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History Workshop Journal, Issue 60, Autumn 2005, pp. 25-44 (Article)

Published by Oxford University Press



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# Forgetting the Smyrna Fire

by *Biray Kolluoğlu Kırılı*

We cannot help but think of fire as the element of annihilation. But both mythographers and natural historians know better: that from the pyre rises the phoenix, that through a mantle of ash can emerge a shoot of restored life.

*Simon Schama, 1995<sup>1</sup>*

What I see as I stand on the deck of the *Iron Duke* is an unbroken wall of fire, two miles long in which twenty distinct volcanoes of raging flames are throwing up jagged, writhing tongues to a height of a hundred feet . . .

The sea glows a deep copper-red, and worst of all, from the densely packed mob of many thousand refugees huddled on the narrow quay, between the advancing fiery death behind and the deep water in front, comes continuously frantic screaming of sheer terror as can be heard miles away.

*Daily Mail dispatch, 16 Sept. 1922<sup>2</sup>*

This was how the correspondent of the *Daily Mail*, watching from on board a British destroyer in mid September 1922, described ‘the scene of appalling and majestic destruction’ as he saw Smyrna burn. The Great Fire involved the literal and symbolic destruction of this city, which from being an unremarkable small town in the sixteenth century had experienced spectacular growth and development to become in the nineteenth century the most favoured port of the Eastern Mediterranean. Late Ottoman Smyrna embraced a cosmopolitan population of over 200,000 in which the demographic and economic dominance of the non-Muslim groups significantly marked the city.<sup>3</sup> It was known as ‘*gavur* (infidel) Izmir’ by Muslims during the Ottoman period.<sup>4</sup> It is more than likely that Smyrna began to be called infidel not only because so many of its inhabitants were non-Muslims, but also because of the dominance in the city’s economic and socio-cultural life of the ‘Levantine’ or ‘Franks’<sup>5</sup> – foreigners of European origin – and the centrality and importance of their districts in its urban geography.<sup>6</sup> To this day, reference to ‘*gavur* Izmir’ finds resonance in Turkish popular imaginary.

The city’s residential layout was organized around its communities. Levantine, Greek, and Armenian quarters lay close to the bay in a triangle formed by two railway lines and the sea. On the other side of the tracks were the Jewish and Turkish quarters. The fire wiped out Smyrna’s ‘Frank’ District, commercially and culturally the centre of the city and home to the



Drawing of the fire at Smyrna based on a painting by Raffael Corsine.

majority of Levantine merchants. It also consumed the Armenian and Greek quarters, which housed most residents from these communities. This means that almost all non-Muslim neighbourhoods were destroyed (with the exception of the Jewish quarter), along with three-quarters of this bustling port city. Physical destruction of such dimensions is significant in and of itself. In this article, however, I will concentrate on the symbolic destruction of space and history that the Great Fire of 1922 signified. In the following pages I will argue that symbolically the Great Fire was an act of punishment, a destruction aiming to purify, to chastise this '*gavur*' (infidel) city. At the same time, I argue, the destruction of the city through fire was an act of creation, an attempt to build places of (counter) memory, opening up a terrain upon which the new nation's imprint, its Muslim and Turkish identity, could be carved and its cosmopolitanism nationalized.

Smyrna burned to ashes at a time when the Ottoman Empire – with its administrative, political, and economic structures and institutions, its peoples, geography, and imagination – was being radically replaced by nationalist counterparts in the Turkish Republic. This transition involved the drawing of a new human and spatial geography. Extensive muslimization of Anatolia had already begun in the nineteenth century through forced migration of the Muslims of the Balkans and Russia and took a new form with the cleansing of Armenians undertaken by the Young Turks controlling the Ottoman government in 1915. The construction of a purely Muslim and Turkish nation was an attempt to create a rupture between what belonged to the Empire and what was imagined to belong to the nation-state.<sup>7</sup> This involved not only the eradication of the synthetic imagination of the Empire and the construction of a new national imaginary, but also the eradication of Ottoman spaces and the creation of national spaces in their stead. Although the significance of a developing imaginary that redefines national territory as homeland and that of the territoriality of nation-building have been studied, analyses of the construction of collective identities have largely obscured the reconfiguration of cityscapes as an integral element in the creation of national imaginaries. I will argue that the destruction of Ottoman spaces and the redefinition and reconstruction of new cityscapes and public spaces were an integral part of the process of the construction of Turkish nationalism in the 1920s.

These arguments will be based on an analysis of how the Great Fire was reconstituted within official and collective memory, or a microanalysis of the role of memory in nationalist modernism. Silences, omissions, and gaps in the narration of the fire in Turkish historiography and collective memory will be used as sources of information. In the following pages the ways in which the fire is (not) remembered or (not) verbalized provide instances of the workings of memory in the creation of a nationalist imaginary. The process of nation-state formation involves drawing of spatial boundaries and the remoulding of prior spatial orders. A significant aspect of the reconfiguration of spatial matrices or construction of national spatialities

is the 'privileging of certain places as . . . places of memory'.<sup>8</sup> This is usually understood as memorialization of symbolic sites (such as battlefields or the site of the twin towers in New York), or of symbolic events and figures through spatial inscriptions (monuments, war memorials). This article will present the privileging of the fire zone in Izmir as a place of (counter) memory.

My focus here is not the traumatic consequences of the fire as it translated into the devastation of lives, through death, loss, or the uprooting of people from their homes. Rather, for our purposes what is significant is the temporal and spatial break that the Great Fire represents. Its erasure from official history and from collective memory translates as a new beginning for the new nation as the fire's destruction mediates the erasure of Ottoman spaces. According to Ana Maria Alonso, '[t]he spatial, temporal, and bodily matrices are conjoined in nationalism'.<sup>9</sup> We can see the coalescence of these matrices not only in the articulation of the Izmir Fire in collective memory, but also in its role in the inscription of the nationalist blueprint on Ottoman Izmir.

