The Interviewees
Interview with Iosif Maravelakis - June 2024
1- Greece obtained its recognition as a state in 1830 under the London Protocol signed between France, Russia and Great Britain while representatives of Greece and Turkey were absent but the Ottoman Sultan had already accepted the terms as they were recently defeated by the Russians and wished to end the distraction of a long war with Greek rebels. The Greek governor Kapodistrias was excluded from the negotiations due to British suspicions that he was inciting a revolution in the Ionian Islands. Crete was also excluded from this initial Greek state and do you think going for this modest land border was a way to ensure Turkish acceptance of this new reality or were British commercial concerns, such as free navigation in the Aegean Sea played a part as well?
Clearly, there were British concerns about free trade in the eastern Mediterranean. The signing of the Treaty of Balta Liman confirms this, as it ended Mehmet Ali’s state monopoly in Egypt, which had mercantilist origins rooted in a type of Asiatic proto-capitalism that developed in the peripheries of the three Muslim empires in the 18th century, where central authority could not reach to a great extent.
Regarding British commercial interest in Crete, it is important to note that it was not a significant trading partner of Britain during the final years of the Levant Company, nor in the initial years after its dissolution. During this period, which coincides with the Greek War of Independence and the ensuing Eastern Crisis, France was Crete’s most important western trading partner. Second, although Crete was part of Mehmet Ali’s territory from the middle of the revolution until 1840, his mercantilist policy and state monopolies were not effectively implemented there. Therefore, Britain had not any reason to pursue the implementation of free trade in Crete.
It could be said that British commercial interest in Crete was indirect; that is, to the extent that it was geographically and politically connected to a region where conflicts partly driven by free trade issues took place, but not as a significant trading partner per se. Britain’s interest in Crete during this period was primarily geopolitical and strategic. From this point of view, there was a strong British interest in free navigation in the Aegean Sea, and for this reason, Britain was interested in Crete being controlled by a friendly power.
2- Clearly there was a complicated relationship between the consuls of various European powers and also between them and the local Ottoman governors of Crete as they varied between being rivals to enemies depending on the wider world events. How well instructed you think were Consuls in their duties, limits of freedom of action and interactions with the lower levels of Ottoman power in their jurisdiction? You focussed on violations and exceeding their consular duties: do you think there was a degree of gray zone here so the Consul may have thought he was acting in the ‘national interest’ in some of these transgressions?
Consuls’ training in the 19th century varied not only based on the country they served but also on the specific time period. For instance, French consuls initially underwent consular training and were appointed directly from Paris. Conversely, in Britain, some consuls never visited London.
In 1825, Canning endeavoured to establish a professional consular service, comprised of salaried and trained consuls dedicated to advancing British political and commercial interests in their consular districts. However, this vision never materialised during the 19th century.
The concept of consuls acting in the national ‘interest’, whether they did so knowingly or not, is explored through various examples in the book. Ongley, for instance, was conscious of not acting in the national interest yet presented his actions as such. Conversely, Sandwith believed he was serving his nation’s interests and acted accordingly.
The case of “grey zone” where a consul violated his duties thinking of acting in favour of his nation was Dickson who on the one hand knew that he was violating the policy of his country in terms of diplomacy, but on the other hand, he believed that he saved the honour of his country from a humanitarian point of view and for this reason he moralised with religious arguments that this violation was an act that fits the morality of a Protestant state, such as Great Britain.
3- Your book is based on meticulous study of the various correspondence and reports of 3 British Consuls of different periods in the 19th century on the island of Crete: Dickson, Sandwith, Ongley. While it is useful to compare and contrast the style and level of exceedance of powers of these different Consuls, were you also faced with the challenge that they didn’t serve the same period and things on the ground were changing rapidly as Ottoman power in Crete was declining and the Christian population of the island were increasingly rebellious, so Consular ‘over-step’ in powers perhaps inevitable in some circumstances?
Thank you for posing such an intriguing question. It delves into one of the significant challenges I encountered while comparing the behaviour of the consuls. Of course, things on the ground were changing rapidly not only in Crete and not only due to the gradual insurrectionary behaviour of the Christians, but also in the development of both the British policy and the professionalisation of the British consular service in the Eastern Mediterranean. In chapters 3-5, I consistently examine the relationship between the chronological framework and the various types of consular attitudes. A characteristic comparison that depicts this relation between chronological period and consular policy is that of Ongley and Sandwith. In the case of Ongley, the attitude is linked to local conditions and the political legacy of the Egyptian occupation in Crete. In contrast, Sandwith’s attitude can be traced to external political factors and a more direct and proactive policy from the Foreign Office in Crete.
