In the eighteenth century the embassies and trading houses of France, England, Venice, and other European powers shared space on the steep hills of Galata and Pera, separated only by the waters of the Golden Horn from Istanbul, capital of

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the Ottoman Empire. Drawn together by its location deep within Islamic lands, this mixed community of western Christians, living side by side with Muslim, Jewish, and Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire, might seem to be the perfect testing ground for the birth of an international, cosmopolitan society. Instead it was a fractious community, where conflict often occurred between individuals from different nations. In the most extreme scenarios, and especially among the lower orders, very little excuse was needed for disputes to lead to mayhem and even to murder. In late November 1729, a French chef was brutally assaulted by several Venetian domestics after appearing uninvited at a Venetian wedding. A second French chef used this attack on his compatriot as an excuse to pick a fight with a Venetian barber, which ended with the barber shooting him dead in broad daylight. Such actions were not unknown; a similar incident had occurred the previous year, and the staff of the Venetian embassy had a history of violence toward others.

The events on which this essay is based have been preserved in a smattering of documents now housed in the archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Despite the small source collection, the narrative provides an interesting glimpse of competing ideas about national and social-class identities in a place and time before either marker was traditionally thought to exist in a meaningful way. The essay focuses on a group of individuals on the extreme outer periphery of Ottoman society, who nonetheless resided at the heart of the empire, in the greater metropolitan area of Istanbul. No less than the Ottoman subjects surrounding them, they too lived the empire, and in their own way were similarly engaged in questions of establishing and asserting their personal and political identities. Istanbul, like other major cities in the borderlands of the Mediterranean world, had long attracted a society of highly mobile individuals. As Julia Clancy-Smith

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asks of similarly fluid nineteenth-century Tunis, what made someone a “migrant, stranger, or foreigner” within these communities? How should we characterize such outsiders, and how did they view themselves and one another? The examination of a pair of violent altercations and their aftermath will show that among early-eighteenth-century Western Europeans living in the Ottoman Empire, a significant tension existed between nationalist and cosmopolitan impulses, a tension highlighted in this particular case by class-differentiated concerns as well as by taking place in the heart of the Empire.

We must tread carefully when using the terms nation and national identity for the early eighteenth century, as their meanings differed from our modern usages. Nation originally derived from the classical Latin word natio, and for many centuries was used chiefly to identify people born in the same geographical region or even in the same city. It could also be applied to other kinds of communities, such as groups of university students. For both sets of people, national identity (insofar as it existed) was much more in use among the nobility than among commoners; indeed, in France prior to 1789, the nobility alone was thought to truly embody the nation, and likewise in the early modern Venetian Empire only the patriciate and a few non-noble families could officially claim “Venetian” citizenship. In pluralistic or composite societies, such as the Venetian or Ottoman Empires, most subjects ordinarily possessed little to no sense of a universally-shared national identity, but only of political, ethnic and religious identities.

For Europeans resident within the Ottoman Empire, nation was used in yet another way, to refer to “communities of merchants and diplomats living abroad under the aegis of a particular city or state.” This concept had certain similarities to, but was ultimately very different from, the Ottoman millet system, which accommodated non-Muslim subjects by grouping them according to religious, rather than national, identification, and placing each under the authority of a specific

religious leader. Membership in the diplomatic and mercantile European nations of Galata also bore little connection to either modern nation-state based identities or even, sometimes, to the political entities from which they were derived. An ambassador, who was appointed directly from the home government, governed each nation. Merchants and diplomats, along with their families and extended households—including both professionals and servants—made up the officially recognized membership of each nation. But the nations also included many unofficial members, who typically added between several hundred (in the French case) and several thousand (in the Venetian case) additional men and women to the community. These were mostly independent artisans, laborers, and their families, who serviced the official residents of each European nation within the Ottoman Empire, and who might or might not be recognizably of the nation from which they claimed protection. Even more confusingly, the unofficial membership also included marginal types such as enslaved persons, wandering adventurers, bandits, exiles, and other potentially troublesome elements who required constant supervision if the nations’ reputations with the Ottoman authorities were to avoid compromise. Despite these complex possibilities, members of the nations sometimes conformed in surprising ways to behaviors which appear recognizably nationalist in a modern sense: that is, they claimed identities forged from the combined elements of birthplace, parentage, and political allegiance, which were often viewed as more important than the potential dividers of ethnicity, religion, and class.

In addition to these individualistic categories of identity based on affiliation with particular nations, the ancient Greek notion of cosmopolitanism was also present within the European community of Galata, albeit less visibly so. Cosmopolitan originally meant simply a citizen of the world. Our modern understanding of cosmopolitanism descends from a set of philosophies developed between the 1720s and 1790s by Montesquieu, D’Alembert, and Kant, among others. Practiced individually, cosmopolitanism is an “ethical stance” in which the individual strives to value others in addition to valuing one’s own family, tribe or nation; this stance


7 Consider for example the case of Jan van Maseijk, as discussed by Maurits H. van den Boogert in “Resurrecting home ottomanicus: The constants and variables of Ottoman identity,” elsewhere in this volume.