If memory is to be employed in social analysis in an intellectually sustainable manner it needs to be posited as a relational concept. Remembering is a process of framing the past with the guidance of past and present social relations. Acts of remembering are always already acts of forgetting; and memories are shaped within and in relation to material objects and spatial frameworks. Memory is not an individual faculty, despite its seemingly very personal dimensions. Individual remembrances are made possible by the structures of collective memory. Hence remembering/forgetting is a process of social construction.<sup>10</sup> Yet, one should be careful not to push this argument without qualifying it. The notion of construction does not imply a vacuum in which an endless number of pieces can be put together in infinitely varying possibilities. The truth may remain in the eye of the beholder, but that gaze is located at a particular moment in time-space and in relation to other gazes that again stand in a certain structure of social relations. If collective remembering/forgetting is an integral part of constructing national imaginaries, unravelling this process is essential to uncovering the relationships that are constructed and sustained through collective memory.

Fire marks the moment when the spatial and temporal continuity of Smyrna/Izmir was broken, a moment of discontinuity. The process of a concerted effort of collective forgetting is inextricably tied to the workings of collective remembering. Paul Connerton keenly observes that periods of radical transformations are periods of recollection as much as they are periods of forgetting. Through a study of the workings of social memory during the French Revolution he argues that 'all beginnings contain an element of recollection' despite the fact that the moment of beginning marks the 'abolition of the sequence of temporality'. 'But the absolutely new is inconceivable,' says Connerton, 'in all modes of experience we always base

our particular experiences on a prior context in order to ensure that they are intelligible at all.<sup>11</sup> These insights underline that collective memory during radical transformations is in continuous dialogue with the time that is in the process of becoming the past. Commenting on how nineteenth-century European societies coped with the radical transformations that they were experiencing Hutton writes ‘ironically, this society, self-conscious about the new culture that it was creating, also needed a new past with which it might identify’.<sup>12</sup> We can think of this assessment as a more general commentary on the state of breaking away from one order and establishing a new one. Or, to go back to our departure point, this can be thought of as a commentary on moments of discontinuity. National histories are built on premises of continuity in the face of actual radical discontinuity. Hence moments of rupture, like the Great Fire, are always already moments lending themselves to reconstructions that mark a continuity. Alessandro Cavalli calls these ‘crucial events’ and writes, ‘[t]hey mark a discontinuity, and therefore require the reconstruction of a sense of continuity’. At such moments because the discontinuity with the past is maximized, ‘the crucial event performs the symbolic function of closing past accounts and opening a new era’.<sup>13</sup> The fire is forgotten for the new nation to construct its narrative. ‘All profound changes in consciousness, by their very nature’, writes Benedict Anderson, ‘bring with them characteristic amnesias. Out of such oblivions, in specific historical circumstances, spring narratives.’<sup>14</sup>

Before we can begin to analyze an instance of collective amnesia in the construction of Turkish nationalism, it is necessary to look briefly at this historical event, the Great Fire. This will be followed by an analysis of the ways in which the fire was absorbed into, or deleted from, official history and collective memory. The last section is devoted to an analysis of the ways in which the fire was absorbed into or deleted from official history and collective memory.

## THE GREAT FIRE

When the ashes settled in 1922, Smyrna, the glorious port-city of the Ottoman empire had disappeared from the face of the earth.

With a horrific appropriateness, the fire expressed in symbolic terms the rooting out and destruction of Greek and Armenian Smyrna. Hellenic Smyrna was dead. Christian Smyrna, too, one of the great ancient foundations of Asia Minor, was dead. The phoenix to rise from these ashes was a Turkish Izmir purged of two thousand and more years of history.<sup>15</sup>

Looking back at the period that carried Smyrna to its ‘death’, that is, at the days immediately preceding the actual days of the catastrophe, will give us clues to understand what the fire signifies. Let us look back at what immediately preceded the fire.

Following the defeat of the Ottomans in the First World War, what was left of the already shrunken territories of the Ottoman empire, that is mainly Anatolia, was also slipping away. The Mudros armistice, 31 October 1918, certified the unconditional surrender of the Ottoman state in this war and after this an allied fleet anchored in Istanbul and an allied military administration was set up there. French troops entered Cilicia and Adana in Southern Anatolia and the Italians landed in Antalya, again in Southern Anatolia, in early 1919. The Greek army under the cover of allied warships set foot in Smyrna on 15 May 1919, occupied a large portion of the coastal area and began a march towards the interior. On 19 May 1919, immediately after the Greek army disembarked in Western Anatolia, Mustafa Kemal Pasha landed in a Black Sea port, Samsun, under the orders of Istanbul to disband the remaining Turkish forces in Anatolia. But he did just the opposite and began to organize a nationalist resistance army against the occupation of European powers and the Sultanate in Istanbul that had accepted their terms. In August 1922 the Turkish nationalist resistance forces launched a major counter-attack against an over-stretched Greek army which by then had also lost the half-hearted support of the Allies. The Turkish counter-attack proved catastrophic for both the Greek army and the Anatolian Greeks. In the first week of September 1922, while the army was retreating, the civilian Greek population was fleeing away from the Turkish forces, flowing from the inland into Smyrna.

The first news from the eastern front reached Smyrna on 28 August in the form of a brief communiqué announcing the evacuation of the Greek army from Afyon Karahisar, a city approximately 200 miles east.<sup>16</sup> Although rumours of 'disaster' had begun to spread, it seems that they were not yet effective at the level of upsetting the daily life of the city. A dispatch published in the *Manchester Guardian* on 28 September 1922 reported:

Arriving at Smyrna on Tuesday morning, August 29<sup>th</sup>, we found it bathed in sunshine and blissfully ignorant of the terrible fate overhanging it and many of its people. The quays were thronged with Greek soldiers and their officers, seamen, visitors, labourers and merchants, passing one way or another in two endless streams . . . It was a scene of abounding life and vitality . . . Nightfall found all at their rest, recreation, or refreshment, the open-air and indoor cafes, with their orchestras or singers, all being busy and crowded, while the Opera House was filled with an enthusiastic audience showing their appreciation of the artistic efforts of an Italian opera company.<sup>17</sup>

It took only a few days for the imminence of radical change to be recognized. The first week of September brought an influx of refugees and the remnants of the Greek army into the city. Greek civilians and soldiers poured into Smyrna from Aydin, Soke, Alasehir, Usak and other neighbouring cities. Driving towards Manisa (a city towards the East of Izmir), the

*Daily Telegraph* correspondent observed that 'refugees and erstwhile fighting men were travelling in any sort of conveyance that came to hand. Wagons, carts, donkeys, mules, camels, and even prehistoric wooden-wheeled bullock carts were pressed into service ... The confusion was indescribable'.<sup>18</sup>

