, but Pera also suffered due to a decline in Genoese trade in the Black Sea. Although there was a wave of refugees to Pera from Caffa (the *Ianuensis civitas* in extreme Europe), it marked the end of Pera as a bridgehead between the Genoese traders of Chios, the capital of Genoese trade in the Aegean Sea, and Caffa, the capital of trade in the Black Sea. Ottoman dominance and consolidation of Ottoman institutions was encroaching on the Genoese eastern Mediterranean presence.¹²⁵

Among the professionals and artisans mentioned in the notarial documents during the later years are shoemakers Constantino di Mitilene and Luca di Voltaggio; the textile merchant Battista de Ripa; the baker Giovanni di Torriglio and the spice merchant Pietro de Eliano as well as the notaries themselves, Domenico de Alsario Nicola de Mauro, and Teramo di Castellazzo. In 1478¹²⁶ the emissary from Chios, Casano Giustiniani appears in Pera, probably sent by the Moense government of the

¹²³ Ibid., docs.97 and 98

¹²⁴ Pistarino, “The Genoese in Pera”, p.75

¹²⁵ Ibid., p.81

¹²⁶ Roccatagliata, *Notai genovesi in oltremare*, doc.106

island for the usual negotiations with the Porte. The references to the Genoese and Latin shops are also numerous and include those of the above-mentioned professionals and artisans. Whether or not these names appear in Ottoman official sources and under what pretext is of relevance in investigating the Genoese presence in Ottoman Constantinople and Pera after 1453. Professionals and artisans would have the most contact with merchants and traders, more so possibly than persons of higher social status. The frequency of their appearance in Ottoman court records would act as an indicator for the persistent presence as suggested by the Genoese notarial sources. On the other hand, Heers in “Genes XV” examined the Genoese notarial archives for the two decades between, 1447-1466. He states that he could find no merchant letters and the only substantial surviving account book is that of Giovanni Piccamiglio (1456-1459), which Heers has published as his *Thèse Supplémentaire*.

A case indicative of the present and functioning Genoese *modus operandi* is that of Raffaele Machiavello, a Genoese citizen, in September 1468.¹²⁷ He appointed Gregorio di Pino to represent him, in order to recover the sum of 170 Venetian ducats, paid to Babilano Adorno, citizen of Caffa, for ten barrels of pickled sturgeon (*morene*) at the price of 17 liras a barrel. These were to be delivered in Pera following a decision of the Ufficio di Mercanzia but were never sent. In November-December of the following year, two arbitrators were appointed in order to settle a claim arising out of an act of piracy by Cristoforo de Franchis, Saco and Giacomo di Valditaro. The arbitrators passed judgement referring extensively to the procedures of the administrator, podesta, of Chios. From this evidence it is clear that the Genoese procedures, such as the rulings of the Ufficio di Mercanzia and the system of arbitration, were still effective in Pera in the 1460s. This is also true of evidence on oath before a notary and a witness, as in the case of Antonio Albino, who in November 1469 wanted to prove and record an episode that had occurred twenty-two months earlier, concerning the non-delivery in Chios of two barrels of palamite and a keg of caviar.

¹²⁷ Ibid., doc.69

The Genoese notary and the witnesses, usually also Genoese, filled the role of an official magistracy for the Genoese living in Pera, and were always able to refer to decisions by the podesta of Chios. According to Pistarino, the Turks did not interfere in any way with the Genoese institutions in Pera, or with their relations with Genoa and its colonies in the Levant. It is significant that, despite the gradual decrease in the numbers of those who defined themselves as inhabitants of the borough of Pera (*burgenses Pere*) a legal definition no longer applicable after the inclusion of Pera in Ottoman lands, the frequent presence of the Genoese citizen (*cives Ianue*) either resident or in transit, continued. The collective Peran identity gradually disappeared but the presence of Genoese cives continued and was possibly strengthened by the arrival of foreign guests with limited privileges residing in a centre which, by now, was Ottoman. Furthermore, instead of appeals to distant Genoa in the event of legal or administrative problems, matters were referred to the magistracies of Chios.

It seems that the persistence of foreign trading activity in Pera, did indeed transcend state and religious authority. They are commercial activities whose rules of engagement existed by common consensus and were universal. Commerce persisted even if the currency of trade changed, “asperorum teucrorum” and later the asperos “octomani” or “ottomano” were adopted, with also use of the asper of Caffa. The Genoese commercial and judicial *modus operandi* continued with the Ufficio di Mercanzia and the system of arbitration, still effective in Pera in the 1460s.

The unusual circumstances of Genoese merchants in Pera after the conquest in 1453 meant, furthermore, that the foreign slave owners had an incentive to manumit their slaves. Agostino di Taggia owned a Circassian slave named Margarita whose brothers Acmat and Mustaf, both Muslims, petitioned Agostino to free their sister, a request that would not have been considered in Genoa. These instances of manumission mentioned in the Italian notary documents after 1453 are comparably fewer to those found in later sources. The records of the Ottoman kadı sicils from Pera between 1560-1572 have been analysed by Nur Sobers-Khan in *Slaves without*

Shackles.¹²⁸ There is a notable population of about six hundred slaves, primarily male, showing up in the court records of Pera under the Ottomans from 1560 onwards. The first few court records contain hundreds of manumissions of large populations of slaves of a wide mix of origin (*asil/cins*), primarily from the southern Mediterranean, but also including others from Russian, Polish, area of Lithuania and the occasional Ethiopian and Indian. Manumitted slaves would be contractually obliged to work for their former owners for short terms of one or two years paying a certain amount of money, in instalments either seasonal or monthly. This is a pattern seen in both the Italian notary documents and the Ottoman court registers.

An analysis of the earlier records from the *Istanbul kadi sicilleri üsküdar mahkemesi 1 numarali sicil* (h. 919-927 / 1513-1521) provides a similar picture of the period before that studied by Sobers-Khan, within a century after the conquest and just after the production of the last notary documents. The selection of the court records from the Üsküdar district of Istanbul, on the other side of the water to Pera in Anatolia, and reflect on the Ottoman preoccupation of managing the slave population of wider Istanbul. Amongst the intricate records there are the usual instances of banality such as the *narh*¹²⁹ system of state fixing of the prices of commodities (doc.19), instances of non-conformity to the regulations of the weight of bread (doc.109) and even disputes over exchanged insults (doc.162). Included are records enforcement of the strict laws against the sale of alcohol whereby the residents of the Üsküdar district İstavros village were reminded not to sell wine to the slaves of Muslim owners (doc.57 [10a-3] *İstavros köyü halkının Müslümanların kölelerine şarap satmamak üzere tenbih olunduğu*) and perhaps unavoidably the penalties for drinking alcohol (docs. 81 and 195). However, most strikingly on the eight years of court records from one district of wider Istanbul, there are sixty-eight instances of runaway slaves being caught and processed by the local courts. Their origins are given as: Acem (Iranian¹³⁰), Arap (Arab), Arnavut (Albanian), Boğdan

¹²⁸ Nur Sobers-Khan, *Slaves without Shackles: Forced Labour and Manumission in the Galata Court Registers, 1560-1572*, (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2014).

¹²⁹ Mübahat S. Kütükoğlu, “NARH نرخ (Osmanlılar’da)” *TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi (DİA)* 1: 2006), vol: 32, pp.390-391

¹³⁰ Adnan Karaismailoğlu, “ACEM العجم” (TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi (DİA) 1: 1988), vol: 1, p.321

(Moldovian), Boşnak (Bosniak), Çerkez (Circassian), Hırvat (Croat), Leh (Polish¹³¹), Macar (Hungarian), Rus (Russian), Sırp (Serb) and Ulah (Vlach). Their origins, mostly Balkan, in these registers slightly different to the majority southern Mediterranean as found in the court records of Pera in later years and can only be tentatively attributed to the further maritime reach of the Pera slave owners.

The previously mentioned incentive to manumit was not only present for the owner, paid and worked for by their former slave, but there was also an incentive to encourage manumission for the Ottoman state. There is no evidence of how the slaves were captured but the assumption is that they would have been taken from the maritime arenas. Most of the slaves seem to be from the maritime economy who were made to work in shipbuilding in the docks (*Tershane*). Manumission of foreign specialised slaves provided an opportunity for the Ottoman state to develop and expand their maritime economy. This was a relatively new endeavour for the Ottoman state and would influence shaping the nature of the Ottoman Empire as taking on the characteristics of an eastern Mediterranean Empire with a stake in the Mediterranean maritime spaces. Merchant foreigners participating in eastern Mediterranean trading circles no longer excluded the Ottoman involvement and ambitions in the maritime economy.

The notary documents of Pera produced before and after the conquest of Constantinople in 1453 are a precious source for providing a snapshot of Italian trading activity in Pera at such a key time for not only the end of the Byzantine and beginning of the Ottoman states as empires, but also for the eastern Mediterranean trading circle and the Italian trader's participation in it. Geo Pistarino did not exclude the possibility of new documents being found in the future, but therein lies their limitation, for the whole period between 1408 to 1490 the hundred and twenty-four acts are spread unevenly, and the gaps are considerable. By their very nature, these acts do not and cannot represent the lower day-to-day transactions in Pera since they predominantly feature higher value transactions and contracts. On their own, they are therefore limited in demonstrating any decline in the foreigners of Pera's trading activity.

¹³¹ "Leh" (TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi (DİA) I: 2003), vol: 27.

Instead, what can clearly be seen, not unexpectedly perhaps, are moments of stress, or peaks in production. They also give a precious insight to the priorities of Italian merchants and other participants in trade in Pera. Although the documents pertain mainly to the higher value transactions, the precision of some of those lower value documents provide a strong mirror to the quotidian of these traders. Such routine documents, produced on the eve of the siege of Constantinople sway the narrative so that rather than being outsiders, the Ottomans can be seen as an already recognised, integral part of the eastern Mediterranean trading circle. It is easy to notice the moments of stress when it comes to the analyses of these documents, but the moments of banality are as insightful as any other. A notary document¹³² produced in Pera in December 1469, less than fifteen years after the conquest demonstrates just that, a routine, banal dispute on the profit made from the sale of fruit from Izmir and sold in Pera. The transaction, within the Ottoman domains, conducted in Turkish aspers.

Narratives previously focusing on the disruptive characteristic of the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople miss these nuances of the local market perception of impending events. In a milieu of “market confidence” in the persistence of trading activity and the durability of contracts, even under alien rule, the descriptions of the Ottomans as being a disruptive other that is damaging a trading circle seems, at least from these specific examples, as not reflecting the whole story. One event that offers insight into the attitude of those inhabitants of Pera before the conquest is described in two documents, the 1634 *Relation sur l'état de la chrétienté de Constantinople et de Péra*¹³³ and by Podesta Angelo Giovanni Lomellino. Some fled Pera by means of a Genoese ship that would then sink. Lomellino sent a messenger “beseeching them not to leave and said that a peace agreement with the Sultan was certain. But they did not heed our message, they hoisted sails.”¹³⁴

¹³² Roccatagliata, *Notai genovesi in oltremare*. doc.87

¹³³ E. Dallegio d'Alessio, "Le monastère de Sainte-Marie de la Miséricorde de la Citerne de Péra ou de Saint-Benoît. Des origines à l'occupation du monastère par les Jésuites (12 mai 1427-18 novembre 1583)", *Échos d'Orient* 33, no. 173 (1934): pp.59–94

¹³⁴ Halil İnalcık, *The Survey of Istanbul 1455: The Text, English Translation, Analysis of the Text, Documents* (Istanbul, Turkey: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2012), p.3

Even before the conquest, the Ottoman state, from its early stages, had contact with the Genoese. The Genoese had allied themselves against the Ottomans on occasion but not to the extent and enthusiasm of Venetian involvement in Ottoman territories. The Genoese had close relations with the Ottomans, relations which began early on with Menteşe, for Genoa made an alliance with the beylic in 1311 for a joint attack on Rhodes and the surrounding islands, and with Saruhan to whom the Genoese of New Phokaea were paying tribute in return for freedom to trade soon after the construction of the new city. Treaties were made between the Genoese and Saruhan in, probably, the late 1340s and with Hızır Bey of Aydın in 1351. At the end of that year the Genoese requested provisions from Aydın for their fleet. The treaty between the Genoese and the Ottoman ruler Murad I, enacted in 1387. The Genoese are known to have concluded treaties with the Ottomans in the winter of 1351 and in 1389. They were also, together with the Byzantines, the Venetians and the Hospitallers, signatories to the treaty with Bayezid's son Süleyman in 1403. As detailed in the previous chapter, Genoese refused to join a crusade against Izmir in 1344 and their reluctance led to the failure of Pope Innocent VI attempts in 1362-1363 to organise retaliation against the Ottoman expansion. Genoese involvement in Latin alliances does not seem to have affected relations with the Ottomans.¹³⁵ As M. Balard has already been quoted as having said, for the Genoese it was more important to maintain the commercial networks in the East than to participate in an alliance of Christendom against the Turks¹³⁶ Relations between the Ottomans and the Genoese were thus highly developed with a constant exchange of embassies and conclusion of treaties and agreements of one sort or another, the main motivating force behind these relations was money, generated by an active and lucrative commerce.

The evidence presented by the notary documents follow this amenable relationship between the Italian traders and the Ottomans. When the Ottoman armies besieged the city, and took the surrender of Pera before attacking Constantinople, they did so having already had previously established links with the Genoese of Pera. Interactions between the Ottomans and Pera had taken place as early as the

¹³⁵ Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, p.74

¹³⁶ Balard, "La Romanie Génoise", pp.103-104

fourteenth century. Mutually benefiting treaties had been signed with even some co-operation during the siege of Constantinople. In contrast to Fleet's view that merchants were not so keen on bringing their trade to a city which could not guarantee their safety, the long-term contracts being drawn up in the run up to the siege of Constantinople demonstrates an acknowledgement of the Ottoman state as a legitimate legal and political entity in which financial contracts would be recognised, protected, and honoured.¹³⁷ The immediate signing of a treaty after the conquest by Mehmed II is recognition of the importance of the traders of Pera, their established commercial links, and most significantly, the primacy of inherited legal contracts.

The evidence of the notarial documents after 1453, the successive treaties including 1387 and 1453 with the Ottomans and Ottoman policy introduced by Mehmed II does not necessarily explain the reduction in Western activity in the empire. The position of Pera in the early empire, changes in its population, and the wider question of the reasons behind the seeming decline of Western trade in the Ottoman territories will thus also be investigated by looking at the surveys of Istanbul. The impression from sources such as the later 1455 Ottoman survey is that the first years after the conquest were difficult for Pera. However, from the later notarial documents, it appears that life for the Genoese of Pera returned to normality and business resumed its normal course.

Pera's ill-fortune in the first years of the Ottoman occupation was only of short duration. After the Ottoman occupation, according to İnalcık Pera's dependence on the Bursa market increased and trade expanded appreciably as the kadı records of Bursa for the last two decades of the fifteenth century and the correspondence of J. Maringhi a Florentine agent residing in Pera at the turn of the century, demonstrate. After the fall of the Genoese ports in the Crimea, Black Sea trade became vitally important for the growing capital of the Ottoman Empire. As Ottoman subjects (including Turks, Greeks, Armenians, and Jews) established themselves further, they began to supplant the Genoese in inter-regional trade.

¹³⁷ Fleet, *European and Islamic Trade*, p.125

The drop in production of notary documents referred to by Fleet, Pistarino and İnalçık follow the template of the decline narrative of the city. When looked at closely this drop is not recognised as described but instead show snapshots of stress and banality. Any long-term reduction in production in notary documents can be interpreted as a drop in Italian traders' production of notary sources only and not necessary a reduction in the participation in trade in Pera under Ottoman rule. The story suggested instead is of a clear persistence of Italian foreign trading activity after the conquest under the Ottomans. They also demonstrate an understatement of the Ottoman threat in the years before and right after the conquest, describing the times as being of a "precarious political situation". A clear impact of the conquest to the traders in Pera is noticeable, most immediately the inventories of the deceased would have an apparent immediate consequence. It is, however, the changes in commercial practices after 1453 that are particularly relevant. They form part of a new setting of changing trading patterns in the face of a new political landscape and the homogenisation of new territories under Ottoman rule. It is unfair to prescribe the drop in trade over four decades to the outsider and disruptive Ottoman force. Instead, there is an observable longer *durée* trend of an overall Genoese decline in trade in Pera and in eastern Mediterranean, imminently in the face of the rise of Venetian trade, and long-term Ottoman maritime ambitions.

2.3 The 1455 and 1477 surveys of Pera and Istanbul

The day of the conquest of Constantinople, Fatih Sultan Mehmed (*Meḥmed-i sālī*), declared that Istanbul would become the throne city (*pây-i taht*), or imperial capital city with the Hagia Sophia it's Great Mosque (*Câmî`-i Kebîr*). Our sources for this early period are primarily that of Kritovoulos¹³⁸ and the Ottoman historian Tursun Bey¹³⁹. It is possible to extract a relatively reliable chronology of events and state of affairs from both these sources but there are also other documents surviving from

¹³⁸ Kritovoulos, *History of Mehmed the Conqueror*, trans. Charles T. Riggs (Princeton, 1954)

¹³⁹ Tursun Beg, *The History of Mehmed the Conqueror* (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1978)

the time. Mehmed's first act after the granting of the ahidnâme to Pera for the surrender, was to order the rebuilding and repair of the city walls.

Fatih also declared that the city be repopulated with those from the rest of his realm before he left for Edirne on 21st of June 1453 as recorded by Tursun and Doukas.

Tursun: "The Conqueror declared that whoever, either ordinary or higher class (*‘âm u hâs*), choses to come and stay in Istanbul the house that he occupies be his property (*mülkü*)."¹⁴⁰ Hızır, the kadı for Istanbul, reported back to Mehmed that the repairs were completed exactly as ordered: "It was ordered to this humble servant to repair the ruined parts (*gedik*, breach) of the walls from the tower (*burgaz*) demolished beside Yalı-Kapusı to the demolished tower near Top-Kapusı."¹⁴¹

Kritovoulos writes that "The dead of Romans and foreigners as was reported in all the fighting and in the capture itself, all told, men, women and children, were well-nigh four thousand, and a little more than fifty thousand were taken prisoners including about five hundred from the whole army."¹⁴² Upon his arrival back in Istanbul in Autumn, it was apparent, however, that the repopulation hadn't taken place as expected and in order to rebalance the population of the city, Mehmed "sent an order in the form of an imperial command to every part of his realm, that as many inhabitants as possible be transferred to the City, not only Christians but also his own people and many Hebrews."¹⁴³

The survey of Istanbul and Pera (Appendix C) was probably commissioned then and completed in December 1455. Tursun Bey was given the task of conducting the survey by the governor of Bursa, Cübbe Ali Bey. It provides a precious account to the state of the pâ-y-ı taht less than two years after the conquest, and is an expression of Mehmed's priority after the conquest to the repopulation of the city. Chroniclers such as Kritovoulos give an impression of the task at hand but the survey of 1455 by Tursun Bey is the most detailed and reliable source on the condition of the buildings of Constantinople, including its monasteries and churches. Of the twenty-seven monasteries listed only one still occupied by Greeks, the others are deserted

¹⁴⁰ İnalcık, *The Survey of Istanbul 1455*, p.8

¹⁴¹ Ibid., Document XI

¹⁴² Kritovoulos, *History of Mehmed the Conqueror*, p.76

¹⁴³ Ibid., p.93

or inhabited by Muslims, forty churches are listed of which only two still belong to the Greeks.¹⁴⁴

The survey is split into two parts: Istanbul and Pera. Constantinople was taken by force ('*anwatan*) while Pera surrendered by treaty and an 'ahdnāme agreed (Persian term for book of peace or a covenant), so the two would be subject to different stipulations of Islamic Law. Pera was to have a city prefect, *subaşı*, and *kadı*, appointed. The non-Muslims citizens of Pera would be *dhimmi* subjects of the Ottoman state and would be subject to pay the *mukata'a* on their land and the *djiza*, or poll tax, to the Ottoman Treasury. Foreigners in Pera (the *Frenk* of *Frengistan*), who weren't its citizens but were present at the time of the surrender, namely the Genoese (*Ceneviz*) and Venetian (*Venetik*) merchants, would not be subject to the *djiza* (*bî-cizye*). Citizens of Pera at the time of the surrender, given the status of *dhimmi* (or *dhimmiye*) subjects would pay the *djiza* based on their ability to pay so their rates are recorded in the survey based on whether they were poor (*fakir*), eligible for the payment of medium *djiza* (*evsat*, *mutavassıt*), rich (*ganî*) or very rich (*ganî akvâ*). İnalçık notes that the classification cannot reflect faithfully the real situation as those subject to tax would certainly do their utmost to avoid paying the right amount and would mislead the surveyors by sometimes even running away and returning to avoid payments.

For Pistarino the "charter", 'ahidnāme, is a document guaranteeing "local self-government and the right of the Latins of Pera to elect a protogerus". He admits that the Latins of Pera being subject to the *haraç* became "non-Muslim subjects of the Porte" and that once "the Porte's sovereignty" was established it was no more "the Genoese city it used to be", an entity separate from Constantinople. Considering the fact that the Genoese administrative framework and institutions with a community head (but now only a protogerus instead of a podesta) and the Council of Pera, the Genoese *cives* and *burgenses* *pere* continued to be called as such and the relations with Genoa and the Genoese colonies in the Levant took their normal course, giving the impression that nothing had happened. However, one must not forget that Pera was now under an Ottoman *kadı* and a *voyvoda*, representing all civil and

¹⁴⁴ İnalçık, *The Survey of Istanbul 1455*, p.24

political authority in the name of the Sultan. The kind of communal autonomy established under an ‘ahidnāme should not be exaggerated. As the Genoese documents as well as the Ottoman survey attest, after the surrender in 1453, a great number of Genoese stayed on in Pera under the status of dhimmi or harbi/müste’min while others who had left the city to take refuge in the Genoese Chios or elsewhere came back to stay either temporarily or permanently.¹⁴⁵

On the other hand, Istanbul, as per Islamic Law, now belonged to the ruler having been taken by force after the Byzantine Emperor Konstantinos XI Palaiologos refused the surrender of the city three times. The Ottoman army was permitted to sack the city (*yağma*) and enslave the population. The land and buildings were registered as mevkûf and retained by the Ottoman Treasury, Mehmed “donated to all the grandees, and to those of his household, the magnificent homes of the rich with gardens and fields and vineyards inside the City. To some of them he even gave beautiful churches as their private residences.”¹⁴⁶ Such a policy would have transferred immediate responsibilities of maintenance and running of these lands and buildings to the Mehmed’s closest and most able.

By the Ottoman besieging of 1453, Constantinople was already a ruinous city, never fully recovered from the sack of 1206 and the decades of Latin rule. It was the physical embodiment of the collapsed state of the Byzantine Empire. The sources aren’t clear, and there is much debate amongst historians as to the population of Byzantine Constantinople and the city under subsequent Ottoman rule¹⁴⁷. Constantinople’s population had significantly decreased during the

¹⁴⁵ İnalcık, *Essays in Ottoman History*, p.317

¹⁴⁶ Kritovoulos, *History of Mehmed the Conqueror*, p.76

¹⁴⁷ David Jacoby, “La Population de Constantinople à l’époque byzantine: un problème de démographie urbaine”, *Byzantion* 31 (1961), p.82 and 107 ; Necipoglu in *Byzantium Between the Ottomans and the Latins* states that modern estimates of the city’s population in 1453 range widely from 15,000 to 140,000, but the figure on which scholarly consensus has been established is 40,000–50,000, first suggested by A. M. Schneider, “Die Bevölkerung Konstantinopels im XV. Jahrhundert,” *Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, Philologisch-historische Klasse* 9 (1949), pp.233–44, esp. p.237 ; cf. E. Francès, “Constantinople byzantine aux XIVe et XVe siècles. Population, commerce, métiers,” *RESEE* 7/2 (1969), pp.405–12, esp. P.406 ; A. Andréadès, “De la population de Constantinople sous les empereurs byzantins,” *Metron* 1/2 (1920), p.106. ; At its peak level at the end of the twelfth century the city had a population of 400,000, as shown by Jacoby.

thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the city retained a diverse citizenry until the empire's collapse in 1453. The Black Death of 1347 killed nearly one third of the city's population, which had already been shrinking as a result of the Latin occupation and Byzantine civil wars.¹⁴⁸ Constantinople's population on the eve of the conquest is estimated being between thirty to fifty thousand, a shadow of its former self. Pera was less affected by the decay Constantinople experienced, being separate both politically and geographically.

Halil İnalçık first published an article on his work on the 1455 survey in 1991, "Ottoman Galata"¹⁴⁹. It is his later book in 2012, *The Survey of Istanbul 1455*¹⁵⁰ in which he published the original text, its transcription and translation, that forms the basis of the following discussion.

The impression from the 1455 survey is that the first years after the conquest were difficult for Pera. Many of the wealthy Genoese had left the city on the day of the conquest and they preferred to live in Chios. But the numbers of fugitives do not show an exodus of the Latins from the city and instead, the majority of the Genoese chose to stay on as Ottoman dhimmi subjects. From the registers it is also noticeable that the rich Jews, Armenians and Greeks, whose numbers exceeded the Genoese, also remained in Pera. The houses of those who left were confiscated. Their new tenants were mostly poor, aged people, and many of the buildings remained unoccupied and went to ruin. In the business district, out of thirty-three shops, fifteen remained in the hands of their original owners, while eighteen were confiscated. Fifteen of those remaining found renters. According to İnalçık all evidence points to a picture of a decaying city.¹⁵¹

The survey reflects the effects of Mehmed's initial declaration after the conquest before he left for Edirne in June 1453. According to Doukas, this triggered a wave of settlers from other Ottoman domains, particularly Anatolia and Thrace. "We see him busy sending orders for people to be brought at once from Anatolia and

¹⁴⁸ Michael Maclagan, *The City of Constantinople* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1968), p.119

¹⁴⁹ Halil İnalçık, "Ottoman Galata", in *Première Rencontre Internationale sur l'empire Ottoman et la Turquie moderne*, ed. E. Eldem (Istanbul: Isis 1991)

¹⁵⁰ İnalçık, *The Survey of Istanbul 1455*

¹⁵¹ İnalçık, *Essays in Ottoman History*, p.313 ; İnalçık, *The Survey of Istanbul 1455*

Rumelia for the resettlement of the City.”¹⁵² The initial wave of settlers to the city soon departed, presumably because the grand city they expected did not match the reality they were faced with and are marked in the survey as “gone away” (*gitmiş*), “ran away” (*kaçmış*) or “left with permission” (*izinle gitmiş*). It is thereafter that the policy is changed to that of exile (*sürgün*) or the forceful deportation of mostly Rumelian Jews to the city.¹⁵³

The subsequent Ottoman accounts of the state of Istanbul and Pera reflect the changing social, political and economic conditions as it integrated into a single homogenised Ottoman domain. Istanbul, according to one Ottoman source from 1478, had 14,803 households and with the accepted four or five inhabitants per household, that amounted to perhaps a total of a population of over sixty thousand. Mehmed and his repopulation policies would initiate the growth of the city that would only really express itself a century after the conquest, with a population closer to half a million and under Mehmed’s successors. Tracing the rise in population of the Ottoman capital (*taht*, throne) cities or Bursa, Edirne, and Istanbul in the decades after the conquest, the new economic conditions in the eastern Mediterranean become apparent. Istanbul, although the largest of the cities, would no longer hold a mercantile monopoly over trade routes into Italy. Bursa continued to be the distributor of Iranian silk and textiles into the Italian city states and other markets in the eastern Mediterranean.

The survey of 1455 is one of many Ottoman accounts of the state of Pera and Istanbul from which it is possible to extract an understanding of the population of the city. It is methodologically not possible to trace a reliable graph of the variations in the population of Pera and Istanbul due to the nature of the documents at hand. The sources vary from surveys to accounts and each have their own way of counting both buildings by quarter (*mahalle*) or people by households (*hane*) (see maps in Appendix D). Although individual names do sometimes appear in the sources, the surveys only reliably counted households from which only estimates of the total population can be made based on the accepted four or five individuals per household. The 1477 survey was intended for determining tax which left out the

¹⁵² Magoulas, *Decline and Fall of Byzantium to the Ottoman Turks*, chap. 38

¹⁵³ İncalcık, *The Survey of Istanbul 1455*, p.8

palace population, soldiers, students, slaves and single men and as Selim Kuru points out, “those uncounted individuals actually constituted if not most, then a substantial portion of the city’s population.”¹⁵⁴ It is therefore difficult to have an accurate account of the fluctuations of the population of Pera and Istanbul at least in the century after the conquest. Furthermore, the differences in accounting between Pera and Istanbul were also due to the different respective nature of rule, Pera being under an ‘ahdnāme and Istanbul’s properties being mevkûf.

From the works of Halil İncik, “*Ottoman Galata*”¹⁵⁵ and *The Survey of Istanbul 1455* others who have built on them including Mehmet Öz, *1455 Tahriri ve Istanbul’un İskan Tarihi Bakımından Önemi* and Kerim İlker Bulunur *Osmanlı Galatası 1453-1600* and in addition to other archival sources, it is possible to create the following tables on the population of both Pera and Istanbul from the Ottoman sources:

¹⁵⁴ Selim S. Kuru, “Istanbul: City of Men,” in *Brill Companion to Early Modern Istanbul*, edited by Shirine Hamadeh and Çiğdem Kafesçioğlu (Leiden: Brill 2021), p.68

¹⁵⁵ İncik, “Ottoman Galata”

Dwellings	Istanbul	Pera	Total
Muslim Households <i>Müslüman hane (Hânehâ-i Müslimânân)</i>	8,951	535	9,486
Christian Households <i>Hristiyan Hane (Rum Ortodks; Hânehâ-i Nasrâniyân)</i>	3,151	592	3,743
Jewish Households <i>Yahudi hane (Hânehâ-i Yehudiyân)</i>	1,647	--	1,647
Caffans Households <i>Kefeli hane (Hânehâ-i Kefelular)</i>	267	--	267
Armenian Households <i>Ermeni hane (Hânehâ-i Ermeniyân)</i>	372	62	434
Karamāniān of Armenian appearance Households <i>Karamanlı-Ermeni hane (Hânehâ-i Karamaniyân ba-şekl-i Ermeni)</i>	384	--	384
Gipsy Households <i>Çingene hane (Hânehâ-i Çingene)</i>	31	--	31
European Households <i>Efrenciyan hane (Hânehâ-i Efrencân-ı Galata)</i>	--	332	332
Total	14,803	1,521	16,324
Shops (Muslim or other) <i>Dükkan</i>	3,667	260	3,927
Grand Total	20,251		

Table 1 The population makeup of Istanbul and Pera according to a survey carried out by Kadı Muhyiddîn in 1477 (Archives of the Palace of Topkapı, No: D 9524)

Year	Muslims	Greeks	Armenians	Jews	Catholics	Fishermen	Total
860/1455							1,120
882/1477	535	592	62	--	332	--	1,521
894/1488 -1489	--	--	--	--	--	--	813
947/1540	--	131*	32	--	94*	34	261
952/1545	--	77	89	--	79*	46	288

Table 2 Pera's Population (households) 1455-1545 Sources: 1455 survey of Istanbul ; 1478 Topkapı Palace Archives, N.D. 9524 ; 1488 : Belediye Library, Istanbul, M. Cevdet Collection, No091, edited by Ö. L. Barkan, "894 (1488/1489) Yılı Cizyesinin Tahsilâtına ait Muhasebe Bilançoları" Belgeler, vol. I-1 (1964), p.39 ; 1540 : Tapu Defter No210 , Başvekâlet Archives, Istanbul ; 1545 : Tapu Defter No240 & No210 , Başvekâlet Archives, Istanbul, pp.89-96 and ()corroborated with Bulunur Osmanlı Galatası 1453-1600.*

Year	Istanbul	Pera	Total
860/1455	908	1,120	2,028
882/1477	5,852	986	6,838
894/1488-1489	7,894	813	8,707
947/1540	2,816	261	2,077
952/1545	3,814	288	4,102

Table 3 Istanbul and Pera's non-Muslim households

In a similar table in *Essays in Ottoman History*, İnalcık reflects at the drop in the non-Muslim population of Pera: "In the table, the striking fact is the constant decline in the non-Muslim population subject to the djizya in Galata to almost half

the previous number within a period of ten years between 1478 and 1488, and then to one third of the population of 1488 in about half a century.”¹⁵⁶ The drop between 1478 and 1488 is not as steep as his figures show, due to the inclusion of the Muslim households in the figure for the total number of non-Muslims subject to the *djizya*. In fact, he overcounts by 535 households recorded as Muslim Households (*Hânehâ-i Müslimânân*). The total number of households in 1478 according to İnalçık is 1,521 (which includes the 535 Muslim Households) and the total in 1488 is 813 (which does not include Muslim Households). 1,521 to 813 would be a near halving, however, the non-Muslims Households in 1478 is in fact 986. The reduction in ten years is equivalent to a 20% drop.¹⁵⁷

Nevertheless Table (3) is an adequate summary of the registers of Istanbul and Pera conducted by the Ottoman state after 1453. Repeating the methodological cautions in comparing different surveys and sources including *waqf* registers and different means of counting. The 1455 survey of Istanbul with 908 registered households is also incomplete with pages missing and some households marked as unoccupied (*hâlî*) or in ruins (*harâb*) and that sections of the population are absent, for example, the palace, soldiers, students, slaves and single men in these surveys.

The story it portrays is of a constant and significant decline in the non-Muslim population of Pera and an overall decline in that of Istanbul. The drop in the non-Muslim population between 1488 and 1540 is remarkable in both cases. Most immediately the reason could possibly be due to flight from the city but there is probably a more nuanced reason for the significant drop that can't be accounted for by simply whole households fleeing the city. Instead, it might be due to the intricacies of the Ottoman legal system not reflecting the realities on the ground, in which a change of status, conversion or transfer of tax accounts to another register would explain the significant drop.