8 Dursteler, Venetians in Constantinople, 24-40; Eldem, French Trade in Istanbul, 205-217; and Amaury Faivre d’Arcier, Les Oubliés de la Liberté: Négociants, consuls et missionnaires français au Levant pendant la Révolution (1784-1798) (Brussels, Belgium: Peter Lang, 2007), 17-44.
can develop into a world-view that transcends national boundaries. When practiced by whole communities, cosmopolitanism becomes—because of its unusual other-before-self valuation—a “moral achievement built from existing (primarily national state) foundations.” Ideally, the exercise of cosmopolitanism should result in a borderless world united by mutual moral obligations. Enlightenment thinkers were keenly interested in cosmopolitanism, seeing in it the prospect of overcoming the “blindly given ties of kinship and country” in favor of a universally inclusive society. But unlike today, most eighteenth-century philosophers did not view the particular and universal (or national and cosmopolitan) as being opposed to one another. D’Alembert, for instance, in his entry “Cosmopolitan” in the *Encyclopédie*, described the two conditions as complementary aspects of society. One could belong at multiple levels. This notion reached its apogee in 1795, when Kant proposed the novel idea of “Europe” as a universal and peaceful community, bound by a common law of humanity complementary to existing national and international law.

Like national identity in the eighteenth century, a common criticism of cosmopolitanism has long been that it too was only available to the elite, i.e. those with resources to travel and experience other cultures. But long before Kant had his vision, small European settlements scattered around the globe were already bring-


11 Kendall, Woodward and Skrbis, *Cosmopolitanism*, 37-38; and “Cosmopolitain, ou Cosmopolite,” in Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond D’Alembert, eds., *Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, etc.* (Paris, 1751-1772), Vol. 4: 297.

12 Immanual Kant, *Project for a Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay* (1795), trans. from the German (London: Vernor and Hood, 1796).

13 Steven Vertovec and Robin Cohen, “Introduction: Conceiving Cosmopolitanism,” in Vertovec and Cohen, eds., *Conceiving Cosmopolitanism: Theory, Context, and Practice* (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 2002), 5. This criticism may apply similarly to peoples of the Ottoman Empire, who although very diverse, tended to live within closed communities. According to Sami Zubaida, prior to the nineteenth century, only “the higher echelons of [urban Ottoman] society” such as wealthy merchants, diplomats, and courtiers, would have inhabited the empire’s few “cosmopolitan milieux” See Zubaida, “Middle Eastern Experiences of Cosmopolitanism,” in *Conceiving Cosmopolitanism*, 33.
ing together representatives of Europe’s aristocratic and educated elites (merchants, diplomats, naval commanders, colonial governors) with the popular classes (artisans, craftsmen, servants, sailors), all collectively conducting unplanned experiments in cosmopolitan living. The world of the Eastern Mediterranean in general, and of Galata and Pera in particular, was culturally pluralistic to an extreme degree.¹⁴ Not only did men and women of many diverse linguistic, geographic, cultural, religious, and ethnic backgrounds intermingle fluidly across the region, but Europeanist historians have only recently begun to recognize the degree to which early modern Galata was not an insulated Christian/European island within the Ottoman Empire, but was in fact fully integrated into the greater capital-city region of Istanbul, with a residential Muslim majority by the seventeenth century and double the number of mosques as churches by 1700.¹⁵

Perhaps provoked by the unusually international environment of Galata, the lowest orders among the Europeans resident there consistently exhibited strongly nation-oriented (almost xenophobic) identities, even while the ambassadors responsible for their well-being attempted to promote an idealistic vision of international cooperation and cosmopolitan behavior among all Europeans operating within the Ottoman Empire. The general interest in resolving the disturbing violence which erupted in late 1729 between Europeans of different national origins created an opportunity for the diplomatic communities in Pera and Galata to transcend their national differences, and for a brief interval to behave like true cosmopolitans. Led by France’s ambassador, the representatives of France, England, Holland, Austria, Russia, and Venice acted in solidarity to discipline one nation among them. Together they succeeded in briefly engaging in cooperative regulation, government, and justice for the common good in order to prevent the future recurrence of such violent acts.

Let us turn now to a full account of the violence that erupted on 20 November 1729. According to a report written by the French ambassador Louis Renaud de Villeneuve, the following incident disturbed the peace of Galata that night:

At ten in the evening Jean Rimbaud, a Frenchman who was chef to the English ambassador, imprudently went to the home of a Venetian artisan who was married that day and for the occasion was giving a supper for many Venetians, most of

¹⁴ Michel Fontenay, La Méditerranée entre la Croix et le Croissant: Navigation, commerce, course et piraterie (XVIe-XIXe siècle) (Paris: Garnier, 2010), 129-130.
whom were domestics from the Venetian embassy. Rimbaud was poorly treated there, receiving multiple blows from sword, stiletto and dagger. Several domestics of Mr. Stanyan [the English ambassador] then rushed in with his janissaries and the Turkish Guard, seized three domestics of the Venetian embassy, and placed them in the prison of the English embassy.16