While the soldiers were headed towards Cesme, a smaller port across the island of Chios which served as the disembarkation point of the Greek army, the refugees were camping on Smyrna's quay and the streets leading to it. The first to leave the city were the foreign nationals. The consulates in the city began transferring their nationals to the Greek islands and to Athens in the first week of September.<sup>19</sup> '[T]he quays were packed with people waiting to get their passports or pass their baggage through the Customs, and the congestion grew so great that these regulations were abandoned altogether.'<sup>20</sup> The city was in a state of chaos. While the 'terrifying inflow of refugees, deserters, and exhausted troops' overwhelmed the city, the Greek inhabitants of Izmir were also trying to get on to ships, abandoning their shops, houses, and property.<sup>21</sup>

There are no reliable figures for the number of refugee arrivals or for the population of the city in 1922. Journalistic estimations frequently agree on 50,000 refugees. According to United States official sources, there were around 150,000 refugees in the city during the first week of September and this number rose to 300,000 as of 13 September.<sup>22</sup> We also have no reliable figures for casualties during the fire, or for the killings that took place after the Turkish army came into the city, though to make an educated guess at this we can use the number of people who survived to leave the city. Harry Powell, commander of the USS destroyer *Esdall*, reported to Admiral Mark L. Bristol, US High Commissioner to the Ottoman Empire, that by 1 October a total of 213,480 refugees from Smyrna had been transferred to Athens, Salonika, Mytilene, Chios, and Samos. While 21,000 of these were British, French, and Italian nationals, the majority were Greeks. Taking into consideration that the 231,480 figure in all likelihood includes those who were hiding in the villages surrounding Izmir and who flocked to the city only after the Turkish army's deadline for the evacuation was set for 30 September,<sup>23</sup> and that it also reflects the non-Muslims who managed to flee, we can estimate that the casualties were no less than 100,000.

In the chaotic first week of September 1922 fire became a dangerous possibility. During the army's march towards Izmir many small towns and villages in Western Anatolia were set on fire. While Admiral Bristol was reporting to the US State Department that the deserting Greek Army could burn the city down,<sup>24</sup> the Turkish army's entrance to the city was also alarming Smyrna's non-Muslim inhabitants. In other words, there were various rumours everywhere in the city that the Turks, the Armenians, or the Greeks were preparing to burn the city down: the identity of the possible arsonist group varied from community to community.



The Turkish nationalist forces marched into Smyrna on 9 September. Paul Prentiss, a member of the Near East Relief committee, reported to the American Admiral Bristol that in the first week of September there was an average of five fires per day in Izmir. The report, mainly based on the account of the chief of Smyrna Fire Department Paul Gerscovich, said that this number far exceeded the average number of fires in a normal year which was about one in ten days. The fires reported between 10 and 12 September were so numerous and at such widely-separated points that the fire department was rendered helpless. It must be added that the small department had already been crippled by the arrests of its twelve Greek employees upon the orders of the Turkish military. During this ill-fated week there were only thirty-seven fire fighters in the whole city.<sup>25</sup>

Towards noon on Wednesday 13 September at least six fires were reported simultaneously around the freight terminal warehouses and the passenger station of the Aydin Railroad. Around noon five more fires were reported around the Armenian hospital, two at the American club and several around the Kasaba railroad station. Additionally the wind started to blow from the south-east and drove the flames towards the Frank and Greek quarters.<sup>26</sup> These disparate fires, originating in different spots in this part of the city, eventually turned into a single conflagration.

As the fire was engulfing a larger area the refugees and those inhabitants of the Armenian, Greek, and Frank districts who had not already fled to the suburbs were swept towards the waterfront, where thousands of people were packed on the quay. Let us again listen to one of the observers on one of the British warships:

It was a terrifying thing to see even from the distance. There was the most awful scream one could ever imagine. I believe many people were shoved into the sea, simply by the crowds nearest the houses trying to get further away from the fire ... Many did undoubtedly jump into the sea, from sheer panic.<sup>27</sup>

The fire continued to burn with all its might for two days and when it finally burned itself out on 15 September the flames had consumed three quarters of the city (excluding its suburbs), including the Armenian, Greek, and Frank districts. It is estimated that some twenty to twenty-five thousand houses, stores, and shops were burned including post offices, consulates, big department stores, major hotels, theatres, and clubs. The fire stretched 3,200 metres along the shoreline and it penetrated 5,000 metres inland.<sup>28</sup>

#### SILENCE SPEAKS

The fire is consigned to the margins in the writings of noted British and American scholars in Ottoman-Turkish studies. Bernard Lewis and Richard Robinson do not mention it at all, while Stanford Shaw rejects the

suggestions in the western press regarding Turkish responsibility for the fire but does not discuss how it happened.<sup>29</sup> In contrast, Armenian and Greek historians base their arguments that the Turkish army started the fire on a book by the American Consul George Horton whose anti-Turkish bias is crudely explicit.<sup>30</sup> The other book routinely cited on the city in this catastrophic period is Marjorie Housepian's *Smyrna*, a study based largely on the sources utilized by Horton.<sup>31</sup>

Debates regarding the responsibility for the Izmir debacle hold a particularly sensitive place in the memory of the peoples of both Turkey and Greece. Turkish official history, propagated through high-school history textbooks and both television and radio programmes broadcast on the significant days of republican history, preaches that the city was burnt by the Greeks and Armenians in a final attempt to destroy what they were leaving behind. The Greek accounts place the responsibility on the 'vicious' and 'barbarian' Turks. All accounts find, or better yet, fabricate evidence to support their ardently-argued positions.

Relying on the existing sources it is possible to make a case for either Greek or Turkish complicity in the burning of the city. One can argue that the Prentiss report is a testimony to the innocence of the Turkish soldiers and people and point towards the barbarism of the Greeks; or alternatively use Horton and Housepian to make just as clear a case for the victimization of the Greeks and Armenians. In such cases as these one can fortunately call upon the wisdom of Hannah Arendt, who noted that 'facts and events are infinitely more fragile than axioms, discoveries, theories' because they are constantly changing.<sup>32</sup> It is not my intention here to join the debate since this would involve subscribing to its nationalist contours. My concern is with the role of this fire in national histories and the processes of its digestion into national narratives.