After forty years Pera had, as an urban centre, lost its special status as a unit separate from Constantinople, as Pistarino puts it, it had become Turkish Galata, assimilated into the wider city. Pistarino insists that the Genoese, diminished in

¹⁵⁶ İnalçık, *Essays in Ottoman History*, p.363

¹⁵⁷ Ibid. ; these figures are also corroborated in Bulunur, *Osmanlı Galatası*, p.183

number remained true to themselves as merchants and refused to leave the marketplace by adapting. The Magnifica Communita of Pera to which all foreigners in Constantinople belonged to, succeeded the Genoese colony.¹⁵⁸

As with most states and societies, evasion of poll-tax was common, with those fleeing the city before surveyors arrived, or deceiving those that did. As such, İnalçık notes the prevalence of the “newly found” (*nev-yâftegân*). This would, however, been taking place equally amongst all the communities mentioned. Table (2) shows that although there is a significant decrease reflected in the Greek community between 1477 and 1545 from 592 to 77 households, it is contrary to other accounts where a Greek immigration into the city, from the Aegean islands, that was attempted to be halted by imperial decree, casting doubt again on the reliability of the sources to reflect the reality of the demographic changes in the city.¹⁵⁹ Trends can certainly be deduced from these figures.

A. M. Schneider estimated that the population was at sixty or seventy thousand. However, the military class was immune from tax and was therefore generally left out of such surveys. But twenty-five years after the conquest, the population was double that of the time before with a Muslim majority. Barkan estimates the population of Istanbul in 1530 at close to half a million and Braudel at about seven hundred thousand at the end of the 16th century.¹⁶⁰

The population estimates of Constantinople on the eve of the conquest was at the most fifty thousand.¹⁶¹ The 1478 Ottoman account of over sixty thousand within two decades, and a tremendous jump to half a million in less than a century, is

¹⁵⁸ Louis Mitler, "The Genoese in Galata: 1453-1682", *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 10, no. 1 (February 1979), p.90

¹⁵⁹ Document from Edirne, 22 Cemaziül-Evvel 975 published by A. Galante in *Don Joseph Nassi, duc de Naxos*, (Constantinople, 1913), p.27 doc.II and p.34 doc.II

¹⁶⁰ İnalçık, *The Survey of Istanbul 1455*, p.392 ; Ömer Lütfi Barkan, *Tarihi Demografi Araştırmaları ve Osmanlı Tarihi*, “Türkiyat Mecmuası”, X, 1951-1953, pp.1-26. ; Ömer Lütfi Barkan, *Essai sur les données statistiques des registres de recensement dans l'Empire Ottoman au XV^e et XVI^e siècles*, in “Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient”, 1, 1957, pp.9-21 ; Ömer Lütfi Barkan, *Research on the Ottoman Fiscal Surveys*, in *Studies in The Economic History of the Middle East*, ed. M.A. Cook, (London 1970), pp.163-171

¹⁶¹ Halil İnalçık, "The Policy of Mehmed II toward the Greek Population of Istanbul and the Byzantine Buildings of the City." *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 23/24 (1969), p.231

reflective of the remarkable success of the Ottoman state in the eastern Mediterranean.

The mercantile experience of Ottoman Pera in the century after 1453 must be placed into the context of this narrative. The Ottomans made a success of its newly created homogenised territories in the eastern Mediterranean. For Pera, however, the demographic changes showed that it did not keep up its previous characteristics of being an extra-territorial (*genovesi in Oltremare*) expression of Genoese domination of the trade in the Black Sea, Aegean and Mediterranean. Over a century, the non-Muslim population steadily declined, moving away, converting, and assimilating.

Although this reads like the story of the decline of Pera it is certainly quite the opposite. As noted by Pistarino, Pera was assimilated into the Ottoman Empire and its economic system, becoming a Turkish Galata. Pera's immediate idiosyncrasy characterised by its privileged status gradually changed in the eyes of the Ottoman state to that of a community whose mercantile primacy over trading circles in the eastern Mediterranean had to be assimilated.

Laiou makes this point in *The Byzantine Economy in the Mediterranean Trade System* that whilst Mehmed was having difficulty repopulating the city since the deportees from Rumelia and Anatolia returned home after the initial wave of immigration, the depopulated city on the other side made Pera's own chances for recovery seem slim. Italian traders were crucial in bringing the city back to normality by resuming trade. As Laiou asserts, they were the ones with the connection and know how:

“Market information was readily available, at least to the Italian merchants, and the traders were sufficiently well trained to take advantage of it. There were networks of Venetian and Genoese and later Florentine merchants bound by family and business ties, who worked in cities all over the East: Alexandria, Tana, Caffa, other Black Sea ports and Crete.”¹⁶²

The uncertain success of the conquest and Ottoman expansion would depend on the preservation and rejuvenation of trading activity in and around Istanbul. Mehmed’s efforts at repopulation are clearly in an effort to resume normality as soon as possible. But Mehmed also tried to revive the economic activity of Istanbul and Pera by building trading hubs in the form of the iconic Ottoman covered bazaars in the “old city” and other key areas including Fatih and the port area of Tahtakale.

Efforts at reconstruction¹⁶³ were not limited to the city walls or the building of commercial districts, before the conquest, Clavijo notes the desolate state of Haghia Sophia.¹⁶⁴ Mehmed also initiated its repair and restoration, a significant project that would boost the local economy through investment and employment of local workers. To help pay for this, he allocated pious foundations wakfs. “In Istanbul proper, Galata and Üsküdar (Skutari) there were 2350 shops, 4 caravanserais, 51 baths, 987 houses, 32 bozahane and 22 aşhane (a kind of restaurant) all amounted to 718 421 akçe (about 13 000 Venetian ducats).”¹⁶⁵

The focus on the resumption of trade within Pera’s persistence and gradual assimilation with the Ottoman economic system is an expression of an identifiable conscious Ottoman participation, whether initially by chance or by design, in

¹⁶² Angeliki E Laiou, "The Byzantine Economy in the Mediterranean Trade System; Thirteenth-Fifteenth Centuries", *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 34/35 (January 1980), pp.177–222

¹⁶³ On the rebuilding on Constantinople: Kafescioğlu, *Constantinopolis/Istanbul* and Gülru Necipoğlu, "From Byzantine Constantinople to Ottoman Kostantiniyye: Creation of a Cosmopolitan Capital and Visual Culture under Sultan Mehmed II," in Exh. cat. *From Byzantium to Istanbul: 8000 Years of a Capital*, (Istanbul, Sakip Sabanci Museum, 2010): pp.262-78

¹⁶⁴ Clavijo, *Embassy to Tamerlane 1403- 1406*, p.76

¹⁶⁵ İnalçık, “The Re-building of Istanbul by Sultan Mehmed The Conqueror”, p.14 (Information derived from the *wakıf* Register of Ayasofya for 1490, Prime minister’s archives, Istanbul).

regional and inter-regional trade. Although there is a notable decline in the city of Pera, seen as the drop in non-Muslim population — following the traditional narratives of the disruptive outsider — the Ottoman proactive approach in regional trade instead allows the early Ottoman Empire to be seen as a part of, and not an outsider to, the eastern Mediterranean trading circle.

After the Ottoman occupation, according to İnalcık, Pera's dependence on the Bursa market increased and trade expanded appreciably as the *kadı* records of Bursa for the last two decades of the fifteenth century and the correspondence of J. Maringhi a Florentine agent residing in Pera at the turn of the century, demonstrate. Now, Ottoman subjects, Turks, Greeks, Armenians, and Jews, began to supplant the Genoese in this inter-regional trade, especially after the fall of the Genoese ports in the Crimea as the trade of the Black Sea became vitally important for the growing capital of the Ottoman Empire. Under Mehmed, the Florentines were favoured at the expense of the other Italian nations in Pera. The Florentines and the Genoese now specialised in the trade of Iranian silk which was to a large extent bartered for European cloth on the Bursa market. Maringhi noted in 1501 that every year several silk caravans arrived in Bursa from Iran, and his letters reflect the impatience with which the Italian merchants awaited the arrival of the caravans, their rush to buy the goods and the fierce competition that ensued.¹⁶⁶

The surveys of 1455 and 1477 and the subsequent sources tell on the face of it a chronology of the decline of Pera and the rise of Istanbul from ruins. It forms part of a narrative of the decline of Italian participation in trade in the region and the rise of the Ottoman dominance in the eastern Mediterranean. However, it is instead possible to bring a nuance to this story based on the same sources. The gradual and constant “decline” of Pera can be seen as part of a longer *durée* reduction in specifically Genoese active participation in regional trade and most notably the gradual and constant change attributed instead as an assimilation into a wider homogenised Ottoman economic system in which the foreign households adapt to the intricacies of the Ottoman legal system, changing of status, converting, or further imbedding themselves by transferring tax accounts to other registers. Pera is

¹⁶⁶ İnalcık, *Essays in Ottoman History*, p.314

still relevant in the century after the conquest, clearly observable due to its persistence and its newly forged relationships with the other trading hubs of the Ottoman state, namely Bursa and Edirne.

Istanbul, and to a lesser extent, Pera, certainly went through turbulent times after 1453 and were subject to Mehmed's reactionary policies of repopulation that resulted in waves of immigration and flight from the city. It was Mehmed's successors that would see the city's rise, his immediate successor Bayezıt II (1481-1512) assumed a more reconciliatory stance to the rebuilding and repopulation of the city and Istanbul would reach an estimated population close to half a million by 1530, less than a century after the conquest.

2.4 From a *genovesi oltremare* to a Turkish Galata

The mercantile experience of Pera in the century after 1453 has been previously expressed following the framework of the decline of the quarter because of the disruptive force of the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople. The question as to why after the conquest of Constantinople, Genoese notarial activity connected with trade in the Ottoman Empire had tailed off has been explained under these terms. However, as seen previously, when looked at closely this drop is not necessarily recognised as described but instead show snapshots of stress and banality. The story suggested instead is, of a clear persistence of Italian foreign trading activity after the conquest and any reduction in production in notary documents can be interpreted instead as a drop in Italian traders' production of notary sources only and not necessary a reduction in the participation in trade in Pera under Ottoman rule.

The reduction in the production of notary documents after 1453, used as evidence of decline, must instead be considered as part of a longer *durée* trend of an overall Genoese decline in trade in Pera and in the eastern Mediterranean, and not attributed solely to the Ottoman conquest. The rise of Venetian trade had, over two

centuries from the 1300s, dropped Genoa to a second-class player in the Mediterranean trading circle.

Trade missions in the Black sea area were governed from Pera during the late 13th century but by the middle of the fourteenth century Pera's decline had begun as other regional rivals challenged its status as a trading hub. The prominent feature of Byzantine mercantile activity in the fourteenth century, according to Laiou, was its dependence on the Latins, in particular on the Genoese, who monopolised the grand commerce on the exports from and imports to the Aegean and the Black Sea, including slaves and oriental goods. In the pre-Ottoman period, "the Byzantines," Laiou asserts, "rarely gained access to the Italian markets." That the Genoese systematically prevented the indigenous traders-Jews, Armenians, Tatars, and Greeks-by force when necessary, from participating in international commerce is confirmed by contemporary documents. Greeks were prohibited even from bringing such vital provisions as grain from the northern Black Sea. Robert Lopez observes that in the fifteenth century even before the conquest "Pera's commercial activity was reduced to one seventh of what it had been in the previous century" The two graphs below taken from Lopez, "Market Expansion: The Case of Genoa" make the point of the historic decline of Pera, following that of its patria, Genoa.




Figure (3) Maritime Trade of Genoa from 1271 to 1530s.




Figure (4) Maritime Trade of Pera from 1334 to 1430s.

Fig. (3) and Fig. (4) Graphs taken from Robert Sabatino Lopez, "Market Expansion: The Case of Genoa," *The Journal of Economic History* 24, no. 4 (December 1, 1964): 452 and 453. "The dotted line indicates the same figures adjusted to incorporate changes in the actual weight of gold caused by the fast debasement of the Genoese coinage, as calculated by Cornelio Desimoni."

These two graphs illustrate the story of the decline of Pera as being part of a longer *durée* decline of its role as a Genoese mercantile hub in the eastern Mediterranean and its fortunes being inextricably linked to that of its Patria. Pera's maritime trading activity was already steadily and sharply declining from the mid-fourteenth century onwards, before its Ottoman takeover and it formed part of the overall reduction of the dominance of Genoese maritime trading activity in the Mediterranean.

While the traditional sections of Constantinople were in decline by the fourteenth century, several merchant sections around the Golden Horn still prospered. The Western traveller Clavijo, visiting Constantinople around 1403, marvelled at the prosperity of these quarters amid the ruin and desolation surrounding them. Clavijo noted the commercial district of Pera, across the Golden Horn from the city proper, and the immediate area around the Byzantine imperial residence along the city walls, the Blacharnae Palace, still thrived:¹⁶⁷

“Though the circuit of the walls is thus very great and the area spacious, the city is not throughout very densely populated. There are within its compass many hills and valleys where corn fields and orchards are found, and among the orchard lands there are hamlets and suburbs which are all included within the city limits. The most populous quarter of the city is along the lower level by the shore towards the point that juts into the Sea [of Marmara]. The trading quarter of the city is down by the gates which open on the strand [of the Golden Horn] and which are facing the opposite gates which pertain to the city of Pera [Galata], for it is here that the galleys and smaller vessels come to port to discharge their cargoes, and here by the strand it is that the people of Pera meet those of Constantinople and transact their business and commerce. Everywhere throughout the city there are many great palaces, churches and monasteries, but most of them are now in ruin, It is however plain that in former times when Constantinople was in its pristine state it was one of the noblest capitals of the world.”

¹⁶⁷ Clavijo, *Embassy to Tamerlane 1403- 1406*, as cited in Joseph Gill, *The Council of Florence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959), p.85

The trading *modus operandi* of Genoa and its *oltremare* colonies had been facing a steady challenge. The Ottoman entry into the eastern Mediterranean saw the loss of Genoese colonies in the Levant to the Ottomans. The loss of Caffa and in this context, Pera, has been cited as leading directly to the end of the Genoese trading presence in the lands under Ottoman rule. Although Chios was still held by Genoa until well into the sixteenth century, keeping a reduced Genoese presence.

Pera had previously served a Genoese-Byzantium centred and closed circuit of trading activity, which begs the question of what the effects of Ottoman expansion were and the opening up of larger homogeneous territories. The creation of a level playing field of trade in the territories expanded into by the Ottoman Empire is described by Franz Babinger in “Mehmed the Conqueror and his Time”¹⁶⁸ and later by others as well such as İnalcık and Imber¹⁶⁹.

The Ottomans had taken over areas in which the Genoese had traded before, notably Menteşe and Aydın which were annexed as *beyliks*. They had previously granted the favourable trading privileges to Western merchants, but the Ottoman takeover did not lead to any decline, and favourable trading conditions continued. The continuation of the *modus operandi* of trading centres under the Ottomans is later proven again with the example of Thessaloniki in 1430, again another important commercial centre, had been taken over without adverse effects on trade. Franz Babinger argues that Ottoman expansion, far from being detrimental to trade, had the advantage of removing borders and resulted in one homogeneous trading zone in which only one set of import-export customs was due.¹⁷⁰ This was true for the trading conditions for the Genoese in Pera in 1387, 1453 and 1455.

The other important Genoese trading post in the region became Caffa, its main colony in the northern Black Sea coast. Other fortified colonies emerged on the Crimean peninsula in Soldaya (Sudak), Cembalo (Balaklava), Bosporus (Kerch), as well as along the coast of the Sea of Azov. In Tanais at the outflow of the Don,

¹⁶⁸ Franz Babinger, *Mehmed the Conqueror and His Time* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978)

¹⁶⁹ Halil İnalcık, "Mehmed the Conqueror (1432-1481) and His Time", *Speculum* 35, no. 3 (July 1960): pp.408–27 ; Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973)

¹⁷⁰ Babinger, *Mehmed the Conqueror and His Time*, p.433

where the Genoese co-existed with the Venetians. Some of these towns were entirely Genoese with fortified fortresses and had their own military garrison, administrative and financial offices and were governed by a consul. In others there was a separate merchant quarter or separate houses of residing merchants. The colonies created by the Genoese existed until expanded into by the Ottomans. Caffa until 1475, Kilia and Maurocastro (Moncastron) until 1484. Only Pera continued to exist for a longer period of time; it had extraterritorial powers and its own government, but the last documents issued from there date back to 1490.¹⁷¹

Babinger, İnalcık in “Ottoman Galata”¹⁷² and Kafadar *Between Two Worlds*¹⁷³ suggest the existing evidence does not support the view that the Ottoman takeover of territories in the area being served by Pera and ultimately the Genoese can account for the decline in trade after 1453. By looking at the successive treaties including 1387 and 1453 and the notarial documents of 1455, the fall of Constantinople or Ottoman policies introduced by Mehmed II do not either explain the reduction of activity.

Mehmed’s policies on taxation would have been a disincentive for Western traders if after the conquest there would have been brought substantial raises, although the evidence for this is not clear. The treaties agreed in 1387, 1403 and 1430 give no rates but refer to taxes being paid by the Genoese according to previous custom. The rates paid according to treaties in 1475 do not seem, in İnalcık’s view, to be exceptionally large.¹⁷⁴ Although it could be argued that it is unrealistic to expect there to be no rises in custom charges over the one hundred years. One argument against there being a significant rise in Ottoman customs charges under Mehmed is that there does not appear to be any evidence of complaints from the Genoese merchants.¹⁷⁵ Apart from the policies of taxations, Mehmed had influence over the Western merchants trading within the empire through state control on the flow of commodities. He controlled goods through the use of state monopolies such as

¹⁷¹ Balard, *La Méditerranée Médiévale*, p.9

¹⁷² İnalcık, “Ottoman Galata”

¹⁷³ Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds*

¹⁷⁴ İnalcık, *Essays in Ottoman History*, p.311

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

timber and soap. In the second half of the fifteenth century the monopoly on the timber trade between Antalya and Egypt was passed onto individuals.¹⁷⁶

But these controls were not a new phenomenon faced by the Italian traders in Pera or elsewhere. Murad I had imposed restrictions on the export of alum in 1381 and his successor Beyazid I had also controlled the export of grain with its export being forbidden in 1390 after the capture of Menteşe and Aydın. Macedonian grain was also kept within the boundaries.¹⁷⁷

The expansion of the Ottoman Empire into the territories, their policies on taxation and the restrictions of goods, do not appear to have differed greatly from that of their predecessors and cannot be viewed as a determining factor in any decline in trade relations between the West in general. It seems the Ottoman expansion and their restrictions would have acted as a disruption, but no greater to any other from the Byzantine period or the early Ottoman. The imposition of the *cizye* tax on those with the status of *dhimmi* would have had some affect, but again this does not distinguish the Genoese of Pera from any other non-Muslim living and trading in the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁷⁸

Pera's clear use to the Ottomans was as a centre for trading activity in the region. Its population had the know-how and established links that the early Ottoman Empire could tap into.¹⁷⁹ The rise of Ottoman Bursa from the fourteenth century as an emporium for the caravan trade of Iran and Syria and the revival of the traffic in luxury goods, especially, silk and spices, which now operated in the reverse direction, from Bursa to the northern countries, became a new source of prosperity for the Genoese of Pera and partly compensated for the decrease in the benefits of the inner Asian trade. Heers notes that it was the proximity of Bursa that explains Pera's good fortune.¹⁸⁰ Luxury products would be bought from Bursa and would

¹⁷⁶ Halil İnalçık, "Bursa and the Commerce of the Levant," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 3, no. 2 (August 1960), p.132

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ İnalçık, *Essays in Ottoman History*, p.284

¹⁷⁹ Pistarino, "The Genoese in Pera" ; İnalçık, *Essays in Ottoman History*, pp.314–15

¹⁸⁰ "En fait c'est la proximité de Brousse qui, à cette époque, explique la fortune de Pera. On vient de toutes parts se ravitailler à Brousse en produits de luxe et l'on passe par Pera, évitant soigneusement, semble-t-il, un séjour à Constantinople. Au point de vue

pass by Pera completely avoiding Constantinople. Pera depended more on the wider homogenisation offered by the Ottomans than Constantinople. Pera's persistence, and its gradual assimilation into a Turkish Galata is an expression of an identifiable Ottoman participation, whether initially by chance or by design, in regional and inter-regional trade.

économique, Pera dépend davantage de l'Empire turc que de Constantinople." Heers quoted in İnalçık, "Ottoman Galata", p.313

Chapter 3.

The Ottomans and Mediterranean diplomacy

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3.1 Summary of Ottoman-Venetian relations

Venice’s hold on the region is visible early on by the considerable influence it gained in the Byzantine Empire, and by extension the eastern Mediterranean, in the late eleventh and early twelfth century. Emperor Manuel’s trading agreements with Genoa in 1169 and with Pisa in 1170 were an expression of the need to balance Venice’s hold on the Byzantine Empire and, surely, following these agreements, in 1171 the goods of Venetian merchant in the empire were confiscated. The sack of Constantinople in 1204 and the subsequent Latin rule was to be Venice’s revenge.¹⁸¹

From the early beginnings of the Ottoman state to the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453, the Ottomans and the rival Genoese maintained close relations. While the Genoese did on occasion take part in various anti-Ottoman leagues organised by Latin powers, they were not as active in this regard as their main maritime rival Venice, refusing, for example, to join the crusade against Izmir in 1344.¹⁸²

¹⁸¹ McCormick has written about the rise of Venice before the Ottoman conquest, F. Lane and P. Sebastian have looked at the city state’s relationship with the Empire in trade and diplomacy. M. McCormick, “Where do trading towns come from? Early medieval Venice and the northern Emporia,” in *Post-Roman Towns, Trade and Settlement in Europe and Byzantium: Volume 1 The Heirs of the Roman West*, ed. Joachim Henning (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2007).

¹⁸² Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, p.45

Venice's and other Italian states' desire for, and persistence in trade and diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire in this era, also contributed to their new attitude of diplomacy. The Ottoman privileges with the Latins was certainly not new to the time of the conquest. The oldest surviving Ottoman privilege granted to Venice is from the year 1403 after failure at the battle of Ankara and the first granted to the Genoese was in 1387 although it doesn't survive. Below is a list of treaties conducted with the Venetians and show a stable and consistent diplomatic relationship maintained over a long timeline, of particular note after the conquest and the entry of the Ottomans into the regional trading circle. Upon initial observation it is clear that the Ottomans had an early longstanding relationship with the Venetians even before the conquest of the city of Constantinople, further emphasising their gradual entrance and belonging to the eastern Mediterranean region. The Ottomans were not disruptive outsiders but were instead intrinsic to the regional trading economy.

Year	Signatory
1403	Süleyman Çelebi
1411	Musa Çelebi
1419	Mehmed I
1430	Murad II
1446	Mehmed II
1451	Mehmed II
1454	Mehmed II
1479	Mehmed II
1482	Bayezid II
1503	Bayezid II
1513	Selim I
1517	Selim I
1521	Süleyman I
1540	Süleyman I
1567	Selim II
1573	Selim II
1575	Murad III
1576	Murad III
1595	Mehmed III
1604	Ahmed I
1619	Osman II
1625	Murad IV
1641	İbrahim I

Table 4 List of Venetian 'Ahidnāmes (Source: Hans Peter Alexander Theunissen, "Ottoman-Venetian Diplomats: The Ahdnames. The Historical Background and the Development of a Category of Political-Commercial Instruments Together with an Annotated Edition of a Corpus of Relevant Documents", Electronic Journal of Oriental Studies 1 (1998): 11)

On the 25th of January 1479 Giovanni Dario, Secretary to the Venetian Senate, diplomat, and merchant in presence of the sultan Mehmed signed in Istanbul an ‘ahidnâme where Venice pledged to leave to the Sublime Porte her Albanian colonies (among which were Scutari and Croia), the islands of Stalimene (Lemnos) and Negroponte, Argo and Brazo di Maina (the Mani peninsula) in Morea. Furthermore, Venice also agreed to consign within two years one hundred thousand ducats and an annual tribute of ten thousand ducats for commercial rights in the Ottomans territories. In return, the Porte promised to recognise the authority and legitimacy of the annually elected Bailie. As for the other disputed territories, the Porte allowed to respect the borders as they were before the beginning of the war. In fact, mostly in Albania and Morea, the territorial disputes continued well after the end.¹⁸³ On the 25th of April 1479 the Serenissima, Venice, ratified the peace treaty signed a few months earlier.

The war, the then longest Venetian-Ottoman conflict, played an essential role in the redefinition of the Venetian Stato da Mar, whose domains in Greece and eastern Adriatic suffered a severe reduction having a drastic effect on the trade of the region. The control of the Venetian-gulf played a vital role for the Serenissima, which for the first time saw its power on seas endangered by the Ottomans. The war had a key importance since it also involved many actors of the political scene of the time. Venetian efforts to fight and encircle the Ottomans are to be considered within the frame of its diplomatic communication with Uzun Hasan, of the Akkoyunlu. His death in 1478 represented the end of all challenges to the Ottoman power coming from the Turkish emirates, by that time all subjects of the House of Osman. It is not surprising therefore that the peace treaty was eventually signed only one year after Uzun Hasan’s death.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ A. Calia, “The Venetian-Ottoman peace of 1479 in the light of documents from Venice State Archive”, in *Actes des Ves Rencontres Byzantines*, Paris octobre 2012 (in pubblicazione in Porphyra), pp.19-20

3.2 Ottoman-Venetian 'ahidnāme of 1479

By looking at the evidence provided by Venetian archives it is possible to follow the two-years-long diplomatic exchanges following the peace treaty of 1479 between Venice and Istanbul. Documents deal mainly with respect of the treaty from both parts, border issues and payment of tributes. Seven Greek documents dating back to those events are preserved in the original in Venice State Archive. Moreover, apart from copies and translations of the event documents, the *Liber Graecus* provides another eighteen Ottoman communications, of which thirteen were copied in Greek and five in Venetian. Most of the documents from Venetian archives concerning the peace treaty of 1479 and its aftermath are written in Greek, which at least until the end of Mehmed's reign was still the diplomatic language used by the Ottoman chancery to communicate with Western powers.

Evidence of regular and persistent diplomatic relations between the two states are a further indication of the imbedded nature of the Ottoman presence in the region, adopting the *modus operandi* of commercial treaties, using Greek, the *lingua franca*, and diplomacy to participate in the regional economy.

Furthermore, the Ottoman conquests between 1453 and 1475 is seen to "wipe out the entire Genoese colonial galaxy, with the exception of the island of Chios." The loss of the colonies to the Ottomans is seen as the most serious blow to Genoese trade in the region. "It virtually knocked out the Genoese as traders in Oriental spices and silk, for they could no longer compete with the Venetians, whose colonial empire was still almost intact and unchallenged".¹⁸⁵

In Robert Sabatino Lopez *Market Expansion: The Case of Genoa*, there is an analysis of Genoese trade in Pera over a couple of centuries. On two graphs (Figures 3 and 4 in Chapter 2.4) of the volume of Genoese trade and trade in Pera, a stagnating and ultimately diminishing Genoese trading activity is observed. In Pera,

¹⁸⁵ Robert Sabatino Lopez, "Market Expansion: The Case of Genoa," *The Journal of Economic History* 24, no. 4 (December 1964), p.458

there is a particular drop after the 1370s and with both together, the author suggests that these graphs agree that the Genoese were in the fourteenth and fifteenth century in economic trouble and point to the cause as being due to “a stagnant or diminishing population, a contraction in the number and, probably, the aggregate tonnage of ships at sea, a desperate crisis of public finance, the decline and fall of the Genoese colonial empire, the withdrawal of some of the early capitalists from business activities, the restlessness of a lower class whose hopes for improvement seem now doomed.”¹⁸⁶

The question of the decline of Pera in the Ottoman Empire must be seen through the wider reasoning for the fall in trading activities of the Genoese with the Ottomans. It seems that there is no single decisive factor, instead the new Venetian – Ottoman relationships, even in the face of war, shifting world trade centres and regional trade being exposed to a wider circle, could be part of the explanation.

In which case the argument can be made that Pera had, up until the expansion of the Ottomans and the opening up of larger homogeneous territories with the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, served a Byzantium centred circuit of trading activity. Byzantium with Constantinople and Pera in its centre, branched out to colonies and trading centres such as the Black Sea and the Aegean from within the confines of a territorially ever decreasing empire. In such a unique circuit where trading activities had been monopolised by the Genoese colonies such as Pera, Caffa, Kilia and Akkerman¹⁸⁷, mostly through the exclusion of any others in commerce, had built itself a symbiotic relationship with an Empire that served a specific centralised region.¹⁸⁸ After 1453, Pera under Ottoman rule and thus separated further from Genoa, was thrust into a new wider trading circle dominated by Pax Ottomana. The creation of a level playing field of trade in the territories expanded into by the

¹⁸⁶ Lopez, "Market Expansion: The Case of Genoa" p.455

¹⁸⁷ Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p.291

¹⁸⁸ J. Shepard, "Byzantium's overlapping circles," in *Volume 1 of the Proceedings of the 21st International Congress of Byzantine Studies*, ed. Elizabeth Jeffreys (London: Taylor and Francis, 2006)

Ottoman Empire is noted by historians such as İnalcık and Imber but particularly by Franz Babinger in “*Mehmed the Conqueror and his Time*”¹⁸⁹.

Within these new sets of circumstances, Pera, or Turkish Galata now formed part of the same economic system that, in the face of Genoese long *durée* mercantile decline in the eastern Mediterranean, instead had a relationship with the rival Italian city state, Venice. Pera would be assimilated into the Ottoman economic system, no longer a state within a state or even a state outside of a state, (Genoese colony, “*colonie genovesi*”), severing its relationship with the Republic of Genoa and the declining Genoese trading activity within the eastern Mediterranean. Instead, it would become part of a new economic system faced with the rise and dominance of the Republic of Venice in regional trade. Ottoman conquests between 1453 and 1475 would end Genoese dominance in the region and help the rise of the influence of the Republic of Venice. The method of Ottoman advances into Venetian territories and spheres of influence were similar to the experience of Pera in so much as the Ottomans used the ‘*ahidnāme* even in the face of Venetian military defeat as was the case in 1479. Not since the twelfth century had the Venetians found themselves in such a position, then exploiting Emperor Manuel’s trading agreements. Now, although the Venetians were militarily defeated, it would still be their merchants spearheading regional trade, this time under Pax Ottomana.

The Ottoman method at empire after 1453 used the diplomatic tool of the ‘*ahidnāme*, unilateral pledge or privilege granted to a submitted or friendly group, in this case to the Venetians, their regional military and economic rivals, to insert themselves into the eastern Mediterranean trading circle. This is an illustration of the recognisable and notable early Ottoman ambition, whether by design or by chance, in a pragmatic method at empire that is a facilitator, promoter and active participant in regional and inter-regional trade. In this early Ottoman state, pecuniary considerations eclipsed any other, be it religious or even military.

¹⁸⁹ Babinger, *Mehmed the Conqueror and His Time*

3.3 The Republic of Venice in Ottoman lands, the Relazioni

The Republic of Venice became one of the main regional economic and military rivals of the Ottoman state after the conquest of Constantinople. The Ottoman conquests between 1453 and 1475 would end the Genoese dominance in the region allowing for the rival Republic to gain an advantage. But the city state of Venice also faced its own unparalleled threat to its dominance in the region from the Ottoman advances between 1453 to the 1520s. After the conquest in 1453, most of the Venetian traders moved into Pera becoming the centre of international community under Ottoman rule.¹⁹⁰ In a series of wars between 1469-1479 and 1499-1503, the Ottomans became the most serious threat to the survival of the Republic's hegemony over trade in the Mediterranean, taking over their spheres of influence, the *Stato da Mar*, its port cities and Mediterranean islands.

The *raison d'être* of the Republic of Venice, its reign over maritime trade routes in the Mediterranean region, was also threatened by world events of the 1490s, in particular the voyages to of the Portuguese explorer Vasco da Gama in 1498 to Calicut in India by the circumnavigation of the Cape of Good, opening up new trade routes to the eastern spice trade rival to the land routes taken to the shores of the eastern Mediterranean.

The *terraferma* state of the Republic of Venice was also encroached on by the French at this time, disrupting the peace agreement of the treaty of Lodi between Milan, Naples, and Florence signed in April 1454, later culminating in the French movement into the Italian peninsula and the disastrous 1508-1516 War of the League of Cambrai. The Republic regained its *terraferma* territories, but Cambrai would have a long-lasting impact on Venetian confidence, and this, combined with the disastrous war with the Ottomans that ended in 1503, served as a final notice to the Republic that the balance of power in the Italian peninsula and the Mediterranean, had been permanently altered. In the new political and commercial

¹⁹⁰ Eric Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), p.23

reality, the Republic was in danger of becoming a second-class actor in regional and recent inter-regional trade.¹⁹¹

The method of Ottoman advances into Venetian territories and spheres of influence were similar to the experience of Pera in so much as the Ottomans used the pragmatic approach of the 'ahidnāme in order to cause minimal disruption to pre-established trade routes, even in the face of Venetian military defeat as was the case in 1479. The Republic of Venice would at the turn of the century follow this diplomatic trend and pursue a policy of nonalignment and neutrality thanks to its active and able diplomatic corps, but also its defensive military presence at home, strong enough to deter potential antagonists. It became apparent that their state was "unequal in strength and situated so as to be easily attacked"¹⁹². These methods of soft power politics together with strong defensive strategies would characterise their relationship with the Ottoman Empire.

The outcomes of the wars with the Ottomans and the reliance on diplomatic and political means to maintain the Republic's relevance in the eastern Mediterranean led to the governing body, the Signoria, to initiate institutional innovations and reforms intended to cultivate the Ottoman relationship. Throughout the sixteenth century, there is an observable financial investment in the Ottoman diplomatic mission, particularly in Istanbul, and especially after the wars of 1537-40 and 1570-73. As part of this renewed *modus operandi* with the Ottoman state, the Republic's chief representative at the Ottoman Porte in Istanbul, the bailo played a central part in maintaining and defending the Republic's interests in the face of increasing Ottoman regional hegemony.