Rimbaud later recovered from his injuries, but he was so seriously wounded that night that many assumed he had died.17 The next day news of the assault spread among the rest of the French servants in Pera. Remembering that a Venetian had killed another French domestic the previous year, a delegation of these servants came to Villeneuve demanding permission to retaliate “because the Venetians were continually assassinating the French.”18 Villeneuve tried to calm them with the news that the attackers had already been arrested, and that he and the English ambassador were as concerned as they to insure that justice be served against the guilty. But his assurances were insufficient, and later that day another fight erupted in the rue de Pera, the main thoroughfare which linked the tranquil suburb of Pera, where all the embassies were located, to the more crowded neighborhoods of walled-in Galata, where most Venetians and French resided who were not directly attached to the embassies. Villeneuve reported the following:

Today after dining my chef [Jacque Avenins] went out with a friend. They ran into a Venetian, a barber by trade, and demanded to know whether he was among those who had murdered the [other] chef the previous evening. Their tempers rising, threats were quickly followed by actions; my chef took a pair of pistols from his pocket, the Venetian did the same, and after receiving the first shot, [the Venetian] pulled his trigger and knocked my chef to the ground. A crowd drawn by the sound of gunshots chased the murderer; he ducked into one of the Grand Seigneur’s palaces, which they call the Palace of the Pages [Galata Saray], but this


17 It is confusing to reconstruct exactly what the outcome of the attack was for Rimbaud. The official signed report of the incident states that Jean Rimbaud “fût blessé mortellement” [was mortally wounded]: see “Relation d’une batterie entre un des principaux domestiques de l’ambassade de France, avec quelques uns de ceux de l’ambassade de Venise,” 27 November 1729, CP, Turquie, Vol. 81, ff. 203-207; f. 203r. But one day later Villeneuve writes that “les blessures n’ont pas été mortelles” [the injuries [of Rimbaud] were not mortal ones]: Villeneuve to Chauvelin, 28 November 1729, f. 218r.

18 Villeneuve to Chauvelin, 28 November 1729, f. 210v.
asylum could not prevent him from being chased by those animated from having viewed the murder...[they followed him], penetrating all the way to the second [inner] court.\textsuperscript{19}

Although Villeneuve was briefly unaware of the latest unpleasantness, when he learned what had happened he acted quickly to resurrect order in the community. His first act was to placate the Ottomans, who had been drawn into the general excitement by the Venetian barber’s ill-judged decision to hide inside the Galata Saray, an imperial school normally closed to public access. On the advice of the Grand Vizier’s kâhya (lieutenant), Villeneuve quickly sent “presents” amounting to nearly 400 piasters to Ahmed Agha, director of the Galata Saray, and to the voyvoda (mayor) of Galata, to ensure that Sultan Ahmed III would not learn about the accidental invasion of imperial property.\textsuperscript{20} The French ambassador’s second concern was to locate and arrest Angelo Fuci Gradenigo, the Venetian barber who had shot

\textsuperscript{19} Ib., ff. 211r-212r. The name of Villeneuve’s chef, Jacque Avenins, was reported in the “Relation d’une batterie...,” f. 203v.

\textsuperscript{20} Fethi Isfendiyaroglu, Galata Saray Tarihi (Istanbul: Dogan Kardes Yayinlari, 1952), Vol. I: 241-266; and Fariba Zarinebaf, Crime and Punishment in Istanbul: 1700-1800 (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2010), 26, 135. To give a comparative sense
his chef. Within two hours of the assault, Villeneuve learned that “the Venetian, who had fallen in one of the palace courtyards pretending to be dead from the injuries he’d received, had snuck away to his own house after the crowd dissipated.” The ambassador “judging therefore that his wounds were not serious” sent a dragoman to arrest him and escort him to the prison of the French embassy.21

Galata, where the first attack took place, was no stranger to violence. A crowded city within a city, in addition to housing most resident members of the European nations, it was also home to wealthy Jewish, Greek, and Armenian subjects of the Empire; many of the poorest day-laborers in the metropolitan area; and Istanbul’s red-light district of several hundred brothels and taverns. According to Fariba Zarinebaf, Galata was (perhaps because of this intensely mixed population) “the most crime-ridden area of the city.”22 But calm, leafy Pera was another matter. Violence that linked the two districts was deeply disturbing to all.

What should we make of these attacks? Robert Muchembled puts it bluntly: “murderous violence is a male crime, and essentially an affair of young men of marriageable age.”23 Violence such as this has its own particular history, magnified in this case by the international dimension of both setting and protagonists. Historians have established that European homicide rates declined sharply and almost continuously between the thirteenth and eighteenth centuries, from a medieval peak of approximately thirty-five killings per 100,000 people per year to a mere three or four annual deaths per 100,000 people by 1750.24 This drop was especially evident in urban populations; only in the more traditional and less prosperous rural areas did homicide rates remain closer to those of earlier centuries.25 The most

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21 Villeneuve to Chauvelin, 28 November 1729, ff. 212v-213r; quotes on f. 213v; see also the “Relation d’une batterie…,” f. 203v.
influential explanation for this change derives from Norbert Elias’ theory of the
civilizing process: in the early modern era people learned to suppress unpleasant
behaviors (such as poor hygiene and bad manners) and various “unsocial passions;”
as a result, interpersonal violence declined. Also, with the rise of the state, early
modern governments gradually acquired a monopoly over legitimate violence at
the expense of the old feudal elite. Because the male nobility were guilty of the
great majority of interpersonal violence in this era, such shifts can account for
much of the historical drop in homicides (especially when one considers that the
nobility were social leaders for less elite elements of society).²⁶ But even as new
internalized concepts of masculine honor caused homicide rates to drop among
the nobility and bourgeoisie in the eighteenth century, “many lower-class men
continued to cherish traditional notions of honor and stood ready to attack those
who insulted or hindered them.”²⁷