In this context, since the existing scholarship is both very thin and biased, and the sources are scanty and mostly unreliable, I suggest that it is worth considering this historical instance, not necessarily from the perspective of the documents and sources, but from the perspective of social and cultural ramifications or by evaluating its discursive aftermath. Put differently, the way in which the fire was articulated into or disarticulated from Turkish history and collective memory can provide us with the background to assess the journalistic sources, memoirs, and oral accounts on the fire. These resources lend themselves to interpretation only after they are discursively embedded. Analysis of this kind of has the potential to transcend the pitfalls of nationalist debates and pose the Great Fire as a moment of rupture in the construction of Turkish nationalism.

The Great Chicago Fire of 1871, comparable in proportions and in the devastation that it caused, led both eyewitnesses and later observers to believe that the calamity was 'utterly incapable of verbal representation'. Yet this perception rather than leading 'into a silence by the realization that no words could describe the fire experience' produced quite the opposite

result of ‘a massive literary, journalistic and personal outpouring’.<sup>33</sup> The Great Fire in Smyrna, however, produced in Turkey a vast silence within which the few voices to verbalize the catastrophe were swallowed. So scarce are the accounts, whether scholarly, literary, or popular, that the Great Fire seems to have burnt away all traces, even from collective memory. Although the catastrophe and its aftermath would provide rich material that could with great ease lend itself to artistic imagination, not a single Turkish novel, film, or memoir deals with it. And again, though multiple social and economic dimensions of this historical instance call for exploration there is not a single scholarly study of it.

In the absence of scholarly, literary, or artistic sources to analyse the Great Fire one viable intellectual trajectory is to find ways of listening to the silence. Minkley and Legassick suggest that ‘history is constituted through mechanisms of “not telling” as it is by ways of telling’.<sup>34</sup> We can deduce information and learn from listening to silence just as we can from listening to words.

The silence begins in official accounts and official history. Firstly and also perhaps most importantly, Mustafa Kemal did not mention the Izmir fire in his historically significant speech to the Assembly on 4 November 1922. This was his first appearance before the Assembly after the nationalist victory and in this speech he described in detail the events and the battles of late August and early September. Nor was the Izmir fire included in his six-day speech in 1927.<sup>35</sup> The elimination of the fire from these speeches, which can be seen as labour pains preceding the birth of official memories of the new nation, prepared the ground for wiping this episode out of its history. To recapitulate, in these speeches Mustafa Kemal, the ‘father of the nation’, sketched the outline of the history of the ‘war of liberation’ before the National Assembly and thus before the nation. These sources form the basis of the sub-field of history in Turkey known as ‘The History of the Turkish Revolution’. ‘History of the Turkish Revolution’ courses are compulsory in high schools and universities and there are institutes of the same name in various universities. Ataturk’s historical outline did not include the almost total destruction of the second most important city of the new nation. This is how he referred to the fire in a speech during his visit to Izmir in 1923:

Izmir was in flames and smoke. Everyone was sombre before this sad scene. They had tears in their eyes. However, upon brief inquiry I realized that these tears were not because of the fire and the devastation. This fire and this devastation did not have any influence on them . . . , their eyes were filled with tears from happiness because of witnessing our victorious army liberating them.<sup>36</sup>

In this quotation fire does come into the picture, yet barely, and it still escapes description. Perhaps it was too difficult to ignore it altogether while

the scars on the face of the city after only a year were still so visible. Yet it is articulated in such a way that it becomes the symbol of liberation rather than of destruction, gain rather than loss, joy rather than mourning. Izmirians are told that this event should not have 'any influence' on them other than to remind them of what it brought them, that is 'liberation.

In most memoirs on the Turkish national war 'Izmir's liberation', which holds an important place in popular consciousness and the historiography of the Turkish Revolution, is recounted in great detail. It was in Izmir that actual fighting came to an end and the victory of the nationalist resistance was crowned. Hence it is telling to see that while the entrance of the Turkish army into the city and the ensuing days are recounted in great detail, the fire itself is either passed over in one sentence or not mentioned at all.<sup>37</sup> Most Turkish academic accounts of the 'war of liberation', fully consonant with the official account, tell us how the Greeks (sometimes with the help of the Armenians) burned down a city which they did not want to leave behind.<sup>38</sup> It is also important to observe the style and the tone of the Turkish sources. Foreign journalistic accounts, of which we have read examples in the preceding pages, reflect the awe, sympathy, and pain of the commentators, implying some form of personal engagement before the catastrophic event that they witnessed. Time and again the human suffering is described in arresting detail – not at all surprising given the gigantic scale of the devastation. However, in Turkish sources not only is the human element completely absent but there is also a sense of distance, a sense of alienation. What is being discussed is no longer the city which became the stage for the glorious event of the final defeat of the Greek army, but a reified landscape. Izmir becomes a city devoid of its inhabitants and the reader is offered a neutralized description of the material damage, boosted by enumeration of the buildings and shops lost to the fire.<sup>39</sup>

This process of removing the fire from history undoubtedly targets the ways in which ordinary people remember/forget this catastrophic experience. As Alonso observes it, collective memory cannot be sustained 'in pristine isolation from official constructions of the past'.<sup>40</sup> Oral accounts of the fire from elderly Izmirians testify to the power of the 'sheltered pathways' elaborated by Halbwachs in shaping collective remembrances.<sup>41</sup> At this point I will offer instances of this collective memory based on oral interviews. The interviews that I draw upon in the following pages were conducted in the second half of 1998 and first half of 1999. These were open-ended interviews in which I asked questions not only about the fire, but also other aspects of early twentieth-century Izmir. For purposes of anonymity I use pseudonyms.

The majority of the Izmirians whom I interviewed and who had witnessed the burning of their city as children, told me right away that the Greeks and/or Armenians set it on fire as they were escaping because they did not want to leave it to the Turks. It was interesting to observe that in the memories of these interviewees the order of events was reversed. In response

to my question 'whether they had heard any arguments about reports of the fire being started by the Turkish troops' they were saying that this was not possible because the army came after the fire. I must add that this reordering of the events is not exclusive to the elderly Izmirians who survived the Anatolian War. In the various settings where I have offered these observations, audiences from Turkey were taken aback by the actual chronology of the events. This reversal in collective memory is critical especially in the face of the fact that there is no such reversal in official history.

