Class and cosmopolitanism: the historiographical fortunes of merchants in Eastern Mediterranean ports

Athanasios (Sakis) Gekas*

Department of History, York University, Toronto, Canada

This article examines the historiographical trajectory of merchants in Eastern Mediterranean ports, from a commercial bourgeoisie to cosmopolitan citizens. The paper argues that despite recent historiographical trends, class is still a valuable analytical tool, and is compatible with the notion of cosmopolitanism. A class dimension when approaching the history of Mediterranean ports is important because it emphasizes the urban inequalities and intra-communal hierarchies and can explain the inter-communal conflicts that characterized most of these ports in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.

Keywords: class; cosmopolitanism; merchants; Eastern Mediterranean; ports; nineteenth century

Economic historians are still debating the causes, characteristics and implications of the industrial revolution, and have attempted to explain why England industrialized first while other economies took so long.1 It is now accepted that England’s famous revolution – the profound change in productive capabilities and output that took place in the Lancashire and Yorkshire regions of Northern England – was the precocious exception rather than the norm, and cannot offer a blueprint for the history of industrialization in continental Europe or elsewhere.2 Social historians have often looked for a pattern of social formation in non-European societies that resembles the typology that economic historians applied to the history of industrialization. In the highly influential and standard reference work on the middle classes in Europe, J. Kocka suggests a simple model of interpretation: to the west of Germany, in England, the propertied groups dominating the middle classes were strong, and their wealth and privileges kept growing. In Central Europe education was the strength of the middle classes, but the lines of privileges with the aristocracy were clearly drawn; whereas in the East, the middle classes were even weaker. ‘At the eastern and south-eastern margins of Europe, a coherent middle class hardly existed.’3 Aside from the now documented absence of a coherent middle class even in England, what was peripheral to the European centre could be seen as central to the broad region of the Eastern Mediterranean. This region included the imperial capital of Istanbul and some of the fastest growing centres at the time: Salonica, Smyrna, and Alexandria. The pattern of industrialization in continental Europe and the rest of the world did not (and could not) follow the English example, and there is no reason why developments in the social structure of the Eastern Mediterranean should have followed the same path as in Western

*Email: agekas@yorku.ca
Europe. Therefore it is very difficult to compare middle classes in different parts of the world and argue that they were more or less coherent.

Under the spell of modernization theory, some historians applied the model of class formation in Western Europe and England specifically to societies in the so-called periphery of Europe. Historians and social scientists in the 1950s and 1960s employed ‘indexes of modernization’, and assumed that progress (however defined) would bring the gradual eradication of traditional elements in modernizing societies. This teleological analysis presupposes one mode of development, namely the modernization that more ‘progressive’ groups in Western European societies promoted. While the paradigm was dominant in the 1960s – but became heavily criticized in the 1970s and particularly in the 1980s – it has not entirely relieved the study of non-Western societies of its fetters. The problem was identified over 30 years ago, when historians of the Middle East cautioned against the pitfalls of an indiscriminate and uncritical use of terms such as class, class conflict, and social groups. Still, historians are only now developing new methodologies, concepts, vocabularies and research agendas for the study of Ottoman ports and their societies, and are now re-interpreting the process of modernization and urban development not only through the historical trajectory of Istanbul and Alexandria – and their alleged failings to modernize – but also through the municipal experience of the urban elites in cities such as Beirut and Salonica.

This article revisits the two analytical paths that have so far defined the research paradigm of the history of Eastern Mediterranean ports during the long nineteenth century: world-system analysis and cosmopolitanism. At the heart of the discussion lies the following problematic: can historians accommodate the analytical tool of class and the concept of cosmopolitanism, or are these notions mutually exclusive and incompatible? One particular class of these port societies, the bourgeoisie or middle classes, has attracted historians’ interests. More specifically, the commercial bourgeoisie, the merchants of these ports, is the class that several historians have held responsible for the process of incorporation of the Eastern Mediterranean into a world economy. Other historians regarded the ‘same’ merchants as harbingers of modernity, promoters of national(ist) projects, leaders in municipal politics, and people who set examples of cosmopolitan conviviality. An earlier historiography focused on the emergence of a bourgeoisie in the Eastern Mediterranean ports as a result of economic penetration of the Ottoman Empire by Western European capitalism – namely the economic expansion of France, Britain, and, in the last decades of the nineteenth century, Germany – at the expense of Ottoman productive capabilities. The findings of the group that spearheaded research on the social and economic history of Eastern Mediterranean ports were significant, and placed the region within a world-systems historical framework, inspiring multifarious further research. In the wake of the linguistic turn and the shift towards cultural history, other historians abandoned the use of class as an analytical tool, and employed instead the categories of community and ethnicity. More recently, the ports of the region, including Odessa (due to its connections with ports of the Eastern Mediterranean and Western Europe), have been seen under the rubric of cosmopolitanism, and the merchants that belonged to the same ethno-religious groups have been elevated to the status of cosmopolitan citizens of a multi-ethnic and multi-denominational empire. As far as the Greeks and Jews of the Empire are concerned, this historiographical shift is to some extent related to the field of diaspora studies and to histories of entrepreneurship. These histories tend to privilege ethno-religious groups that were dispersed in various geographical settings but which belonged to the same network due to traits of kinship, common origin and ethnicity. Diaspora business studies have addressed the issue of whether cultural
characteristics matter for successful business organization, but overlooked issues of social stratification. Under the influence of the linguistic turn, micro-history and aversion to grand narratives of social change, with few exceptions the concept of class has waned.\textsuperscript{12} Class as a category of analysis, and the middle classes/bourgeoisie as a field of study, were abandoned in favour of studies that employ community as an analytical tool and object of study.\textsuperscript{13}