In early modern French and Venetian cultures more specifically, violence among
men of the lower orders was well known, although not condoned. The servants
within well-to-do French households were considered children of the master. The
head of the household had a responsibility to look after all his or her servants, and
their actions reflected upon the master and mistress. But the great houses were open,
and servants were free to wander in their hours off—exactly as both Jean Rimbaud
and Jacque Avenins did, to their great misfortune. Violence was famously central
to male servants’ lives; it sometimes seemed the only way to assert or defend one’s
honor and reputation. In Paris as elsewhere, while physical disputes involving ser-
vants, artisans, and laborers were common, homicide rarely resulted.²⁸ In arguments
that did lead to homicide, the origins were often remarkably petty. Frequently the
trigger that initiated a violent encounter involved a tavern or other social setting
with alcohol. A virtual formula existed, in which a verbal insult or quarrel, usually

²⁶ Henry C. Clark, “Violence, ‘Capitalism,’ and the Civilizing Process in Early Modern
Europe,” Society 49 (2012): 122-130; 124; and Norbert Elias, The History of Manners. The
53-59, 191-205. See also the discussion of Elias’s theories in Erik A. Johnson and Eric
H. Monkkonen, “Introduction,” in The Civilization of Crime: Violence in Town and
Country since the Middle Ages, ed. Johnson and Monkkonen (Urbana and Chicago:
University of Illinois Press, 1996), 4-6.

²⁷ Speirenburg, A History of Murder, 66.

²⁸ Cissie Fairchilds, Domestic Enemies: Servants and Their Masters in Old Regime France
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U. Press, 1984), 5, 43-45; David Garrioch, Neighborhood and
48-53, 131-132; and Sara C. Maza, Servants and Masters in Eighteenth-Century France: The
between acquaintances, would lead them to physically brawl; with further escalation weapons were drawn in anger, and occasionally one combatant killed the other. This sequence could occur within minutes, or it could unfold over multiple days. In the present case, we see the formula at work: the first encounter was at a wedding party, where Rimbaud was clearly unwanted and likely did or said something to provoke the mixed crowd of Venetian artisans and servants. A day later Avenins, another chef who was at the very least Rimbaud’s compatriot and fellow chef, and most likely also his friend, sought accountability from the first Venetian he saw. Again, insults were exchanged and weapons were drawn, this time with deadlier results.

Another aspect worth considering in this case is what Malcolm Greenshields identifies as the three possible “social directions of violence” available to the Third Estate, or non-elite: violence could occur either between roughly social equals, or as a form of “downward” punishment meted out to social inferiors, or as a form of “outward” defense by one community against a perceived external threat. In our two incidents the actors would appear at first to have been social equals, and were likely perceived as such by the ambassadors who had to sit in judgment over their actions: victims and attackers all belonged to the socially similar categories of servants and artisans. But upon closer examination, the two French chefs may have considered themselves socially and professionally superior to the artisans and domestics at the wedding as well as to the barber; their income was doubtless higher, and indeed each appears to have been the initial aggressor in their respective situations. Thirdly, in the general assault of Venetian domestics against Rimbaud on 20 November, and in the delegation of domestics who asked Villeneuve for permission to retaliate en masse, and in the deadly encounter between Avenins and Gradenigo who appear to have been unacquainted prior to their fight (and therefore without personal motive for assault), we can see evidence of mutual xenophobic tendencies among the lower orders of the two nations.

The sharply downward trend of urban homicides, coupled with the increasing restriction of crimes of rage and passion to the lower classes, meant that the 1729 events were both shocking for their rarity, and yet somewhat explicable on account of the social status of both perpetrators and victims. Knife fights, such as broke out between Rimbaud and his attackers at the wedding party, had long thrived among the lower classes and peasantry across most of western Europe. Young men, eager to prove themselves in the eyes of their peers, often drew knives and swords in moments of anger to assert their masculinity and defend their honor.\(^\text{32}\) The second attack, in which the barber Gradenigo shot Jacque Avenins, was more surprising: up through the late eighteenth century, firearms were still highly unusual murder weapons. Especially in urban environments such as Paris, Venice, or Istanbul, guns accounted for less than 10 percent of deaths by homicide. In France only aristocrats were permitted to own firearms. Outlaws were a glaring exception to this rule; but although bandits often carried pistols, because of the challenges to loading and aiming them, these were used more to threaten than to actually injure victims.\(^\text{33}\) Across the Ottoman Empire handguns were more readily available, thanks to poorly-regulated private manufacture and trade in firearms throughout Anatolia and the Balkans, but in these regions as in France and the Venetian Empire, most non-military gun owners were bandits and landless wanderers.\(^\text{34}\) Was either party here a bandit? Avenins was very unlikely to have been; French chefs were highly prized employees anywhere, and to be chef to the French ambassador would require an especially honest character. It is possible (but un-confirmable) that the Venetian barber had a history of banditry, even though the investigation that followed revealed Gradenigo to be a long-established resident of Galata, living with his wife, children, and mother-in-law. Many criminals banished from Venice did come to Istanbul and settle down as useful members of the nation. Because he was well aware of this migration pattern, Villeneuve did not trust anyone associated with the Venetian nation in Galata to be whom he or she claimed. Nonetheless, the record is silent on the question of how either party acquired the pistols they wielded so eagerly.