Such reversal is not uncommon. Alessandro Portelli discusses similar cases in Italian history, as for instance the death of Luigi Trastulli, a steel-worker in Terni, Italy. He was killed in an anti-NATO demonstration riot there in 1949, but was subsequently mythologized and remembered as being killed in 1953 in the resistance against a massive laying-off of steel workers.<sup>42</sup> A similar case, discussed by Simonetta Falasca-Zamponi, concerns memories of Mussolini's march on Rome in 1922. While the fascists were waiting at the outskirts of Rome and surrounding cities in late October of 1922 to march into Rome Mussolini was summoned to Rome by the Italian King, where on 30 March 1923 he was legitimately and peacefully proclaimed Prime Minister. It was only the next day that the black-shirts paraded before the King and the new prime minister. In the ensuing years, however, this accession to power became known as 'the events of late October' and the 'revolutionary march of the fascists'.<sup>43</sup>

The reversal in the chronology of the events in the oral accounts of the Izmir fire is thus critical. With this the heroic stories of 'Izmir's liberation' are solidified by their imagining an army which marches into a city on fire, the conflagration set with rage and barbarism, and which saves the city from the enemy. No matter how the questions were formulated, most interviewees did not recall any particular concrete moment regarding the fire. Yet in almost all cases, they would readily tell how they remembered carts full of dead bodies being carried, the blood on the streets, their parents offering help to some neighbour in those days of chaos, or even accounts of themselves murdering other people. In other words, it was not that these people did not remember those eventful days during which they were young witnesses of war, rather there seemed to be a gap in their memories concerning the fire. The unreliability of the oral sources here gives them a unique power: as Portelli observes, 'errors, inventions, and myths [in the oral accounts] lead us through and beyond facts to their meanings'.<sup>44</sup>

One of the few exceptions was a Levantine woman who was around seven years old at the time of the eventful September of Smyrna. As soon as I asked her if she remembered the burning of the city, she jumped from her chair and hastened to the other end of the living-room, picking up an ornamental porcelain pitcher which sat on an end table at the corner. She brought it back with her and with a smile on her face said, 'this is what is left. My mother took only this from our house and said that we could use it

to drink water'. Their house was located in the Frank district and was completely burnt down. She continued to tell me in detail the story of their escape: how they had dressed wearing several layers of clothing on top of each other, how a Turkish officer carried them on his horse to the station where they boarded the train that took them to safety in Bornova, a nearby suburb. She was quite moved and ended by saying, 'I can still smell it. I can still recall the smell of burned and dead bodies'.<sup>45</sup>

In another instance I was interviewing Orhan Bey, who was an architect in Izmir municipality, about details of the post-fire reconstruction during the 1940s and 1950s. His seventy-six year old wife was there listening. At some point Orhan Bey mentioned that his wife's father was one of the first Muslim pharmacists in Izmir at the turn of the century. I asked her whether she remembered her parents or other elders talking about the war and the fire. After a short pause she told me, 'now that you ask this I realize that they never talked about it'. The interesting thing was her own astonishment in her realization. Twice she came back to that question as I was continuing my interview with her husband which was wandering in different directions. Finally after a while, without being asked, she said, 'you asked whether the fire was talked about at home. They never talked about it. I do not remember anything. But, they used to talk about the violence of the Greek soldiers. I remember this very clearly'. Then she went on to relate her mother's stories of how she had witnessed Greek soldiers killing innocent women and the Turkish army entering the city.<sup>46</sup>

Two interviewees were substantially different from the others. In both cases their reactions were similar when I began to ask questions about the fire. In both cases, voices were lowered and body gestures implied a movement closer to my ear and, in one case, away from the tape-recorder. Mehmet Bey, son of a wealthy landowner in Bornova, and Salih Bey, son of a landowner from a village at the opposite end of the city, both asked me if the recorder was still on when we began to talk about the fire and the exodus of Greeks from the city. In both cases I said that I preferred to tape the conversation and that the recorder was turned on. Neither asked for it to be turned off. It was as if they were going to talk about some secret that they had been keeping to themselves and were having difficulty in getting it out. However, they wanted to do it anyway. Mehmet Bey told me that the Turkish troops started the fires to clamp down on continuing resistance in the Armenian and Greek neighbourhoods: 'They [Greeks and Armenians] were armed and still hiding in the houses in these narrow streets.' He added, 'but I think the real reason was to prevent them from coming back'.<sup>47</sup> Salih Bey also told me that it was the Turkish troops who burned the city and explained it the following way: 'We did not want them to come back; and their shops and houses burnt down where were they going to return to?'<sup>48</sup>

I came across an obscure book written to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the Republic. It was made up of around sixty interviews with Anatolian war veterans. The editors tell us that they have published the

transcribed accounts without editing them and the language of the accounts testifies to truth of this claim. As can be expected they are mostly stories of heroism regarding the war. Yet the testimony of the following veteran is very interesting:

Whatever, I forget the day, we entered Izmir. From the barracks square until *Alsancak*, all that seaside [is] full of *gavur* carcasses.<sup>49</sup> Our soldiers have killed them all with bayonets. There were seven fleets across *Pasaport*.<sup>50</sup> English, French, Greek fleets. All the Greek *gavur* are throwing themselves into the sea. They are yelling 'help'. Even the fleets couldn't save them. The place of the Fair was a Frank cemetery. The Armenians and the *gavurs* didn't give up their houses. The irregulars burnt all those houses. Bombs were exploding, rifles were fired. Most of the *gavurs* and Armenians burned alive.<sup>51</sup>

This former soldier clearly states that the fires were started to force the *gavur* inhabitants of the city from their houses. For him the burning of the city is not important. The act itself is normalized. What matters is that the enemy was forced out and destroyed.

Nineteenth and early twentieth-century Izmir, a cosmopolitan port city, could have no place in the new nation being created under the slogan: 'Turkey belongs to Turks'.<sup>52</sup> The old Izmir belonged to Levantines, Greeks, Armenians, Jews, and Muslims. For it to gain a Turkish identity it had to be purified. The interviewees who had had a glimpse of that former city remembered this. When it was time to talk about what had been forgotten they started to act as if they did not want to hear the words they were about to utter. Even today voices have to be lowered and bodies need to move closer precisely because nationalism comes with an active process of forgetting and selective remembering; remembering what was supposed to be forgotten brings about one of the most significant challenges against nationalistic sentiments.