An unenviable task, not conducted from a position of strength but instead requiring all the tactfulness and intricacy of the discipline of diplomacy, the report to the

¹⁹¹ Dursteler, "The Bailo in Constantinople", p.1

¹⁹² Eugenio Albèri, *Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti al Senato* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Series III, 434 quoted in Eric Dursteler, "Describing or Distorting the 'Turk'? The *Relazioni* of the Venetian Ambassadors in Constantinople as Historical Source," *Acta Histriae* 19, no. 1-2 (2011), p.239

Senate in 1564, from a former bailo, Daniele Barbarigo, provides an illustration of the Republic's position at the Porte as compared to other diplomatic missions:

“In my opinion, your Serenity does not give any charge ... of greater importance, and of greater travail ... than this one [bailo in Constantinople]; because if a bailo wants to do his duty he will never loaf about, as he has too much to do in not allowing the merchants to be mistreated, in holding audience with subjects, in meeting with those who can make known to him new information (for which purpose one would need never to leave the house), in addition to going to the Magnificent paşa and negotiating important matters. ... I must believe that in three bailates there will not be as much to do as there was in mine.”¹⁹³

Part of the political and diplomatic duties of the baili was their responsibility to collect, process, and communicate to Venice information on the Ottoman Porte. The Relazioni was a stylized device for providing information concerning ‘the power and disposition of all great lords and princes of the world as well as of the condition of the lands and of the people who dwell in them’. This was an essential part of the duty of a Venetian ambassador, along with following his instructions and reporting frequently on the results of his mission. Venetian ambassadors, upon their return, were required to present a comprehensive report, Relazioni, before the Venetian Senate.¹⁹⁴

The Relazioni of Venetian and Genoese ambassadors to the Ottoman Empire provides an insight into the reports sent back to the Italian city states on their view of the state of the Empire. Considerable amounts of Relazioni were edited by E. Alberi in the *Relazioni degli ambasciatori Veneti al senato* which contain reports published between 1839 and 1863 in fifteen volumes on relations with European states outside Italy, other Italian states and with the Ottoman Empire from the late

¹⁹³ ‘Relazione di Daniele Barbarigo’, in *Albèri*, Vol. 6, pp.37–8

¹⁹⁴ Yurdusev, *Ottoman Diplomacy*, p.1–4 ; D. E. Queller, “The Development of Ambassadorial Relazioni”, in *Renaissance Venice*, ed. J.R. Hale (London: Faber & Faber, 1973), p.173

fifteenth century to the early seventeenth century. These sources are from the later part of the period but give a good impression of Ottoman diplomatic activity.

The Republic and their diplomatic representatives needed precise information that would assist them in formulating rational policies that would help preserve their state in the new political realities of the early modern world.¹⁹⁵ The Relazioni were an important aspect of this information-sharing process. Between 1453 and 1552 thirty-five baili and representatives were sent to the Istanbul.

From this list an uninterrupted, regular, and comprehensive Venetian diplomatic mission is observed from the very beginnings of the early Ottoman state for over two centuries after the conquest in 1453. Taking the period before 1507 and 1598 as a comparison, Venice sent 33 baili and 27 extraordinary ambassadors to the Ottoman capital. In this period 39 reports were presented to the Senate on the Ottoman Empire, as compared with 27 on the Papacy, 23 on France and 18 on the Empire and Spain.¹⁹⁶ The reports produced by these diplomats represent one of the most complete, continuous collections of Relazioni, and taken together with the above list of the comprehensive Venetian diplomatic mission, it is an unequivocal expression of the primacy in the Ottoman relationship for the Republic.

The aforementioned Barbarigo's account suggests the range of a bailo's duties, but another bailo, Simone Contarini, simplified these into two principal areas: 'The task of bailo in Constantinople for Your Highness seems to me to be contained in two offices: one ambassador, the other consul.'¹⁹⁷ First and foremost, then, the bailo was present in the Ottoman capital to represent and protect Venetian political interests. To prepare them for their important post, the Senate regularly voted to

¹⁹⁵ Queller, "The Development of Ambassadorial Relazioni", p.176.

¹⁹⁶ Armand Baschet, *La Diplomatie Vénitienne. Les princes de l'Europe au seizième siècle, d'après les rapports des ambassadeurs vénitiens*, vol. 1, p.215 ; Lucette Valensi. *The Birth of the Despot: Venice and the Sublime Porte* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), p.16

¹⁹⁷ 'Relazione di Simone Contarini', in N. Barozzi and G. Berchet (eds.), *Le Relazioni degli stati europei ... nel secolo decimosettimo, Turchia, Vols. 1 and 2* (Venice, 1871–72), Vol. 1, 234; *SMar*, reg. 80, c. 124v, 1 Oct. 1622.

allow the baili-elect to attend its sessions in order that they might be 'informed of current public affairs'.¹⁹⁸

This was accomplished most often through a form of personal diplomacy where the baili maintained extensive networks of friendship and patronage through which they were able to establish relationships with influential Ottomans in positions to benefit and protect Venetian interests.

On certain important ceremonial occasions, such as the ascension of a new sultan, the circumcision of a sultan's son, to renew the capitulations, or to treat for peace, an extraordinary ambassador was usually sent from Venice. This ambassador had a very specific mission and remained in the Ottoman capital only for as long as was necessary to accomplish it. During his time in Constantinople the extraordinary ambassador was considered the bailo's superior, and indeed the latter vacated his embassy compound in favour of the former.¹⁹⁹

The ambassadorial reports had a privileged place in the Republic's decision-making process. By the sixteenth century, the *Relazione* had evolved into a mature form of a final report by an ambassador to the Senate on his diplomatic mission, covering a number of specific areas of interest to the senators. As Niccolò Tiepolo observed in 1532, the object of a *Relazione* was "not to render account of [the ambassador's] actions [...], which can be clearly grasped from the dispatches [...], but to report if he has learned anything of the country from which he comes worthy of being heard and pondered by prudent senators for the benefit of the patria." The *Relazione* was intended to provide "a broad and comprehensive synthesis," a tableau of the "political, military, economic and social conditions of the country," as well as insights into "the characters of princes and ministers, the attitudes and sentiments of peoples, the strengths and weaknesses of states."²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ On the distinctions between the *baili* and ambassadors in a slightly earlier time, see D. Queller, *The Office of Ambassador in the Middle Ages* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp.80–82

²⁰⁰ "Relazione di Niccolò Tiepolo ritornato ambasciatore da Carlo V l'anno 1532," in *Relazioni Degli Ambasciatori Veneti Al Senato*, ed. Eugenio Albèri (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

A Venetian ambassadorial guide from the 1570s provides a very specific outline:

"First, describe the site of the province in which one has been; [...] Second, it is necessary to treat the qualities of this province, [...] Third, it is important to discuss its inhabitants, showing their customs and habits. [...] The order and apparatus of war by land and by sea. Their industries [...] Which merchandise they export and which they import from strangers. The government of the princes or rulers, their richness, nobility, etc. [...] Fourth, it is necessary to cover the particulars of the prince [...] to describe his person, his life, what he does and what his customs are, [...] how much his income is, how many expenses he has, the guard he maintains, the size of his court, and which princes are his friends and which his enemies"²⁰¹

These characteristics are evident in the report of Alvise Renier, who returned from Constantinople in 1550, which contains many of the fundamental elements of the model *Relazione*. He describes the sultan's physical appearance and provides some general observations about his character, but only briefly because as he acknowledges, ambassadors meet the ruler only twice, and are thus not well placed to judge him. Renier follows with a discussion of the principal officials in the Porte with whom he treated, assessing their personality and their inclination toward Venice, and he devotes significant attention to the rivalries and intrigues in the Porte, and their impact on Venetian policies. He then develops a detailed examination of the Ottoman army and fleet, including their size, organisation, level of preparation and ability to mobilize, which was information of critical importance to Venice's ruler's intent on preserving peace with the sultan. Renier also discusses several specific issues he treated while in the Ottoman capital, including the Uskok problem and the recovery of slaves from the war of 1537–40. It is only in the final section of his report that Renier briefly provides some of the expected cultural commentary representing the "Turk", discussing the depopulation of the countryside (which he attributes to Ottoman tyranny), and the practice of

²⁰¹ Donald E Queller, "How to Succeed as an Ambassador: A Sixteenth Century Venetian Document," *Studia Gratiana* 15 (1972), p.670

cannibalizing classical ruins for building materials. This is never the focus, however, rather the bulk of the report emphasizes time-sensitive information relevant to current issues in the Veneto-Ottoman relationship.²⁰²

Sixty years later, another bailo, Ottaviano Bon, returned from his posting in Constantinople and tendered a *Relazione* that presents a suggestive comparative foil to Renier's. Bon begins by stating "I will leave out a discussion on the specifics of the forces, income, the state and government of the empire of Sultan Ahmet, because I know that there is not one of your lords who has not heard them many times from the baili [...] also because they are things described in many books, which can be read easily by whomever might be curious." Instead, he states, his focus will be on the present situation in the empire in three key areas – government, military, and finances – which will be more directly applicable and useful to "the public service".²⁰³

Contarini, describes the bailo also as Venice's chief consular representative in the Ottoman Empire. However, his ambassadorial responsibilities, also came with commercial ones mentioned in commissions given the baili by the Signoria:

"We have sent you there [to Constantinople] as our bailo as is the custom, and finally, [you will] recommend the merchants and our subjects to His Majesty as will seem expedient to you during the time that you are in his presence. You will not fail in any of their necessities to give these merchants and our subjects every help and favour possible, as this is one of the principal reasons you are sent there by us."²⁰⁴

²⁰² Maria Pia Pedani Fabris, *Relazioni di ambasciatori veneti al senato, Costantinopoli: Volume XIV, Relazioni Inedite (1512–1789)*, (Padova: Bottega d'Erasmus-Aldo Ausilio Editore, 1996).

²⁰³ Pedani Fabris, *Relazioni di ambasciatori veneti al senato, Costantinopoli*, p.477

²⁰⁴ *Senato Secreto Deliberazioni*, reg. 71, cc. 37r–49r, cited in Simon Contarini 'Les dépêches de MarinCavalli bayle à Constantinople (1558–1560)', Ph.D. diss., *École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales*, pp.303–5 ; Dursteler, 'The Bailo in Constantinople', p.4.

It was the bailo's duty to promote and protect Venetian trade in the Ottoman Empire, and Ottoman commerce in Venetian lands. Especially in the years following the battle of Lepanto in 1571, the Senate regularly instructed the baili to defend Venice's commercial position in the sultan's lands against potential interlopers such as the English, the Dutch, and the Florentines. This task was all the more important given that the Ottomans had no permanent diplomatic representatives in any foreign court in the early modern era. The bailo would also act as a notary, countersigning deeds for Venetian traders, freeing slaves and representing Venetian traders at the Ottoman Porte in the diwan.

Another component of this institutional imperative for accurate information on the Porte was the significant Venetian investment in maintaining a regular postal service between the lagoon and Constantinople in order to monopolise and exploit the flow of information to and from the Ottoman Empire²⁰⁵.

The Relazioni of Venetian ambassadors and envoys after the conquest in 1453 are an expression of the Italian city state's adaptations to the changing power dynamics of the eastern Mediterranean. The wars with the Ottomans and the loss of spheres of influence to a new regional power homogenising territories under Pax Ottomana necessitated a change in approach. The Venetian Senate by 1551 had seen the needs to train young men in eastern languages in order not to rely on Ottoman drogomans.²⁰⁶ As part of a renewed *modus operandi* with the Ottoman state, the Republic's chief representative at the Ottoman Porte in Istanbul, the bailo played a central part in maintaining and defending the Republic's interests in the face of increasing Ottoman regional hegemony. The bailo had very similar powers to that of the Genoese podesta in Pera. The baili's discretion could include "liberation, safe-conduct, permutaion, moderation of sentence or other criminal pardon"²⁰⁷ The Republic's ambassadorial investment into both Pera and Istanbul demonstrated the importance of the Venetian-Ottoman diplomatic and commercial relationships despite their status as competitors.

²⁰⁵ Dursteler, "Power and Information", pp.601–623

²⁰⁶ Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople*, p.37

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p.63

3.4 Turks as belligerents in the State Papers

As the government's national archive for England, Wales and the United Kingdom, the National Archives in Kew, hold historic manuscripts relevant to the period in question. Perhaps not unexpectedly, the Ottoman state and in particular Pera and Istanbul also feature in these documents and are worth analysing.

In the late medieval or early modern England, responsibility for the equivalent of modern-day foreign affairs was shared between the Royal Council, which held consultations with the king, Chancery, which dealt with administration of treaties, and the Exchequer, which dealt with the financial aspects. Diplomatic missions, in today's sense, were undertaken by great officers of state, leading churchmen, major noblemen and the king's personal entourage. The National Archives hold a large collection of English diplomatic documents including accounts (for the expenses of envoys), diplomatic correspondences, treaties and documents relating to the royal council. The Ottoman references are found within these diplomatic correspondences pertaining to Mediterranean and European state affairs, highlighting the far-reaching impact of the Ottoman entry into the eastern Mediterranean system.

Included amongst these are the *Calendar of State Papers Relating To English Affairs in the Archives of Venice*²⁰⁸, *Calendar of State Papers Relating To English Affairs in the Vatican Archives*²⁰⁹ *Calendar of State Papers, Spain*²¹⁰ and *Calendar of State Papers Foreign, Elizabeth*²¹¹. The *State Papers Venice* (SPVenice) are papers relating to British diplomacy held in the archives of Venice, *State Papers Vatican* (SPVatican), in the Vatican Archives, *Calendar of State Papers, Spain* (SPSpain) in the Spanish Archives and *State Papers Foreign, Elizabeth* (SPForeign) are those held from Elizabeth I deposited at the Public Record Office.

²⁰⁸ *Calendar of State Papers Relating To English Affairs in the Archives of Venice*.

²⁰⁹ *Calendar of State Papers Relating To English Affairs in the Vatican Archives*.

²¹⁰ "Spain: February 1531, 16-28," in *Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 4 Part 2, 1531-1533*, ed. Pascual de Gayangos (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1882), pp.64-78.

²¹¹ *Calendar of State Papers Foreign: Elizabeth, Volume 1, 1558-1559*.

Extracts from these documents pertaining to the Ottomans are included in the Appendix F.

One of the first mention of the Ottomans, or referred to as “Turks” in these sources, in the Calendars is regarding the war against the Isle of Rhodes and a treaty made by the Grand Master Pedro Raimondo Zavosta by means of an embassy with the Turk. Doge Christoforo Moro writing and the Senate to Edward IV in September 1465 expresses his displeasure at the action of the Grand Master. Even if he professes to be a defender of the faith, he is “indeed of a contrary disposition”²¹².

This theme of the supposed hypocrisy of professing to be the defender of the faith and Christendom, but nevertheless drawing up treaties with the enemy of the faith, the Turks, follows throughout the Calendars in relation to references to the Ottomans in the Mediterranean. This is a similar state of affairs observed previously in the case of the Genoese of Pera, the Venetians and the Ottomans. Warring states, of different faiths, fostered and promoted lines of communication, demonstrating the importance of Ottoman diplomatic, and the primacy of pecuniary, relationships.

The state papers including references to agreements and treaties with the Ottoman state (Appendix F) are indicative of the changing attitudes towards the Ottomans from the first reference in 1465 (No.397 SPVenice) in which the Doge Christoforo Moro is protesting the signing of a treaty between the Knights of Rhodes and the Ottomans contrary to their profession to be defenders of the faith. Just over ten years later, (No.467 SPVenice) the same office of the Doge informs Edward IV that having fought wars on two fronts, with the Turk and the other Italian city states, a peace agreement with the Turks was more favourable. By 1525 (No.9 SPVenice) a courteous relationship between the Ottomans and the Venetian Signory is observed, whereby an ambassador of the Grand Turk enquired about a dispute involving Venetian subjects and left “well satisfied”. Although protests against peace being made with the Turk continues to feature within the papers, they seem to be falling on deaf ears.

²¹² Doc.397, 9 Sept 1465. *Deliberazioni Senato Secreta*. v. xxii, 115 ; "Venice: 1461-1470," in *Calendar of State Papers Relating To English Affairs in the Archives of Venice, Volume 1, 1202-1509*, pp.92-126

A number of the documents in the Calendars are in relation to a particular series of events around a single individual, Sultan Zizim or Cem Sultan. Cem Sultan (b.1459 – d.1495) was a pretender to the Ottoman throne, then occupied by his older brother Beyazid II. The first mention of Cem is found in a dispatch from Rhodes in June 1487, in which the question of his custody is mentioned in parallel to defensive preparations being made against the Turks. After Beyazid took power via political outmanoeuvring since there was no clear successor to Mehmed II, Cem was exiled. After seeking refuge in Rhodes and with the Knights of St John, Cem was imprisoned there after Bayezid bribed the knights. After six years, Cem was turned over to Pope Innocent VIII. Together with the kings of Hungary and Naples, the Pope had been competing for his custody as a valuable political weapon.

Zizim has multiple appearances in the State Papers, wherein they negotiate with the King of France for his custody:

No.518 SPVenice²¹³ 1487 June 13 Pierre d'Aubusson, Grand Master of Rhodes, to Sir John Kendal, Turcopolier, his Ambassador at Rome refers to the question of the custody of Sultan Zizim; to certain negotiations with the Duke of Savoy; and to defensive preparations to be made against the Turks.

D'Aubusson had accepted the bribe from Bayezid to imprison Cem. His imprisonment, a mutual interest to both Bayezid, resolving any potential attempts of Cem to take power as the claimant to the Ottoman throne, and to D'Aubusson to use as leverage with other European powers. It is of note that in that same document from 1487 both a negotiation (the bribe) and defence against the "Turk" takes place in parallel.

No.522 SPVenice²¹⁴ 1487. Sept. 13. Lettere Collegio, iv. No. 1. Hieronimo Zorzi, Ambassador in France, to the Venetian Signory.

“Endeavoured to ascertain from the Hungarian Ambassador the position of the negotiation with the King of France for the custody of the Turk's brother (Zizim). The Hungarian answered that unless his King (Mathias Corvinus)

²¹³ "Venice: 1486-1490," in *Calendar of State Papers Relating To English Affairs in the Archives of Venice, Volume 1, 1202-1509*, pp.159-203

²¹⁴ Ibid.

had received a positive promise of the custody of Zizim he would not have sent an ambassador. [...] Had ascertained from a trustworthy person that Zizim was willing to go to the King of Hungary if the King of Hungary would not surrender him into the hands of Sultan Bajazet, his brother, for he said that in France he is a lost man, and that the promises made to him had not been observed. Stated to his informant that if Guy de Blanchefort, Prior of Auvergne, who had Zizim in custody at Bourgneuf, and kept him for Rhodes, advised the King of France to surrender Zizim to the King of Hungary, who wanted to deliver him to the Turk for the sole purpose of making an agreement with the Turk—in that case, Zizim having been placed in France, under guarantee that he should be consigned to none but the Grand Master of Rhodes, or to such as he should choose, the King of France would break his promise, and place Rhodes and the whole of Christendom in very manifest peril, and by such proceeding would ill become a most Christian King, the title of the King of France.”

No.523 SPVenice²¹⁵ 1487 Sept. 15. Deliberazioni Senato Secreta v. xxxiii. p. 105.
The Doge and Senate to Hieronimo Zorzi, Ambassador in France.

“...both of the Bishop of Waradin, the ambassador of the King of Hungary, and likewise of the Reverend Lord Prior (*sic*) of England (Sir John Kendal), the nuncio of the supreme Pontiff and of the Grand Master of Rhodes, to whom the ambassador is to show every favour, in order that the Pope may obtain possession of the person of Sultan Zizim. [...] On the departure of those ambassadors from the kingdom, whether they obtain the aforesaid Sultan Zizmi or not, or should it chance that, before the departure of both of them, one of the two obtain and hold Zizim,—in that case Zorzi to declare to the King of France, although unable to obtain what justice and the Republic's devotedness required, nevertheless he did not doubt but that his Majesty would give satisfaction..”

“Proposed letter to the Ambassador aforesaid:

²¹⁵ Ibid.

The Reverend Lord Prior of England of the order of St. John's of Jerusalem, is on his way to the King of France, and we have given him credentials. The Prior has been sent by the Supreme Pontiff, and by the Grand Master of Rhodes, that he may negotiate the affair of Sultan Zizim. Enjoin you to lend him all your favour, so that the wish of the Pontiff may take effect.”

No.533 SPVenice²¹⁶ 1488 Aug. 20. St. Mark's Library. The Knights of Rhodes, Guy de Blanchefort, Prior of Auvergne, and Sir John Kendal, Turcopolier, to Pope Innocent VIII.

“Acquaint the Pope that the affair of the brother of the Grand Turk (Zizim) is in a fair way, and permission may be conceded to remove Zizim to some castle subject to the Roman Church near the sea, and to keep him there until the arrival of a Rhodian ship, and until other necessary arrangements be made for his removal. Request the Pope to consult the Cardinal of Anjou, the “Protector” of the Order of St. John's, on the subject.”

D'Aubusson would be made cardinal by Pope Innocent VIII after transferring Cem Sultan to his custody who arrived in Rome on 13 March 1489. Innocent VIII prepared to launch a crusade against the Ottomans, but it was postponed. Bayezid, contacted D'Aubusson and sent the kapıcıbaşı Mustafa Bey to Rome, to conclude a secret agreement, in December 1490. The sultan promised not to attack Rhodes, Rome, or Venice, as well as to pay Cem's allowance of 40,000 ducats to the Pope (10,000 of which for the Knights of St John), in return for the prince's incarceration. Cem would eventually die in early 1495 fleeing the invading army of Charles VIII.²¹⁷

The saga of Cem Sultan is demonstrable of the Ottomans being an intrinsic part of the Mediterranean system, although a belligerent according to the sources, yet well woven into the politics of the Mediterranean. The Ottomans are simultaneously belligerents and part of the Mediterranean shifting alliances with a bribe from Bayezid being accepted to imprison a pretender to the throne – D'Aubusson

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ Nicolas Vatin, “Cem,” in: *Encyclopaedia of Islam three*, ed. Kate Fleet et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2011).

receiving payment for fulfilling a service for the Ottoman court. The preoccupation and involvement with the Ottoman state did not end with their military and political affairs in the region. Constantinople, as it appears in the sources, and Pera, also appear in the documents with reference to their status as an important regional hub.

"Produce Imported to England" SPVenice²¹⁸ Table five lists produce and manufactures conveyed to England by the Venetians in the Flanders Galleys, during the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries. Of note are those that passed from Constantinople items such as, Dyed silks (Turkish) Wormwood (Persian) Rhubarb (Persian), Ambergris (A tonic from the shores of the Indian Ocean), Musk (Asia) and Civet (Painkiller from the East Indies and "wherever the hyaena is found.") From this, it is apparent that Ottoman Istanbul continues and has achieved further success in its role as a mercantile hub in the eastern Mediterranean, serving not only the region but also reaching inter-regional trade. Commodities from the far reaches of Asia and the Indian Ocean World made its way to the ends of the silk road, in this case, the relatively smaller markets of England. An inter-connected trade, with the Venetians as middlemen can be observed, successfully functioning under the auspices of Pax Ottomana even under the duress of conflict in the region between the various factions.

The *Calendar of State Papers Foreign, Elizabeth, Volume 4, 1561-1562* also gives a local insight into the somewhat separate status of Pera with regards to Constantinople. A letter from Constantinople from August 1561 (No.467 SPForeign)²¹⁹ states that "1,700 people died in one day of the plague and the inhabitants have gone to Pera." It seems that Pera was seen as a separate entity within Constantinople, with the supposition that the plague hit Istanbul first and more severely than Pera, allowing it to act as a place of refuge. Its geographic isolation, on the other side of the shore would nevertheless act as a natural barrier.

²¹⁸ "Produce Imported to England," in *Calendar of State Papers Relating To English Affairs in the Archives of Venice, Volume 1, 1202-1509*, ed. Rawdon Brown (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1864), cxxxv-cxxxix.

²¹⁹ "No. 467 1561 August 31," in *Calendar of State Papers Foreign, Elizabeth, Volume 4, 1561-1562*

In an earlier dispatch from Istanbul April 1561 (No.122 SPForeign)²²⁰ mentions a scarcity of bread and wine in the city and there “was a great persecution of such as were found to drink wine in any place but in Pera, where it was lawful for Christians to drink it, but none of the Turk's subjects. Warning was given to the Emperor's Ambassador to abstain from drinking of wine, or else to go with his family to Pera.” Again, demonstrating a clear separation between Istanbul and Pera in line with its privileges.

These two documents from 1561 demonstrate that although Pera had by this time become Turkish Galata, still to a certain extent can be described as having kept its idiosyncrasy. Previously characterised twofold, Pera acted as a state within a state, through the Byzantine privileges and then Ottoman *ahidnāme* but it was also a state outside of a state, known by the Genoese as the *genovesi* in *Oltremare*. Pera by 1561 was still a distinct entity. On one hand, Turkish Galata, under Ottoman rule and within its economic system, but on the other, remaining a separated quarter from Istanbul with its own peculiar laws.

The majority of the state papers, taking on the form of general reports, only mention the Ottomans by way of an update of news from the region. Within the papers including intelligence information on the Ottoman state (Appendix F) early on the events in the eastern Mediterranean are reported to the ends of the silk route, to the Kings of England and Scotland. In the earliest reference (No520 SPVenice) there is a reference to “the people of England” to be ready “for defence against the Turks”. English interests in the Mediterranean threatened by the Ottomans are being highlighted by Pope Innocent VIII in what appears to be a desperate attempt at drumming up support in the form of a coalition against the enemies of the faith (No558 SPVenice). These cries for help are clearly rebuked by the James IV unequivocally (No568 SPVenice) “my kingdom, situated to the west and north, at a very great distance from Rome, does not overflow with silver and gold, although it abounds in other proper commodities.”.

²²⁰ “No.122 1561 April 19: Intelligences from various Places,” in *Calendar of State Papers Foreign, Elizabeth, Volume 4, 1561-1562*.

The attempts at creating a coalition of the different factions with a stake in the Mediterranean world around the Pope is followed explicitly though the rest of the documents (No.818 SPVenice, No.893 SPVenice, No.941 SPVenice and No.945 SPVenice). The documents referring to the growth of the Ottoman navy from the 1500s onwards, forewarns of the Ottoman ambitions in the Mediterranean. Document Add. 28,583 from the State Papers of Spain dated 1531 provide a summary of the intimidating Ottoman activity in the Mediterranean:

Owing to the way in which the Turkish pirates are now infesting the Mediterranean, the Pope is of opinion that the Imperial galleys, those of France and Rhodes, ought to join and go in chase of them.

A ship from Alessandria arrived the other day at Venice. Great preparations of biscuit and other provisions were being made in that port and throughout the whole of Egypt. The Venetian galleys that went thither had returned empty, owing to the Turk having recently given orders that the Spice trade should be transferred to Constantinople.

“Advices have come that Barbarossa has presented a fine galley to the Grand Turk. Cannot help thinking that this offensive league against the Turk proposed by the duke of Albany may give rise to very serious apprehensions. Is very much afraid that it is only a cunning device of the French either to prevent any agreement with the Grand Turk—which in his opinion would be justifiable under present circumstances considering the conduct of most of the Christian princes—or else to incite the Turk to arms, that being, as they have been heard to say, the only corrective against the Emperor's growing power. Again, it may be for the purpose of informing the Turk of any preparations made against him, for certainly anything may be apprehended from the French. - Rome, 26th February 1531.”

Written by the Imperial Ambassador to Rome, Miçer Mai, by 1531 from the Spanish perspective in Italy, there is an infestation of Turkish pirates in the Mediterranean. This maritime activity, probably half-supported by the Ottoman state is also presented together with a much more ambitious Ottoman state plan of transferring the regional spice trade to Istanbul. This is a clear and active

participation in the Mediterranean trading and maritime circles, attempting to shape the creation of new trade routes. The Ottomans are growing their navy and are becoming a legitimate threat. The final paragraph from this extract is demonstrative of the diplomatic manoeuvrings present in this arena. Even in 1531 there is no clear-cut anti-Ottoman league present, and the allegiances of the Spanish could have easily gone either way.

The Ottoman ambitions at regional maritime trading routes and its growing navy is traced throughout the state papers. The same year as the creation of the Holy League, document No.499 SPVenice from 1571 reports that free negotiations on trade were still being conducted by the French with the Ottomans to the apprehension of the Spanish.

Aynabakhtı or the battle of Lepanto, was the last major naval engagement between rowing fleets in the Mediterranean, fought between the Ottomans and the alliance of the Holy League on 7 October 1571. Supported by the Pope, the league included Spain, Venice, Genoa, Tuscany, Savoy, Urbino, Parma, and the Knights of St John, with the aim of recapturing Cyprus, which had been conquered by the Ottomans in 1570. The Ottomans were led by the admiral of the navy (*kapudan*) Mu'adhdhinzāde 'Alī Pasha, a land commander with no experience in naval warfare. The forces of the Holy League destroyed almost the entire Ottoman fleet in less than three hours. Only 'Ulūc 'Alī Pasha, the most experienced Ottoman sea captain, managed to escape with about thirty galleys.²²¹

Casale describes an “Ottoman Age of Exploration” beginning with the 1517 conquest of Egypt and note a turning point with the 1571 Battle of Lepanto and “the most crushing naval defeat in their history”²²². The events around 1571 and Lepanto, however, it is said, saved Venice and the Western Mediterranean from further Ottoman conquests.²²³ However the Ottomans built 150 new vessels by the spring of 1572, and it seemed that the battle of Lepanto had done little to alter the balance of power. The Ottomans continued to occupy Cyprus, and the Holy League

²²¹ Gábor Ágoston, “Aynabakhtı”, in *Encyclopaedia of Islam three*, ed. Kate Fleet et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2011)

²²² Casale, *The Ottoman Age of Exploration*, p.138

²²³ Ibid.

collapsed when Venice concluded a treaty with the Ottomans in 1573. The outrage at the Vancian treaty with the Ottomans after the battle can be seen in documents (No.176 SPVatican: “disappointing and vexatious intelligence of the peace made by the Signory of Venice with the Turk”, No184 SPVatican: “the vexation it has caused the Pope” and No.188 SPVatican: “the resentment that his Majesty thinks his Holiness should exhibit at so grave an offence”).

The language of diplomacy in the various Calendars show a nuanced approach to dealing with the Ottomans in the Mediterranean. Although disgust and outrage are expressed for treaties and agreements made with the Ottomans as the enemies of Christendom, it isn't possible either to represent another coalition of forces in the struggle for regional power.

The force of the pecuniary eclipsing any other distraction is a common pattern in the method at empire in this period and region. The legitimacy and law of treaties drawn up between two belligerent sides, similar to the contracts written in Pera just before the conquest, transcended religious authority, but in these particular cases, took their legitimacy from more than one state authority. Their legitimacy came not from a particular state or religion, threatened by another in 1453 and in these cases, by the wars between the Venetians and Ottomans in the late 15th and mid-16th centuries, but were inherent in their very nature as part of the struggle for control over (mostly) the eastern Mediterranean. The commercial contracts signed in the run up to the siege of Constantinople, were human activities whose rules of engagement existed by common consensus and were universal. In a similar way, the treaties drawn up between the belligerent factions in the Mediterranean in this period, were state activities (or methods) at vying for regional hegemony. The Ottomans were an intrinsic part of the Mediterranean system and they participated under the same universal rules of engagement as defined by common consensus, in their bid for dominance over regional maritime trade.²²⁴

²²⁴ Halil İnalcık, “The Ottoman Turks and the Crusades, 1329–1451”, in: Kenneth Meyer Setton (ed.): *A History of the Crusades*, Wisconsin 1989, vol. VI, p.226 ; Cemal Kafadar, “The Ottomans and Europe”, in: Thomas A. Brady Jr. et al. (eds.), *Handbook of European History 1400–1600, Late Middle Ages, Renaissance and Reformation*, (Leiden : 1994) vol. 1, pp.589–635

Chapter 4.

New trading circles in the homogenised Ottoman dominions

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4.1 Summary of the Ottomans position as locals

Nearly a century after the ahidnāmes granted by Mehmed II following the conquest of Constantinople, the first significant Ottoman capitulations were those issued by Süleyman the Magnificent notably to France in 1535. The commercial agreements cannot be called Capitulations with a capital “C” since these agreements were closer in its format to the 11th Century Byzantine-Latin Privileges. These capitulations were unilateral agreements for, conversely, those who wanted to enter the newly created Ottoman homogenised trading area. The agreements weren’t granted from a position of weakness, at least during the early period including up to the time of Süleyman the Magnificent, but were granted from a position of strength in the spirit of alliances amongst relative equals. Those granted at what is traditionally known as the high point of the Ottoman empire from the 1530s onward, required renewal whenever a new ruler ascended to the throne and no agreement extended beyond the reign of the grantor.

Legally, the temporary and unilateral grants were not only required to be renewed by every new Sultan, but they were also strictly regulated. Uniquely, it was the consuls and ambassadors who were directly responsible for petitioning the Ottoman administration in order for their country’s merchants to benefit from the privileges. The issuing of a grant, or berat, was required containing the specific articles of the treaty in question that exempted the traders from specific taxes. Merchants or dragomans could not benefit from the privileges in the treaties without these berat. Most importantly these berat needed renewing as well. Usually, a consul was sent

to a port and an application submitted on behalf of the merchant for a berat. The Ottoman administration therefore had full control over who received these berat and would check who the applicants were, their backgrounds, and may not grant them. Unlike the 19th century view of the capitulations as burden to the empire resulting in a free for all for foreign traders, the agreements of the 15th and 16th centuries were highly regulated and controlled affairs. Every time a ship docked into a port, such as Pera, they had to petition for an internal Visa, a route document (*yol emri/hükmü*). Just like the berat the consul or ambassador had to go to the ports and submit a petition with the name of the captain and details of the ship and merchandise. Permission would then be granted for the ship or the merchant to travel from one place to another. Petitions and berat show that the process could take weeks and was not necessarily a straightforward rubber stamp.