4- The various consuls derived their power from the powerful nation they represented but these powers were further built upon the connections and networks he developed locally. This overlap was clearly part of the consul’s job in better projecting their national interests yet do you think it also led to possible conflicts of interest as trade partnerships and unfair advantages the consular role could provide in that role, could lead to local resentments undermining their soft power?
The answer to this question is provided through the comparison of the cases of Ongley and Sandwith, as mentioned below. Both officials used two types of power. Sandwith used connections and networks to serve the interests of the country he represented, while Ongley used them for personal socio-political and commercial interests. Ongley also used his official position to justify his actions, claiming that his close relationship with Veli Pasha was to help Veli implement British-desired reforms, portraying the Porte as incapable and his French counterpart as uncooperative.
However, it was not the connections and networks that caused local resentment; rather, they were the reason Ongley was somewhat blamed for the events of 1858. The comparison between the two consuls suggests that neither type of power is sufficient by itself for the effective action of a consul, whether for serving his country’s policy or personal interests. Instead, a careful combination of both types is necessary. Finally, the importance of connections and networks is further emphasized when considering the case of Calocherino in comparison with the other two stories.
5- In the 6th chapter of your book you tried to exploit the traditional sources, that is the consular letters, in this new methodological way, without disdaining the previous approaches of political and economic history. Do these letters provide a view of Crete by these consuls which could be termed ‘colonial gaze’ where policy was being formulated for afar without due consultation with the locals with the aim of restoring peace and subsequent prosperity? Do you detect a great detail of careful observation of how the island functioned to a micro-level or more a degree of high-mindedness perhaps based on their experiences in their own colonial outposts?
Indeed, Greek sources complemented the official consular correspondence, satisfactorily covering gaps that the latter could not capture. The sources used for the sixth chapter reflect the contradictory views many Christians had about Britain, often mirrored in their opinions about the British consul: seen as potential occupiers but also as potential saviours through an autonomous constitution under British protection.
Regarding the ‘colonial gaze’, it is shown (mainly in the first and sixth chapters) that British policymakers considered indirect control of Crete through the Ottoman Empire as the best solution. The colonial view of Crete was reflected in the reports of captains and travellers, some of whom saw the locals as potential colonial subjects. However, consuls had a different perspective due to their longer stays and greater interaction with the locals. Consuls aimed to transform the locals into imperial subjects of an informal empire rather than colonial subjects. While these two viewpoints may initially appear similar, they have significant differences.
6- You take a positive light on the effects of the Egyptian occupation of Crete, brought in to suppress the early rebellions yet creating a stable provincial authority with long-standing officials giving rise to the first mercantile families of British citizenship. Were these families Greek Cretans who obtained British citizenship through ‘protege’ status or were they mixed origin such as Ionians, Maltese, Levantines etc.? What do you think were the dynamics of this stable authority period; do you think the dual influence of Istanbul and Alexandria where neither side dominated allowed for the trickling in of reforms that were not effectively blocked by local officials?
Thank you for this question, because it highlights Crete’s unique position not only as a region between two rival political powers but also as a crossroads of two different modernization ideologies.To put it simply, for a long time before the period covered in the book, the Western monarchies and the Ottoman Empire had two opposite mindsets regarding wealth. The Western monarchies followed a mercantilist logic, aiming to increase exports and decrease imports to boost state treasuries. In contrast, the Ottoman Empire, along with the Safavid and Mughal empires, followed a provisionist approach, reducing exports and increasing imports to achieve self-sufficiency. For example, in the Ottoman Empire, land was not associated with maximising production for export. Instead, its taxation was granted to a cavalry army for its maintenance. This contrasts with the Western monarchies, where the state treasury, based on a trade surplus from mercantilism, financed the army. All the above, do not imply that the Ottoman Empire did not engage in trade.
However, during the 18th century, some governors of provinces within these empires, which were not entirely controlled by the central authority, began implementing mercantilist policies similar to those in Europe. The most well-known example is Mehmet Ali, who maximised the resource production in his area of jurisdiction by placing them under provincial monopoly and fully controlling trade in the region, following a mercantilist logic.