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Less than twenty-four hours after a Frenchman had foolishly crashed a Venetian wedding party matters now stood thus: one French chef lay on the edge of death; another French chef was already dead; and three Venetians were incarcerated (two servants being detained in the English prison and the barber in the French prison). On the basis of two related assaults occurring against French nationals within twenty-four hours, and the threat to general safety on the streets of Pera and Galata posed by the escalating violence, Villeneuve convened an urgent meeting at the French embassy of all the resident European ministers. Once assembled, they debated how to end the violence and prevent future accidents “among the Nations.” A general consensus prevailed that punishing the attackers, ideally without leaving the Ottoman Empire, would be the best possible warning to future would-be disturbers of the peace. The principle question they faced in the present case was a legal one: in this international setting, whose system of justice should be used? Among the attackers, the victims, and the larger mixed community of upset nationals, who would be best served by using Venetian law, English law, or French law? Under normal circumstances the laws of Venice would have been unquestionably the most appropriate choice for punishing Venetian wrongdoers. Ultimately the national identity of the accused determined the choice of legal system in this case as well, but due to the international dimension of the situation, the choice of a Venetian court was arrived at only by negotiation.

Orazio Bartolini, who had only become the bailo (ambassador) of Venice three months earlier when his predecessor died in office, was forceful in championing the use of his government’s legal system for the case. At the meeting he persuaded England’s ambassador Abraham Stanyan to hand over the pair of prisoners in the English embassy, on the grounds that they were “his domestics and subjects of the [Venetian] Republic.” Furthermore, he was insistent that his domestics “be judged by their natural judges,” that is, by members of their own nation. Stanyan agreed to give up the prisoners, but only after Bartolini promised “that their trial would be held according to the utmost rigor, and that his secretary would attend the procedure.” Villeneuve was less amenable about handing over his own captive; he keenly remembered that the death of his other servant (coincidentally,

35 Although initially three Venetian domestics had been arrested on the night of November 20, one of them turned out to be uninvolved in the attack and was immediately released. “Relation d’une batterie…,” f. 203r.
36 Ibid., 204r.
37 Villeneuve to Chauvelin, 28 November 1729, f. 214r.
38 “Relation d’une batterie…,” f. 204r.
39 Villeneuve to Chauvelin, 28 November 1729, f. 214r.
also a cook) one year earlier at the hands of a Venetian had never been punished. To avenge the previous year’s unresolved incident, he was determined to try the barber Gradenigo under French law if at all possible. Perhaps out of respect for Villeneuve’s mistrust in the efficacy of Venetian laws and punishments, Bartolini deferred discussing Gradenigo’s release from the French prison until another day.  

Throughout the debate one government was left conspicuously unnamed: no one considered the possibility of trying the prisoners under Ottoman law. There were several reasons for this omission. Dating as far back as 1453, Sultan Mehmed II had established two status options for the residents of Galata, replacing their former autonomy under the Byzantines as a Genoese merchant colony. Henceforth, the population would be divided into two groups: zimmis, or subjects; and harbis, or foreigners. Zimmis were non-Muslim permanent residents who agreed to become subjects of the sultan and were legally recognized as such by paying a special head tax; in return they received certain economic benefits and legal protections. Harbis were non-Muslims who retained the status of foreigner, and were permitted to reside in Galata, whether temporarily or for many years, under the jurisdiction of their own nation. Crucially, the legal status of these two groups was completely distinct. A 1502 treaty further ruled that Venetians who lived in Galata for more than one year had to pay the tax and become Ottoman subjects, but those who regularly traveled between the two states were not required to do so. The Venetian bailo was responsible for certifying these individuals as Venetian subjects, who in return enjoyed Venetian legal protections along with other rights, privileges, and responsibilities.  

In addition to these early laws, more recently signed agreements within the Capitulations historically negotiated between Ottoman sultans and various European governments expressly granted each resident European nation the right to use its own legal system and courts of law for matters, such as these attacks, which concerned its nation solely. Yet as Villeneuve revealed in his unofficial report about the affair, keeping its resolution under European control and away from Ottoman authority was, despite these assurances, of paramount concern

40 Ibid., and “Relation d’une batterie…,” f. 205r.
41 See Zarinebaf, Crime and Punishment in Istanbul, 142-148, on the legal autonomy of non-Muslim communities within the Ottoman Empire.
43 Edhem Eldem, “Capitulations and Western Trade,” in The Cambridge History of Turkey, 293-295.
in the ministers’ minds. Gradenigo, as a long-time Galata resident, could easily have taken *zimmni* status. It is possible, in fact, that his wife and mother-in-law were *zimmis*. But he had maintained his *harbi* status as a Venetian subject, thus making Bartolini responsible for both protecting and punishing him. Peculiarly, the effort to keep the Ottomans out of the affair resulted in them being largely ignored in the documentary evidence except insofar as they provided local color: the Janissaries as an excuse for European domestics and artisans to bear arms, the imperial palace in which Gradenigo hid, the Turkish guard assisting in the arrests, the requirement to appease Ottoman officials with gifts so the sultan wouldn’t learn of the incident.