Calling the commercial agreements after 1453 and before 1535 Capitulations in its fully loaded form is a tacit approval of the narrative of the “outsider”. That is, the outsider attempting at significant cost, to artificially enter trading circles they have previously had no active part in. The later 17th century British capitulations were still peace treaties and as Michael Talbot writes, they ensured friendship (*dostluk*) between the states.²²⁵ The conditions in which the capitulations of the 16th and 17th century are written and those of the Late Ottoman Empire are, however, incomparable.

The possible outcomes of the fall of Constantinople in 1453 can be summarised in the simplest terms into three possible outcomes. Decline in trade due to the disruptive force of the Ottoman conquest of the city; a boom in trade due to the creation of a single trading circle; or little change in trading activity due the resilience of traders. This approach and its variations, however, is too narrow.

From the century after 1453 a whole new set of circumstances are observed in which, if a direct comparison between Westerner trading activity before and after

²²⁵ Michael Talbot, “A Treaty of Narratives: Friendship, Gifts, and Diplomatic History in the British Capitulations of 1641”, *Osmanlı Araştırmaları/The Journal of Ottoman Studies* 48 (2016), pp.357-398

1453 was to be drawn, a dip to a certain extent is observable, but this doesn't account for the new shifting trading circles. It assumes any dip in trader activity is due to the disruptive force of the Ottomans attempting to forcefully infiltrate a trading circle they don't belong to.

The sack of Constantinople during the fourth Crusade in 1204 was arguably a more traumatic event for the city and its inhabitants than the conquest in 1453. The Genoese had for long sought revenge on the Venetians for their involvement in the Fourth Crusade and later Latin rule of Constantinople, having long suffered discrimination in the hands of Latin rule.²²⁶ Patriarch Michael III of Anchialos (1170–8) summarises the feeling towards the Latins when he told the emperor:

“Let the Muslim be my material ruler, rather than the Latin my spiritual master. If I am subject to the former, at least he will not force me to share his faith. But if I have to be united in religion with the latter, under his control, I may have to separate myself from God.”

His view was to be put more bluntly in words attributed to the Grand Duke Lukas Notaras on the eve of the fall of Constantinople in 1453: “Better the turban of the Turk than the mitre of the Latin [pope].”²²⁷

The analysed notary documents of Pera show moments of stress, or peaks in production. Routine documents, produced on the eve of the siege of Constantinople sway the narrative so that rather than being outsiders, the Ottomans can be seen as an already recognised, integral part of the eastern Mediterranean trading circle. The focus on the resumption of trade with Pera's persistence and gradual assimilation with the Ottoman economic system is an expression of an identifiable conscious Ottoman participation, whether by chance or by design, in regional and inter-

²²⁶ Judith Herrin and Guillaume Saint-Guillain, *Identities and Allegiances in the Eastern Mediterranean After 1204* (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2011), p.304 ; Michel Balard, "The Genoese in the Aegean (1204 - 1566)." in *Latins and Greeks in the Eastern Mediterranean After 1204*, ed Benjamin Arbel et al. (Hove: Psychology Press, 1989), p.158

²²⁷ Anthony Bryer, "Byzantium: The Roman Orthodox World, 1393–1492," in *The New Cambridge Medieval History*, ed. Christopher Allmand (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p.782 ; Ducas, *Istoria turco-bizantină (1341-1462)* (Academia Republicii Populare Române, 1958), p.329

regional trade. Although there is a notable decline in the city of Pera, seen as the drop in non-Muslim population — following the traditional narratives of the disruptive outsider — the Ottoman proactive approach in regional trade instead allows the early Ottoman Empire to be seen as a part of, and not an outsider to, the eastern Mediterranean trading circle.

The mercantile experience of Ottoman Pera in the century after 1453 is one of clear persistence in Italian foreign trading activity. The documents form part of a new setting of changing trading patterns in the face of a new political landscape and the homogenisation of new territories under Ottoman rule. It is unreasonable to prescribe the drop in trade over four decades to the outsider and disruptive Ottoman force. Instead, there is an observable longer *durée* trend of an overall Genoese decline in trade in Pera and in the eastern Mediterranean.

Venice and other Italian states desire for, and persistence in trade and diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire in this era, also contributed a strong development in diplomacy. The Ottoman privileges with the Latins was certainly not new to the time of the conquest. The Ottomans had an early longstanding relationship with the Venetians even before the conquest of the city of Constantinople that was later cultivated, further stressing the gradual nature of their entrance, and belonging to the eastern Mediterranean region. The Ottomans were not disruptive outsiders but were instead a known, intrinsic part of regional trading economy.

The state papers references to the Ottomans demonstrate their role as locals in the Mediterranean system, although a belligerent, observed from afar by contemporary participants. The preoccupation with the Ottoman state did not end with their military and political affairs in the region but focused on their maritime involvements and to Pera and Istanbul's status as an important regional hub.

Rather than considering the Ottomans as an outsider disruptive force to the eastern Mediterranean, instead they should be considered an established local player whose new homogenous dominions created new circles, that promoted, not disrupted, trade. The Ottomans changed the cityscape of Pera, and Istanbul locally, but also

had a deep impact on the economic system of the region and the wider inter-regional sphere, and the competition for its domination.

4.2 Shifting Trade Circles

The mercantile experience of Ottoman Pera in the century after 1453 is linked to the shifting world trade centres and regional trade being exposed to a wider circle. The Genoese interest in the Black Sea, Pistarino argues²²⁸, increased as trade with North Africa dwindled and the prospects for the Crusader states seemed unclear after the failure of Louis IX's seventh crusade to Egypt (1249-1250) and shifted towards a more Constantinople centred trading circle, especially after the end of the Latin rule in 1261. In an essay on the fall of Constantinople in 1453²²⁹, Pistarino shows that it did not necessarily mean the loss of Genoa's important colony in Pera. But he does not make clear, why from 1490, few Genoese were left in Pera and any hopes of a Genoese *modus vivendi* with the Turks was lost. Pistarino introduces the sources of the notarial records and papers but his work²³⁰ does not constitute a critical analysis of the fate of the Genoese in Pera in the years after the conquest of Constantinople.

Venice's role in the Mediterranean and its trading rivalry with the Genoese is of particular relevance when looking at the mercantile experience of Pera after the conquest. The enterprise of the Crusades relied heavily on Venetian merchants and ships. One of the starkest examples of the primacy of pecuniary motives over any other in the Mediterranean world, even faced with the existential threat of an opposing faith, was the culmination of the perverse events of the fourth Crusade and the siege of the Catholic city of Zara in 1202 and the sack of Constantinople in 1204 in order to repay debts owed to the Venetians for funding the crossings to the Crusader states in the eastern Mediterranean.

²²⁸ Pistarino, *Genovesi d'Oriente*. p.113

²²⁹ Ibid. p.129

²³⁰ Ibid.

Throughout the later Byzantine period, Genoa's main rival remained Venice, a state much more stable politically, and one with a much tighter control over its Levantine colonies. This rivalry resulted in various wars between Genoa and Venice, fought largely over control of the Black Sea and with largely inconclusive results for the balance of power between the two states in the eastern Mediterranean, the status quo remaining intact, with neither side being able to dominate the other.²³¹ After the conquest of Constantinople this balance of power didn't shift dramatically either, neither gained any real advantage over the other. Any privileges gained by the Genoese after 1453 were also extended to the Venetians, both in the treaty of 1454 and that of 1479 which had ended the war begun in 1463.²³²

Kate Fleet's conclusion in her study, attributes the decline in Western trading to factors unconnected with Ottoman policies but resulting more from traders' own motivation to explore newly discovered markets of the New World.²³³ With a certain equilibrium of involved parties in the Mediterranean, the Portuguese attempting to tap into eastern trade routes had to act beyond the confines of the Mediterranean system. The Portuguese explorer, Vasco de Gama's successful expedition around the continent of Africa via the Cape of Good Hope, at the end of the fifteenth century, sent waves to the established Mediterranean centred world trade system. The new maritime inter-regional trade routes were created, undermining the relatively expensive and hazardous land route on the Western edges of the silk route that was the dominions of the Ottoman Empire. The later expeditions by Columbus and Drake only opened up other possibilities of further shifting the world trade circles away from the eastern Mediterranean.²³⁴

The world view before 1488 was very different to that a year later, with trade centred on the eastern Mediterranean and Istanbul at the heart. After 1492 the world view changed again within the century after the conquest of Constantinople, and the opening up of the Americas to world trade. Pera found itself in, within a century

²³¹ Balard, *La Romanie génoise*, pp.58-61

²³² Fleet, *European and Islamic Trade*, p.129

²³³ Ibid., p.133

²³⁴ Ibid.

after 1453, a larger polycentric world trade system and new inter-regional maritime trading.

Therefore, the specific question of the decline of Western trade in Pera, whilst also considering the mercantile position of the Ottoman Empire in the century after 1453, must be seen through the wider effects of the shifting trading circles. The perceived reduction in western trading activity within the Ottoman empire, particularly that of the Genoese and to a lesser extent the Venetians, must be considered within this wider historical perspective.

In terms of the local, the onset of the Ottoman advances changed conditions, in which the localised trading economy of Pera serving a specific need, with Italian city states as the middleman, was exposed to wider trading routes through Anatolia and the silk road, benefiting other rival centres such as Bursa.

Unlike before, the Genoese of Pera no longer held monopolies over trading activities or a designated role as traders within the region. As quoted before, Laiou asserts, previously the Byzantines rarely gained access to the Italian markets.²³⁵ In fact, the international trade system was dominated by the Italians, primarily the Venetians and Genoese, whose merchants had acquired an advantage through the extracted privileges.²³⁶ The Genoese systematically prevented the indigenous traders-Jews, Armenians, Tatars, and Greeks - by force when necessary". This was no longer true with the Ottomans, since they were only one amongst others having been granted the dhimmi status as any other non-Muslim subject (*kul*) of the Sultan. The distinguishing factors and privileges, with a small p, of the Genoese of Pera were eroded as commerce was liberalised, opened up to competition, as part of the harmonisation process with the time's prevailing currents of the regional economy.

The documents referring to the growth of the Ottoman navy from the 1500s onwards in the State Papers, forewarns of the Ottoman ambitions in the Mediterranean and a further shift in the power dynamics. The previously mentioned Document Add. 28,583 from the State Papers of Spain written by the Imperial

²³⁵ Laiou, "The Byzantine Economy in the Mediterranean Trade System", p.180

²³⁶ Angeliki E Laiou, *The Economic History of Byzantium: From the Seventh through the Fifteenth Century* (Washington: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 2002), p.1159

Ambassador to Rome, Miçer Mai, by 1531 providing a summary of the intimidating Ottoman activity in the Mediterranean reads that “there is an infestation of Turkish pirates in the Mediterranean.” This is a clear and active participation in the Mediterranean trading and maritime circles, attempting to shape the creation of new trade routes in Ottoman controlled sea routes.

1488 and 1492 drastically changed the world trade focus, while in the Mediterranean, the Ottomans were further establishing themselves. The battle of Çaldiran in 1514 strengthened their easternmost land frontiers and the Ottomans further expanded around the eastern Mediterranean coastline in 1517 when Selim I, Yavuz Sultan Selim (r. 1494 – 1511), captured Cairo. This marked a drastic shift in the nature of the Ottoman empire, now with full control of the eastern Mediterranean proper and the beginnings of the semblance of the Roman Mare Nostrum.

4.3 Ottoman Thalassology

The formation of an Ottoman thalassology²³⁷ had its origin in the imagination of the seas by their predecessors. The Roman imagination of the Mediterranean as a whole, and not just the eastern Mediterranean, was known as the Mare Nostrum (our sea). This body of water, internalised into the empire by becoming a lake, acting as a communications highway, interconnected different parts of the empire, otherwise impossible to reach. The Ottoman experience of seas, however, is not identical. Although the domination over the Mediterranean as a whole could have been in the minds of early 16th century Ottoman court, the 1571 Battle of Lepanto is described as the turning point of the thalassology alla Turca, by halting the successful creation of a Mediterranean Mare Nostrum, a body of water entirely dominated by one empire.

²³⁷ Thalassology as defined by Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell in “The Mediterranean and ‘the New Thalassology.’” *The American Historical Review* 111, no. 3 (2006): pp.722–40

By the early 16th century, the Ottomans did have full dominion over a body of water, the Red Sea. However, Alex Wick in *The Red Sea: In Search of Lost Space*²³⁸ argues that the idea of an Ottoman Red Sea does not exist, even if all the evidence suggest that it should. His study on the imagination of the Ottoman seas, the problematic absence of an Ottoman “Red Sea” and the implications it has on the nature of the early Ottoman Empire, forms the basis of the following discussion of the New Thalassologies²³⁹ of not only the Mediterranean, but of all Ottoman encounters with seas. These include but are not limited to, the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Gulf, and, mostly the Northwestern Indian Ocean. The reasons he gives in his book for the absence of an Ottoman “Red Sea” are as follows:

1. Because of a long-standing identification of maritimity with Europe, and the collateral affirmation of the incompatibility of Islam and the sea.
2. Because it lies at the frontier of a great disciplinary divide opposing the Arab to the African.
3. Because it has no nation.
4. Because it has no archive.
5. Because it did not exist as such in Ottoman discourse during the period under consideration.

The tangible problem Wick identifies is why the “Red Sea” has no Ottoman archive, only one document makes use of the term “Red Sea” (in its Arabic derived form Bahr-i Ahmer) and why it did not exist in their discourse at this time. Passing references are made later when incidentally referring to European contacts, the French invasion of Egypt and the Ottoman military and political efforts to defeat it.

Thalassologies were a European phenomenon, a Roman creation, and inextricably linked to the special relationship European states and societies had with the sea, their *joie de vivre*. Such a tradition in its European form was foreign to non-Europeans, namely the world of Africa and the East and not coincidentally perhaps, Islam. As Wick puts it, the historical trajectory of these Islamic states was dictated

²³⁸ Alexis Wick, *The Red Sea: In Search of Lost Space* (Univ of California Press, 2016)

²³⁹ Markus P. M. Vink, “Indian Ocean Studies and the ‘New Thalassology.’” *Journal of Global History* 2, no. 1 (2007), pp.41–62

by their Landedness (*kurudan*²⁴⁰). In short, the Ghazis belonged on horseback and the Frengis were found out at sea (*deryada*²⁴¹).

The Ottoman imagination of spaces, particularly maritime spaces, is linked to the Ottoman self-consciousness as an eastern Mediterranean Empire. The conquest of Constantinople in 1453 and the establishment of the capital of the empire in Istanbul, solidified the very nature of the Ottoman Empire as being, whether by design or chance, an empire with a direct relationship with the sea. The Ottoman imagination of the seas in and around its dominions in the 15th and 16th centuries bear a direct rapport with its own understanding and application of what it is to be an empire.

When thinking about Thalassology alla Turca, as Alex Wick puts it, it is tempting to look at the cartographic evidence of the Ottoman observation, perception and understanding of what the sea is. The cartographic discipline, in technology and methodology, from the Ottoman pre-modern encounter would have been one based on Western cartography as demonstrably seen by the 16th century Ottoman cartographer Piri Reis' efforts drawn from mostly Western European world maps. The naming of the "Red Sea" is itself by extension an application of the Western cartographic custom, something that was followed duly by Piri Reis.

But the problem remains that this might not be an accurate empathetic understanding of Ottoman imagination of this space. There is a clear lack of evidence in the Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri where entries that include the "Red Sea" are missing. Simply said, even if the Red Sea clearly did exist in the physical sense, it appears to have been absent in that form from the Ottoman imagination. That body of water, contemporarily known as the Red Sea, must first be imagined for it to be empirically recorded. In the absence of such an imagination, instead the space being described with reference to other points of interest, the ports. Known as the Bahr-i Suveys, Bahr-i Kulzum, Bahr-i Cidde, Bahr-i Mekka and Bahr-i Muha, Bahr-i Yemen, Bahr-i Habes, all named the sea after the adjoining places.

²⁴⁰ See line 12 of the 1453 'ahidnâme in section 1.3

²⁴¹ Ibid.

It is evident that spaces of no perceived value (deserts, mountains etc.) are less likely to be subjected to rigorous observation, description, and categorisation. Unless the seas are described with reference to currents, tides, or other land-based points of reference (islands, spits, cliffs etc.) their empirical evidence will be lacking, instead those of definitive value, ports such as Pera, would be highly described and recorded.

This absence of imagination and description of vast geographical spaces, create the curious case of certain hyper-connectivities of one place to another. Ports, although separated by vast distances over bodies of water, seemingly insurmountable were it land, can be imagined as closer than if they were inland towns separated by the same distance. The clear advantages of maritime routes as opposed to land routes in speed, efficiency and cost effectiveness can lead to an increased connectivity. This is noted with Pera and Caffa, Pera and Genoa (*genovesi oltremare*) as opposed to Pera and the land-based towns and cities such as Edirne.

The Ottoman involvement in seas shouldn't be seen as an exclusively a Mediterranean project. Until the mid-16th century, the early Ottoman Empire had as much of a stake in the eastern Mediterranean, Mediterranean but also in the Indian Ocean as any other player. After 1498 and the circumnavigation of the Cape of Good Hope, there is the beginning of the inter-regionalisation of the area known as the Indian Ocean world and the Ottomans have clear ambitions in participating in this system.

The European entry into the Indian Ocean World began with the emergence of Portuguese explorers at the end of the 15th Century and the following Portuguese colonialism, concentrated on Bahrain and Muscat. Under Albuquerque as commander, in 1507 the Portuguese sent an expedition which resulted in the seizure ports around modern day Oman controlling the Gulf of Oman, including the important port of Muscat. However, the commander had an overriding personal ambition to establish a great Eastern empire through the erection of impregnable fortresses at Aden, Diu, Hormuz on the other side of the Gulf, and Goa on the Western coast of the Indian sub-continent. Towards that end, in September 1507, he forced the king of Hormuz to sign a treaty which laid down that the king should be

restored to his kingdom, become a vassal of the king of Portugal and pay an annual tribute, and hand over an area outside the town, suitable for the erection of a fortress and a factory.

Portuguese influence then waned, however, and a second expedition to Hormuz in 1515 re-established Portuguese control over the island. Albuquerque now entered into agreement with Safavid Shah Isma'il I whereby the king of Hormuz would rule in the name of the Portuguese king, while the Portuguese themselves were to provide the Persians with shipping, invade Bahrain (*al-Bahrayn*) and join the Persians in a military alliance against the Turks.

By 1534 the Portuguese had lost control of Bahrain to the Ottomans. The Ottomans had moved into the area at local instigation, as rulers in the area sent envoys to welcome the Ottoman Sultan's entry into Baghdad. This development ushered in a period of Turkish-Portuguese and Persian-Portuguese rivalry in the Gulf. In 1525, Süleyman the Magnificent, sent his Grand Vizier Ibrahim Pasha to Cairo to reorganise the administration of Egypt. One of the accomplishments of Ibrahim Pasha was to energise the Egyptian (now Ottoman) navy in the Indian Ocean. In 1535, Süleyman Pasha, Governor of Egypt, set out with a fleet from Suez, drove the Portuguese from Yemen, and arriving in India, laid siege to Diu 1538 (Gujrat on the West Indian coast) in cooperation with the Sultan of Gujrat. The siege was, however, unsuccessful, and Süleyman Pasha returned to Egypt.

The Ottomans originally regarded the Indian Ocean as foreign and removed from their sphere of influence, as did most of the European powers of the early 16th Century. The Indian Ocean was a self-contained trading system stretching from the Swahili Coast all the way to South-East Asia. The sailors and merchants who dominated the region were largely Arabs from the Gulf area while India served as the geographic hub and largest market of goods within this network.

After 1488 a new dynamic, and destructive force exploded onto the scene, the heavily armed Portuguese galleon. Even with the Portuguese strong-arming their way into strategic possessions along the trade routes scattered throughout India and Africa, the Ottomans only became actively interested in exploring opportunities within the region after 1517 when they successfully annexed the Mamluk Sultanate.

While the Ottomans initially expanded into the Indian Ocean with the purpose of securing the southern flank of these new territories, they quickly realised they too could secure a significant advantage by securing the region's trade routes.

Within the remarkably short period time of a few decades, from 1498 and by 1538, the Portuguese and Ottomans had entered the Indian Ocean world, established competing footholds on its coastal cities and set up a whole new arena of competition for regional hegemony. With the failure of the Ottoman siege of Diu in 1538, the Ottoman Empire reverted to a policy of piracy, terrorizing Portuguese shipping across the Indian Ocean. By then the Ottomans had established a stronghold in Egypt annexing the Mamluk state, assimilated the Red Sea into their empire and had already fought and lost far reaching enterprises in the Indian sub-continent, framing them firmly in the Ottoman "Age of Exploration."

The narratives of the European "Age of Exploration" fit within the framework of early colonialism and its associated justifications of early ideas of sovereignty. In the late-medieval, pre-modern, Catholic Europe, its expression was through religious desire to save souls. An old myth re-emerged of Prester John, a supposedly powerful king of a legendary Christian nation in the undefined "east". It was popularly believed that Prester John had ordered all Christians to join him in a holy war against the non-believers. The search for Prester John had been a story appearing under different guises for centuries, found in 12th Century Byzantium, in Crusader legends and even in those referring to the Mongol Empire and the persona of Toghrul. The Portuguese explorers at the turn of the 15th century were also motivated by the search for Prester John on the African West coast that would ultimately spur them forward to the circumnavigation of the continent.

The Portuguese maritime presence went from a loosely held expeditionary force led by Da Gama at the dawn of the 16th century to under a century becoming a major presence in the Indian spice trade, and the dominant naval power operating in the Indian Ocean. The Portuguese method held a nominal rather than physical monopoly of the seas and Indian spice trade and went largely unchallenged by the other Islamic empires in the Indian Ocean. The Iberian Union was the dynastic union of the Crown of Portugal and the Spanish Crown between 1580 and 1640,

bringing the entire Iberian Peninsula, as well as Spanish and Portuguese overseas possessions, under the Spanish Habsburg kings. The union began as a result of the Portuguese crisis of succession and the ensuing War of the Portuguese Succession and lasted sixty years, until the Portuguese Restoration War and establishing a new ruling dynasty. As quickly as it was established, it lost its hegemony over the Indian Ocean from 1580 and was later wiped out by the newly created private state sponsored companies, the Dutch then the British East India Companies at the turn of the 17th century.

In this short time, however, the Portuguese method at empire was drastically different to that of the Ottoman. The Mediterranean method at empire was contrasted to that of the Indian Ocean. Most notably was the technological difference in the shipping between those built for the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean.

Manpower was essential for a Mediterranean fleet. The galley, the principal vessel of war in the Mediterranean and remained effectively similar across centuries and amongst the different states. Its key feature was that it was oar-powered, thereby requiring significant manpower. The oarsmen often turned into sword-wielding soldiers when boarding the enemy's galleys or when disembarking and leading charges on ports or other land fortifications. The challenge was that every time a fleet had to be manned, large numbers of men had to be found. The Ottomans tended to recruit their oarsmen among their conquered populations, in many cases avoiding forced conscription and relying on volunteers. But this method was insufficient when facing large Christian fleets in the 16th century. The North African ghazis, however, could supply large numbers of slaves, obtained during their raids on the Italian shores, and attracted Muslim populations from Spain after the Reconquista (8th-15th Century).²⁴²

The Portuguese galleon on the other hand relied on sails and wind-power for propulsion. Wind power was ideal for the conditions of the Atlantic and Indian

²⁴² Jakub Grygiel, "Ottoman Sea Power and the Decline of the Mediterranean World," in *China Goes to Sea: Maritime Transformation in Comparative Historical Perspective*, ed. Andrew Erickson et al. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2009), p.111

Ocean where winds could reach higher forces compared to the confined Mediterranean Sea. The oceans would also whip up larger waves and so the Portuguese galleon were made to be high sided, larger, and heavier, multi-decked vessels unlike their counterparts in the Mediterranean. This would allow them to keep afloat in rougher seas but also had the advantage of being able to store more produce for trade in their lower decks and, crucially, carry cannons for both attack and defence capabilities. Relying on wind power, sails, and guns instead of men meant the Portuguese would have more efficient vessels. They exchanged the reliance on humans for inanimate power, thus requiring less manpower, fewer provision and could travel further. Their naval tactics were thus changed to favour bombarding coastal towns or other vessels from a distance rather than having to rely on first disembarking on shore or ramming other ships then boarding them.

Even so, the Portuguese didn't succeed in the Mediterranean. By the mid-16th century, the Ottoman navy had two clear advantages over its Portuguese and other Christian counterpart. First, the Ottomans controlled most of the East Mediterranean coastline. This allowed the Ottomans to hinder, and if necessary, block European shipping, to control access to key shipbuilding resources (especially timber which was in short supply in Italy), and to encircle the eastern Mediterranean. The second advantage was the Ottoman reliance on North African Muslim corsairs, who supplied them with manpower as well as new technologies. They were in constant contact with the Portuguese ships in North and East Africa, and with the Spanish navy in the Mediterranean, and these continuous clashes forced them to introduce new ship designs in order to compete with the technologically more advanced Atlantic powers. Nevertheless, the Ottomans remained reliant on the galley as their principal ship, and despite their defeats in the Indian Ocean did not attempt to compete technologically with the Portuguese.²⁴³

Although the "Age of Exploration" does not begin until well into the 16th century, its origins as an idea can be traced to a document from the early modern period in 1494, the Treaty of Tordesillas. Originally, a Papal bull (or edict), it set the foundations of the rules of engagement for colonialism. The rivalry between

²⁴³ Ibid.

Portugal and Spain for the control of trade with the Orient had intensified. The Pope stepped in to arbitrate and in 1494, after year-long negotiations, the Treaty of Tordesillas was signed at the return of Columbus from his first voyage to the New World. This in effect drew an imaginary north-south dividing line through the Atlantic, West of Cape Verde, giving all the newly discovered lands to the West of the line to Spain and everything to the East of the line to Portugal. The treaty meant that Portugal retained its control of the West African coastal trade and of the possible sea route to India. Three years later in 1497 King Manuel I, appointed Vasco da Gama to lead a pioneering voyage to India.

The problem for the Ottomans was that the Indian Ocean was not the Mediterranean and the strategy and thalassologies that was successful in the latter was not appropriate in the former. Although the Portuguese shipping was superior to that of the Ottoman Mediterranean fleet, there was no concerted Portuguese effort to enter to Mediterranean system, instead their ambitions were, literally, global. Their galleons, naus, stocked with the bombarda grossas, that could deliver 40kg shots each, lined on their broadsides as well as the bow and stern was the epitome of the importance of artillery in naval supremacy.

Unlike the Ottoman strategy of establishing a chokehold by surrounding bodies of water with firm control over the coastal land masses, the Portuguese, low on manpower and geographically far from the arenas in question, focused their efforts as a *modus operandi* on the establishment of fortified footholds or strategic outposts covering large territories and dominating the maritime trade routes.

An example of the Portuguese method in the Indian Ocean at controlling maritime trade routes were the fortifications at Diu. The fortress withstood multiple sieges by the Ottomans, notably in 1538. The Portuguese's main advantage was that the Asian rulers, the Mughals of India, and the Ming of China cared little who managed trade along their coasts, as long as taxes and trade continued to flow inland. Most of all, the scale of Portuguese activities was never a threat to anyone other than the local rulers of small coastal kingdoms or of island states. Indian states were funded by agricultural rather than commercial revenues and were thus indifferent to maritime trade. "Even Gujarat, one of South Asia's most maritime-oriented states,

drew only six percent of its revenues from sea-trade, which is why it did not busy itself with the ocean.”²⁴⁴ The Portuguese outposts would eventually lead to the establishment of factories where inland trade would be brought to the coast and shipped by their galleons to the West. In India, the Mughals rose to prominence, creating an Islamic empire to rival the Ottomans in size and power. Despite their shared religion, they saw the Turks as a threat and favoured the weaker and more manageable Portuguese, contributing significantly to the deterioration of Ottoman influence in the central and eastern Indian Ocean. This thalassology, part of the European “Age of Exploration” was in contrast to that of the Mediterranean Ottoman thalassology, based on a continuous landmass and only assisted by the seas as parallel highways.

The Ottoman court was split on the Indian Ocean enterprise, the Grand Vizier Rustem Pasha, opposed the idea and Sokollu Mehmed Pasha, its strongest supporter as well as, not surprisingly, high officials tasked with governing Egypt and managing the Hejaz and Yemen. Also supporting the enterprise, were the privateers aware of how profitable the spice trade was and the advantages a strong Ottoman presence in the Indian Ocean.

The Indian Ocean lobby during the 16th century affected by personal rivalries at the Ottoman court hampered the development of a long-term policy, including ambitions for a Suez canal.²⁴⁵ Opinion shifted to tax from land as the favoured source of income over profits made from the spice trade. The Ottoman-Safavid territorial struggles and the maritime losses including the battle of Lepanto, helped shift away interest in the Indian Ocean.²⁴⁶

While the Venetians in the 13-15th centuries and the Portuguese in the late 15th and 16th century concentrated their efforts on building widely dispersed strongholds along key sea routes and controlled commercial flows from them, the Ottomans attempted to counter such expansion by effectively enveloping the contested waters

²⁴⁴ Tonio Andrade, "Asian States and Overseas Expansion, 1500–1700: An Approach to the Problem of European Exceptionalism," in *Asian Expansions: The Historical Experiences of Polity Expansion in Asia*, ed. Geoff Wade (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), p.54.

²⁴⁵ Casale, *The Ottoman Age of Exploration*, p.160

²⁴⁶ Ibid., p.137

by land. While Portugal rejected the conquering tradition of its warrior aristocracy to lean almost entirely upon maritime commerce as the primary reason for imperial naval expansion in the East, the Ottomans, in contrast, sought to conquer territories in order to gain tax revenues from newly acquired agricultural and commercial economies.

Thus, the conquest system of the Ottomans reflected the desire to administer and tax numerous lands and peoples, for only ample resources could support the vast armies and bureaucracies that ruled the Muslim Empire. A resultant feature of this strategy was that the Ottomans rarely focused on defeating the enemy's fleet, and instead limited themselves to controlling the shore, thus hindering the operations of the enemy's fleet. This was in part a conscious decision taken from a position of naval weakness, but it continued even after the Ottoman navy achieved a considerable strength and mastered the necessary skills to conduct naval operations. The key to Ottoman sea power was not maritime control (or, from the Ottoman perspective, the destruction of the enemy's fleet), but control over the coast. That is why Lepanto, where the Sultan's fleet was annihilated, did not end Ottoman control of the sea. The maritime strategy of a continental state, such as the Ottoman empire, maintains its land-centric focus.

Furthermore, this Ottoman method of continual land expansion was in direct contrast to the overseas outposts of Portuguese, Genoese and Venetian method, which concentrated only on a few, widely scattered ports. As Nicholas Spykman observed, "A land power thinks in terms of continuous surfaces surrounding a central point of control, while a sea power thinks in terms of points and connecting lines dominating an immense territory."²⁴⁷

But control over these shores was insufficient to hinder Portuguese naval operations. In part this was due to the sheer size of the Indian Ocean; it could not be easily encircled by land, like the Mediterranean. Even when the Ottomans controlled the Arabian coastline, the Portuguese could simply avoid nearby sea routes and reach their ports in India without difficulty.

²⁴⁷ Nicholas J. Spykman, "Geography and Foreign Policy, II," *The American Political Science Review* 32, no. 2 (1938), pp.213–36

It is of course the seminal work of Fernand Braudel, *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II*, first published in 1949 that brought together the Mediterranean as a system and the Ottomans played as much a part in his account of the time of Philip II of Spain as the Spanish or English. As Colin Heywood has commented²⁴⁸, his accounts of the rise of the Ottomans are due to, unsatisfyingly, merely the crisis and decline of the Mediterranean city-states and of states “merely the extensions of powerful cities”, including Aragon/Barcelona, the Byzantine Empire/Constantinople and Thessaloniki. His account of the success of the Ottomans is broad stroke as well, due to “three centuries [sic] of repeated effort, of prolonged conflict and of miracles”, whose beginnings, says Braudel, “gave the Ottoman state its style, its foundations among the people and its original exaltation”. The miracle, he adds is that “such a tiny state should have survived the accidents and disturbances inherent in its geographical position”.²⁴⁹

An important starting point in establishing the Ottoman participation in the Mediterranean, Braudel's work contributed to our own understanding of a Mediterranean thalassology, describing at first the environment, geography, and the climate. The Turks are seen from a Francophone perspective, with examples of their involvement in North Africa and the Maghreb. The resumption by the Ottomans of Spanish-occupied Tunis is given as an example of the lack of interruption Lepanto gave. Braudel's argument of “what killed the Ottoman navy was inaction”²⁵⁰ due to peace in the Mediterranean. He also noted, however, that the Turkish occupation of Egypt was not the stimulator of the age of discoveries, but the reverse.²⁵¹

The Mediterranean during the “Age of Exploration” and the first inter-regionalisation of the world trade systems played a secondary role. The Mediterranean states became marginal in the new race to trade in the Atlantic and were left out of the European and American trade. This inaccessibility for the

²⁴⁸ Colin Heywood, "Fernand Braudel and the Ottomans: The Emergence of an Involvement (1928–50)", *Mediterranean Historical Review* 23, no. 2 (December 2008), pp.165–84

²⁴⁹ Ibid, p.170

²⁵⁰ Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), p.1141

²⁵¹ Ibid., p.667

Mediterranean states including the Ottomans, meant they were left out on the colonial exploitation the Spanish and Portuguese so readily made the most of. The Spanish access to silver mines, particularly then the largest in the world, in Potosi, not only allowed them to bring bullion back into Europe, causing “Spanish Price Revolution” and severe inflation but also allowed Castile to finance simultaneous wars against not only those Mediterranean states but also England and the Dutch as well as their engagements in the New World and Asia.