Such policies brought these provinces into competition with Western powers. In response to Mehmet Ali’s “commercial threat”, Britain imposed a free trade treaty on the Ottoman Empire in 1838. This was not solely driven by newly introduced free trade theories, such as those by Adam Smith, but also served as a practical solution to counter Mehmet Ali as a commercial competitor. The infiltration of liberal ideologies was essentially imposed on the Ottoman Empire during times of crisis, when it sought help from the West (e.g., Eastern Crisis, Crimean War, Balkan Crisis). These reforms were not only economic but also political in nature. Economically, I believe that Muhammad Ali’s system was best suited not only for Egypt but also for the Ottoman Empire. However, due to space constraints, I cannot further elaborate on this issue.
During the period of Egyptian control, strict trade controls in the form of a state monopoly were not applied. Mehmet Ali’s modernisation model also laid the groundwork for infrastructure development, which Mustafa Pasha, the governor of Crete during Egyptian rule, tried to continue after 1840 when the island returned to the Sultan’s control. The Mustafa family effectively ruled Crete until 1858. It is not a coincidence that Crete had a trade surplus only during a brief period between the end of Egyptian occupation and the early years after the island’s return to the Sultan. Part of the trade was controlled by Ionians operating under British citizenship, who played a significant role in trade development.
Regarding the “dual influence” of two modernisation models (both Western-origin), it is important to recognise that they were both competitive and complementary. For example, both modernisation models accepted Christian participation in local administration and it was under Egyptian rule, some decades before the design of the Organic Law of 1868, that this first occurred.Conversely, an infrastructure modernisation program of Egyptian origin faced competition from Istanbul. The latter did not support it due to its inability to finance it. Thus the alternative solution would be the increase of taxation. However, increased taxation could provoke reactions, especially as Christians were already wary of the Tanzimat reforms. It is not implied that the Porte opposed infrastructure development in Crete, but rather that increased taxation for such projects would undermine its efforts to gain Christian trust in the Tanzimat reforms.
7- You paid close attention and highlighted the development of the relation of the British consul with the governor of the island, as a type of relation of co-governance of the island. Do you think this process was made easier as the island was relatively removed from Ottoman power with its then relatively weak navy or do you think this was the British way of cultivating relations for their own aims? With time the power shifted towards Britain as the Ottoman Empire became weak and bankrupt and do you think British interference in the affairs of the island made the situation such as inter-ethnic tensions worse?
The Tanzimat reforms, designed by Britain and France, involved a collaboration between the Porte’s viziers and British and French policymakers. Implementing these reforms in Ottoman provinces, such as Crete, also required cooperation between local officials, namely the Ottoman governor and the consul. The co-governance discussed in the book pertains to this framework, alongside the gradual professionalisation of the British consular service.
Such a type of “co-governance” could not be so feasible in the first years after the passing of the consulates in the jurisdiction of the Foreign Office because such a high level of professionalisation did not exist (not only in Crete but also in further British consular district in the Levant, such as that of Rhodes) and on the other hand, because the French-British political intervention in the interior of the Ottoman Empire had not started so strongly yet. This is why the “co-governance” between Veli Pasha and Ongley, during the early years of the British consular service, was based on local factors. In contrast, the “co-governance” between Sandwith and the local authorities was rooted in increased British involvement within the Ottoman Empire.
On the occasion of the need for gradual co-government in the context of the need for cooperation from below (i.e., between the British Consul and the Ottoman Governor) I was given the opportunity to refer to an additional consul, who is not mentioned in any of the four major cases of the book (Ongley, Dickson, Sandwith, Calocherino) that of Guarracino, who despite his short tenure in Crete he worked hard to draw up a reform program (mainly of an economic-fiscal nature of Tanzimat) tailored to the vilayet’s needs. Regarding the last question, the British interference in the affairs of the island affected the conflicts between Christians and Muslims to the extent that it raised expectations among the Christians for British intervention, if not for the solution of the union, for that of autonomy even under British protection.