Falih Rifki Atay, a prominent journalist and author who witnessed the fire provides us with a rare instance of talking openly on it. His account is very different from the accounts of the fire in most Turkish sources and hence deserves close attention. He writes:

It was the day of the Great Fire. As the flames were devouring the neighbourhoods people were running towards the quay ... Some were jumping into the sea to hang on to small boats ... I was watching this unique tragedy with my heart aching ... Izmir was burning and along with its Greekness (*Rumluk*), the peoples of the first civilizations, the ones who passed the Middle Ages with the Muslims, those who were living in their homelands and homes in comfort, those who held up Izmir's and all of Western Anatolia's agriculture, trade, and the entirety of its economy, those who used to live in palaces, *konaks*, and *çiflik*s,

now, at the twenty-second year of the twentieth century were dying for a piece of boat to take them away for good.<sup>53</sup>

This account is rare because it gives us a picture of the fire which includes people. Atay underlines the human suffering, instead of just writing about the destruction of the built environment. Diverging from the discursive patterns of the Turkish sources that we have seen above, he talks about what the fire represents: the destruction of not only the landscape but also the city's humanscape and history. He continues by tacitly acknowledging the Turkish responsibility for the calamity while offering his explanation for the burning of the city.

*Gavur* [infidel] Izmir burned and came to an end with its flames in the darkness and its smoke in daylight. Were those responsible for the fire really the Armenian arsonists as we were told in those days? ... As I have decided to write the truth as far as I know I want to quote a page from the notes I took in those days. 'The plunderers helped spread the fire ... Why were we burning down Izmir? Were we afraid that if waterfront *konaks*, hotels and taverns stayed in place, we would never be able to get rid of the minorities? When the Armenians were being deported in the First World War, we had burned down all the habitable districts and neighbourhoods in Anatolian towns and cities with this very same fear. This does not solely derive from an urge for destruction. There is also some feeling of inferiority in it. It was as if anywhere that resembled Europe was destined to remain Christian and foreign and to be denied to us.<sup>54</sup>

This brief 'confession' touches the heart of the issue. Here I will venture to engage in a substitutive reading of Franz Fanon, applying his thoughts on decolonization to nation-building on the ruins of an Empire. Although in the Turkish case there was no colonizer against whom rage and violence could be justifiably channelled, the creation of the new nation reflected the will to create a *tabula rasa* – '(w)ithout any period of transition, a total, complete, and absolute substitution'<sup>55</sup> of what belonged to the Empire with what was imagined as belonging to the nation. In a post-colonial context the colonized peoples needed to wipe out the traces of their colonizers. In the post-imperial context of the newly-founded Turkish nation, the nationalists needed to wipe out what belonged to the Ottomans. The social and spatial geography of the Ottoman Empire had to be remade and remapped for the construction of Turkish nationalism and the formation of the Turkish nation-state. This remaking and remapping involved a process of erasure, and in most cases of the complete elimination of the peoples and spaces of the Ottomans. The eradication was both literally and symbolically violent. By burning Izmir the nationalists were chastising infidel Izmir. Flames devoured the



cosmopolitan, hence decadent, impure culture of the city. When the black clouds cleared, Izmir had undergone a moral improvement; it was purified. As Atay observes in the above quotation: destroying the glamorous seaside mansions, hotels, clubs, and cafés of the Frank district – that is, what defined the Ottoman port city – did ‘not solely derive from an urge for destruction’. It was, at the same time, an act of purification, an act of creation.

Let me finally draw upon a book on Izmir written in 1939 to illustrate my argument. This is a kind of travel guide, penned by a Turkish author who visits the Republic’s Izmir after a break of almost twenty years. He begins by telling us about the first time he visited Izmir, at the turn of the century. During this visit, as he was approaching the city, he eavesdropped on a conversation and overheard someone extolling the beauties of Izmir with the words, ‘every place in Izmir is like foreign lands. It is as if we are going to Marseilles’. This made a great impression on our author, who recalls thinking: ‘Going to a foreign land. How thrilling’.<sup>56</sup> Then he begins to describe what Izmir looked like at the turn of the century. His account is strikingly different from other nineteenth-century travellers’ accounts which, almost without exception, underline the beauty of the city. The famous Frank district becomes in our guide’s words a very dim, crowded, chaotic and ugly place: ‘If it were possible for you to visualize the Frank district in its older form you would find it ridiculous’. When finally he finishes his account of what a hilariously ugly city Izmir used to be he says: ‘When the black clouds on Izmir opened up, the city found its quay and hinterland in ruins and emptiness ... Today’s Izmir begins after this.’<sup>57</sup>

He begins his account of the city under the Turkish Republic by telling us that ‘it is now as if we are entering a European city’ and continues to draw a picture of an orderly, clean, well cared-for city:

The old does not exist. Moreover, one does not miss it. Here, there was *Posidon*. There, there was *Kramer*, *Klanaridi* ... But, I do not even want to think about them. Now in their place I see our Atatürk’s statue on his rearing horse. This monument alone is enough to explain to us that those former buildings were only rubbish ... I want to apologize to you, the charming people of this beautiful city, that I made you remember these bitter memories.<sup>58</sup>

Our guide is trying hard to forget what old Izmir was like and yet still is haunted by it. When images and remembrances of the former city creep in he becomes apologetic because he is invoking his readers’ memories of the fire and what stood there before it. Let me also underline that he manages to tell his story without talking about or even mentioning the fire. ‘The black clouds’ imply both the smoke of the fire and the misfortunes of the city ‘before it was saved’.

## CONCLUSION

In this article I have tried to establish that the key piece for solving the historical puzzle of the Izmir Fire, the thread that ties the scattered evidence that we encounter, is silence. The silence as to the Great Fire, official and popular, speaks to a societal amnesia. Amnesia and amnesty are derived from the same root in Greek, *mnesthai* – to remember. Amnesty is defined as ‘an act of oblivion, a general pardon of offenses against a government; a deliberate overlooking, as of an offense’.<sup>59</sup> Hence, amnesia also implies an act of pardoning. Michael Kammen argues that ‘memory is more likely to be activated by contestation, and amnesia is more likely to be induced by the desire for reconciliation’.<sup>60</sup> The way in which fire is deliberately overlooked implies the presence of an offence, a violence, and the concerted effort spent to forget it speaks to an attempt of amnesty and reconciliation. Yet, the violence or offence that is invoked here, as I suggested at the very beginning, is not necessarily the violence against the non-Muslims who were burned, drowned, or otherwise killed in mid September 1922. It is the violence against the city, the chastising of Smyrna. The fire mediates the taming of its ‘foreignness’. It is also a violence against time: the violation of its continuity. It is the violence executed through the disruption of its flow by the abrupt transformation of the present into a distant past: the rupture that is caused by the discontinuity between present and future.