Aside from the vaguely ominous threat of potential Ottoman involvement, quickly averted by bribery, the description of the attacks and arrests might have been set in any European capital. This apparent closed-mindedness to the real locale was in actuality a concerted effort by the ambassadors to maintain their nations’ good standing with the Ottoman government. They feared that if news of the murder, and worse, of the penetration into an imperial residence, were to reach any of the higher echelons of the Ottoman court, then the European community as a whole would risk losing face and possibly real economic and political privileges for its respective governments. This shared concern could have prompted the ambassadors to attempt to judge the accused using general principles of right and law, without recourse to the laws of any particular nation. But such a degree of cosmopolitanism appeared inconceivable in the face of a crime that pitted the members of one nation so violently against another.44

The day after the ministers’ meeting, Villeneuve ordered his surgeon to examine Gradenigo’s injuries and the cadaver of Jacque Avenins, while his chancellor began questioning Gradenigo about the previous day’s events.45 Villeneuve soon learned that he could not honestly justify imprisoning the barber: “I began to realize…that the Venetian’s case was quite forgivable, as my chef was the aggressor and he only killed him from the necessity of legitimate defense.”46 The next day Bartolini followed upon this disappointing discovery by paying Villeneuve a visit in which he again pressed for the prisoner’s release on grounds of

45 Old Regime France had no official criminal code, but Villeneuve closely followed traditional French legal procedures in compiling his case against Gradenigo, down to the medical examination of both attacker and corpse, and the formal interrogation of the accused. See Greenshields, *An Economy of Violence*, 176-186, 199.
46 Villeneuve to Chauvelin, 28 November 1729, f. 214v.
his nationality. “The prisoner’s mother-in-law had presented him with a request, in which she explained that her son-in-law was a subject of the Republic and consequently bound to its jurisdiction, and therefore could only be judged by its representative.”47 To this request Bartolini added the same promise he had made to Ambassador Stanyan, that he would swear to hold a legitimate trial in Galata, with the judgment to be approved by Venice, and that if the barber were found guilty he would be punished. Nevertheless, Villeneuve was reluctant to accede to the inevitable. He sternly addressed Bartolini: “The example of what happened last year allows me to refuse what in other circumstances should have presented no difficulty” (handing over Gradenigo) “but because it seems so easy for Venetians to avoid being punished for their crimes, I am determined to pass sentence upon this man myself.”48 Bartolini exited the French embassy once more without having won the barber’s release.

Villeneuve was stalling for time, in an effort to persuade Bartolini of the importance of punishing Gradenigo as a matter of form to keep the peace in Galata and Pera. Even if by rights the barber did not personally deserve to be punished, to Villeneuve he represented the chance to win a symbolic measure of justice against the historically unpleasant behavior of the Venetian embassy. In the preface to his private report on the two assaults to Secretary of State Chauvelin, Villeneuve described the kinds of problems regularly posed by members of the Venetian embassy:

> Very frequently quarrels have arisen here between the domestics of the Venetian ambassadors, and those of other ministers. The former are almost always the instigators, and they usually follow up with murder. The House of the Bailo is composed not just of subjects of the Republic (among whom are often persons who have been banished from Venice for wicked deeds), but also of Albanians wearing Venetian colors… About two years ago these Albanians assassinated a German working for Mr. Dirling [the Habsburg Resident, or ambassador], who was unable to get reparation apart from the Bailo’s promise that the Republic would

47 Ibid., ff. 214v-215r.

48 Ibid., 215v/v. The previous year, two months prior to Villeneuve’s arrival in Constantinople, his rotisseur (whom he had sent ahead) got in the way of a dispute between several French and Venetian domestics and was stabbed to death in the rue de Pera by a servant of the Venetian bailo at the time, M. Delphino. The perpetrator avoided punishment by vanishing, or so claimed Delphino. Neither Villeneuve nor his predecessor the Sieur de Fontenu believed this disappearance was genuine, but neither saw fit to inform Versailles about the occurrence. See ibid., ff. 208v-209v, and “Relation d’une batterie...,” ff. 205v-206r.
take care to punish the guilty. Last year...my rotisseur (roaster)...newly arrived in Constantinople...was fatally stabbed in the middle of the rue de Pera by one of the domestics of the Bailo...who escaped punishment. [This past September] these same Albanians...attacked members of the Embassy of Holland. S. Bartolini [...] chased the most seditious attackers from this country, and hushed up this affair.49

With the capture of one representative Venetian for one typical crime, Villeneuve intended to win symbolic restitution for these many other assaults—not only for the sake of his own countrymen, but also for every European nation represented at the Ottoman capital that had ever been injured by a member of the Venetian community. Even while refusing to honor the release request made by Gradenigo’s mother-in-law, Villeneuve admitted privately that “I really resisted [handing over the prisoner] only so long as was necessary to make S. Bartolini [sic] realize how it was in the Republic’s interest not to let assassins remain unpunished, as in last year’s case. Ultimately I decided against persisting in my stubborn refusal, because I foresaw that by the rules of law I would not find material sufficient to convict the Venetian who had killed my cook.”50