The influx of the riches of both the East and the West into Western Europe in the early 16th century during this time altered the world trade balance significantly and would act as a catalyst for Ottoman ambition into the new horizons of the Red Sea and the borders of the Indian Ocean World. The usual regional rivals of Venice in the maritime sphere and Hungary in eastern Europe were replaced by other rising sea powers and their colonial method at empire. The Ottoman necessity to build a maritime force became even more crucial in this new context. Conceivably it is the second-class status of the Mediterranean system, the decreasing relevance of the Mediterranean maritime routes which meant that the 1571 Battle of Lepanto was not, as previously thought, such a cataclysmic event for the Ottoman ambitions at controlling inter-regional trade²⁵². The Ottomans rebuilt their navy by 1572, and it seemed that the battle had done little to alter the balance of power in the Mediterranean.

In 1509, Mamluks of Egypt allied with the Indian sultanate of Gujarat in an attempt to drive out the Portuguese, only to have Portugal's superior navy defeat their combined fleets off the Gujarati coast. It is possible that the financial strain caused by Portuguese activities fatally weakened the Egyptians, because only eight years later they were conquered by the Ottoman Turks.

²⁵² Casale, *The Ottoman Age of Exploration*, p.138; Hess, “The Battle of Lepanto and Its Place in Mediterranean History.”, pp.53–73. On the other hand, Faroqi, *The Ottoman Empire and the World Around It* p.38 and Palmira Brummett, “The Lepanto Paradigm Revisited: Knowing the Ottomans in the Sixteenth Century,” 63- 93, in Anna Contadini, and Claire Norton, editors, *The Renaissance and Ottoman World*. (Farnham, Surrey; Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2013).

In 1517 when Selim I captured Cairo, he also captured the last Abbasid Caliph, al-Mutawakkil III and had his title transferred to the Ottoman dynasty. In that year, the Ottoman Empire took on another defining nature, it became a Caliphate. Selim assumed not the title of “Caliph” but that of “Servant of the Two Noble Sanctuaries” (*Khādim al-haramayn al-sharīfayn*²⁵³) was now responsible for protecting Muslim merchants and pilgrims throughout the Indian Ocean and if he was successfully in this, he might reasonably expect a measure of allegiance in return from Muslims throughout maritime Asia, regardless of whether or not they were actually Ottoman subjects.²⁵⁴

The Indian Ocean world was where two different thalassologies and their empires met. On the one hand, the Portuguese participating in the European “Age of Exploration” with its associated Catholic definitions of sovereignty, and on the other hand, the Ottomans described as part of the “Gunpowder Empire”²⁵⁵ land-based empire paradigm were also participating in their own, “Age of Exploration”. Their “Ottoman Age of Exploration” was performed with the Red Sea at its centre stage expanding into the Indian Ocean world. Although the Ottoman thalassology might not have included the imagining of the “Red Sea” as a Bahr-i Ahmer, now for all intents and purposes a Caliphate, it instead framed it under its own terms and linking it inextricably to the Hajj and Mecca, the Bahr-i Mekka.

4.4 Empire alla Turca

The traditional story of the Ottomans starts with the entry of the Turks into Anatolia in 1071 and the battle of Manzikert, Malazgirt, between the Byzantine and Seljuk Empires. Until 1299, the date accepted as the inception of the Ottomans, the history

²⁵³ Hugh Kennedy, *The Caliphate*, (London: Penguin, 2016), p.343

²⁵⁴ Giancarlo Casale, "Tordesillas and the Ottoman Caliphate: Early Modern Frontiers and the Renaissance of an Ancient Islamic Institution," *Journal of Early Modern History* 19, no. 6 (23 October 2015), pp.485–511

²⁵⁵ Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam* ; McNeill, “The Age of Gunpowder Empires, 1450-1800”

of the Turks is known as the “black hole”²⁵⁶ and is accounted for by Paul Wittek’s *Ghāzī* ²⁵⁷ thesis.²⁵⁸

The Ghazi thesis puts emphasis on the bellicose nature of the early beyliks of Anatolia.²⁵⁹ Osman Ghazi and his beylik would be the ultimate victor over other rival tribes and the start of his Ottoman dynasty. A Ghazi was a warrior of God who carried out the Ghaza. The original meaning of Ghaza was only of a “raid against the infidels” at the frontiers of Islam for the purpose of the acquisition of plunder and less so the expansion of Islam as a religion. Ghaza was not synonymous with Jihad, Holy War. The word Jihad is rarely used in these frontier narratives and the sources clearly maintained a distinction.

However, as part of the founding legends of the Ottoman Empire, the emphasis on Holy War was loaded only retrospectively in Medieval narrative sources²⁶⁰ to the term Ghazi. Osman’s beylik did everything but wage a ghaza in the sense of Holy War. The early Ottomans recruited the Byzantine peasantry and incorporated them into their society. They were even allowed to continue their Greek Orthodox religious practices. In many cases a hybridised version of Islam and Greek Orthodoxy emerged as Turkic peoples spread across the Anatolian peninsula. The early Ottomans also fought against fellow Muslims. They did not enforce strict

²⁵⁶ Colin Imber, “The Legend of Osman Gazi,” in Zachariadou, *The Ottoman Emirate*, pp.67-73 ; Colin Heywood, “Filling the Black Hole: The Emergence of the Bithynian Atamanates,” in *The Great Ottoman Turkish Civilisation*, ed. Kemal Çiçek, Ercüment Kuran, Nejat Göyünç, Eugenia Kermeli and Oktay Özel, eds *The Ottoman Empire: Myths, Realities and “Black Holes”: Contributions in Honour of Colin Imber* (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2006) ; İlber Ortaylı (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınevi, 2000), 1, pp.107-15

²⁵⁷ “A *ghāzī* is the instrument of the religion of God, a servant of God who cleans the earth from the defilement of polytheism; a *ghāzī* is the sword of God, he is the protector and the refuge of the Believers; if he becomes a martyr while following the paths of God, do not think him dead, he lives with God as one of the blessed, he has Eternal Life” Paul Wittek, “Deux chapitres de l’histoire des Turcs de Roum”, in *Byzantion*, xi, (1936), p.304.

²⁵⁸ Ibid., pp.285-319 and Paul, Wittek, *The rise of the Ottoman Empire*, (London : Royal Asiatic Society, 1938).

²⁵⁹ Further on the controversy around the Wittek thesis: Dimitri Kastritsis, ‘Conquest and Political Legitimation in the Early Ottoman Empire’ eds. Jonathan Harris, Catherine Holmes, and Eugenia Russell. *Byzantines, Latins, and Turks in the Eastern Mediterranean world after 1150*. (Oxford Studies in Byzantium. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 225-234.

²⁶⁰ 15th century Ottoman historian Aşıkpaşazade *Tevārīḫ-i Âl-i ‘Osmān* (History of the house of Osman), *Menâkıb-ı Âl-i Osman* (Story of the house of Osman) and poet Aḥmedî (d.1413).

religious practices; shamanism, Christianity, and pre-Islamic cults, the cult of the ancestor, many Central Asian Turkic practices, existed amongst their ranks, all of which served as evidence which directly contradicts any notion of Osman's beylik as a state whose existence was solely based upon Islamic holy war. Furthermore, no contemporary Byzantine source²⁶¹ mentioned any sort of Ghaza, and later Ottoman chroniclers who noted that Osman was a ghazi, made it clear that rather than the spread Islam, he was more deeply concerned with plunder.

During its early stages, under Osman I (‘*Osman Gāzī*; *I. Osman*; d. 1323/4) and subsequently Orhan I (*Orhan Gazi* c.1281–1362), the Ottoman principality was a tribal confederation gathered around the Ottoman dynasty on the basis of common interest, which almost wholly rested on ghaza-raids. These were a set of very specific methods at conquest, through raid and plunder based on a specific set of economic motivations, both the acquisition of land and booty.

The events in the lead up to and during the siege of Constantinople in 1453, reflected the developing nature of the Ottoman Empire. The walls of Constantinople had succeeded in defending the city for centuries from attackers, but the adoption by the Ottomans of the new technology of gunpowder revolutionised siege warfare. Gunpowder emerged in China centuries ago, probably at the turn of the millennia, and had reached eastern Europe by the 13th century. The development of cannons in with European methods at metallurgy was readily adopted by the Ottomans who in turn, had by the mid-15th century the ability to cast their own cannons. This was only possible under a centralised state structure due to the vast number of resources required to produce the highly specialised technology, monopolising its effective use in warfare in the hands of advanced states.

This nature of the Ottoman empire was described as a “Gunpowder Empire” by Hodgson and McNeill,²⁶² that identifies commonalities between three of the contemporary eastern empires, the Ottoman, Safavid and Mughal empires. All three

²⁶¹ The 1148 *Alexiad* by the Byzantine princess *Anna Komnene*, daughter of Emperor *Alexios I Komnenos* does not refer to *ghaza* when recounting Byzantine-Turkish conflict in Anatolia.

²⁶² Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam* ; McNeill, “The Age of Gunpowder Empires, 1450-1800”

were Islamic, land-based, and inter-warring empires of common central-Asian Turkic descent. There existed a stable power struggle between all three particularly after the 1514 Battle of Çaldıran that created more or less the modern Turkish and Iranian border. Furthermore, these empires also had a common centralised militarist administrative hierarchy made up of soldier-administrators, the Janissaries in the Ottoman example. Geoffrey Parker argues in *The Military Revolution 1500-1800* that later by the 1550's this trio of Islamic empires, the Ottomans, Safavids and the Mughals were capable of resisting Portuguese monopoly of the seas. The Ottomans, however, were the only empire of the three to actively participate in the seas and become as much a maritime empire as any other in the Mediterranean. Even whilst resisting Portuguese encroachment, the Safavid and Mughals did so by challenging them on land and not out at sea.

The conquest of Istanbul marked the beginnings of another journey the Ottomans would embark on, their unmistakeable encounter with the seas. Most immediately these were the Aegean and the Black seas but with the conquest, it now also meant the whole of the eastern Mediterranean. Although, in their early stages, the Ottomans can be seen as tribal raiders (and later “Gunpowder Empires”²⁶³), the mercantile experience of Ottoman Pera and the commercial treaties after 1453, show that it quickly moved away from these exclusive definitions to a mercantile empire. The ‘ahidnâme of 1453 nevertheless was still an oath sworn on one’s sword, an ancient *alla Turka* tradition (line 7, *kuşandığım kılıcımın hakkıçün*²⁶⁴), Sakiroglu notes that this is a practice continued until the end of the century, but also enforcing the tribal dynastic tradition of swearing on ancestors and future generations (line 7, *ve dedem rûhiçün ve babam rûhiçün ve benüm bâşım için ve oğlancıklarımın bâşıçün*) a slight deviation from the Byzantine tradition, but an indication also of pre-established Turkish-Latin practices. The document most importantly promised keeping old habits (line 9, *yine ol üslub üzere âdetlerin ve erkânların yerine getüreler*²⁶⁵). The Sultan become the inheritor of the Byzantium,

²⁶³ Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam* ; McNeill, “The Age of Gunpowder Empires, 1450-1800”

²⁶⁴ See the 1453 ‘ahidnâme in section 1.3.

²⁶⁵ Ibid.

the Kayser-i Rûm, and its well-established trading circles were handed over to his control.

The early Ottoman Empire after the conquest of Istanbul in 1453 found itself now a part of the eastern Mediterranean system, inheriting all the characteristics of a Mediterranean empire both land and seas (line 12, *deryadan ve kurudan*²⁶⁶). This inherited relationship with the sea must mark the inauguration of an Ottoman “Age of Exploration” so inseparably linked with its relationship with the seas. It is the moment the Ottomans are fully thrust into, and are experiencing their own, Mediterranean thalassology which would later lead them to expand into the Indian Ocean World and participate in further inter-regional maritime rivalries.

This formation of an Ottoman thalassology as an eastern Mediterranean Empire, begs the question of what role pre-modern Ottoman Istanbul took in this new homogenised territory. In other words, if now an eastern Mediterranean Empire by conquest and succession, what would the experience of its principle urban and trading centre be?

This question must be looked at in parallel with Ottoman imagination of spaces, particularly maritime spaces, as it’s inextricably linked to the Ottoman developing self-consciousness as an eastern Mediterranean Empire. The conquest of Constantinople in 1453 and the establishment of the centre of the Ottoman Empire in Istanbul, solidified the very nature of the Ottoman Empire as being, whether by design or chance, an empire with a direct relationship with the sea. The Ottoman imagination of the seas in and around its dominions in the 15th and 16th centuries bear a striking rapport with its own understanding and application of what it is to be an empire.

In order to understand the Ottoman recognition of the identity of the merchant foreigner, and its extrapolated implications for Ottoman self-identity, the application of the preceding tradition of privileges must be understood in relation to its subsequent pragmatic application under the Ottoman religious law, the Shari'a (*Şeriat*).

²⁶⁶ Ibid.

Whether dhimmīs or Djeneviz bāzırgānları in post-conquest Ottoman Pera there existed a complex pluralist legal framework. This was, uniquely, not only due to the recognition of the special status of dhimmī as per the Shari'a but also due to the characteristically pragmatic Ottoman application of religious legal frameworks by recognising the dar al-sulh. These produced a separate special status and identity of the merchant foreigner, protected under the title of müste'min, with the ability to trade freely in Ottoman lands.

These different titles or identities, guaranteeing privileges to foreigners within the Ottoman lands, either as dhimmīs or Frengis, not only had commercial, religious, and legal consequences, but as also played a part in the construction of Ottoman self-identity. Recognising the identity of the foreign merchant tacitly highlighted what the Ottoman identity was not. It recognised the invaluable role of the merchant foreigner whether transient, the Frengis or settled, the dhimmīs and codified the relationship with their Ottoman rulers. The merchant foreigner had pre-existing primacy over the established trade routes of Pera, monopolising access to the Black Sea and the trading of certain goods.

This relationship, in the first instance, when viewed from the language used in the 'ahidnāme is submissive to Ottoman rule. Its day-to-day application, for merchant foreigners, was certainly not as straight forward as a pragmatist would hope. Merchants would have to invoke the assistance of their consul and ambassadors to petition the Ottoman administration for the issuing of a grant, berat, stating the specific articles in treaties applicable and would also require renewal. Similarly, any trader intending to travel within Ottoman lands would require appropriate documentation, a route document (*yol emri/hükmü*). Although such bureaucracy is arguably inevitable, it emphasised the Ottoman perceived superiority as the grantors of rights, from a position of clear authority.

Thus, new Ottoman territories were a part of a pluralist, eastern Mediterranean, mercantile, empire. It was an empire with responsibilities towards their new peoples. The administration of these new responsibilities and rights, particularly of the merchant foreigners, was handled by a complex bureaucracy that was formed by extension to meet the new need. The Ottomans became therefore aware of their new

role as an eastern Mediterranean Empire, managing multiple peoples and their multiple interests.

Up until the mid-1500s, the Ottomans taking on the characteristics and a self-awareness of being or becoming an eastern Mediterranean Empire had a clear stake in the Mediterranean maritime spaces and made active efforts to engage with spaces beyond, the Red Sea and even the Indian Ocean World. What the extensive discussions about whether there was an “Ottoman Age of Exploration”, or even those on the nature of the Ottoman Empire, particularly the “Gunpowder Empire”²⁶⁷ paradigm misses, is that this formative period and the creation of the identity of the Merchant Foreigner versus the Rest acts as a foundation to Ottoman involvement, or arguably, aspirations of becoming an empire dominating multiple maritime spaces. In other words, the Merchant Foreigner under Ottoman dominion leading in eastern Mediterranean trading circles did not exclude Ottoman state control over the maritime trade in the Mediterranean and did not hamper their efforts in becoming a maritime force.

Quite the opposite, the status of the Merchant Foreigner would enable the Ottomans to become a maritime force. The century after 1453 is a crucial point in the foundation of the nature of the Ottoman Empire. The unique privileged relationship of the Merchant Foreigners versus the Rest in early Ottoman Istanbul, or similarly that of Pera and the City had implications on Ottoman self-identity. Codifying the status of the merchant foreigner tacitly acknowledged what the Ottoman rulers were not, in this case, those who were active in pre-existing trading circles of the eastern Mediterranean, instead, they had an authoritative role in managing them.

Maria Pia Pedani Fabris “Between Diplomacy and Trade: Ottoman merchants in Venice.” puts forward a nuance to this self-acknowledgment by the Ottomans of what they are not, or are she phrases it that “Turks are not merchants”. She points at the discovery of many documents which demonstrate the contrary, the *ahidnâme* given to the Venetians by Mehmed I in 1416 introducing reciprocal rights for Ottoman’s trading in Venetian-ruled areas. The author mentions, Kafadar’s claim

²⁶⁷ Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam* ; McNeill, “The Age of Gunpowder Empires, 1450-1800”

that there is a noticeable upswing of Ottoman mercantile activity in Venice after the peace of 1573.²⁶⁸ Although there are Ottoman mercantile activity present, similar to their description as pirates in the State Papers²⁶⁹, the main state policy was geared at a pragmatic method at empire that is a facilitator, promoter and active participant in regional and inter-regional trade.

The “Golden Age” of the rule of Süleyman the Magnificent, Kanunî Sultan Süleyman (r. 1520 –1566) and his son Selim II, Selīm-i sâni (r.1566 –1574) as the pinnacle of the Empire, although re-examined²⁷⁰, coincided with the European “Age of Exploration”. By the mid-16th century, the Ottomans were in a position of strength: the borders with the Safavid Empire strengthened after Çaldıran in 1514, dominating most of the eastern Mediterranean with a competing navy and a firmly Ottoman controlled coastline, and the Mamluk state annexed in 1517. These conquests, which united the lands of eastern Europe and the eastern Mediterranean under a single authority, brought a time of peace and stability.

The Ottoman thalassalogy of its encounters with seas was unique unto itself and didn’t frame its imagination of spaces as expected, but it instead did so under its own terms, affirming its own particular alla Turca method at empire. Crucially the Ottoman Red Sea, imagined not as the as the Bahr-i Ahmer but instead Bahr-i Mekka after 1517, only half a decade after the conquest of Istanbul in 1453, illustrated a new side to the nature of the Ottoman Empire.

All the characterisations of the Ottomans, shedding its identity from a Ghazi state, a “Gunpowder Empire”²⁷¹ to an eastern Mediterranean empire, experiencing a “Golden Age” and with ambitions of an “Ottoman Age of Exploration”, all have one common feature, the integration of the Ottoman state into local, regional, and

²⁶⁸ Pedani Fabris “Between Diplomacy and Trade”

²⁶⁹ Document Add. 28,583 from the *State Papers of Spain* written by the Imperial Ambassador to Rome, Miçer Mai, by 1531 providing a summary of the intimidating Ottoman activity in the Mediterranean reads that “there is an infestation of Turkish pirates in the Mediterranean.”

²⁷⁰ Cemal Kafadar, “The Myth of the Golden Age: Ottoman Historical Consciousness in the Post-Süleymanic Era,” in *Suleyman the Second and His Time*, edited by Halil İnalcık and Cemal Kafadar. Istanbul: Isis, 1993., pp.37–48

²⁷¹ Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam*; McNeill, “The Age of Gunpowder Empires, 1450-1800”

inter-regional economic system, with a single underlying motivation, the hegemony over trade.

The only exception to this common feature is the characterisation of the Ottoman Empire as a Caliphate. A Caliphate, World Empire, responsible for, and burdened by, the protection of the Hajj and furthermore, all Muslims.

The extent of the reach of the perceived responsibility is best expressed on the fringes of the eastern Indian Ocean world in which they found themselves involved in, the Sultanate of Aceh. Centred around the modern-day Indonesian province of Aceh, the first sultan of the Aceh Darussalam Sultanate, a Sunni Muslim, Ali Mughayat Syah fostered diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Sultan and recognised Ottoman Dynasty as their caliphs and protector against their common regional rivals the Portuguese. The Ottomans and the Sultanate of Aceh shared common trading routes from East to West, and encountered on the pilgrimage route to Mecca and Medina.

Süleyman, received the envoy from Aceh in 1547 at Istanbul and sent an Ottomans ambassador to Aceh later in 1564-65. The wealth of Aceh enabled them to hire trained soldiers from overseas and their army contained large contingents of Turkish soldiers. Aceh's key strategic position and wealth came from the Malacca Straits which was, for centuries, the gateway into the Indian Ocean World from the East and from where trade from India to China was conducted.

The Portuguese commander Albuquerque fought his way to the Malacca straits by first taking Hormuz in the Gulf in 1507, Goa on the Western shore of the Indian sub-continent in 1510 and finally Malacca in 1511 as part of the Portuguese method at securing regional coastal hubs to control trade. They introduced the cartaz written permit naval trade licence system to establish full monopoly over all trade that passed through their sphere of interest. Aceh took on the role of leader of the Muslim opposition against the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean. The Portuguese regarded initially Aceh's actions against their ships in the straits as raids, but they quickly began to perceive the help of the Ottomans as part of a wider motivation of jihad.

This focus on the title Caliph might be a 19th century distortion of its power and influence on the 16th century Muslim World, associated with the later British fear of a Muslim uprising in the Indian sub-continent during the First World War under the banner of jihad called for by the Caliph. In 1517 after Selim I captured Cairo and the last Abbasid Caliph, he did not take the title of “Caliph” but that of Khādim al-haramayn al-sharīfayn²⁷² “Servant of the Two Noble Sanctuaries”. This was a true expression of what the Ottomans self-identified their role being as an empire. They were only explicitly responsible for protecting the Hajj and the associated movement of people and, inevitably, trade. Selim I did not use the title “Caliph” and the Ottomans seemed to lack an enthusiasm for its use until the later 19th century and the rule of Abdü'l-Ḥamīd-i sâni (r.1876–1909) who used Pan-Islamism in his efforts to strengthen his grip on the empire.²⁷³

Brummett on the sixteenth century and the “Age of Discovery”, described as a period when the voyaging empires of Western Europe endeavoured to capture the revenues of the oriental trade and, in the process, came upon and conquered the Americans. In her view, early sixteenth century Ottoman expansion was in large part both inspired and driven by what she calls the pecuniary “profit motive”. Dismissing the idea that “Islamic jihad was foremost in the minds of Ottoman foreign policy planners”, she insists that their expansion towards Suez and beyond denoted commercial and economic “intentionality”. Her conclusion is that the Ottoman Empire was at the protectionist, pre-mercantilist stage in the sixteenth century, as characterised by İnalcık, with steps taken toward economic internationality.²⁷⁴

The Ottoman inter-regional endeavours outlined in the Ottoman “Age of Exploration” is situated further back in time as there is a conscious and active participation, in regional and, at least the existence of, ambitions in inter-regional trading activity from the moment of the conquest and their takeover of maritime trade routes in and out of Pera. Brummett defines the expansion into Mamluk territory and beyond as commercial and economic “intentionality”. This early

²⁷² Kennedy, *Caliphate*, p.343

²⁷³ Ibid., chapters “The Ottoman Caliphate” and “Abd al-Ḥamīd II, Sultan and Caliph”.

²⁷⁴ Brummett, *Ottoman Seapower and Levantine Diplomacy*

notable active participation contextualises the 1571 Battle of Lepanto as being part of a longer Ottoman ambition in the participation of inter-regional trade and its associated mercantile method at empire.

The conquest of Pera and Istanbul came at end of the 15th century that saw the beginning of geopolitical changes resulting in a gradual marginalisation of the Mediterranean and the globalisation of the strategic map faced by eastern Mediterranean states. Beginning with the opening up of new maritime routes to America and circumnavigating the African continent, the Atlantic powers in Europe (the Dutch Republic, Portugal, Spain, and England) within a century gained a considerable advantage over the Mediterranean states. It isn't a coincidence that after those granted by Mehmed II following the conquest of Constantinople, the first significant Ottoman capitulations were those given out by Süleyman the Magnificent, notably to France in 1535 opening of foreign intervention in the Empire.

The routes linking Europe and Asia through the Mediterranean Sea and the eastern Mediterranean had to compete with those new routes to America and the East. The eastern Mediterranean's key *raison d'être*, to control Eastern trade into the West, was weakened by the shift in trade routes to the Atlantic Ocean. Venice, Genoa and then the Ottomans had to compete with Western European powers for access to Asian markets for the first time. For instance, from 1507 on the Portuguese often blockaded the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, interrupting the flow of goods (mainly spices) to Alexandria and other Mediterranean ports. The link between the Mediterranean and Asia was therefore threatened, and the various trading cities, from Venice to the cities on the Levantine coast, began to become less relevant. From the early 16th century on, states such as Portugal or the Dutch Republic started to have direct access to the Asian markets. The influx of silver bullion and the subsequent "Spanish Price Revolution" had a further impact on the regional economic systems and the Ottomans as intermediaries between the Western European markets and eastern trade.

From the 15th to the 16th Century a global trade system began to emerge. Previously unconnected territories began to trade with each other. These new links changed the

shift in the polycentric trade system that was established before the integration of the Americas, centred on the engine, China. Europe had been marginal in these trade routes, always competing within itself for the limited resources and at the terminus of the Asian-Eastern trade links.

By this point, however, the Ottomans had a fairly sophisticated picture of the world and its oceans. Ottoman spies kept abreast of the latest Spanish and Portuguese cartographic knowledge, to the extent that by 1513, the Turks were able to produce the Piri Reis world map, based mostly on Western cartographies, but nevertheless with a detailed depiction of the American coastline. In other words, in 1513, the Ottomans were aware of the new trading routes, self-imagined their position as being part of a larger world trade system. Then the reason why there were no Ottoman conquistadors joining their European counterparts in staking a claim in the New World is one that explains the *alla Turca* method at Empire. The Ottoman dominions were much closer to an even greater resource, South Asia, and the Indian Ocean world. Until the nineteenth century, the Americas were something of a backwater and the main object of international competition was still the Indian Ocean and the routes to East Asia. Ottoman proximity to the Indian Ocean gave them an economic advantage over the Portuguese, who had to travel the much longer route around Africa to gain access. Nonetheless, the Portuguese, as well as the Dutch and English who followed them, considered the trip worthwhile and valued their possessions in that ocean more highly than those in the Americas.

All these descriptions of the Empire *alla Turca*, a Ghazi, “Gunpowder”, eastern Mediterranean empire, or one participating in an Ottoman “Age of Exploration” are all methods at empire with the primacy of pecuniary over all other motives. This would later take on its most extreme form of the burdensome capitulations, nevertheless still following the inherited traditions of the privileges.

The second half of the 18th century paved the way for a new economic system through developments in trade, industry and shipping spurred on by European players including British liberalism replacing the mercantilist approach. It is in this context that Capitulations, part of the ‘Free-Trade Agreements’ of the early-nineteenth century, including notably the *Baltalimanı* Agreement signed in 1838

between the British and Ottoman Empires, can be seen as part of the harmonisation process with the time's prevailing currents of the world economy.

The 1838 commercial treaty came a year before the 1839 Edict of Gülhane which launched the reorganisation of the Empire or the Tanzimat era. The 1839 Edict granted security of life, honour, and property, along with reforms in taxing and conscription methods. The extensive works on the Tanzimat era have focused predominantly on how the reformers tackled the question of Ottoman identity. It is clear from the following clause that there is a move to the identity of the "Ottoman subject" or "Ottomanism" which does not distinguish between religion or sect: "These imperial concessions extend to all our subjects, whatever religion or sect they may belong to; and they will enjoy them without any exception." It thus became popularly known as the edict that said "*gavura gavur denilmeyecek*" that is, a foreigner shall no longer be called a foreigner.

İlber Ortaylı in *The longest century of the Empire* makes the point by suggesting the treaty between the British and the Ottomans was the result of an unavoidable economic current. International commerce and the Ottoman's economic position required such a treaty to be made. However, he also questions how the treaty influenced the later 1839 Gülhane Edict. These principles of equality, individual freedom and security of property influenced by French Revolutionaries are the basis of "Ottomanism" but are also the fundamentals of a liberal free-trade economy. Both the 1838 agreement and the 1839 Edict were ultimately the result of the same process of restructuring of the empire to suit the needs of the European trading model. The liberalisation of commerce required the guarantees of property and accumulated wealth by a legal system recognising the equality of all.²⁷⁵

²⁷⁵ "It is [...] a mystery as to how the treaty made between the British, which was truly an unavoidable current for the Ottoman economy to be drawn in, influenced the November 1839 Gülhane Edict. [...] One must not consider the forward looking progressive development that is the equal treatment, in the eyes of the law, of all subjects irrespective of their religious beliefs, to safeguard their life and property and the abolishing of confiscation of property and the privatisation of tax and duty collection (iltizam) of a country as being the subject of an imperialist European game." in İlber Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı* (Istanbul: Alkım, 2006), p.97

The principles of the 1838 commercial treaty combined with the 1839 Gülhane Edict were no different in spirit to those of the 1453 ‘ahidnâme granted to Pera. Days after the siege the Mehmed would be promising: "let them travel by sea and land and be free of any hindrance" (“*deryadan ve kurudan sefer edeler kimesne mâni’ ve müzâhim olmiya mu’af ve müseliem olalar*”²⁷⁶). Baltalimanı stipulated that British merchants would pay the same duties as “the most favoured class of Turkish subjects”, that commercial regulations shall be “general throughout the Empire”²⁷⁷. The ‘ahidnâme also promised security for the people, families, free circulation in the Ottoman lands, and the free exercise of their religion in their churches. Baltalimanı, however, went even further in an attempt to facilitate and promote trade, it no longer saw the identity of the Merchant Foreigner established in the after 1453 as being separate. The 15th century assimilation of a *genovesi oltremare* to a Turkish Galata was taken to its logical conclusion, the Merchant Foreigner, was no longer to be called a foreigner, but will be known thereafter as an Ottoman.

Trade with Europe increased rapidly and direct investment by Europeans began to grow significantly after the Crimean war (1853). Following the war, the Ottoman Empire had entered into loan contracts with London banks. In 1874, the foreign debt alone took over half the total annual income of the Ottoman government. Unsurprisingly perhaps, in 1876 the Ottoman Empire declared bankruptcy and in December 1881, the Sultan issued the Decree of Muharem. It regulated the internal and external debt of the Ottoman Empire and created an institution, the Ottoman Public Debt Administration (*Caisse de la Dette Publique Ottomane*, *Düyun-u Umumiye-i Osmaniye Varidat-ı Muhassasa İdaresi*, the OPDA). The OPDA was given direct access to a number of important revenue sources of the state. Although the administration was a department of the Ottoman Ministry of Finance, it practically functioned as an independent section. By the end of the 19th century, the OPDA controlled approximately a third of all Ottoman revenues.

Acts of harmonisation, be it reform or re-organisation, from the beginning of the 19th century, the abolition of the Janissaries, the ‘Free-Trade’ agreements, and the

²⁷⁶ İnalcık, *Essays in Ottoman History*, p.284

²⁷⁷ F. E. Bailey, *British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement, A Study in Anglo-Turkish Relations 1826-1853* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1942), p.86

Imperial edicts were all responding to the needs of the prevailing currents in the world economy. The process paradoxically, ended with the perverse solution of ceding revenue management to external players. This, however, does not necessarily signify the failure of the process. The fact that the OPDA was established, in itself, is one of the most apparent signs of economic harmonisation Empire alla Turca had achieved. Capital would not have been so heavily invested in the empire, ultimately leading to its defaulting, had the state not conformed to the requirements of the world trade system. Harmonisation with the world economy does not prevent bankruptcy, the ‘boom or bust’ scenario is nevertheless a result of the then “Free-Trade” and liberal economy model. The act of intervening in the Ottoman economy so directly by taking over the administration of the debt is the final indicator that the Ottoman Empire had made a place for itself within the world system, particularly the European trading circle.

The supremacy of the pecuniary motivations in the Ottoman Empire would lead to the final coup de grâce and its ceding of political and economic control over its own institutions and industry to European powers. The primacy of the pecuniary is a common theme in the Empire alla Turca and also follows with an impressive flexibility demonstrated by the Ottoman state in adapting and changing to local, regional and inter-regional systems and act as locals rather than outsiders adopting local *modus operandi* to preserve and encourage trade.

This pragmatism and the primacy of the pecuniary over any other factor, might just simply be a description of what it is to be an empire per se. Not necessary an exclusive characteristic of an eastern Mediterranean empire, it might also be applied to other regions and periods more widely. What is for certain nevertheless, is that the alla Turca method at Empire – that is a pragmatic, facilitator, promoter, and active participant in regional and inter-regional trade – might, by the same logic, be no more than a description of what it is to be an eastern Mediterranean empire. That is an empire that has succeeded its predecessor, the Roman Empire, as an intermediary between regions and between different world systems. Although the ultimate outcome was not necessarily inevitable, it may explain the trajectory the Ottoman methods at empire took. The Ottomans in 1453 had by conquering Constantinople and adopting the title Kayser-i Rûm, whether by chance or by

design, become an empire with a direct relationship with the sea, developing their own unique Mediterranean thalassology and method at empire whose ambitions would see it expand its horizons beyond the shores of the Red Sea and into the Indian Ocean.

Conclusion

This thesis has examined the mercantile experience of Ottoman Pera in the century after 1453 to illustrate the changing nature of the Ottoman empire as it took on the inherited *modus operandi* of the East Roman empire by, most immediately, adopting its longstanding local tradition of privileges. This custom, an expression of the dominance of foreign merchants in the trade of the eastern Mediterranean system, would be present in one form or another throughout the history of the Ottoman Empire, gradually taking on a more burdensome capitulatory nature.

The argument has been that, from the 1453 conquest of Constantinople onwards, the Ottomans had, as a result of inheriting previous norms, actively participated in regional and, had at least aspirations in, inter-regional trade. The narrative put forward of an “Ottoman Age of Exploration”, must be pulled further back in time as from the very beginning in 1453 there is an identifiable and conscious Ottoman participation, whether initially by chance or by design, in regional and inter-regional trade. These later accounts of an “Ottoman Age of Exploration” begin with the 1517 conquest of Egypt and note a significant point with the 1571 Battle of Lepanto and the loss of the Ottoman Mediterranean fleet to a coalition of Christian forces. In this thesis, however, this defeat²⁷⁸ is placed within a longer *durée* Ottoman ambition in the participation of inter-regional trade and its associated mercantile method at empire, and not seen instead as the terminal climax of Ottoman inter-regional ambitions.