The act of forgetting speaks to the presence of the former city. The gestures of the interviewees, the way in which the flow of events is reversed, the apologies of our traveller for invoking images of the former city, and the occasional confessions all speak of the strength of the collective amnesia. This amnesia marks the beginning of a national narrative.

## NOTES AND REFERENCES

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1 Simon Schama, *Landscape and Memory*, New York, 1995, p. 19.

2 *Daily Mail* dispatch, 16 Sept. 1922, reprinted in Lysimachos Eecenomos, *The Martyrdom of Smyrna and Eastern Christendom*, London, 1922, pp. 70–1.

3 In 1890 the population of the city of Smyrna, including its suburbs, was 229,615, according to Vital Cuinet, *La Turquie d'Asie, géographie administrative statistique descriptive et raisonnée de chaque province de l'Asie Mineure*, vol. 3, Paris, 1894, p. 439. At the end of the nineteenth century, non-Muslims comprised 61.5 per cent of the city's total population: Justin McCarthy, *The Arab World, Turkey and the Balkans (1878–1914): a Handbook of Historical Statistics*, Boston, 1983, p. 142.

4 See the chapter on ‘Infidel Smyrna’ in Alexander William Kinglake, *Eothen*, London, (1908) 1911, pp. 38–47. Smyrna and Izmir were both names for the city during the Ottoman

Empire. While the Europeans used Smyrna, in official Ottoman documents the city was called Izmir. Smyrna was also used among the Ottoman Greeks and Levantines. Under the Republic the usage of Smyrna completely disappeared. In this article I refer to the Ottoman city as Smyrna and the Republican city as Izmir, to emphasize the rupture.

5 Levantines or Franks were foreign nationals of European origin, regardless of their nationality, which might be Dutch, English, Italian, German, Austrian or French. The French consulate in Izmir was established in 1619. By 1630 the Levant Company began to dominate Ottoman markets and it was at this time that English consuls settled in Izmir. In the 1620s the Dutch, and Venetians followed the French and the English. The European presence began to be more salient in the city towards the end of the seventeenth century.

6 Within the Ottoman domain, *gavur* was used predominantly if not exclusively for non-Muslims who were not Ottoman subjects. Various terms described non-Muslims in the Empire. Most common of these is *zimmi*, a legal category comprising Orthodox Greeks, Armenians, Jews, and other non-Muslim Ottoman subjects. This being the official definition *zimmi* more specifically refers to Christian subjects. *Reaya*, another category, officially meant taxpayers, but came to be used almost exclusively for non-Muslims by the nineteenth century. *Gavur*, *kafir* (plural *kefere*), that is infidel, was not an official category and most often conveyed a pejorative connotation for the subject group referred to.

7 Turkey's secularism captures the imagination of West European and North American scholars and politicians alike as a singular experiment in establishing a decidedly secular regime in the Muslim world. This emphasis on the secular character of the Turkish Republic conceals the early stages of the construction of Turkish nationalism during which the Republican state was actively engaged in the project of reshaping the population within its territories by eliminating the non-Muslims who began to be considered as 'excesses' (c.f. Arendt) in the spatial and discursive matrices of the nation-state. The most striking instance of this in the post World War I era is furnished by the 1923 Lausanne Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, which resulted in the forced uprooting of some two million Greek Orthodox and Muslim people. The process of accommodating and assimilating those exchanged played a significant role in shaping the modalities of Turkish nationalism by creating new lines and fissures which further divided the 'Muslim brethren' into ever more restrictive constructions of Turkishness. (See Biray Kırılı, 'From Ottoman Empire to Turkish Nation-State: Reconfiguring Spaces and Geo-bodies', Unpublished Dissertation, 2002, Binghamton University, New York.)

8 *The Power of Place: Bringing Together Geographical and Sociological Imagination*, ed. John A. Agnew and James S. Duncan, Boston, 1989, p. 3.

9 Ana Maria Alonso, 'The Politics of Space, Time, and Substance: State Formation, Nationalism, and Ethnicity', *Annual Review of Anthropology* 23, 1994, p. 387.

10 John Urry, 'How Societies Remember the Past', in *Theorizing Museums*, ed. Sharon Macdonald and Gordon Fyfe, Cambridge, 1996, p. 50.

11 Paul Connerton, *How Societies Remember*, Cambridge, 1989, pp. 4, 6.

12 Patrick H. Hutton, *History as an Art of Memory*, p. 5.

13 Alessandro Cavalli, 'Patterns of Collective Memory', discussion paper No. 14, presented at *Collegium Budapest*, June 1995, pp. 2, 4.

14 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London, 1991, p. 204.

15 Michael Llewellyn Smith, *Ionian Vision: Greece in Asia Minor (1919-1922)*, London, 1973, p. 311.

16 Smith, *Ionian Vision*, p. 299.

17 Ćenomos, *Martyrdom of Smyrna*, pp. 54-5.

18 *Daily Telegraph* dispatch, 12 Sept. 1922, in Ćenomos, *Martyrdom of Smyrna*, p. 56.

19 Marjorie Housepian, *Smyrna 1922: the Destruction of a City*, London, 1972, p. 113.

20 *Manchester Guardian* dispatch, 28 Sept. 1922, in Ćenomos, *Martyrdom of Smyrna*, pp. 54-5.

21 *Morning Post* dispatch, 15 Sept. 1922, in *Martyrdom of Smyrna*, pp. 56-7.

22 Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1922, pp. 418-20. Robert L. Daniel writes, basing his findings on United States Government documents, that there were 260,000 homeless refugees in the city on the evening of 13 September 1922, mostly Greeks: *American Philanthropy in the Near East, 1820-1960*, Athens, Ohio, 1970, p. 166.

23 Dimitra M. Giannuli, 'American Philanthropy in the Near East: Relief to the Ottoman Greek Refugees, 1922–1923', Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Kent State University, 1992, pp. 131, 130.