Three more days elapsed. Then at Villeneuve’s instigation another general meeting of all the European ministers was held at the French embassy, during which Bartolini made a third attempt to reclaim the prisoner. Finally Villeneuve allowed him to take Gradenigo, but only after all the ministers agreed to jointly write and sign a formal report of the murder and its resolution. This document became the “Relation of an assault between one of the principle domestics of the Embassy of France and several domestics of the Embassy of Venice.”51 Each minister received his own copy of the report and forwarded it to his home government. In addition Villeneuve held Bartolini to his former promise of a local trial for Gradenigo, assisted by the secretary of the French Embassy. But no sooner was the trial begun, then Villeneuve was confirmed in his suspicion that Venetian law would absolve the barber of having committed a crime and thence he, Villeneuve, would lose his scapegoat. Villeneuve seriously desired to inflict corporal punishment on the man as a public lesson to others, but according to Venetian law, homicide committed in legitimate defense was simply not a criminal act. And while the bearing of arms was technically a crime, it was accepted custom for Franks (as all European Christians were known locally) to carry weapons in the Ottoman Empire “under pretext that they are a necessary guarantee against

49 Villeneuve to Chauvelin, 28 November 1729, ff. 208v-210r.
50 Ibid., ff. 215r/v.
51 See note 17.
insults from Levantines or Janissaries.”

Villeneuve’s token prisoner was slipping through his fingers like water through a sieve.

Realizing that he would never succeed in gaining justice against a Venetian as long as he operated in accordance with the laws of Venice, Villeneuve changed tactics from insisting on a trial to negotiating a private settlement with Bartolini that satisfied both ministers and still provided a fair warning to future offenders. They sentenced Gradenigo to permanent exile on the island of Corfu, separating him from his wife and children who were to remain in Galata. All things considered, this let Gradenigo off lightly. In both France and the Venetian Empire, over 60 percent of homicide convictions were penalized by a death sentence, and less than 10 percent by banishment.

Villeneuve decided that exile was an adequate punishment. If the barber had been whipped, beaten, or otherwise physically punished, yet permitted to continue living in Galata as before, “his residency would not have been accepted easily by the French, and doubtless would have led to some fresh trouble.” However, Villeneuve also tried to ensure that a certain amount of external pressure be applied to the Venetian embassy, to make its residents behave less like uncouth ruffians and more like dignified diplomats. Two months after Avenins’ murder, Villeneuve urged his government to encourage reform within the Venetian diplomatic corps:

I think…that in order to prevent a future reoccurrence [of affairs like this], it would be good if Your Excellency [the French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs] could…explain to the Doge that too often are found, among the servants of the Venetian ambassadors who come to Constantinople, vagabonds and bandits who only come here to avoid the full rigor of the law…indeed often the entire household of the ambassador is composed of such men… Your Excellency might

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52 Villeneuve to Chauvelin, 28 November 1729, f. 217r. See also Goffman, Britons in the Ottoman Empire, 13-28, and Masters, Origins of Western Economic Dominance, 77.

53 Banishment to an isolated Greek island was also a common punishment meted out by the Ottoman courts, usually applied to individuals judged to be “undesirable neighbors” by their community. See Zarinebaf, Crime and Punishment in Istanbul, 168-169.

54 A 1670 French ordinance listed the criminal punishment options in descending order of severity as “death, torture, life in the galleys, perpetual banishment, limited term in the galleys, and banishment for a limited time” (Greenshields, An Economy of Violence, 199-204). In Venice there was more forgiveness for homicide when it was a “senseless” crime of passion or committed in self-defense; the range of punishments for convicted murderers in Venice included, in descending order of use, “execution, mutilation, corporal discipline, jail, banishment, and fines” (Ruggiero, Renaissance Venice, 48-49, 180).

55 Villeneuve to Chauvelin, 28 November 1729, f. 217v.
suggest that the best means of preventing future difficulties would be to engage the ambassadors of the Republic to staff their households only with known and wise persons.\textsuperscript{56}

Another postscript to the murder occurred in February when Bartolini and Stanyan sentenced the two Venetians who had attacked Jean Rimbaud to row in the galleys.\textsuperscript{57} Also, to the great satisfaction of all the ministers, Bartolini dismissed six domestics of dubious reputation.\textsuperscript{58} Although it is unlikely that Bartolini was encouraged to do this by either his Doge or through any suggestion from France—not enough time had elapsed for the necessary communications to take place—his actions lent the appearance of an agreeable resolution to the whole business.\textsuperscript{59} However, it was no more than an appearance; not only did the Venetian embassy have a past history of disreputable servants, but it would continue to accommodate similarly quarrelsome roughnecks for decades to come, with few repercussions.\textsuperscript{60} By the eighteenth century Venice had ceased to be the economic superpower it once had been in the eastern Mediterranean, and the bailo’s increasing inability to choose and control his staff reflected this decline.

In conclusion, I would like to highlight several issues this case raises about identity-related behavior among western Europeans resident in early eighteenth-century Galata. These men clearly were not Ottomans, even though as the other essays published here demonstrate, historians are discovering that “Ottoman” is

\textsuperscript{56} Villeneuve to Chauvelin, 25 January 1730, CP, Turquie, Vol. 82, ff. 46v-47r, AAE.