The changes in the nature of the early Ottoman Empire can be traced by looking at the particular case of Pera. Its idiosyncrasy is characterised twofold, it acted as a state within a state, through the Byzantine privileges and then the Ottoman *ahidnâme*, and secondly it was also a state outside of a state, known by the Genoese as the *genovesi* in *Oltremare*. It was the conspicuous expression of foreign dominance of trading activity in the region of the eastern Mediterranean. An

²⁷⁸ Faroqhi, *The Ottoman Empire and the World Around It*, p.38 ; Brummett, “The Lepanto Paradigm Revisited”

analysis of the mercantile activity of Pera in the century after 1453 and its relationship with the empire, positions the early Ottoman Empire as locals, belonging to the eastern Mediterranean trading system. The daily experience of traders in the city with their rulers, depict the Ottoman practical use of an Islamic legal framework to follow pre-established Byzantine trading traditions.

The first chapter situated Pera, as being an intrinsic part of this trading tradition and the eastern Mediterranean system. The treaties, Privileges under the Byzantines and ‘Ahidnāmes under the Ottomans, would be part of a discussion around its central use in the Ottoman method of empire. Pera was the primary example of the importance of privileges in the late Byzantine Empire and early Ottoman Empire and is therefore central in understanding the shift in Western trading activity after 1453. In the period before and after the fall of Constantinople, Pera was a key player in the region's economy in its role as a mercantile hub and acted as an acid test to the health of trade in the region. Its relationship with both the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires were characterised by the granting of privileges and acted as a bridge between the Black Sea, Levant, and the West through the Latin territories.

Ottoman Istanbul's relationship with Pera and its foreign merchants was indicative of the unique approach of the Ottoman state to the administration of its territories. Whether dhimmīs or Genoese merchants (*Djeneziz bāzīrgānları*) in post-conquest Ottoman Pera there existed a complex pluralist legal framework. This was, uniquely, not only due to the recognition of the special status of dhimmī as per the Shari'a but also due to the characteristically pragmatic Ottoman application of religious law and the recognition of the dar al-sulh and the value the corresponding legal frameworks. These produced a separate special status and identity of the merchant foreigner, protected under the title of müste'min, with the ability to trade freely in Ottoman lands. The agreements, guaranteeing privileges to foreigners within the Ottoman domains, not only had commercial, religious, and legal consequences, but also played an important part in the construction of Ottoman self-identity both regionally and locally by recognising the role, and, implicitly, the identity of the Merchant Foreigner.

A narrative of decline in the foreigner trade of Pera can be recounted based on the drop of production in the Genoese notary documents and the descriptions of Istanbul after the conquest²⁷⁹, following the traditional narratives of the Ottoman disruptive outsider, for example Scholarios, made Patriarch of the city in 1454, describing a "city of ruins in great part deserted, stricken with poverty".²⁸⁰

When analysed closely, however, this drop is not recognised as described but instead show snapshots of stress and banality. Any long-term reduction in production in notary documents can be interpreted as a drop in Italian traders' production of notary sources only and not necessary a reduction in the participation in trade in Pera under Ottoman rule. The story suggested instead is of a clear persistence of Italian foreign trading activity after the conquest under the Ottomans. They also demonstrate an understatement of the Ottoman threat in the years before and right after the conquest, describing the times as being of a "precarious political situation". A clear impact of the conquest to the traders in Pera is noticeable, most immediately the inventories of the deceased would have an apparent immediate consequence. It is, however, the changes in commercial practices after 1453 that are particularly relevant. They form part of a new setting of changing trading patterns in the face of a new political landscape and the homogenisation of new territories under Ottoman rule. It is unfair to prescribe the drop in trade over four decades to the outsider and disruptive Ottoman force. Instead, there is an observable longer *durée* trend of an overall Genoese decline in trade in Pera and in eastern Mediterranean, imminently in the face of the rise of Venetian trade, and long-term Ottoman maritime ambitions.

The notary documents produced before and after 1453 are a valuable insight into the trading activity of mostly Italian merchants in Pera and their priorities in the production of legal evidential documentation. Most of the notarised documents pertain to the higher value or higher risk activities undertaken by these traders and

²⁷⁹ Pistarino, *Genovesi d'Oriente*, amongst other works, İnalçık, *The Re-building of Istanbul by Sultan Mehmed The Conqueror*.

²⁸⁰ Georges Scholario, *Oeuvres complètes de Georges Scholarios: Oeuvres oratoires, traités théologiques sur la Providence et sur l'âme*, vol. 1 (Paris : Maison de la bonne presse, 1928), p.287

there is a marked drop in their production after the conquest. However, as such, it is already methodologically difficult to ascertain a net decline in overall trading activity before and after 1453 based on these notarised documents of foreign traders as although there may be a reduction in foreign higher value and risk activity, the overall trading activity, participated in the years after 1453 by not only foreign merchants but also Ottoman merchants who may be absent from these sources, may have indeed remained at a similar level. Certainly, this reduction in production was an indication of the changing trade systems.

Narratives previously focusing on the disruptive characteristic of the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople miss these nuances of the local market perception of impending events. In a milieu of “market confidence” in the persistence of trading activity, the descriptions of the Ottomans as being a disruptive other, damaging a trading circle, seems, at least from these specific examples, not to be reflecting the whole story. In the run up to the siege and conquest, bizarrely when faced with religious, social, and political catastrophic change, new contracts were being written or old ones extended.

Earlier treaties between the Genoese and the Ottomans, notably the 1387 treaty²⁸¹, followed the same patterns of Italian notary deeds rather than those agreements based on the Islamic legal framework. From the first line: “In nomine Domini amen.” to the format of the last paragraph of the document giving the location, date and witnesses present at the writing of the document, it follows the same pattern seen in the notary documents produced in Pera. These documents show that the Ottomans were inextricably part of the eastern Mediterranean trading circle, recognised and included in contracts and treaties. Although these treaties were written under a Christian framework, they applied to non-Christian traders.

The legitimacy and law of these contracts transcend state and religious authority. Their legitimacy came not from a particular state or religion, threatened by another in the case of 1453, but were inherent in their very nature as a commercial practice. They are human activities whose rules of engagement exist by common consensus and are universal. These documents produced weeks before the conquest, even in

²⁸¹ Fleet, "The Treaty of 1387", p.32

the face of impending doom, had a legitimacy afforded to them that could outlast mundane states and societies.

The land and population surveys of Istanbul under Ottoman rule were also analysed to trace changes in the demographics of the city and the resultant impact on trade, relations with foreign states and the nature of the early Ottoman Empire. Two surveys, one within a couple of years after the conquest and the other two decades after, provide a valuable snapshot to the condition of Pera and Constantinople proper right after the conquest and its evolution into an Ottoman capital thereafter. The impression that obtained from sources such as the 1455 survey is that the first years after the conquest were difficult for Pera. However, from the later notarial documents, it appears that life for the Genoese of Pera returned to normality and business resumed its normal course.

The surveys of 1455 and 1477 and the subsequent sources tell on the face of it, a chronology of the decline of Pera and the rise of Istanbul from ruins. It forms part of a narrative of the decline of Italian participation in trade in the region, and the rise of the Ottoman dominance in the eastern Mediterranean. However, it is instead possible to bring a nuance to this story based on the same source. The gradual and constant “decline” of Pera can be seen as part of a longer *durée* reduction in specifically Genoese active participation in regional trade and most notably the gradual and constant change attributed instead as an assimilation into a wider homogenised Ottoman economic system. A system in which the foreign households adapt to the intricacies of the Ottoman legal system, changing of status, converting, or further imbedding themselves by transferring tax accounts to other registers. This view still maintains Pera’s relevance in the century after the conquest. Its presence is clearly observable in its newly forged relationships with the other trading hubs of the Ottoman state — Bursa and Edirne.

Istanbul, and to a lesser extent, Pera, certainly went through turbulent times after 1453 and were subject to Mehmed’s reactionary policies of repopulation that resulted in waves of immigration and flight from the city. It was Mehmed’s successors that would see the city’s rise, his immediate successor Bayezid II (1481-1512) assumed a more reconciliatory stance to the rebuilding and repopulation of

the city and Istanbul would reach an estimated population close to half a million by 1530, less than a century after the conquest.

Mehmed II's imperial decree (*amān-nāme*) issued to the Genoese of Pera on 30 May 1453 for their surrender, granted them the right to sell their goods freely, as in all other parts of his lands, exemption from taxes except the haraç, a legal authority of their own to deal with the affairs of the merchants, while he granted merchants from Genoa the right to come and go, provided they paid according to law and custom. These commercial arrangements were also extended to the Venetians, in the 1479 treaty that ended the war begun in 1463. Trade and war may have been considered separately and the treaty suggest the importance of trade relations with the West. The treaties thus become invaluable in understanding the Empire's attempts at regaining the previous Byzantine mercantile position in the region with Western traders.

The difficulties Pera faced in the early years of Ottoman rule was comparably short in duration. Pera and Constantinople certainly had faced worse traumas in the past, most memorably the 1204 sack of Constantinople. İnalcık places an emphasis on the effects of the newly connected Bursa markets with Pera. Kadı records from the 1480s to 1500s suggest a new dependence of Pera on the Bursa markets as trade expanded. At the turn of the sixteenth century, Pera's demographics are seen to change with Ottoman subjects, Turks, Greeks, Armenians, and Jews succeeding the Genoese in inter-regional trade, especially after the fall of the Genoese ports in the Crimea as the trade of the Black Sea became vitally important for the growing capital of the empire.

The third chapter took wider diplomatic sources to help understand the practical approach of Ottoman rule of Pera and Ottoman ambitions in the Mediterranean and regional trade. The Relazioni of Venetian ambassadors and envoys after the conquest in 1453 are an expression of the Italian city state's adaptations to the changing power dynamics of the eastern Mediterranean. The wars with the Ottomans and the loss of spheres of influence on a new regional power homogenising territories under Pax Ottomana necessitated a change in approach. The Venetian Senate by 1551 had seen the needs to train young men in eastern

languages in order not to rely on Ottoman drogomans.²⁸² As part of a renewed *modus operandi* with the Ottoman state, the Republic's chief representative at the Ottoman Porte in Istanbul, the bailo played a central part in maintaining and defending the Republic's interests in the face of increasing Ottoman regional hegemony. The investment of the Republic into Pera and Istanbul demonstrated that the importance of the Venetian-Ottoman diplomatic and commercial relationships and an example of the resilience of pecuniary interests between two warring states over the hegemony the region.

Pera, or Turkish Galata, became part of a trading circle that shifted away from the long *durée* Genoese mercantile decline in the eastern Mediterranean and instead built relationships with the rival Italian city state of Venice. Pera would be assimilated into the Ottoman economic system, no longer a state within a state or even a state outside of a state *colonie genovesi*, severing its relationship with the Republic of Genoa and the declining Genoese trading activity within the eastern Mediterranean. Instead, it would become part of a new economic system faced with the rise and dominance of the Republic of Venice in regional trade. Ottoman conquests between 1453 and 1475 would end Genoese dominance in the region and help the rise of the influence of the Republic of Venice. The method of Ottoman advances into Venetian territories and spheres of influence were similar to the experience of Pera in so much as the Ottomans used the *'ahidnāme* even in the face of Venetian military defeat as was the case in 1479. Not since the twelfth century had the Venetians found themselves in such a position, then exploiting Emperor Manuel's trading agreements. Although the Venetians were militarily defeated, it would still be their merchants spearheading regional trade, this time under *Pax Ottomana*.

The Ottoman method at empire after 1453 used the diplomatic tool of the *'ahidnāme*, unilateral pledge or privilege granted to a submitted or friendly group, in this case to the Venetians, their regional military and economic rivals, to insert themselves into the eastern Mediterranean trading circle. This is an illustration of the recognisable and notable early Ottoman ambition, whether by design or by

²⁸² Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople*, p.37

chance, in a pragmatic method at empire that is a facilitator, promoter and active participant in regional and inter-regional trade. In this early Ottoman state, pecuniary considerations eclipsed any other, be it religious or even military.

Venice's and other Italian states desire for, and persistence in trade and diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire in this era, also contributed a strong development in diplomacy. The Ottoman privileges with the Latins was certainly not new to the time of the conquest. The Ottomans had an early longstanding relationship with the Venetians even before the conquest of the city of Constantinople that was later cultivated, further stressing the gradual nature of their entrance, and belonging to the eastern Mediterranean region. The Ottomans were not disruptive outsiders but were instead a known and an intrinsic part of regional trading economy.

The state papers references to the Ottomans demonstrate their role as locals in the Mediterranean system, although a belligerent, observed from afar by contemporary participants. The preoccupation with the Ottoman state did not end with their military and political affairs in the region but focused on their maritime involvements and to Pera and Istanbul's status as an important regional hub.

The language of diplomacy in the various Calendars showed a nuanced approach to dealing with the Ottomans in the Mediterranean. Although disgust and outrage were expressed for treaties and agreements made with the Ottomans as the enemies of Christendom, it isn't possible either to represent another coalition of forces in the struggle for regional power.

The force of the pecuniary eclipsing any other distraction is a common pattern in the method at empire in this period and region. The legitimacy and law of treaties drawn up between two belligerent sides, similar to the contracts written in Pera just before the conquest, transcended religious authority, but in these particular cases, took their legitimacy from more than one state authority. Their legitimacy came not from a particular state or religion, threatened by another in 1453 and in these cases, by the wars between the Venetians and Ottomans in the late 15th and mid-16th centuries, but were inherent in their very nature as part of the struggle for control

over (mostly) the eastern Mediterranean. The commercial contracts signed in the run up to the siege of Constantinople, were human activities whose rules of engagement existed by common consensus and were universal. In a similar way, the treaties drawn up between the belligerent factions in the Mediterranean in this period, were state activities (or methods) at vying for regional hegemony. In other words, the Ottomans were just another state within the Mediterranean system, intrinsic to it, and participating under the same rules of engagement as defined by common consensus, in the shared struggle for dominance over the regional maritime trade.²⁸³

In the final chapter, conclusions are drawn from the thesis on the nature of the early Ottoman Empire and framed within previous historical narratives of pre- and post-conquest methods of empire. Rather than considering the Ottomans as an outsider disruptive force to the eastern Mediterranean, it instead can be seen that the new homogenous Ottoman dominions created new trading circles that not only change the cityscape of Pera and Constantinople but also both regional and inter-regional trade. Furthermore, the associated formation of a distinctive Ottoman Mediterranean Thalassology forewarns of later ambitions at an “Ottoman Age of Exploration.”

Rather than considering the Ottomans as an outsider disruptive force to the eastern Mediterranean, instead they should be considered an established local player whose new homogenous dominions created new circles, that promoted, not disrupted, trade. The Ottomans changed the cityscape of Pera, and Istanbul locally, but also had a deep impact on the economic system of the region and the wider inter-regional sphere, and the competition for its domination.

The onset of the Ottoman advances changed conditions, in which the localised trading economy of Pera, serving a specific need together with Italian city states acting as the middleman, was exposed to wider trading routes through Anatolia. The distinguishing factors and privileges of the Genoese of Pera were eroded as commerce was liberalised, opened to competition, as part of the harmonisation process with the time’s prevailing currents of the world economy. This period was a

²⁸³ See section 2.1 Notary Documents of Pera.

precursor to the “Ottoman Age of Exploration” and can be seen as the emergence of the Ottomans as a regional trading power with later, greater, ambitions.

The Indian Ocean world was where two different thalassologies and their empires met. On the one hand, the Portuguese participating in the European “Age of Exploration” with its associated Catholic definitions of sovereignty, and on the other hand, the Ottomans described as part of the “Gunpowder Empire”²⁸⁴ land-based empire paradigm were also participating in their own, “Age of Exploration”. Their “Ottoman Age of Exploration” was performed with the Red Sea at its centre stage expanding into the Indian Ocean world. Although the Ottoman thalassology might not have included the imagining of the “Red Sea” as a Bahr-i Ahmer, now for all intents and purposes a Caliphate, it instead framed it under its own terms and linking it inextricably to the Hajj and Mecca, the Bahr-i Mekka.

The supremacy of the pecuniary motivations in the Ottoman Empire would lead to the final coup de grâce and its ceding of political and economic control over its own institutions and industry to European powers. This common theme in the Empire alla Turca also follows with the impressive flexibility the Ottoman state demonstrates in adapting and changing to local, regional, and inter-regional systems and act as locals rather than outsiders, adopting local modus operandi to preserve and encourage trade.

This pragmatism and the primacy of the pecuniary over any other factor, might just simply be a description of what it is to be an empire per se. Not necessary an exclusive characteristic of an eastern Mediterranean empire, it might also be applied to other regions and periods more widely. What is for certain nonetheless, is that the alla Turca method at Empire – a pragmatic, facilitator, promoter, and active participant in regional and inter-regional trade – might also be no more than a description of what it is to be an eastern Mediterranean empire. That is an empire that has succeeded its predecessor, the Roman Empire, as an intermediary between regions and between different world systems. Although the ultimate outcome was not necessarily inevitable, it may explain the trajectory the Ottoman methods at

²⁸⁴ Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam* ; McNeill, “The Age of Gunpowder Empires, 1450-1800”

empire took. The Ottomans in 1453 had by conquering Constantinople and adopting the title Kayser-i Rûm, whether by chance or by design, become an empire with a direct relationship with the sea, developing their own unique Mediterranean thalassology and method at empire whose ambitions would see it expands its horizons beyond the shores of the Red Sea and into the Indian Ocean.

The merchants of Pera, in the run up to the siege of Constantinople by the Ottoman Turks bargained on the persistence of trading activity when faced with impending catastrophic religious, social, and political change to their worlds. The “market confidence” led them to draw up contracts relied on their legitimacy and law transcending state and religious authority. Their legitimacy was inherent in their very nature as a commercial practice, they could outlast mundane states and societies, and would form the very basis of any eastern Mediterranean Empire.

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A.{DVN.DVE.d.00901	Fransa elçisinin arzı üzerine Tunus, Sakız, Mısır, Halep, Trablusşam, Galata, Cezayir-I Garp, Rodos, Mora, Nakşa, Suğla ve İstanbul'un Beylerbeyi, Muhafız, Kadı, Bey vesair ümerasına gönderilen hükümlerin kayıtlarını havi defter.
A.{DVNSDVE.d.00016.4	Venedik Ahidnâme Defteri
A.{DVNSDVE.d.00017.5	Venedik Hududname Defteri
A.{DVNSDVE.d.00018.6	Venedik Ahidnâme Defteri
KK.d.02434.00001	Galata Beytülmal muhallefat müfredat defteri (Muhallefat, Beytülmal).
KK.d.05637.00001	Galata'daki hassa gemilerinin masrafları (Tersane Emaneti).
TT.d.00020.00027	Figle, Üsküdar, Kızılağaç, Prevadi, Dimetoka, Ergene nahiyeleri kurasının nüfus ve hasılatıyla tımarlarını ve evkaf ve emlakini havi mufassal tahrir defteri.
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TT.d.00185	Fatih Sultan Mehmed Camii'nin haslar, Vize, Kırkilise, Çorlu, Hayrabolu, Silivri, Ereğli, Tekfurdağı, Saros nevahisinde olan evkafı ve karyelerinin nüfus ve hasılatını havi mufassal tahrir defteri.
TT.d.00240	Fatih Sultan Mehmed İmaretî'nin İstanbul, Galata ve Rumeli'deki vakıf karyelerinin nüfus ve hasılatını mübeyyin mufassal tahrir defteri.
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Appendix A – Notary Documents

One hundred and twenty-four notary documents from 1408 to 1490 analysed by
Geo Pistarino and published in Italian in Ausilia Roccatagliata, *Notai genovesi in
oltremare : atti rogati a Pera e Mitilene / [a cura di] Ausilia Roccatagliata.*

(Genova: Università di Genova Istituto di Paleografia e storia medievale, 1982)

Translated into English:

[1] 1408, ..., Pera

Bartholomew of Levanto, resident²⁸⁵ of Pera, nominates attorney notary Antonio de
Salvo, Genoese citizen²⁸⁶.

[2] 1408, October ... , Pera.

Pera's *podesta* and board of directors accept to loan the Pera resident Giorgio de
More, 200 *perperi*²⁸⁷ of Pera for the purchase of 50 bushels²⁸⁸ for the intended for
the approval and deliberation of the creditor of the commune from the *Officium
Victualium*

²⁸⁵ *Burgense*.

²⁸⁶ *Cittadino*.

²⁸⁷ *perperi* as transcribed by Geo Pistarino, or *perperos* in the documents are an adaptation of the
term for *hyperperum* or *hyperpyron*, Greek *hyperpyros* (ὑπέρπυρος) or "burning", i.e. purged by fire.
The *hyperpyron* replaced the previous *solidus*. The *perper* was divided into 24 *carats*.

²⁸⁸ *moggi* unit of measurement, see Anna Laura Lepschy and Giulio C. Lepschy, *The Italian
Language Today* (Rowman & Littlefield, 1988), 63.

[3] 1408, November 27, Pera

Nicholas of Moneglia, *Podesta* di Pera, appointed attorney to the notary Nicola Pellerano for the 420 *perperi* claim from the assets of Bertola de Zino.

[4] 1442, September 10, Costantinopoli

Filippo Alferii, Consul of the Anconetians in Constantinople and all over Romania's Empire, judge of the case between Marcono de Nicolla Toroleonis, a citizen and Anconetan merchant, and Giacomo di Pietro di Ancona for a lot of 100 sacks of soap in Ancona, owned by Marcono, sentenced Giaconmo, broker of the sale, to pay to the counterpart 579 *perperi* and 8 *carat* for Paolo Contarino Veneto, 50% invested, reserving the right to act against the insolvent. Sentenced by others Marcono also gives Giacomo every right against Contrarino, reserving the right to produce information and texts outside of Constantinople before the magistrate appealed to.

[5] 1442, September 10, Costantinopoli

Giacomo of Peter of Ancona appeals against the judgment of the consul of the Anconetani according to the statutes of the city of Ancona.

[6] 1442, September 17 Costantinopoli

Giacomo di Ancona deposited at Geronimo De Franchi 579 *perperi* and 8 carats in Pera in accordance with the Statutes of Ancona and the appeal against the judgment given by consul of the Anconetani in favour of Marcono of Ancona

[7] 1442, September 17, Constantinopoli

Geronimo De Franchi, in the presence of the conule of Anconetani in Constantinopoli, promises to have the money deposited by Giacomo of Ancona in accordance with the consular mandate and the statutes of Ancona.

[8] 1442, September 17, Costantinopoli

The Consul of the Anconetians in Constantinople release from seizure the requisites in Gallipoli on the residence of Marcono of Ancona.

[9] 1442, September 19, Costantinopoli

Giacomo of Piertor of Ancona appealed to the court to appeal against the judgment given on September 10 by the consul of the Anconetani in Constantinople - in the case brought by Marcono de Nicola for a soap of Ancona denouncing the nullity, asks that the consul he sends to Ancona the procedural file together with the money deposited with Geronimo De Franchi, denies that the consul did not accept as councillors in defining the cause of two of the Anconetan merchants present in Constantinople.

[10] 1442, September 19, Costantinopoli

The consul of the Anconetani in Constantinople admits the appeal appealed by Giacomo di Pietro of Ancona against the judgment of 10 September in the case brought by Marcono di Acnona for a lot of soap of Ancona.

[11] 1442, October 17, Pera

Restaurant Corso nominates attorney Giacomo di Mongiardino senatorius, resident of Chio, for collecting credits from Pietro Antonio di Noli.

[12] 1443, August 21, Pera

Exva Judeo de Mancremano sells to Bartholomew Pisa of Modone the Russian slave Iora, 16 years old, for the price of 95 *perperi* of Pera

[13] 1443, August 31, Pera

Nicola de Porta, Leonardo Spinola and Tommaso Spinola make an arbitration ruling in the case between Corastefanos and Ialabi for the profit from the sale of cloths and skimmings for a house with a commune, mill and courtyard owned by Corastefanos and other mobile goods.

[14] 1443, September 6, Pera

Antonio Colotero and Giovanni Costanzo formulate a compromise valid for 15 days and appoint Geronimo Pico and Giovanni Antonio Clavo arbitrators of the case between the parties for an unspecified voyage

[15] 1443, novembre 30, Pera

Giovanni di Udine, known as Scaramusa, sells to Manuele Svati of Chania, acting on behalf of Giorgio Bona

[16] 1444, January 9, Pera

Caloiane Muszachecionis, a resident of Constantinople, sells to Francis of Levanto, Citizen Genovese, 50 bushels of wheat of Panados for the price of 8 *perperi* per mill; promises to deliver the goods within 12 days of arrival to Panados of the buyer ship, which agrees to pay within 10 days. Receive guarantee Peter of Langasco.

[17] 1444, April 3, Pera

Roystorus Corso recognizes the need for the Podera di Pera, Borruele Grimaldi, 15 gold ducats of Chios, equal to 40 *perperi* of Pera, for the rebuilding of parts of a fusta and for the booty obtained by the patronage of Bartolomeo de Paxereto, to be returned at your request in Chios. Receive guarantee Nicola Miller, resident of Pera.

[18] 1447, December 11, Pera

The notary Baldassarre de Segnorio, resident of Pera, declares that he has received in the dowry of his wife Catarina, daughter of the deceased²⁸⁹ Giovanni de Zigeaygo, widow of notary Giacomo Foglietta, 2,000 silver *perperi* of Pera, pointing real estate and cash, corresponds to 200 silver *perperi* of Pera.

²⁸⁹ “*Del fu*”, translated as “of the deceased”, see Lepschy and Lepschy, 174.

[19] 1450, July 21, Pera

Pietro di Torre and Bartholomew of Torriglia are a commercial company with a social capital of 700 *perperi*, divided by 50%, already employed in goods and goods that are transported by sea to Samsun.

[20] 1452, November 26 – 1453, July-August, Pera

The notary Lorenzo de Calvi of Antonio, at the request of the noble Francesco Spinola, administrator of the affair of the generous Antonio Gatellusio, draws up an authentic copy of a proof of 5 October 1452 and a letter of 6 October 1452; they subscribe to the Baldassarre de Segnorio by Bartolomeo and Giacomo de Boconis of Fu Raffaele.

[21] 1453, January 24, Pera

Giovanni De Benedetto of Raffaele declares that he has received from Gregorio Magnono a chest with vices and property belonging to his deceased brother Antonio, who has been pledged to 75 *perperi* to Gregorio, who releases the amount for the balance. Receive guarantee Nicola di Casale.

[22] 1453, January 25, Pera

The merchant Geronimo de Fracnhi Iulla di Pietro, who lives in Pera, nominates attorney Giacomo De Franchi de Viali of the deceased Benedetto for the care of his stores, the collection of claims and litigation.

[23] 1453, January 29, Pera

Nicola Gatellusio Olim de Porta nominates attorney son Percivalle to arrive at a compromise with his grandson Antonio Gatellusio of the deceased Giovanni on any controversy and dispute between them, excluding matters relating to the inheritance of the deceased Giovanni.

[24] 1453, January 30, Pera

Percivalle (Gatellusio, in his own name and in the capacity of his father's attorney) Nicola, and Antonio (Gatellusio of the deceased Giovanni) formulate a valid compromise until the later March 15th.

[25] 1453 January 30, Constantinopoli,

Georgici Inpano valacco nominates attorney Inofio Pinello to settle matters with Giovanni Vasilico Greco and with the *socio*, Tommaso Piroplo Greco.

[26] 1453 January 30, Pera

Giovanni Vasilico, Greek of Constantinople, in his own name and his partner Tommaso Piroplo Greco, and Inofio Pinello, attorney of Georgici Inpano, formulate a valid compromise for 40 days and appoint arbiters of the dispute between the parties Fabrizio Acornerio, Bernardo Strolao and Niccolo Pollo.

[27] 1453, January 31, Pera

Maria, daughter of Manoli Sevasto and widow of Giorgio Iordanino, nominates attorney Inofio Pinello for the care of her interests, the collection of credits and litigation.

[28] 1453, January 31, Pera.

Inofio Pinello claims to have received 100 *perperi* from Angelo di Langasco and is committed to returning them within six months; the foretold Angelo may collect the whole sum, or part, from the assets of the deceased Giorgio Iordanino, debtor in Inofio of 100 *perperi* and more.

[29] 1453, February 3, Pera

Giuliano Fieschi of the deceased Raffaele nominates attorney Luciano de Gaieno for the care of his shops, the collection of claims and litigation.

[30] 1453, February 9, Pera

Francesco Lomellino of the deceased Martino and Lorenzo Gatellusio Olim de Porta nominate Imperiale Grimaldi as an arbitrator of the issues between the parties or a accomendatio and formulate a valid compromise for a month.

[31] 1453, February 22, Pera

Giacomo di Chiavari acknowledges that he has to put an end to Pinello 29 for a batch of [...]; promises to pay 2 per month until the extinction of the debt and to offer guarantors of the future payment.

[32] 1453, February 27, Pera

Baldassarre Gatellusio Olim de Porta nominates its attorney the noble Giacomo Grimaldi olim de Oliva, Citizen Genovese, for the collection of claims and issues with Pietro Antonio di Carretto.

[33] 1453, March 2, Pera

Tommaso Spinola of the deceased Gaspare, attorney of Giovanni Ieragi, Citizen of Rhodes, transfers the attorney's mandate to the merchant Simone of Levanto, a citizen of Genova living in Caffa.

[34] 1453, March 2, Pera

Giovanni Vasilicos Greco and Inofio Pinello prolonged at the end of March the validity of the compromise signed on January 30, 1453 in the name of Tommaso Piroplo Greco and Gergicio Inpano valacco, maintaining unchanged all the conditions

[35] 1453, March 13, Pera

Nicola di Casale acknowledges the duty to Geronimo Bellogio 231 *perperi* and 18 *carati*, who returns it to inquiries, after deducting the sum that can be obtained from the sale of three of his men's clothes, sent to an oil creditor.

[36] 1453, March 16, Pera

Adornino de Elianis of Ovada, special, acknowledges Lorenzo Spinola of Damiano 594 *perperi* and 10 *carats* for a wax batch and for other outstanding and promises to pay 80 *perperi* per month until the debt end. The father and brother of Adornino, Antonio and Cosma de Elianis, are baptized.

[37] 1453, April 6, Pera

Testament by Antonio Pellerano of fu Giacomo, Genoese citizen.

[38] 1453, April 17, Pera

Testament by Lorenzo Gatellusio

[39] 1453, May 30, at Marmora

Inventory of the assets of the deceased Pietro Sevolla Follows on June 12, 1453

[40] 1453, May 30, at Marmora

Inventory of the assets of the deceased Dantogio Corso

[41] 1453, May 31, between Marmora and Gallipoli

Inventory of the assets of the deceased Antonio Spina di Serro. Follows on June 1, 1453

[42] 1453, May 31, between the island of Marmora and Gallipoli

Inventory of the assets of the deceased Antonello di Siracusa, sailor of the ship of Giovanni Giustiniano

[43] 1453, May 31, on the sea between Gallipoli and Marmora

Inventory of the assets of the deceased Lorenzo Bevere of Albenga

[44] 1453, May 31, between Marmora and Gallipoli

Inventory of the assets of the deceased Antoniazio di Vernazza

[45] 1453, May 31, on the sea between Gallipoli and Marmora

Inventory of the assets of the deceased Guglielmo Pistono.

[46] 1453, June 4, to Tenedo

Inventory of the assets of the deceased Giuliano di Monleone

[47] 1453, July 12, Pera

Lodisio Giustiniano de Campis promises to slave Gingibei not to be sold whilst he is alive and to leave her free to death.

[48] 1453, July 13, Pera

Ansaldo Usodimare of the deceased Andrea manumits his slave Giacomino, of Circasian origin, provided that he continues to serve in his house for the next three years.

[49] 1453, July 18, Pera

Testimony by Cristoforo Palavicino regarding the marriage of Giovanni di Crema and Antonia of the deceased Battista di Bargagli

[50] 1453, July 20, Pera

Caracaosa, daughter of the deceased Italian Cataneus and widow of Nicola de Carmadino, manumits the slave Margarita, of Russian origin, provided that he continues to serve him defiantly for the next three years

[51] 1453, July 21, Pera

Carlo Confortino declares that he has received in loan from Benedetto Salvaigo from Borrele 1000 *perperi* to be returned at his request.

[52] 1453, August 3, Pera

Imperiale Grimaldi Appointed Attorney Paolo Grimaldi for the care of his shops, the collection of claims and litigation.

[53] 1453, August 4, Pera

Turkish Cagi Cassani de Mara sells to butcher Andrea and Dimitri Granea, Greeks, and to Armenian Oavanese Vilara the Greek Teodoro, the son of Podegefalo, for 2200 Turkish *aspers*; each buyer agrees to pay a third of the sum within 6 months.

[54] 1453, August 8, Pera

Domenico Salvaigo manumits Ana, of origin zica, is a slave of Benedetto Salvaigo

[55] 1453, August 9, Pera

Nicola Testa, because of the precarious political situation, manumits the slave Iuane, of Russian origin, provided that they continue to serve it for the next two years

[56] 1453, August 10, Pera

Lorenzo Gatellusio olim de Porta, because of the precarious political situation, manumits the slave Sofia, of origin Valavva, provided that they continue to serve it for the next three years.

[57] 1453, August 17 Pera

Gregorio Russo nominates attorney Nicola Paterio of the deceased Lafranco for the care of his stores, the collection of claims and litigation.

[58] 1453 August 20, Pera

Lorenzo Gatellusio, attorney of Raffaele Vigerio, transfers the powers of attorney to Antonio de Carmadino and Angelo di Langasco.