24 Giannuli, 'American Philanthropy in the Near East', p. 106.

25 The Prentiss report was initially given to me by one of my interviewees in Izmir. The entire document is printed in Heath W. Lowry, 'Turkish History: On Whose Sources Will It Be Based? A Case Study on the Burning of Izmir', *Osmanli Arastirmalari – The Journal of Ottoman Studies* 9, 1989, pp. 1–29, and referenced as Library of Congress, Bristol, *General Correspondence*, Container # 38 (November–December, 1922 & January–February, 1923), A Letter from Mark O. Prentiss to Admiral Mark Bristol dated 11 January, p. 23.

26 Prentiss Report.

27 Smith, *Ionian Vision*, p. 309.

28 Turkmen Parlak, *Isgalden Kurtulusu 2: Yunan Ege'den Nasil Gitti, Son Gunler*, Izmir, 1983, pp. 478–9.

29 See Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, London, 1968; Stanford Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol.2: Reform Revolution, and Republic: the Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808–1975*, Cambridge, 1977; Richard D. Robinson, *The First Turkish Republic: a Case Study in National Development*, Cambridge, 1963. Lord Kinross devotes a chapter to the Izmir fire in his book and argues that it was caused accidentally. Lord Kinross, *Ataturk, a Bibliography of Mustafa Kemal, Father of Modern Turkey*, New York, 1965.

30 George Horton, *The Blight of Asia: an Account of the Systematic Extermination of Christian Populations by Mohammedans and of the Culpability of Certain Great Powers; with the True Story of the Burning of Smyrna*, Indianapolis, 1926.

31 Housepian, *Smyrna* 1922.

32 Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: a Report on the Banality of Evil*, New York, 1965.

33 Carl Smith, *Urban Disorder and the Shape of Belief: the Great Chicago Fire, the Haymarket Bomb, and the Model Town of Pullman*, Chicago, 1995, pp. 26–7.

34 Gary Minkley and Martin Legassick, "'Not Telling": Secrecy, Lies, and History', *History and Theory* 39: 4, December 2000, pp. 1–11. See also the other articles in this special issue, particularly Luise White, 'Telling More: Lies, Secrets, and History', pp. 11–23, which is devoted to role of silences and distortions in the construction of historical narratives and how these, in themselves are sources of information.

35 See *Ataturk'un Soylev ve Demecleri*, vol. 1, Ankara, 1989, pp. 265–87; Andrew Mango, *Ataturk*, London, 1999, p. 346.

36 *Ataturk'un Soylev ve Demecleri*, vol. 2, Ankara, 1989, p. 82.

37 Salih Bozok and Cemil S. Bozok, *Hep Ataturk'un Yaninda*, Istanbul, 1985; Hasan Riza Soyak, *Ataturk'ten Hatiralari*, vol. 1, Istanbul, 1973.

38 The Director of 9 Eylul University Institute of History of Principles and Reforms of Ataturk, Ergun Aybars, in his book *Turkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi*, vol. 1, Ankara, 1989, devotes only a single paragraph to the fire. In another book, *Ataturk ve Izmir*, ed. Sadan Gokovali and others, Izmir, 1981, which gathers all possible information regarding Ataturk's relationship with Izmir, the destruction of the built environment caused by the fire, said to have been started by the Greeks and Armenians, is discussed in a single page, p. 97.

39 See Parlak, *Isgalden Kurtulusu*; Aybars, *Turkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi*.

40 Ana Maria Alonso, 'The Effects of Truth: Re-Presentations of the Past and the Imagining of Community', *Journal of Historical Sociology* 1: 1, 1988, p. 47.

41 Maurice Halbwachs, *The Collective Memory* (1950), transl. Francis J. Ditter, Jr. and Vida Yazdi Ditter, New York, 1980, p. 47.

42 Alessandro Portelli, *The Death of Luigi Trastulli and Other Stories: Form and Meaning in Oral History*, Albany, NY, 1991, pp. 13–16.

43 Simonetta Falasca-Zamponi, *Fascist Spectacle: the Aesthetics of Power in Mussolini's Italy*, Berkeley, 1997, p. 1–2.

44 Portelli, *The Death of Luigi Trastulli*, p. 2.

45 Interview, 10 December 1998.

46 Interview, 14 April 1999. I would like to add here that the author of these pages grew up listening to stories of the entry of the Turkish soldiers to Izmir at the end of the 'war of liberation' from her grandmother. Two generations later the vicarious memories of the cruelty and barbarism of the Greek occupation were as alive as yesterday. Yet the fire itself that destroyed my grandmother's beloved city was never narrated in her stories.

47 Interview, 5 April 1999.

48 Interview, 7 February 1999.

49 He uses the phrase '*gavur geberigi*': *gavur* means infidel and *geberigi* is used for dead animals.

50 Barrack Square (*Kisla Meydani*) is today's Konak Square, the area in front of *Kemeralti*, the old bazaar district. At the time *Sarikisla* Barracks was located there. *Pasaport* is the wharf located near the Frank district. *Alsancak* is the name given to the fire zone during the Republican period. It is telling that Frank quarter was renamed as *Alsancak* ('red flag'), a popular way of invoking the Turkish flag.

51 *Cumhuriyet'e Kan Verenler*, ed. Nail Ekinci, Derman Bayladi, Mahmut Alptekin, Istanbul, 1973, p. 101 (translation mine).

52 For a further analysis of the development of the slogan 'Turkey belongs to Turks' and the accompanying campaign 'Citizen: Speak Turkish', especially in regard to the pressures against the Jews, see Rifat N. Bali, *Cumhuriyet Yillarinda Turkiye Yahudileri: Bir Turklestirme Seruveni, (1923-1945)*, Istanbul, 1999, pp. 131-48.

53 Falih Rifki Atay, *Cankaya: Ataturk'un Dogumundan Olumune Kadar*, Istanbul, 1969, p. 323 (translation mine).

54 Atay, *Cankaya*, pp. 324-25 (translation mine).

55 Franz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (1961), transl. Constance Farrington, New York, 1963, p. 35.

56 Ulvi Olgac, *Guzel Izmir Ne Idi Ne Oldu*, Izmir, 1939, p. 7.

57 Olgac, *Guzel Izmir*, pp. 11, 19.

58 Olgac, *Guzel Izmir*, pp. 20, 24. *Posidon*, *Kramer*, *Klanaridi* were famous cafes and hotels located around today's Republic Square and Ataturk monument.

59 Webster's *Unabridged Dictionary*, 1972.

60 Michael Kammen, *Mystic Chords of Memory: the Transformation of Tradition in American Culture*, New York, 1991, p. 13.