\textsuperscript{57} Conviction to the galleys was often a death sentence in itself, although it was considered a lesser punishment suitable for convicts “accused of attempted murder” when the victim survived, precisely as was the case for Jean Rimbaud and his attackers. See Andre Zysberg, “Galley Rowers in the Mid-Eighteenth Century,” in \textit{Deviants and the Abandoned in French Society}, ed. Robert Forster and Orest Ranum (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1978), 84-86.

\textsuperscript{58} Villeneuve to Chauvelin, 8 February 1730, CP, Turquie, Vol. 82, f. 54v.

\textsuperscript{59} Charles Carrière, \textit{Négociants marseillais au XVIII\textsuperscript{e} siècle} (Marseille, France: Institut historique de Provence, 1973), 779-789.

\textsuperscript{60} See, for example, Hatt-ı Hümayun collection 185/8669, 185/8703, 240/13446, and 264/15329, \textit{Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi}, Istanbul, Turkey, in which is recorded the sentencing of six Venetian Croats who, in 1789, assaulted several Turkish sailors in front of the Venetian embassy in Galata. The six offenders were sentenced to the galleys, and all other Venetian Croats in Istanbul were ordered to return to their homeland. Five years later, three had died and the Venetian bailo requested forgiveness for the remaining three. I thank Will Smiley for sharing these documents with me.
turning out to be a far more flexible and open identity than was previously understood. The individuals at the heart of this narrative—Jean Rimbaud, Jacque Avenins, Angelo Gradenigo, and their friends and supporters—were ordinary, excitable young men all similarly removed from their homelands: a mix of servants and artisans, two groups rarely heard from in histories of early modern Europeans abroad. Along with using violence to assert their national identities, the protagonists and their friends appeared well able to unify in the name of their respective nations and to petition their respective superiors to have their needs met, when it suited them. The servants’ and artisans’ daily lives seamlessly incorporated cosmopolitan realities with nationalist preferences. While employment could bring them together (the French chef Jean Rimbaud ran the kitchen for the English embassy, and was rescued from likely death at the wedding party by his co-workers, a mixed party of English domestics and Ottoman janissary soldiers), in their off-duty socializing and violence, their loyalties followed nation-based divisions (the wedding party consisted exclusively of Venetians; and those seeking to defend Rimbaud’s honor were entirely French, even though he belonged to the English ambassador’s household). These preferences form an interesting contrast to the quasi-cosmopolitan aims of the ambassadors, who attempted to preserve a collective European dignity, including all levels of society, within the confines of the Ottoman Empire. However, even the ambassadors’ shared cosmopolitanism was stymied by their individual nationalist sympathies over which legal system to use when punishing wrongdoers whose crimes crossed national-identity boundaries. As legal theorist Sam Adelman observes, “Sovereignty has been the rock on which cosmopolitanism has always been in danger of foundering.” Each nation relied on the bulwark of its own legal system as one element of identification within the pluralistic society that was eighteenth-century Galata.

The events that preceded and culminated in Jacque Avenins’ death were predicated on national identity and national difference in the most literal fashion possible. Venetians were attacking French nationals, and the French were retaliating in kind. Villeneuve, by championing his wounded and his dead, initially appeared intent on defining his community through national distinctions, as did Bartolini in his defense of the barber Gradenigo. But to punish the wrongdoers and prevent future attacks between the domestics of different nations, Villeneuve also worked with Bartolini and the other diplomatic representatives to build a more expansive concept of community rooted in a sense of commonality among Europeans living within the alien world of the Ottoman Empire. National identity, perhaps

61 See especially Van den Boogert, “Resurrecting home ottomanicus,” in this volume.
surprisingly, in certain respects meant more to the lowest social orders than it did to the highest in the early eighteenth century. For the staff and servants of the European embassies in Galata and Pera, national origins defined both who they were and how they should relate to one another. For the ministers, national allegiance defined their official positions, yet they worked together—the Venetian bailo Bartolini no less conscientiously than the others—to restore harmony to the district of Galata as a whole, thus overlooking national distinctions in favor of promoting a general peace.

*Venetian Vagabonds and Furious Frenchmen: Nationalist and Cosmopolitan Impulses among Europeans in Galata*

Abstract • In eighteenth-century Galata, foreign diplomats sought to build a cosmopolitan community based on being Europeans within the Ottoman Empire. But among the lower orders national differences could ignite violent conflicts. In 1729 two French chefs provoked Venetian anger: one was injured by Venetians at a wedding; the second retaliated by attacking a Venetian barber, who then killed him. These events were predicated on national identity in the most literal fashion. Venetians were attacking French nationals simply for being French, and vice-versa. National identity, perhaps surprisingly, in certain respects meant more to the lowest social orders than it did to the highest among early-eighteenth-century western Europeans stationed in the Islamic Ottoman Empire. For the servants, national origins defined who they were and how they related to one another. For the diplomats, nation defined their official positions, yet they worked together to restore harmony.

Keywords: Galata, Homicide, Diplomacy, National Identity, Cosmopolitanism
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