[59] 1453 August 25, Pera

Domenico of Bergamo del Tommaso, resident of Pera, declares to have received from Giovanni of Semino of Matteo, Genoese citizen, 2578 Turkish *aspers* for the

purchase of 3 caviar kegs²⁹⁰ and commits to return the sum within 4 months; guarantee Francesco Lancianegia and Carlo Durante.

[60] 1454, April 2, Pera

Leonardo Belogio, a Genoese citizen, nominates attorneys Giacomo di Casanova and Cristoforo Belogio, Genoese citizens, resident from Caffa, to retrieve to Caffa and the Black Sea regions what he and his brother Geronimo are like heirs of his late brother Giovanni.

[61] 1454, May 11, Pera

The noble Luca Cattaneo, Genoese citizen, nominates Attorney Silvestro, Genoese citizen, for collecting credits and litigation with noble Paolo Battista Lercari in Chio and elsewhere.

[62] 1454, June 3, Pera

The noble Barnaba Centurione, Genoese citizen, nominates attorney and noble Melchiorre and Lansaroto [...], Genoese citizen, for the care of his interests, the collection of credits and leases to Caffa.

[63] 1454 June 6, Pera

Antonio Gonela, resident of Pera, nominates attorneys Giacomo Grimaldi of the [...] Genoese citizen, and Giovanni Gonela to present to the consul and to the board of Caffa a letter addressed to them by the protogero and the advisers of Pera to obtain 231 *perperi* of Pera, the proceeds of two locals registered under the name of the dead Orietta of Santa Croce.

[64] 1454, June 25, Pera

The noble Luca Cattano, Genoese citizen, nominates the attorney and noble Cristiano Cattaneo, resident of Caffa, for the for collecting credits from Lodisio

²⁹⁰ Caratelli.

Doria of the deceased Melchiorre, and by Giovanni Spinola di Luccoli, for the care of his interests and litigation at Caffa and elsewhere.

[65] 1458, September 2, Pera

Isabetta, daughter of Antonio Ponsono, widow of Guglielmo de Lucho, resident of Pera, nominates attorney Battista di Sagliano, resident of Caffa, to recover remains from father Antonio.

[66] 1466, November 12, Pera

Meliadux Spinola of the deceased Giacomo declares that he has received in dowry from his wife Georgieta, the daughter of Imperial Grimaldi, 2,500 ducats of Chio for the value of 2,000 ducats of Venetians, paid by Barnaba Grimaldi of the Oberto, and corresponds to an previous 100 lire of genovini .

[67] 1466, November 21, Pera

The notary Manuele Granello and Abraham of Torriglia of the deceased Antonio, citizens of Genoa, recognize the duty of Cristoforo de Oderico of Taddeo 269 ducats of Chios for seven pieces of black stameto in Milan to be paid by 1 May 1467 to Chio. In the absence of payment Cristoforo was able to change the sum from Chio to Caffa, at the expense of the debtors, while the ship of Antonio di Val di Taro, on which the goods were loaded, arrives at Caffa.

[68] 1468, September 12, Pera

Francesco Giustiniano of Castello of the deceased Bartolomeo nominates attorney Galeazzo Giustiniano of the deceased Bartolomeo for the collection of his inheritance from his deceased parents, Bartolomeo and Mariola, for the care of his interests and disputes.

[69] 1468, September 15, Pera

Raffaele Malclavellus, citizen Genovese, nominates Gregorio di Pino's attorney for collection from Babilano Adorno, citizen of Caffa, of 170 venetian ducats, price of seventeen vegeti salted tuna, never delivered to Pera.

[70] 1468, September 15, Pera

Gaspare de Ottovegio of the deceased Andrea declares that he has received in loan from Pelegro de Ottovegio 1,000 Ottoman *aspers* to return at his request.

[71] 1469, November 23, Pera

Benedetto De Franchi Savo, attorney of brother Cristoforo, and Baldassarre of Savignone formulate a compromise valid until November 27 and nominate Pelegro de Persio and Stefano de Nigrone arbitrators of the dispute over property belonging to Baldassarre, taken out of that Christoforo and Giacomo of Val di Taro by the ship of Andrea Emplat of Siracusa.

[72] 1469, November 24, Pera

Francesco de Cavalorto, Genoese citizen, witness produced by Antonio di Albino, confirms that Antonio had instructed Maurizio di Porto, patron of the ship on which he was embarked as a helmsman, to deliver to Francesco Cape two vegeti of palamite and a caviar caratello intended for Chios Bernardo Grimaldi.

[73] 1469, Novembre 24, Pera

Francesco di Montaldo, a sailor of the ship patronized by Baptist of Carpeneto, witness produced by Antonio di Albino, confirms that Maurizio di Porto, commissioned by Antonio to deliver to Francesco Cape two loads of fish and a caviar caratella, had not maintained the commitment by pretending the impossibility of unloading the goods, placed at the bottom of the ship.

[74] 1469, November 27, Pera

Letter from Antonio Torriglia to Costantino Lomellino with addition of December 18. The content is as follows: 1) sea voyage from Caffa to Pera; b) Epidemic of plague in Pera and Constantinople; c) Antonio's infirmity; d) bankruptcy of a

Genoese embassy; (e) shipwreck in a port of Carpi; f) improvement of the health situation; (g) removal of a captain; h) setting up a large Ottoman fleet.²⁹¹

[75] 1469, December 1, Pera

Asperto Grimaldi, resident of Pera, appointed attorney, at Caffa, in the territory subject to the Caffa jurisprudence and throughout the empire of Gazaria, Battista Gagerio, resident of Caffa, for collecting credits from Andrea di Vallesturla.

[76] 1469, December 1, Pera

Benedetto De Franchi Saco, attorney of his brother Cristoforo and Baldassarre of Savignone formulate a compromise valid until 4 December and nominate Pelegro de Persio and Stefano de Nigrono arbitrators of the issues between the parties.

[77] 1469, December 2, Pera

Peregro de Persio of the deceased Giovanni and Stefano de Nigrono of the deceased Pietro pronounce arbitration in the dispute between Baldassarre di Savignone and Benedetto De Franchi Saco, attorney of his brother Cristoforo.

[78] 1469, December 5, Pera

Silvestro De Marinis, Genoese citizen, from [...], declares the sale of 42 cantaloupe caviar of Kopa, worth 4,830 aspen Ottoman, made with apodixia by Benedetto Catrinelo.

[79] 1469, December 5, Pera

Vincenzo delle Vigne asks Giacomo Antonio de Illice to grant him, on the basis of a previous agreement, a mortgage of 120 Venetian Ducati and declares himself ready to offer a proper guarantee for the reimbursement, pending the nullity of the compromise between the parties. Giacomo agrees to deliver the some behind bail on the redemption in Chio.

²⁹¹ This episode is also mentioned in Alina Alexandra Payne, *Dalmatia and the Mediterranean: Portable Archaeology and the Poetics of Influence* (Brill Academic Publishing, 2014). 192.

[80] 1469, December 9 Pera

Quilico di Rapallo of Antonio, witnessed by Tommaso di Rezzoaglio of Chiavari, declares that he has signed with Perino di Vico an apodixia handwritten by Lorenzo de Argirofo about 1,500 Ottomans aspris by Tommaso invested in a fruit batch loaded with Chio and Izmir on the griparee patronized by Andrea Schiaffino of Camogli and Lorenzo and sold to Pera.

[81] 1469, December 9, Pera

Perino di Vico, witness produced by Tommasodi Rezzoaglio of Chiavari, confirms that he has signed with Lorenzo de Argirofo the apodixia handwritten by Quilico di Rapallo, which allowed Thomas, in case of non-payment, to issue a letter of exchange.

[82] 1469, December 9, Pera

Giuliano Burleto of Chiavari, witness produced by Tommaso di Rezzoaglio of Chiavari, states that, according to an apodixia handwritten by Lorenzo de Argiofo, said Tommaso had promised to change 1,500 Ottoman *aspers*, the value of a batch of fruit, and no more than 500 *aspers* of its profit and confirms a profit of 27 *aspers* percent gains from selling it goods in Pera.

[83] 1469, December 9, Pera

Tommasino di Ronco of the deceased Nicola, witness produced by Tommaso di Rezzoaglio di Chiavari, confirms that he has obtained from the money invested in fruit, together with Giuliano Burleto, Giacomo de Ben and the above-mentioned Thomas, 27 net per cent.

[84] 1469, December 9, Pera

Andrea Schiaffino di Camogli, witness produced by Tommaso di Rezzoaglio di

Chiavari, confirms that from the sale of the fruit lot, loaded on the ship he was patron, where he had invested Bernardo of Santa Margherita, Lodisio Frugono and Tommaso profit of 41 *aspers* percent.

[85] 1469, December 9, Pera

Simone de Larcho, witness produced by Tommaso di Rezzoaglio di Chiavari, confirms a profit of 41 percent received from the sale of fruit charged to Chio and Izmir and sold to Pera, where he had invested 2,300 Ottoman *aspers*.

[86] 1469, December 9 Pera

Bartolomeo de Bernard, witness produced by Tommaso di Rezzoaglio di Chiavari, confirms Simone de Larcho's testimonial of 41 percent profit from the fruit sold to Pera, where he had invested 1,200 Ottoman *aspers*.

[87] 1469, December 9 Pera

Baldassarre di Savignone, witness produced by Tommaso di Rezzoaglio di Chiavari, states that on the previous day, said Tommaso threatened to issue a letter exchange for 2,000 Turkish *aspers*, equivalent to the value of the fruit, loaded at Chio and Izmir and sold to Pera, and its profit, as Lorenzo de Argirofo refused the balance.

[88] 1469, December 9 Pera

Tommasino di Ronco of the deceased Nicola, witness produced by Tommaso di Rezzoaglio di Chiavari, confirms the deposit of Baldassarre di Savignone.

[89] 1469 December 12, Pera

Ambrose Di Negro, a resident of Pera, witness produced by Antonio and Francesco of Val Taro, brothers and heirs for 2/7 of Giacomo, confirms that Antonio, in

Thessaloniki, had delivered to him 10,000 figs and Quilico Giustiniano of the deceased Angelo an unspecific quantity of figs, of the same quality, sold for about of 102 remains for 200 aspen Ottomans.

[90] 1469, December 16, Pera [? incomplete]

The notary Domenico de Alsario, witness produced by notary Antonio of Torriglia, declares that Bernardo of Torriglia, son of Antonio, has been in charge of the assignment of 8 December 1466 to 21 February 1469

[91] 1469, December 18, Pera

Lodisio Frigono, witness produced by Antonio and Francesco of Val di Taro, brothers and heirs for 2/7 of Giacomo, declares that he has seen Antonio deliver, in Salonicco, at Quilico Giustiniano of the deceased Angelo there were about 4,000 fiche, listed no less than 2 asper for remaining.

[92] post 1475, June 6, Pera

Pelegro De Franchi of the deceased [...], already a citizen of Caffa, attorney of his wife Argentina, daughter of Silvestro De Franchi of Pagana, transferred power of attorney to Brother Lodisio and Pietro De Franchi, Genoese citizens, for the care of shops, collection of claims and litigation concerning the estate belonging to his wife from the property of mother Catarineta.

[93] 1475, October 25, Pera

Cipriano Vivaldi and Francesco Fieschi formulate a compromise valid until 4 November and appoint Lazzaro di Cavo and Melchiorre Garbarino as arbitrators of 12,000 Caffa aspri, claimed by Vivaldi.

[94] 1475, November 9, Pera

Lodisio Spinola of the deceased Antonio, Oberto di Rovereto of the deceased Antonio and Giacomo Maraboto of the deceased Ambrogio, witness produced by Francesco Fieschi, confirm that Pera's cadi obliged the aforementioned Francis to

compensate Stefano de Nigrono for 1,000 bocasini, assigned to him, despite Fieschi's opposition to alleged bankruptcy of the counterpart.

[95] 1475, November 16 Pera.

Francesco Fieschi del Teodoro sells the griparea "Santa Maria", of which it is the owner and patron of the capacity of 1,300 cantarri, at anchor in the port of Pera, to Oberto di Rovereto of the deceased Antonio for the price of 10,000 Ottoman *aspers*, of which releases receipt.

[96] 1475, November 17, Pera

Cipriano Vivaldi and Francesco Fieschi formulate a compromise valid until 24 December following and nominate Leonardo Vernasano and Giovanni Spinola of the deceased Bartolomeo as arbitrators of the 12,000 aspri of Caffè claimed by Vivaldi.

[97] 1475, November 18, Pera.

Testament of Antoniotto of Cabella of Antonio, Genoese citizen.

[98] 1475, November 21, Pera

Inventory of the goods found in the house of the deceased Antoniotto di Cabella, in Pera.

[99] 1475, December 1, Pera

The Benedictine Placido di Poggio, a priory of the monastery of Santa Maria della Misericordia de Sisarna in Pera, and the monks Giorgio di Pagana and Bernardo di Camogli appoint attorney the notary Cristoforo di Canevale for the care of the shops, the collection of claims and litigations relative to the convent only to Pera and Constantinople.

[100] 1475, December 5, Pera

Cipriano Vivaldi and Francesco Fieschi formulate a compromise valid until 15 January and appoint Giovanni Spinola of Bartolomeo, Oberto of Rovereto del

Antonio and Antino Salvaigo of Casano, arbitrators of a lawsuit relating to 12,000 *aspers* of Caffa, alleged by Vivaldi.

[101] 1475, December 28, Pera

Notary Nicola di Torriglia, Genoese citizen, nominates attorney Goffredo Lercario, Genoese citizen, for the care of his shops in Chio and elsewhere, the collection of loans, the contraction of mortgages and the issue of exchange letters.

[102] 1476, January 15, Pera

Cipriano Vivaldi and Francesco Fieschi renewed the compromise of December 5, 1475 until 1 February, and confirmed Giovanni Spinola of the Bartholomew, Oberto Rovereto del Antonio and Antonio Salvaigo Casano, referees of the 12,000 *aspri* Caffa.

[103] 1476, January 15, Pera

Giacomo Ponsono of the deceased Andrea sells the "Santa Maria" griparea, of which it is owner and patron, with a capacity of 800 cantaries, at anchor in the port of Pera, to the brothers Bartolomeo and Giovanni Battista Bederii of Lancilloto for the price of 2,700 *aspri* Ottoman, of which it releases receipt. Stephen Rasperio is guarantee.

[104] 1476, January 15, Pera

Bartholomew and Giovanni Battista Bederii of the Lancilloto have the duty, within six months, to Giacomo Ponsono of the deceased Andrea 1,800 Ottoman *aspers*, the rest of the price of the griparea they bought today.

[105] 1476, February 5, Pera

The notary Nicola di Torriglia of the deceased Giovanni, Genoese citizen, declares null any legal act of which he is the author, excluding the testament, for the state of misfortune and danger in which he pays after the co-transfer from Caffa to Pera.

[106] 1478, August 20, Pera

Meluadux Spinola del Giacomo, resident of Pera, and Galeotto Mosca, witness produced by notary Nicola di Torriglia, state that Giovanni di Onzo, grandson of the Torriglia, intended to retain the 14,000 aspri of Caffa that his uncle had entrusted to him before the fall of Caffa.

[107] 1479, July 20, Pera

Nicola di Torriglia and Giovanni di Onzo formulate a valid compromise for eight days and appoint Oberto Rovereto and Angelo Strombo of Focea arbitrators of the disagreement over 14,000 asperi of Caffa delivered by Nicola to Giovanni at the time of the fall of Caffa.

[108] 1479, July 28, Pera

Notary Nicola di Torriglia and Giovanni di Onzo formulate a new compromise valid for eight days and reconfirm Oberto Rovereto and Angelo Strombi arbitrators of the disagreement over 14,000 asperi of Caffa delivered by Nicola to Giovanni at the time of the fall of Caffa.

[109] 1479, July 28 – August 6, Pera

Notary Nicola di Torriglia in the presence of the referees of the compromise and Giovanni di Onzo, confirms that his grandson has to give him 14,000 aspri of Caffa and protest against him for the damages, expenses and interests related to that sum of money.

[110] 1479, August 6, Pera

Notary Nicola di Torriglia, confirms that he has handed over 14,000 aspri of Caffa to Giovanni di Onzo, denounces his grandson's poor reputation and asks for writing to be handed over to Giovanni to attend the oath of witnesses and deposits, within the next day, his questions .

[111] 1479, August 17, Pera

Giovanni di Onzo and the notary Nicola di Torriglia formulate a valid compromise for ten days and appoint Adano de Silvaricia and Nicola de Amingdola arbiters of the dispute between the parties for 2,000 Turkish *aspers*, the rest of the price of a griparea of the late Lorenzo Spinola, already patronized by Giovanni.

[112] 1479, August 21, Pera

The notary Nicola di Torriglia, judgement against Adano de Silvaricia and Nicola de Amingdola, arbitrators of the compromise referred to in doc 111, produces a written statement stating his reasons against his nephew Giovanni di Onzo about 14,000 aspri of Caffa.

[113] 1479, August 21, Pera

Adano de Silvaricia and Nicola de Amingdola, arbitrators of the compromise referred to in doc 111, admit the exposure of Torriglia, despite the opposition of Giovanni di Onzo, and decide that he should examine the various titles and the witnesses he wants to produce.

[114] 1479, August 21, Pera

Beda de Garibaldo, witness produced by Nicola di Torriglia, in his capacity as a referee designated "in a voice", together with Giovanni di Torriglia baker, in the dispute between Torriglia and his grandson, Giovanni di Onzo, for 14,000 aspri of Caffa, confirms the contrasting statements offered by Giovanni di Onzo and the inability to reach a friendly composition between the parties.

[115] 1479, August 21, Pera

Giovanni di Torriglia baker, witness produced by Nocla di Torriglia, in his capacity as an arbitrator signed "in a voice", together with Beda de Garibaldo, in the dispute between Torriglia and his grandson, Giovanni di Onzo, for 14,000 aspens of Caffa, confirms the deposition of said Beda.

[116] 1479, August 26, Pera

Adano de Silvaricia and Nicola de Amingdola, arbitrators of the dispute between Giovanni di Onzo and Nicola di Torriglia about 2,000 Ottoman *aspers*, they give Nicola each request for advanced payment by the counterpart.

[117] 1480, February 3, Pera

Paride de Morde, formerly a Protoger of the Latins at Caffa on the request of the notary Nicola di Torriglia, attest that the said Nicola was not registered in society with Cristoforo di Caneval as owner of a house, built only in part in the district assigned by the King of Turks to the Latins of Caffa sold to Paolo de Roestropis for the price of 150 Turkish *aspers*.

[118] 1480, February 3, Pera

Damiano di Gravago of the deceased Pietro, on the request of the notary Nicholas of Torriglia, declares that he has paid 300 turkish *aspers* in his guarantee, after the transfer of Caffa to Pera to Cristoforo di Canevale.

[119] 1480, June 26, Pera

Lodisio di Pietrarossa, former resident of Caffa, Andrea Fatinanti, former Caffa citizen, Adamo de Silvaricia, Luchino Squarsafico, former resident of Caffa, and Lorenzo di Gibelletto, formerly inhabitant and resident of Caffa, witness produced by Nicola de Mauro of the deceased Lodisio , a former citizen of Caffa, notary public attorney Nicola Torriglia, confirmed that the Torriglia, at Caffa, had held for several years a Goth concubine named Sasia, called Benedetta, now dead, having several sons, the only survivor of such as the firstborn Giannettino, who now moved to Chio, and then married her with a free person, Anechino Rechane.

[120] 1482, March 1, Pera

Luciano Squarsafico del Giuliano appointed attorney Davide di Staglieno del Antonio for the care of his shops, the collection of claims and litigation concerning the inheritance of his mother Dominigina of Luca di San Francesco, of her maternal grandmother Giovannina of Angelo di Monetnero and of a certain Mary.

[121] 1482, April 6, Costantinopoli

Serafina, widow of Bartholomew of Sant'Ambrogio, appointed attorney Davide of Staglieno of Antonio for the care of his shops, the collection of claims and litigation concerning the inheritance of his mother Giovanna of Angelo di Montenero and of a certain Maria.

[122] 1482, November 21, Pera

Lorenzo Squarsafico of the deceased Giuliano e Demetrio de Lorto of the deceased Gaspare nominates attorney Davide of Staglieno of Antonio for the care of his shops, the collection of claims and litigation concerning the inheritance of his mother Giovanna of Angelo di Montenero and of a certain Maria and their respective mothers, Dominigina and Pomelina.

[123] 1484, December 13, Pera

Pantaleone Coressi, attorney of notary Nicola di Torriglia, resident in Chios, declares that he wants to return to Giovanni di Onzo, due to the continuing pressure exerted by the latter, part of the 5,000 *aspers* obtained as advance of the balance of 14,000 *aspers* of Caffa due to Torriglia from his grandson, without renouncing his own rights or Nicola.

[124] 1490 February 1, Pera

Primofiore, daughter of Demetrio de Telicha and nephew of Theodoroca de Telicha, living in Soldaia, widow of Giovanni Battista Campofregoso and wife of Luciano Squaresafico of Giuliano, in virtue of the rights against the debtors that her paternal grandfather gave to her for the payment of the dowry of 400 silver of Caffa, disobeyed the notary Nicola di Torriglia, inhabitant of Caffa and now in Chio, for the precarious economic situation in which he came to find after the fall of Caffa, from the debts contracted with the Theodoroca except 150 Genoese lire to be paid in three instalments, by January 1, 1492. Also, the mother of Primofiore, Catimythia, daughter of the Geronimo de Alegro and widower of Dimitri, renounces the rights that she has against the debtors of Theodoroca.

Appendix B – Fatih Sultan Mehmed'in Galatalılar'a Verdiği Ferman

“Invocatio (da`vet) Hüv`el mu`in

Tuğra: Ahmed bin Mehmed Han el muzaffer da`ima

- (1) Nişân-ı şerîf-i ‘âlişân-ı sultânî sâmi-mekân ve tuğray-ı garraı-ı giti sitân-ı hâkânî nuffize bi-avn`il rabbanî hükmi oldurki
- (2) râfiun-i (unreadable)tevkî`-i refi`-i hâkânî nefsi Galatada sâkin olan efrenç tâifesi südde-i sa'adetime adem gönderüb bundan akdem ecdâd-ı izâmımdan fâtih-i mahruse-i Kostantaniyye olan.
- (3) merhum ve mağfurleh cennet mekân firdevs âsiyan Gâzi Mehmed Han 'aleyhi er rahmet ve'l gufran mahruse-i mezburei bi'avni'llah-i melik'ül mennan şemşîr-i zafer-nişânlarıyla
- (4) kabze-i teshîre getürdüklerinde bunların cedleri Galata kal'asının miftahların getürüb 'atebe-i 'âlişanlarına ita'at ve inkıyad idüb kal'ai teslim eylediklerinde merhum müşarünileyh dahi
- (5) mezburlara bu vechile ‘ahidnâme-i hümayûn ihsan eylemişlerki benki ulu padişah ve ulu şehinşah Sultan Mehmed Han bin Sultan Murad hânım yemin iderim ki yerleri yaradan
- (6) perverdigâr hakkıçün ve hazret-i resul Muhammed el Mustafa 'alehi's salavat ve's selâmın pâk münevver ve mutahhar ruhiçün ve yedi mushaf ve yüzyirmidörtbin peygamber hakkıçün
- (7) ve dedem rûhiçün ve babam rûhiçün ve benüm bâşım için ve oğlancıklarımın bâşiçün ve kuşandığım kılıcınım hakkıçün şimdiki halde Galatanın halkı ve merdümzâdeleri atebe-i'ulyama dostluk
- (8) içün elçiler Babilanı Pallavicino ve Marchesio de Franchi ve dragmanları Niccolo Pagliuzzi ile kal'a-i mezburenin miftahın getürüb bana kul olmağa ita'at
- (9) ve inkıyad göstermişler ve ben dahi kabul eyledim ki kendülerin ayinleri ve erkânları ne vechile olageldüyse yine ol üslub üzere âdetlerin ve erkânların
- (10) yerine getüreler ve ben dahi üzerine asker ile varub kal'alarını yıkub harab etmiyem ve kendülerinin mâlları ve rızıkları ve mekanları ve mahzenleri ve bağları

- (11) ve değirmenleri ve gemileri ve sandalları ve bi-lcümle met'aları ve avretleri ve oğlancıkları ve kulları ve câriyeleri ve kendülerin ellerinde mukarrer olub
- (12) mütaarız olmiyam ve üşendirmiyem ve anlar dahi rencberlik ederler gayri memleketlerim gibi deryadan ve kurudan sefer edeler kimesne mâni' ve müzâhim olmiya mu'af
- (13) ve müsellemler olalar ve ben dahi üzerlerine şer'i harac vaz' idem sâl be-sâl eda ideler gayriler gibi ben dahi bunların üzerlerinden nazar-ı şerifim diriğ buyurmayub
- (14) koruyam gayri memleketlerim gibi ve kilisaları ellerinde ola âyinlerince okıyalar amma çan ve nakus çalmıyalar ve kilisaların alub mescid etmiyem bunlar dahi
- (15) yeni kilisa yapmıyalar ve Ceneviz bazirgânları deryadan ve kurudan rencberlik idüb geleler ve gideler gümrüklerin âdet üzre vireler anlar kimesne ta'addi emiye
- (16) ve yeniçeriliğe oğlan almiyam ve bir kâfiri rızası olmadın müsliman etmiyeler ve kendüleri aralarında kimi ihtiyar iderler ise maslahatları için
- (17) kethüda nasb edeler ve evlerine doğancı ve kul konmiya ve kal'a-i mezbûre halkı ve bazirgânları angariya (unreadable) dan mu'af ve müsellemler olmağla mezbûrân efrenc tâ'ifesi
- (18) senesi cemaziyel evvelisinin evâhîrinde ihsân evledikleri 'ahidnâme merhûm müşarünileyhden sonra ecdâd-ı izâmım enârallahu berahi-nehum zaman-ı
- (19) sa'adet-iktiranlarında tecdîd etdirilmeyüb hâlâ serîr-i saltanat-ı padişahî ve taht-ı izzet-bahş-ı şehinşâhî cenab-ı celâlet me abıma müyesser olmağla mezbûrân (unreadable) efrence tâ'ifesi
- (20) zikr olunan 'ahidnâmenin tecdîd olunmasın rica eyledikleri ecilden ben dahi mukarrer dutub bu nişân-ı hümayûnumu verdüm ve buyurdum kizikr olunan
- (21) efrence taifesine merhum müşarünileyh verdüğü 'ahidnâme-i hümayûn mucebince amel olunub ana muhalif iş olmak ihtimali olmiya şöyle bilalar
- (22) 'alâmet-i şerîfe i'timâd kılalar tahriren fi evâsıt-ı şehr-i muharrem ül harâm sene 1012 minel hicret`ün nebeviyye
- (23) be-makam-ı Edirne el mahruse.”

Appendix C – 1455 survey of Istanbul

Table 5 The quarters and those subject to the jizya tax in Pera according to the 1455 survey of Istanbul. Source: İnalçık, Halil. The Survey of Istanbul 1455: The Text, English Translation, Analysis of the Text, Documents. İstanbul, Turkey: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2012.

Mahalle Quarter	Hane Dwellings	Cize Mükellefleri Subject to Jizya	Cizyeden Muaf Exempt from Jizya
Anton di Garzan (çoğ. Cenevizli, birkaç Rum ve Yahudi)	64	28	32
Asuder Ermeniyan (Ermeni, İtalyan)	14	7	13
Ayo Dikemo Dandano	41	39	25
Bir mahalle (?)	-	11	1
Fabya	38	60	4
Harhanci (Rum, Ermeni ve İtalyanlar)	18	18	5
İskinoplok (çoğ. Ermeni, Rum, birkaç Efrenc)	64	21	10
Kosta Lupaci	19	23	5
Mahalle-i Yahudiyan (çoğ. Rum ve Ermeni)	31	39	18
Nikeroz Bonazita (çoğ. Cenevizli)	32	69	13
Nikeroz Sikay (çoğ. Cenevizli)	25	27	16
Nurbek Kosta İskeneplik (çoğ. Rum ve Ermeni, birkaç fakir İtalyan)	51	57	17

Papa Yani (Rum, Ermeni ve İtalyanlar)	19	25	8
Pero d'Lankaşo	109	100	39
Samona	87	76	28
San Neferzo (kayıp sayfalar)	35	-	-
Varo Hristo	33	32	13
Yani Mavroyani	37	23	12
Yani Vasilikoz	31	25	14
Yorgi Argancelo	32	28	17
Zani Dabdan (çoğ. Cenevizli)	44	20	23
Zani di Pagani (1 Ermeni, çoğ. İtalyan)	30	24	16
Zani Drapora (çoğ. Cenevizli)	10	29	10
Total	864	781	339

Table 6 The origins of the newly settled Muslim populations according to the 1455 Survey of Istanbul Source: Mehmet Öz, "1455 Tahriri ve İstanbul'un İskan Tarihi Bakımından Önemi", Osmanlı İstanbulu I, İstanbul 29 Mayıs Üniversitesi, İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi Kültür A.Ş., 2013

Place of Origin	Number	Quarter settled in
Akhisar	1	BAB-I SİLİVRİ
Amasya	1	İSA-KERMESİ
Ankara	2	BALAT
Ankara	1	BALAT II

Ayasolug	1	BALAT
Ayazmend (Balıkesir'de)	1	İPSOMETHYA
Ayazmend	2	İSA-KERMESİ
Ayazmend	1	AZEBAN
Aydın	1	ZAGANOZ PAŞA

Aydın	9	SOFYAN
Aydın	1	TOP-YIKIĞI
Aydın	1	KIZIL-TAŞ
Aydın	1	AZEBAN
Balat	1	KIZIL-TAŞ
Balat	3	BÜYÜK-BALAT
Balıkesir	1	ZAGANOZ PAŞA
Balıkesir	2	İPSOMETHYA
Beğpazarı	2	BALAT II
Bergama	1	BALAT
Bergama	4	LİPS
Bergama	2	KİR MARTAS
Bergama	13	KIZIL-TAŞ
Biga	4	BALAT II
Biga	4	PEROKAMBİY O
Bigadiç	1	ZAGANOZ PAŞA
Boğazhisar	1	İSA-KERMESİ
Bolu	1	ESKİ BALAT
Bolu	1	AVRANTHARY A
Bolu	2	BALAT
Bolu	3	TOP-YIKIĞI
Bolu	1	RAL KARMİR
Bolu	1	BAB-I SİLİVRİ
Bolu	2	ALTI-MERMER

Bolu	1	KASTEL HİRİSE
Bolu	3	İPSOMETHYA
Bolu	2	İSA-KERMESİ
Bolu	2	KIZIL-TAŞ
Borlu (Demirci-Manisa)	1	KİR MARTAS
Borlu	1	KASTEL HİRİSE
Burgaz (Lâpseki yakınında bir kale)	1	SOFYAN
Burgaz	1	TOP-YIKIĞI
Burgaz	1	BAB-I SİLİVRİ
Bursa	1	BALAT
Bursa	2	BALAT II
Bursa	1	LİPS
Bursa	1	TOP-YIKIĞI
Bursa	1	ALTI-MERMER
Bursa	1	İPSOMETHYA
Bursa	1	KIZIL-TAŞ
Çağa	5	ALTI-MERMER
Çan	2	BALAT II
Çorlu	4	BALAT II
Çorlu	8	ZAGANOZ PAŞA
Çorlu	1	LİPS
Çorlu	1	SOFYAN
Çorlu	1	TOP-YIKIĞI

Çorlu	2	KİR NİKOLA
Çorlu	4	RAL KARMİR
Çorlu	8	KILIÇ
Çorlu	1	BAB-I SİLİVRİ
Çorlu	12	ALTI-MERMER
Çorlu	1	KASTEL HİRİSE
Demircili	1	BALAT II
Denizli	1	TOP-YIKIĞI
Domanic	1	ALTI-MERMER
Domanic	1	KASTEL HİRİSE
Ece-ova	1	BALAT II
Edirne	1	BALAT II
Edirne	2	LİPS
Edirne	2	BAB-I SİLİVRİ
Edirne	2	ALTI-MERMER
Edirne	4	KIZIL-TAŞ
Edirne	2	AZEBAN
Edremid	1	BALAT
Edremid	4	BALAT II
Engüri	1	İSA-KERMESİ
Ereğli	3	ZAGANOZ PAŞA
Ereğli	1	KASTEL HİRİSE
Ereğli	1	İPSOMETHYA
Eskihisar	1	ALTI-MERMER
Fener	1	BALAT II

Filiba	2	ALTI-MERMER
Filiba	2	KASTEL HİRİSE
Gebze	2	BALAT
Gelibolu	1	LİPS
Gelibolu	1	İPSOMETHYA
Gelibolu	1	KIZIL-TAŞ
Gelibolu	6	AZEBAN
Gönen	1	BALAT
Gördek	1	KİR MARTAS
Gülnar	1	KİR MARTAS
Gülnar	1	TOP-YIKIĞI
Gülnar	1	ALTI-MERMER
Güzelhisar	1	ZAGANOZ PAŞA
Hayrabolu	2	BAB-I SİLİVRİ
Hızırbeyle	4	İPSOMETHYA
Iflihan/Eflani	1	BALAT II
İflahan	4	LİKO SPİROS
İflahan	2	KİR MARTAS
İflahan	1	SOFYAN
İflahan	5	TOP-YIKIĞI
İflahan	6	KILIÇ
İflahan	1	BAB-I SİLİVRİ
İncügez	1	BALAT II
İncügez	1	KRON
İncügez	1	LİKO SPİROS
İncügez	1	SOFYAN