8- You mark the start of the British major influence in Cretan affairs as 1837 with the upgrading of the British vice-consulship of Canea to consulship and you mark the date of 1878 as the beginning of the decline of British influence on Crete, with the Ottoman grant of a semi-autonomous constitution (Halepa pact) to the island and Britain being distracted by developments in its own island of Cyprus. Do you think British involvement in Crete became more prone to consular violations as official higher level diplomatic view was distracted by developments elsewhere, allowing for more local independent action? Consul Thomas Sandwith (1870-1885) was acting British Consul and participated in the design of the Halepa pact, clearly a tricky task. Do you think he reluctantly accepted indirectly participating in the governance of the island which was clearly above his official station but he perhaps was trusted by both sides as an ‘honest broker’?
Sandwith’s intervention was part of Britain’s increasing involvement in the Ottoman Empire, aimed at maintaining the integrity of the empire and particularly preserving Crete. This represented London’s last major effort to support the Porte in maintaining its territorial integrity. Despite his fears, Sandwith acted within this context. The Halepa Pact was designed with the involvement of the consul rather than a high-ranking diplomat because British upper diplomacy was focused on the larger issue of saving the entire empire from the Russian threat, rather than just an island, even one as significant as Crete. The above does not imply that the 1878 insurrection was not related to the Balkan Crisis and the war with Russia. The earlier 1866-69 insurrection, did not coincide with such an extensive crisis in the Ottoman region and therefore the design of the Organic Law was a task for the upper diplomacy.
Sandwith’s involvement did not mean he had free rein; he followed instructions from the British Embassy in Istanbul. However, he also had to take initiative and navigate the local environment, a challenge distinct from that faced by the diplomats who drafted the Organic Law in 1868. The Ottoman authorities accepted his intervention out of necessity, not because they saw him as an honest broker. On the other hand, the leaders of the Christian insurgents, accustomed to interacting with consuls as representatives of the governments they sought support from, initially viewed Sandwith’s involvement as a hopeful sign of British intervention in their favour.
9- The earlier Consul Henry Sarell Ongley (1837-1858), served during the longest period of peace thus he was able to develop personal contacts more deeply, including with the Ottoman governor Mustafa Pasha and his son Veli Pasha. Yet he clearly was a divisive figure in the diplomatic community in Crete, in particular with the French Consul with whom he was supposed to be cooperating in extending the Tanzimat reforms to the island. Do you think Ongley can be compared to Sandwith by being more in keeping with the Levant Company consuls where their own business interests often conflicted with their official duties which required a higher level of cooperation between allied nations? Ongley gave his superiors the impression that he was partly responsible for the insurrection that broke out in 1858 and he was subsequently removed from his post. Was this impression chiefly based on his close relationship with Mustafa Pasha?
Obviously, a comparison of Ongley with Sandwith shows that the actions of the former can be traced back to the practices of the Levant Company. The 1825 Canning Reform Act outlines how the consular service under the Foreign Office should be organised and operate. Canning envisioned a professionalized consular service with salaried consuls who were prohibited from trading.The reason is that if the consul was also engaged in commercial activities, unfair competition with other merchants could be caused if the consul took advantage of his consular position. For example, a consul, having access to commercial information, could withhold it from other merchants or not report it to the Board of Trade, as he was supposed to do as a representative of British merchants’ interests.However, providing consuls with an income sufficient to meet their living needs was impractical due to the Treasury’s economic restrictions. Therefore, in the first decades after the dissolution of the Levant Company and the transfer of consulates to the Foreign Office, consuls received a salary (often insufficient) and were allowed to engage in commercial activities for supplementary income.
Ongley’s case is a little different. As explained in the fifth chapter, he relied on the practices of the Levant Company, and his diversion from his duties was largely due to this. However, although Ongley’s cause was commercial, his conduct was not a diversion from his consular duties in representing the commercial interests of British citizens but from his political duties. For example, Ongley was not accused of keeping commercial information secret, and the majority of British merchants in Crete did not report any abuse of his consular position for his trading benefit. In other words, his opponents were mainly political, not commercial enemies. When the opportunity arose, a commercial competitor (Andrea Calocherino) allied with his political enemies. However, even Calocherino did not accuse him of unfair competition but of negligence in his consular tasks. Calocherino’s enmity towards Ongley stemmed from commercial reasons—not because Ongley was an unfair merchant, but because the consul had allied with a commercial rival Calocherino family, i.e., Mustafa and Veli Pasha. Therefore, despite the commercial context, Ongley’s diversion was purely political.