In recent studies of social history, power is inseparable from resistance.\textsuperscript{14} The challenge for studies on urban power relations and governance is to avoid deterministic conclusions based predominantly on people’s relationship to the mode of production, and to be careful enough not to succumb to particularism. In the historiography of port-cities in the 1980s and 1990s, the issue of power was barely touched upon, even when hegemonic class relations were discussed. On the other hand, cases of urban conflict in Eastern Mediterranean ports also received scant attention, and cannot be simply reduced to structural and antagonistic class relations, or be considered a by-product of a fractured modernity.\textsuperscript{15} This modernity in the case of port-cities took the form of commercialization, bureaucracy, industrialization (towards the end of the period), fiscal and legal reform and the adoption of Western cultural practices, filtered as they were by the local societies. Modernization also brought schisms, and was manifested in the spread of nationalism and the rise of a fear of the ‘other’, which sometimes took the traditional form of anti-Semitism and other inter-communal and ethnic conflicts. Ottoman modernization inevitably led to fractured urban societies, and failed to move as quickly as in the expanding Greek nation-state, which benefited from being the first in the region to endorse a European-inspired modernity, albeit with mixed results.\textsuperscript{16}

Modernity in individual cities took various forms; in Smyrna modernity was ‘flexible, impulsive’ and responded ‘to the rhythms of the socio-economic world in which the city was situated’. This was a world of modern, cosmopolitan citizens.\textsuperscript{17} Class as a category is absent from this volume on modernity, with the exception of the Ottoman Greek bourgeoisie of Istanbul, and the innovative attempt to discern attitudes to modernization through signatures in the Ottoman Bank’s records.\textsuperscript{18} Istanbul, perhaps because of its capital status, is the place for which historians use the term bourgeoisie more confidently when writing about the non-Muslim Ottoman merchants who served either as agents of foreign companies or traded for their own interest. This bifurcation, between the bureaucratic and commercial bourgeoisie, seems to be the dominant one among social historians of the Ottoman Empire.\textsuperscript{19} The article looks first at the historiography of ports and their merchants, tracing the transition from a class-driven to an identities-bound interpretation of history, or from the historiography of the commercial bourgeoisie to that of the cosmopolitans.

Comprador merchants or commercial bourgeoisie?

In 1977 İslamoğlu and Keyder set out as the main aim in their agenda for Ottoman history to describe the transition of the Ottoman Empire from a world-economy to a peripheral space in the capitalist world-system. Acknowledging directly the intellectual debts to the world-systems school, and to the dependency theory of Wallerstein, Arrighi and Amin (among others), those historians sought to demonstrate the conflicts within Ottoman society, in contrast to the harmonious but also static and heavily institutional picture painted by previous historians of the Ottoman Empire, such as İnalci. Central in this revisionist stance was the concept of ‘peripheralization’ of the Ottoman Empire,\textsuperscript{20} class analysis followed the discussion of changes in the Ottoman economy, the commercialization of production and the control of foreign trade by European companies
and their intermediaries – Jews, Greeks, and Armenians.21 This analytical framework became a familiar if not dominant one among later historians of the Eastern Mediterranean.