İncügez	3	KILIÇ
İncügez	1	KASTEL HİRİSE
İncügiz	1	KİR NİKOLA
İnönü	2	TOP-YIKIĞI
İn-öyüğü	1	BADRAK/BAT RİK
İpsala	1	BALAT II
İvrindi	1	BALAT II
İzmir	3	BALAT II
İznigmud	1	SOFYAN
İznigmat	1	MANASTIR AYOS HRİSTOFEROZ
İznigmat	2	KIZIL-TAŞ
Karahisar	1	SOFYAN
Karahisar	1	SOFYAN
Kastamonu	2	KIZIL-TAŞ
Kayacık	2	BALAT II
Kayacık	2	KRON
Kepsut	1	ALTI-MERMER
Keradek	2	KİR MARTAS
Kerede	1	MEGALO DİMESTİKO
Kerede	1	MANASTIR AYOS HRİSTOFEROZ
Kerede	2	ALTI-MERMER
Kerede	2	İPSOMETHYA
Kestel	1	TOP-YIKIĞI

Kiresun	1	TOP-YIKIĞI
Kocaeli	4	BALAT
Kocaeli	4	BALAT II
Kocaeli	3	TOP-YIKIĞI
Kocaeli	6	KİR NİKOLA
Kocaeli	1	İPSOMETHYA
Kocaeli	2	AZEBAN
Kocali	4	ESKİ BALAT
Lâpseki	1	BALAT II
Lâpseki	1	AZEBAN
Magnisa	1	BALAT
Magnisa	1	TOP-YIKIĞI
Magnisa	1	ALTI-MERMER
Manisa	2	KIZLAR MANASTIRI
Manyas	1	TOP-YIKIĞI
Melen	1	ALTI-MERMER
Mısır	1	LİPS
Mudurlu	1	ALTI-MERMER
Mudurnu	1	BALAT II
Mudurnu	1	ZAGANOZ PAŞA
Mudurnu	1	İPSOMETHYA
Mudurnu	1	KIZIL-TAŞ
Muğla	1	KIZIL-TAŞ
Nif	1	BALAT
Nikebolu	1	ALTI-MERMER

Saruhan	2	ZAGANOZ PAŞA
Saruhan	2	KİR MARTAS
Saruhan	1	TOP-YIKIĞI
Saruhan	1	ALTI-MERMER
Saruhan	1	KIZIL-TAŞ
Seferihisar	1	İPSOMETHYA
Selanik	1	AZEBAN
Semendire	1	TOP-YIKIĞI
Semener/Semen dire?	1	BALAT II
Silivri	1	KILIÇ
Sinop	1	ZAGANOZ PAŞA
Siroz	1	ALTI-MERMER
Siroz	1	KIZIL-TAŞ
Taraklıborlu	1	TOP-YIKIĞI
Teke	1	İSA-KERMESİ
Tekürdağ	3	LİPS
Yenice	1	İSA-KERMESİ
Yoroz	1	BALAT

Tekürdağ	2	KİR MARTAS
Tekürdağ	1	MANASTIR AYOS HRİSTOFEROZ
Tekürdağı	1	BALAT
Tekürdağı	4	ZAGANOZ PAŞA
Tekürdağı	31	TOP-YIKIĞI
Tekürdağı	6	KİR NİKOLA
Tekürdağı	5	KILIÇ
Tekürdağı	1	KILIÇ
Tekürdağı	1	BAB-I SİLİVRİ
Tırhala	1	KİR MARTAS
Tire	1	BALAT
Trikkala	1	KİR MARTAS
Vize	1	KİR NİKOLA
Yanbolu	1	BALAT II
Yenice	1	SOFYAN

Table 7 The origins of the settlers according to the 1455 Survey of Istanbul Source: Mehmet Öz, "1455 Tahriri ve Istanbul'un İskan Tarihi Bakımından Önemi", Osmanlı İstanbulu I, Istanbul 29 Mayıs Üniversitesi, Istanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi Kültür A.Ş., 2013

Tekürdağ	56
Çorlu	43
Kocaeli	24
Bergama	22
Iflihan/Eflani	20
Bolu	19
Aydın	13
Edirne	13
Gelibolu	9
İncügez	9
Biga	8
Bursa	8
Saruhan	7
Kerede	6
Çağa	5
Edremid	5
Ereğli	5
Magnisa	5
Mudurlu	5
Balat	4
Filiba	4
Hızırbeyli	4
İznigud	4
Kayacık	4
Ankara	3
Ayazmend	3
Balıkesir	3
Burgaz	3

İzmir	3
Beğpazarı	2
Borlu	2
Çan	2
Gebze	2
Gülnar	2
Hayrabolu	2
İnönü	2
Karahisar	2
Kastamonu	2
Keradek	2
Lâpseki	2
Siroz	2
Yenice	2
Akhisar	1
Amasya	1
Ayasolug	1
Bigadiç	1
Boğazhisar	1
Demircilü	1
Denizli	1
Domanic	1
Domanic	1
Ece-ova	1
Engüri	1
Eskihisar	1
Fener	1
Gönen	1

Gördek	1
Gölnar	1
Gözelhisar	1
İn-öyüğü	1
İpsala	1
İvrindi	1
Kepsut	1
Kestel	1
Kiresun	1
Manyas	1
Melen	1
Mısır	1
Muğla	1
Nif	1
Nikebolu	1

Seferihisar	1
Selanik	1
Semendire	1
Semener/Semendire?	1
Silivri	1
Sinop	1
Taraklıborlu	1
Teke	1
Tırhala	1
Tire	1
Trikkala	1
Vize	1
Yanbolu	1
Yoroz	1

Appendix D – Map of Pera




Figure (5) Galata in 1455, according to the Survey of 1455 source: İnalçık, Halil. Essays in Ottoman History (Istanbul: Eren, 1998), 370.

Appendix E – List of *Bailio*, extraordinary ambassadors, secretaries, and representatives

Compiled and amalgamated from the National Archives State Papers and the 2. Uluslararası İstanbul'un Fethi Konferansı – İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi (IRCICA Library) pages 469-470:

Baili (Balyoslar)

- 1454 Bartolomeo Marcello
- 1456 Lorenzo Vitturi
- 1458 Michele Cappello
- 1459 Domenico Balbi
- 1462 Paolo Barbarigo
- 1479 Pietro Vitturi
- 1479 Battista Gritti
- 1482 Pietro Bembo
- 1486 Ermolao Minio
- 1487 Antonio Ferro
- 1489 Onfrè Giustinian
- 1492 Girolamo Marcello

Extraordinary Ambassadors (Fevkalade elçiler ve sair olağanüstü yetkilerle yollananlar)

- 1453 Bartolomeo Marcello
- 1460 Nicolò Sagundino, *sekreter*
- 1465 Giovanni Cappello
- 1466 Leonardo Boldù
- 1471 Nicolò Cocco ve Francesco Capello
- 1475 Girolamo Zorzi
- 1478 Tommaso Malipiero
- 1478 Giovanni Dario, *sekreter*
- 1479 Benedetto Trevisan

- 1480 Nicolò Cocco
1481 Antonio Vitturi
1483 Domenico Bolani
1484 Giovanni Dario, *sekreter*
1486 Antonio Ferro (*sonra balyos olarak kaldı*)
1487 Giovanni Dario, *sekreter*
1493 Domenico Trevisan
1496 Alvise Sagundino, *sekreter*
1497 Alvise Sagundino, *sekreter*
1498 Andrea Zancani
1500 Alvise Manenti, *sekreter*

Baili (Balyoslar)

- 1503 Leonardo Bembo, balyos vekili
1508 Andrea Foscolo
1512 Nicolò Giustinian, balyos vekili
1516 Pietro Donà, balyos vekili
1516 Leonardo Bembo
1519 Tommaso Contarini
1522 Andrea Priuli
1523 Pietro Zen, fevkalade elçi ve balyos vekili
1524 Pietro Bragadin
1526 Pietro Zen, fevkalade elçi ve balyos vekili
1530 Francesco Bernardo
1531 Pietro Zen, fevkalade elçi ve balyos vekili
1533 Nicolò Giustinian
1537 Jacopo Canal
1541 Antonio Mazzaruol, sekr., maslahatgüzar
1541 Girolamo Zane
1544 Vincenzo Zancani
1546 Alessandro Contarini

- 1547 Alise Renier
1550 Bernardo Navagero
1552 Domenico Trevisan
1554 Antonio Erizzo
1556 Antonio Barbarigo
1558 Marino Cavalli
1560 Girolamo Fero
1562 Andrea Dandolo, balyos vekili
1562 Daniele Barbarigo
1564 Vittore Bragadin
1566 Jacopo Soranzo
1568 Marcantonio Barbaro
1573 Antonio Tiepolo
1575 Giovanni Corer
1577 Nicolò Barbarigo
1579 Gabriele Cavazza, sekr., maslahatgüzar
1580 Paolo Contarini
1582 Gianfrancesco Morosini
1585 Lorenzo Bernardo
1587 Giovanni Moro
1590 Girolamo Lippomano
1591 Lorenzo Bernardo, Nobile [asil] sıfatı ile maslahatgüzar
1591 Matteo Zane
1593 Marco Venier
1596 Girolamo Cappello
1599 Vincenzo Gradenigo

Extraordinary Ambassadors (Fevkalade elçiler ve olağanüstü yetkilerle gelen sair temsilciler.)

- 1517 Bartolomeo Contarini ve Alvise Mocenigo
1521 Marco Minio

1523 Pietro Zen, *fevkalade elçi ve balyos vekili*
1526 Pietro Zen, *fevkalade elçi ve balyos vekili*
1527 Marco Minio
1528 Tommaso Contarini
1530 Tommaso Macenigo
1531 Pietro Zen, *fevkalade elçi ve balyos vekili*
1533 Tommaso Contarini
1534 Daniele de' Ludovici, *sekreter*
1536 Tommaso Mocenigo
1539 Lorenzo Grati
1539 Pietro Zen (*İst. ulaşamadan yolda öldü*)
1539 Tommaso Contarini
1540 Alvise Badoer
1544 Stefano Tiepolo
1550 Caterino Zeno
1556 Alvise Renier
1567 Marino Cavalli
1567 Girolamo Zane (*Istanbul'a ulaşamadı*)
1571 Jacopo Ragazzoni
1573 Andrea Badoer
1575 Jacopo Soranzo
1582 Jacopo Soranzo
1595 Leonardo Donà

Appendix F - National Archives State Papers

English diplomatic documents at the United Kingdom National Archives. The *Calendar of State Papers Relating To English Affairs in the Archives of Venice*²⁹², *Calendar of State Papers Relating To English Affairs in the Vatican Archives*²⁹³, *Calendar of State Papers, Spain*²⁹⁴ and *Calendar of State Papers Foreign, Elizabeth*²⁹⁵. These *Calendars* are comprehensive summaries to replace the original documents, printed in the chronological order but do not always follow the ordering of the documents in the archives, and are used to find the records they describe. The *State Papers Venice* (SPVenice) are papers relating to British diplomacy held in the archives of Venice, *State Papers Vatican* (SPVatican), in the Vatican Archives, *Calendar of State Papers, Spain* (SPSpain) in the Spanish Archives and *State Papers Foreign, Elizabeth* (SPForeign) are those held from Elizabeth I deposited at the Public Record Office. Relevant excerpts taken from these documents pertaining to the Ottomans are included here.

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²⁹² *Calendar of State Papers Relating To English Affairs in the Archives of Venice, Volume 1-8* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1864).

²⁹³ *Calendar of State Papers Relating To English Affairs in the Vatican Archives, Volume 1, 1558-1571*. Edited by J M Rigg. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office 1916).

²⁹⁴ "Spain: February 1531, 16-28," in *Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 4 Part 2, 1531-1533*, ed. Pascual de Gayangos (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1882), 64-78.

²⁹⁵ *Calendar of State Papers Foreign: Elizabeth, Volume 1, 1558-1559*. Edited by Joseph Stevenson. (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office 1863).

State Papers which include intelligence information on the Ottoman state.

No.520 SPVenice 1487 Aug. 17. St. Mark's Library. Giovanni de Giglis, Collector of Peter's Pence in England, to Pope Innocent VIII.

“Encloses draft of a letter to be written by the Pope to the King of Scotland, which might facilitate a peace between the two countries, and render Henry VII. and the clergy and people of England more ready to bear a subsidy for defence against the Turks, of which there is not the slightest hope unless letters be written in conformity with his Majesty's wishes. The preparations for war are very great, and if hostilities occur there will be an end of the subsidy. London, 17 August 1487.”

No.558 SPVenice 1490 Feb. 11. St. Mark's Library, cl. x., clxxvi., Flores to Pope Innocent VIII.

“Papal briefs have arrived, directing his colleague, the Bishop of Concordia, to proceed to England to negotiate peace between England and France, which marvellously pleased the King of France, M. and Madame de Bourbon, and the Chancellor. It were advantageous that this peace be concluded on account of the expedition which the Pope wished to have undertaken against the Turks.”

No.568 SPVenice 1490 May 21. St. Mark's Library. James IV. King of Scotland to Pope Innocent VIII.

“Towards the end of last March two letters were brought to me from you by Robert Bishop of Glasgow. You thereby exhorted me, for resistance against the Turk, to send together with the ambassadors of other Kings an ambassador of my own to Rome, as I have done. The Bishop also delivered to me, after long delay, another brief, which urges [the grant of] a pecuniary subsidy for the safeguard of the faith, and that by the 25th of March (the Annunciation) I should forward the same to Rome. This it was impossible for me to do, inasmuch as the letters of your Holiness were brought to me when that day had gone by. Moreover, my kingdom,

situated to the west and north, at a very great distance from Rome, does not overflow with silver and gold, although it abounds in other proper commodities.”

No.635 SPVenice 1494 Jan. 12. Venetian Archives, Library. Henry VII. to Pope Alexander VI.

“A few days ago received letters from you, whereby we learnt the immense slaughter inflicted in Dalmatia and Croatia by the Turks, and the great danger in which that country and every neighbouring province, especially Italy, is placed. This intelligence was very distressing.”

No.810 SPVenice 1500 Oct, 10. Sanuto Diaries, v. iii. p. 651. Letter from the Venetian Ambassador at Rome dated the 4th.

“Had been told by the Pope in secret that on the morrow, in consistory, he meant to appoint legates or nominees *à latere*, namely, to Germany the Cardinal of Gurk, who had experience and was warm about these Turkish affairs; to France the newly elected Cardinal of Salerno, who was afterwards to go to England, Scotland, and Spain; because the French ambassador had shown the Pope letters from the King [of France] requesting the mission of legates to the [European] powers and to himself, though previously the King had not desired this.”

No.818 SPVenice 1501 Nov. 17. *Deliberazioni Senato Secreta*. The Doge and Senate to the three Venetian Ambassadors in France, Domenico Trevisan, Hieronimo Donado, and Francesco Capello.

“Should Lewis XII. assent, Pasqualigo is to proceed with all haste to England, and after congratulations on the marriage of Prince Arthur to the Infanta of Spain to represent the great danger with which the Christian religion is threatened by the Turk; then with the aid of the aforesaid French ambassador to persuade the King to make an attack next spring upon the common enemy, who is prepared to commence hostilities by sea and land, with unheard of power. Should Lewis XII. not be disposed to

send an ambassador, or delay the mission, Pasqualigo is then to set out alone immediately.”

No.893 SPVenice 1507. May 20. Deliberazioni Senato Secreta. Henry VII. to Pope Julius II.

“Since his accession, has been intent on universal peace. At this present is allied by friendship and relationship with well nigh all catholic kings and princes. Has not been moved to this course by any lack on his part of military resources, treasure, or power, as by God's grace it is sufficiently manifest that he is not deficient in the like. Is content with what he at present possesses, and does not seek to extend his possessions, even by such dominions as of right belong to him, nor yet by any foreign conquest; and has moreover been always, by nature, averse to shedding Christian blood. On the other hand, has always been inclined to wage war on the Turks and other Infidels, to avenge so many injuries done to the Christian commonwealth, and also to recover the holy sepulchre and the patrimony of the Church.”

No.941 SPVenice 1509 April 28. Deliberazioni Senato Secreta. The Doge and Senate to Andrea Badoer, Ambassador in England.

“Respecting the suit made by the Pope to have an English ambassador for the Turkish affairs, acquaint him first of all that his Holiness does not make the demand for that purpose, but solely for the sake of giving repute and favour to the stir, which he, together with the King of France, has raised against Christians. Is desired, therefore, should the King of England send an ambassador to Rome, to exhort the Pontiff to make peace with Christians, and to turn his arms against Infidels as is his duty.”

No.945 SPVenice 1509 May 18. Sanuto Diaries, v. viii. p. 219. Letters arrived from the Ambassador in England, Andrea Badoer, dated London, 15th April,

“narrating how he is there without plate; cannot do honour to the Signory; would require money, &c. The King was ill, but had sent some of his

councillors to him, who told him to state the object of his embassy; so he said his coming was caused by the attack on the Signory by the King of France. They expressed regret, said that the King would act, but was prevented by illness, and showed him a brief written by the Pope to the King, inviting him to act against the Turks and Infidels; to which the King had answered, that he lauded the project, but was unable to comply by reason of his malady,—that he was pleased at the peace made between the King of the Romans and the King of France, but grieved to hear that France was hostile to the Signory of Venice, which fact was at variance with an attack on the Infidels, as the Signory is a power which might do much with a fleet, wherefore the Pope should see to allaying these dissensions, &c. Forwards copies of the brief and letter.”

No.166 SPVenice 1518 March 15. Original Letter Book, St. Mark's Library
Sebastian Giustinian to the Signory.

“Communicated to him the letters of the ambassador [Antonio] Giustinian, and the Turkish newsletters. The King replied that, according to advices received from Rhodes, nothing was to be feared from the Turk that year.”

No.441 SPVenice 1522 April 8. Deliberazioni Senato Secreta, v. xlix The Doge and Senate to Antonio Surian, Venetian Ambassador in England.

“As for the mission of a Venetian ambassador to the Turk, it has always been the custom of the State to send one to every new sultan, to congratulate him, and confirm ancient treaties, and Sultan Solyman had sent an ambassador to Venice, announcing his accession. The King of England, moreover, has approved the Signory's policy. In January last the Venetian ambassador [Marco Minio] quitted Constantinople on his way to assume the government of Candia, and the successor of the late “Bailo” is on the point of departure from Venice for the protection of Venetian subjects and merchants [in Turkey] as usual.”

No.894 SPVenice June 29. Deliberazioni Senato Secreta. The Doge and Senate to the Venetian Ambassador in Germany.

“Enclose copy of a letter concerning Turkish affairs addressed to the Pope by the King of England,—“a King of such condition and quality as is known to everybody; in conformity with which letter, hut yet more strongly, it seems that the King of Portugal had written.” Are of opinion that both one and the other were inspired by divine providence, lest in the present peril of Christendom so great an opportunity be lost.”

No.895 SPVenice June 30. Deliberazioni Senato Secreta. The Doge and Senate to the Venetian Ambassador in France.

“Enclose copy of a letter from the King of England to the Pope, concerning Turkish affairs, announcing that they have caused it to be read to the imperial ambassadors in Venice, a copy being also sent to the ambassadors in Germany, that they may read it to the Emperor, to induce him “to turn his thoughts to the Christian expedition.”

1531 SPSpain S. E. L. 852, f. 74. B. M. Add. 28,583, f. 50.

“Owing to the way in which the Turkish pirates are now infesting the Mediterranean, the Pope is of opinion that the Imperial galleys, those of France and Rhodes, ought to join and go in chase of them. Agreed and promised to write to His Majesty about it, but doubts whether the French would consent to serve under Andrea Doria. As to the Imperial galleys being under any other admiral, that was entirely out of the question, &c.

Four days ago the Pope held a congregation of cardinals on this Turkish affair, at which he spoke highly of His Imperial Majesty's power, &c.

A ship from Alessandria arrived the other day at Venice. Great preparations of biscuit and other provisions were being made in that port and throughout the whole of Egypt. The Venetian galleys that went thither had returned empty, owing to the Turk having recently given orders that the Spice trade should be transferred to Constantinople.

Advices have come that Barbarossa has presented a fine galley to the Grand Turk.

Cannot help thinking that this offensive league against the Turk proposed by the duke of Albany may give rise to very serious apprehensions. Is very much afraid that it is only a cunning device of the French either to prevent any agreement with the Grand Turk—which in his opinion would be justifiable under present circumstances considering the conduct of most of the Christian princes—or else to incite the Turk to arms, that being, as they have been heard to say, the only corrective against the Emperor's growing power. Again, it may be for the purpose of informing the Turk of any preparations made against him, for certainly anything may be apprehended from the French.—Rome, 26th February 1531.”

State Papers which include references to agreements with the Ottoman state.

No.397 SPVenice 1465. Sept. 9. Deliberazioni Senato Secreta. v. xxii Christoforo Moro and the Senate to Edward IV.

“We cannot pass over in silence that the Grand Master, professing himself the defender of the faith, is indeed of a contrary disposition, and by means of an embassy has entered upon an agreement with the Turk.

No.398. Doge Christoforo Moro and the Senate to the Lord Robert Prior of St. John's of Jerusalem in England. To the same effect as the preceding.

Similar letters were written to the Earl of Warwick; to the Reverend Lord Brother John Langstrother, most worthy Preceptor of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem.”

No. 467 SPVenice 1479 June 8. Deliberazioni Senato Secreta. v. xxix The Doge and Senate to Edward IV.:

"Wrote, in the past months, and gave notice of the peace made with the Turk, and of the Italian war, alluding slightly to its authors and causes."

"We were simultaneously waging two wars; one with the Turk, and another which concerned the existence of our allies (the Florentines). Lest the two wars should overwhelm us, we sought to make peace with both parties, and found one more tractable than the other, as the covetousness and fury of a third party (Girolamo Riario) occupied and distracted the Pope's mind so greatly that, even after making peace with the Turk, when we implored peace, we could not obtain it."

No.822 SPVenice 1502 April 18. Sanuto Diaries, v. iv.

"News from England that King Henry was in trouble, had ordered the arrest of one of his chamber attendants, and had written to the Hungarian ambassadors on their way to him, that if they were coming for succour against the Turk they were not to proceed, saying that those who are unable to make war upon the Turk should make peace; so no assistance will be obtained."

No. 160 SPVenice 1518 Jan. 26. Original Letter Book, St. Mark's Library, Sebastian Giustinian to the Signory:

"Had received the Signory's missives dated the 4th and 20th December, with the newsletters concerning Turkish affairs. Would impart the intelligence to the Cardinal and the King, suppressing all mention of the renewal of the peace between Venice and the Porte, as the English ministry detested all who maintained peace and friendship with infidels. Had never mentioned the despatch of Venetian ambassadors [to Sultan Selim], nor was the court aware of it; but he would shortly announce the missions both to Damascus and Constantinople, as the fact could no longer remain secret. London, 26th January 1518."

No.141 SPVenice 1520 Nov. 28. Sanuto Diaries, v. xxix. p. 509. Antonio Surian, Venetian Ambassador in England, to the Signory.

“Had received the Signory's letters announcing the arrival of the Turkish ambassador to confirm the peace, and the election of Marco Minio as ambassador to Sultan Soliman, with the letter of thanks to Cardinal Wolsey for his good offices in favour of the State. Went to the Cardinal and communicated this news. Cardinal Wolsey said, “This Sultan Soliman is 25 years old, and has good judgment; it is to be feared he will act like his father.”

No.9 SPVenice 1525 June 28. Lettere del Collegio, Secreta. The Doge and College to Lorenzo Orio, Venetian Ambassador in England.

“About a month ago an ambassador arrived at Venice from the Grand Turk (“Signor Turco,” Solyman II.) concerning certain affairs of private individuals who claimed damages from Venetian subjects. The Signory justified the matter by a true statement, and he departed yesterday well satisfied.”

No. 13 SPVenice 1534. Jan. 9. Lettere del Collegio (Secreta) The Doge and College to Carlo Capello, Ambassador in England.

“Enclose summary of last letters from Constantinople, which are to be communicated to the King, requesting him not to say that he had the advices from the Signory.

On the 31st of October last the Republic's Proveditor of the Fleet, when convoying the galleys bound to Alexandria, fell in by night off the Island of Candia with thirteen galleys commanded by the Moor, and they fought, not knowing each other.

This encounter having occurred by mistake, the Signory has sent apologies to the Turk by their secretary, Daniel Ludovici.”

No.660 SPSpain: 1531 17 Mar.S. E. L. 852, f. 13, Add. 28,583, f. 132 660.
Rodrigo Niño to the Emperor.

“The last letters received by this Signory from Constantinople are of the 23rd December.

His instructions are principally reduced to three points: 1. To dissuade the Turk from the invasion of Italy. 2. In case he decides to come, to confirm the old treaties without introducing new conditions, or asking for the ports in the gulph. 3. To ascertain how far the last overtures of the king of the Romans were received by the Turk, and prevent any settlement between them, because their wish is that the Vayvod do remain in possession of Hungary, whilst the king of the Romans and the Turk are both occupied in fighting for the possession of that kingdom.”

State Papers which include references to the Ottoman navy.

No.805 SPVenice 1500 May 8. Sanuto Diaries, v. iii. Henry VII. and Lewis XII.

“Has learnt by these letters that Lewis understood from Venice, Rhodes, Hungary, and other places, that Bajazet II., the enemy of the catholic faith, had fitted out the most powerful armada ever witnessed in Turkey, with the intention of invading Italy in March or April next; and that this expedition must strike the greatest terror into all Christendom, besides causing immense mischief, unless a remedy be applied: wherefore, for the honour of God, of Christendom, and of the catholic faith, Lewis urged him to make some effort for maritime defence. Hears with the deepest regret of the threatened attack, but from the distance at which he is from the scene of action is unable to give assistance as speedily as he could wish. After discussing the matter at great length with the members of his Privy Council, it seems to him and them difficult and wellnigh impossible to send a force with sufficient speed to resist the invasion, as before his ships could be fitted out with hands, guns, victuals, and other supplies, and before arriving at the spot mentioned, even were the wind fair, so long a

voyage could not be accomplished until towards Michaelmas, so that the cost would have been incurred in vain. Should it however chance, which God forbid, that Bajazet II. effect the invasion, with the intention of continuing it, King Lewis and all the other sovereigns of Christendom may satisfy themselves, that King Henry knows it is his duty to do his utmost to expel the Turks, so that every one will see that to the best of his power he put his hand to the work, as every good Christian prince ought and is bound to do, for the defence of the catholic faith—bearing always in mind the distance he is from the scene of action. Requests King Lewis to give him notice of the invasion, so that he may make the necessary preparations, in union with the French ships, should they come.”

No.809 SPVenice 1500 Sept. 14. Sanuto Diaries, v. iiiReceipt of Letters from Messina,

written by the Venetian envoy, Francesco Floriani, on the 24th of August, stating how the Great Captain (Gonsalvo of Cordova) ceased not fitting out the armada [against the Turks] by day and night, and spared not money. Had mustered the troops. Has excellent infantry, no Italians, only Spaniards, English, and Germans. Has 13,000 men.

No.159 SPVenice 1518 Jan. 24. Original Letter Book, St. Mark's Library, Sebastian Giustinian to the Signory.

“Visited the Cardinal on the 23rd. Informed him that the Turkish armada had moved towards the strait; that the Great Turk was inclined to return to Constantinople; and those great cruelties had been exercised upon those Mamelukes who had taken pay under Selim. As to Italian affairs, stated that since the arrangement between the Pope and Francesco Maria della Rovere, everything had remained quiet.”

No.10 SPVenice 1526 March 2. Lettere del Collegio (Secreta), The Doge and College to Lorenzo Orio, Ambassador in England.

“The Great Turk has lately taken important steps. He has imposed a tax of 15 “aspres” per head on all his subjects, both citizens and peasants. He has sent commands to the “Beglarbei,” “Sanzachi,” “Tunazati,” and all others in receipt of pay, to be ready at the next command to take to horse (cavalcar, march?) under pain of capital punishment; and in Greece he has given orders for the collection of supplies of victuals, corn, and straw. All the galley crews are to be enrolled, and in readiness for service. In the arsenal and in all other places many more hands are employed than usual, and besides repairing the old galleys, he has given orders for the construction of 50 new “bastard-galleys,” 50 light galleys, and 20 large “palandrie” for the conveyance of horses. He is having 2,000 falconets made, besides basilisks, having caused 20,000 muskets to be made last year, although he had a large supply of old ones. In short, from these great military preparations it is inferred that the Great Turk will make an attack by land and sea.”

No.3821 SPVenice 1555 June 1 Brussels. Sir John Masone to the Council.

“By two ships lately arrived at Genoa with wheat from Constantinople it is reported that at their departure the Turk's navy was almost ready to set afloat, for which extreme diligence was used both by day and by night.”

No.359 SPVatican 27 March 1566 Vat. Arch.Nunt. di.Spagna, vol. I Pope Pius V to Philip II, Catholic King of the Spains.

“We may be able to assist our dear son the Master of the Order of the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem, in the defence of the island of Malta against an immense Turkish fleet, and also to remit elsewhere necessary subsidies, We, after careful consideration, have sent Caesar Fontana to our dear daughter in Christ, the noble lady, the Duchess of Parma and Piacenza, Governess of Flanders, diligently to act in our behalf in this business of the alum. We crave, however, of your Majesty, that you also

write to her touching the same matter, and direct her to comply with our desire, and lend your aid and influence on the completion of the business. Which office will be worthy of your Majesty's equitable mind and reverential regard for the Apostolic See, and most gratifying to Us.” 27 March, 1566. Rome

State Papers which include references to the Ottoman after Lepanto

No.499 SPVenice 1571 Feb. 19. Original Despatch, Venetian Archives. Leonardo Donado, Venetian Ambassador in Spain, to the Signory.

“The proclamation which was published in Paris and throughout France some months ago for free trade between the French and the Turks during the negotiation for the league, has afforded such matter for occupation to people here, that they never cease discussing it.” Madrid, 19th February 1571.

No.176 SPVatican 1573 April Vat. Arch. Principi, vol. xxxviii. to [Maturin Lesent] otherwise Romagas, Knight [of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem], Prior of Ireland.

“I have received your letters of 13 Feb. and 8 March, which I thought best not to answer until I had spoken to Marc Antonio Colonna, in order that I might be able to give you some direction as to what you should do; but since the sudden arrival of his Excellency from the Court of Spain, and also of the disappointing and vexatious intelligence of the peace made by the Signory of Venice with the Turk—you may judge for yourself and learn from others how mortifying, how heartrending it must have been to the Pope—I have but to apprise you that, as peace is actually made, his Holiness has no longer any occasion to despatch galleys, and have recourse to you, who cannot now lack scope for the employment of your virtue and valour in serving your Religion, which God grant you grace to

do to good purpose. It remains for me to congratulate you on the news you send me that your affair is peacefully arranged, and that the Grand Master and the Council with the obedience and reverence due to his Holiness' despatch have granted you the place of Prior of Ireland. I am heartily at your service and pray God to grant you all happiness."

No184 SPVatican 1573. Rome. Italian. Minute.Vat. Arch.Nunt. diFrancia, vol. vi. p. 188 [Antonio Maria] Salviati, [late] Bishop of S. Papoul, Nuncio in France to [Ptolemy Galli,] Cardinal of Como.

"The peace made by the Venetians with the Turk causes me double displeasure by reason of what you write of the vexation it has caused the Pope, albeit the matter itself is of all things in the world the most apt to annoy and irritate a Prince. It was for their service that the war was made; to deliver them from the hands of the Turk were all those forces got together; and yet without the cognizance of their confederates, and upon conditions neither advantageous nor honourable they have made peace, and placed themselves at the mercy of him that is most covetous of their possessions.

No.188 SPVatican 25 April, 1573 Vat. Arch. Nunt. Germ. vol. vi. f. 136. [Ptolemy Galli,] Cardinal of Como to [John Delfino,] Bishop of Torcello, Nuncio [in Germany].

"The disgust which, you write, his Majesty has conceived at this accord of the Venetian Signory with the Turk is indeed just and meet; but if it were possible to set it in one scale and that which his Holiness has conceived in the other, I am sure that the latter would exceed it by far; and as to the resentment that his Majesty thinks his Holiness should exhibit at so grave an offence..."

No.894 SPForeign 1576 Sept. 1 The Sultan of Turkey to the Queen,
Constantinople

“Desires her to grant her protection and furtherance to a certain Christian merchant named Gabriel Defreus, who is proceeding to England upon certain business of his Highness.”

No.9 SPVenice 1581 March 4. Original Despatch, Venetian Archives. Paolo Contarini, Venetian Ambassador in Constantinople, to the Doge and Senate.

“Should any agent from the Queen of England arrive at this Porte in order to carry on the negotiations about the capitulation between Turkey and England, I Will, in obedience to your orders, hinder him as far as possible.” Dalle Vigne di Pera, 4th March 1581.

No.73 SPVenice 1582 March 7. Copy of Original Despatch, Venetian Archives. Alberto Badoer, Venetian Ambassador in Germany, to the Doge and Senate.

“News from Constantinople that the French are urging the Sultan to attack Spain; pointing out how weak his Majesty is in Flanders, that England is an open foe, Portugal disturbed, the Azores sure to hold for Don Antonio. The Pasha is said to have promised to make the Turkish fleet take the sea in force this year.” Vienna, 7th March 1582.

No.163 SPVenice 1583 Sept. 13. Original Minute, Venetian Archives. Deliberations of the Senate, Constantinople Reg. VI. To the Venetian Ambassador in Constantinople.

“We gave orders to you, as well as to your predecessor at the Porte, to oppose the negotiations of the English, which might prove of great damage to us. And although as you advise us English operations are now far on, all the same the question is so important that you must not omit any step which will conduce to the desired end. All the more so as the Queen has put a check upon our commerce with England by imposing heavy duties, and has conferred the monopoly of trade on a few of her own English merchants to the express exclusion of the Venetians. For your guidance we

will order you to use all your ability to thwart the Queen in her desire to establish an Ambassador at the Porte and to open commercial relations with the Turk. If you see that you cannot effect anything except by the method usual with the Turk, and you think it opportune to use it, then we give you authority to spend up to 15 thousand sequins in bribes to the Magnificent Pasha; to be paid him, however, only after favours received. You may also employ two thousand sequins in securing other persons.

You will co-operate with and support the French Ambassador, and will communicate our orders to him.”