In closing, regarding the last question, the cause of the 1858 revolt, beyond the general issue of union raised since the end of the Greek War of Independence, was Veli Pasha’s personal modernisation policy (originating from the era of Egyptian occupation in Crete, outside the context of Tanzimat) combined with the Christians’ distrust of the conscription tax introduced by Tanzimat. Ongley gave the impression that he was part of Veli Pasha’s personal policy, rather than working with him and the French Consul to primarily promote the second set of reforms established by the Porte under British and French instructions, i.e., Tanzimat. and for this reason, created such an impression. Moreover, the relation of this impression with Ongley’s commercial dealings with Veli Pasha (such as joint business ventures, commercial operations with Veli Pasha, or operations conducted under Veli Pasha’s orders on behalf of the local authorities), resulted in Ongleybeing the first and, at the same time, the last consul to have the right to engage in commercial activity in Crete.
10- The Consul Charles Dickson (1865-1870) who appeared to have violated his duties during the 1866-69 revolt when he instructed a British captain to evacuate a number of Greek civilians and injured rebels to Greece, which the Foreign Office perceived as a breach of neutrality and non-intervention. Dickson was acting on a humanitarian impulse and the discussion that followed led to a change of policy by the European powers. Would you characterise this as a good case of ‘bottom up’ led policy shift that this and other consuls enabled as they were the ‘eyes and ears on the ground’?
Dickson’s disobedience can be seen as a good example of bottom-up policy due to its significant impact on the European Concert. When such a policy impacts the official policy of a country or other major powers, it does not necessarily mean that the impact was intentional or direct. For instance, in Dickson’s case, the consul aimed to ensure immediate refuge for people to protect them from massacre. Perhaps even Dickson himself did not realise the extent of the effect his actions would have on the European Concert.An act such as Dickson’s can affect specific factors, i.e. Philhellenism, which can (to some extent and in combination with other political factors) affect the foreign policy developments of the European Powers. This is analysed in great detail by Ann Pottinger Saab in her article, ‘The Doctors’ Dilemma: Britain and the Cretan Crisis 1866-69’. She explores how the massacres in Lebanon and Bulgaria in the early 1860s and mid-1870s influenced public opinion and translated into foreign policy, while the massacres of 1866-69, although also influential on public opinion, did not have the same impact on British foreign policy. Saab’s analysis of the additional factors at play in these cases shows that public opinion alone was not always sufficient to drive foreign policy changes.
However, an act like Dickson’s can influence higher diplomacy, albeit indirectly. It can create an impression among other powers, even temporarily, of a possible shift in Great Britain’s stance on a specific issue, such as the transfer of civilians. This, in turn, can influence the policies of other powers on the same issue. Additionally, such acts can give the Christian insurgents the impression that they might have the support of the Great Powers. This impression, even if illusory, can motivate them to continue their struggle, as they hoped for European intervention rather than battlefield victory. Therefore, as long as a revolt remains active, it can lead to developments in European diplomacy, influenced by both Cretan, Ottoman, and extra-Ottoman factors. For example, Dickson’s actions had a significant impact beyond Crete because they coincided with developments in the European Concert, such as the Franco-Russian diplomatic alignment influenced by both Ottoman and extra-Ottoman factors.
11- What are you working on right now?
My new research is related to the participation of the Biliotti family in the consular service in the Eastern Mediterranean. The family had significant participation across a wide geographic range of the Ottoman Empire. Charles, Alfred’s father, served as vice-consul in Makri, Rhodes, Lesbos, and Chios. Fortunato was vice-consul in Kastellorizo. Alfred’s career extended beyond the islands and coasts of the Southeastern Aegean. He served as vice consul in Trebizond, consul in Crete, and Thessaloniki. In Crete, he managed uprisings that led to autonomy in 1898. Despite the prevailing derogatory perception of consuls by Foreign Office diplomats, who marginalised consular employees from their social and political circles due to their old aristocratic traditions, Alfred earned a unique and prominent position that gave him special recognition both within and outside his circle. I am aware that a prominent member of LHF, David Barchard, was the first researcher to highlight Alfred’s unique case. This is one more reason to express my gratitude to your foundation. In his publication titled “The Fearless and Self-Reliant Servant of the Life and Career of Sir Alfred Biliotti (1833-1915): An Italian Levantine in British Service”. Barchard highlighted research gaps and expressed hope for future research. The fact that I did not get to meet him is quite unfortunate for me.
Interview conducted by Craig Encer