Studies also published in the Review journal a few years later elaborated several of the ideas that were simply outlined in the article on Ottoman history. The conflation of the concepts of class and cosmopolitanism is evident in the first lines of the article on Eastern Mediterranean port-cities by Kasaba et al.: ‘Within a new context of flourishing mercantile activity, port-cities developed as opulent and cosmopolitan outposts of European bourgeoisie’.22 The meaning of the word ‘cosmopolitan’, and the characteristics of the bourgeois ‘European’ cosmopolitans, were not elaborated; nor were they of course romanticized, as was the case in subsequent works. The research group clarified that, because intermediate merchants were not primarily or exclusively dependent on foreign capital, it would be insufficient to label them as compradores, that is ‘mere appendages of foreign capital in their respective localities’.23 The issue was taken up in a later special issue of the Review journal, titled ‘Ottoman Empire: Nineteenth-Century Transformations’. Kasaba, addressing the question of whether the process of incorporation of the port economies into a world economy generated a ‘comprador’ bourgeoisie among non-Muslims – and in particular among Greek merchants in Western Anatolia – found that this was a bourgeoisie ‘in its own right’, occasionally in conflict and not in accordance with European interests, such that they could not be easily labelled compradors. The argument extends also to the Armenians of Smyrna, who for Kasaba likewise were not compradors, since they resisted full penetration by the Ottoman Empire.24 Although broad comparisons run the risk of oversimplification, the use of the term ‘comprador’ for the middlemen merchants in both the Ottoman Empire and the Chinese Kingdom has enabled some interesting comparisons between these two areas of the world.25 In any case, it is the special historical conditions in Western Anatolia and the substantial power that non-Muslim merchants acquired that render the use of the term ‘comprador’ unsuitable.26

The reasons why these ports of the Eastern Mediterranean attracted historians’ attention are well known. During the nineteenth century, especially the second half, most port-cities in the Eastern Mediterranean enjoyed economic growth and urban development. However, this growth led to uneven urban development, as social inequalities persisted and most likely intensified. Export of commodities produced in the hinterland (such as agricultural products) reinforced the entrepôt character of the ports, and fostered a limited industrial growth. Continuing concentration of capital in the commercial sector, and (limited) industrial investment by foreign companies and non-Muslim entrepreneurs, led to the rise of banking and other financial services.27 There was limited or no state investment in capital and labour-intensive urban development or infrastructure projects (railroads, industrial plants, factories, port facilities). Urban development took the form of public services, port and city infrastructures, and urban dwellings; at the same time there was a socio-spatial divide between the population, and inequalities became more pronounced, especially in Odessa, Alexandria and Smyrna. Technological advances and their impact on transportation are most evident in the construction of railroads and the advent of steamships. Railroad construction led to the hinterland’s further integration into the urban system and, by extension, into the world economy.

The work of Kasaba and his colleagues was seminal, and provided a comparative point in the historiography of the Eastern Mediterranean bourgeoisies. These historians envisaged Ottoman history in general, and the history of port-cities in particular, through a world-systems analysis, integrating the Ottoman economy and society within a broader global framework and a comparative dimension. The object of research was not the formation, role
and characteristics of a bourgeois class, but the economic history of several port-cities during the long nineteenth century within a comparative framework; economic change and commercial and limited industrial growth determined the class structure of each city. This comparative approach presents a bourgeoisie as a by-product of economic change (albeit with a significant role to play in national projects). The class in question (the bourgeoisie) is presented as the aggregate sum of different ethno-religious groups (Greeks, Jews, Armenians), merchants who enjoyed the protection of foreign commercial powers. Still, it was acknowledged that it is difficult to ascertain whether or not class formation developed along ethnically uniform lines. In many ways, it is a question that still remains unanswered. The world-systems context somehow diminishes the agency of individuals under the overwhelming impact of the incorporation of each port into the world-economy; in this process, the merchants in question were little more than ‘intermediaries’, the importance of their role in the Ottoman economy and politics notwithstanding.

An important ethnic-religious division of commerce in the port-cities in question has also been stressed. Minority merchants handled and controlled European imports and trade, while Muslim merchants prospered by controlling intra-Ottoman trade between regions of the Empire, and between the provinces and the capital. The role of merchants and their communities in local urban politics grew along with their role in the international and wider Mediterranean economy. In Alexandria, at the end of the eighteenth century, the most prevalent merchant communities were Turks, Maghrabis, Jews and Syrian Christians. Adverse international economic conditions, and divisions and competition between non-Muslim merchants did considerable harm to the business of many Europeans, and to the town’s commerce as a whole. During this period, affluence and social position were defined not by their ‘relationship to the means of production, but rather the means of coercion and commerce’. This definition takes into account both local conditions and the pre-industrial commercial economy of Alexandria, which determined its class relations; in Reimer’s Alexandria the upper class maintained a degree of coercion that was higher and differentiated it from the lower classes. Instability and predatory economic policy directed towards merchants by local rulers led to the search for foreign protection, at times the only means of ensuring that commerce could be conducted unhindered and protecting property rights from confiscations. Reimer concludes that there is no evidence of the formation of a class of merchants from different ethnic groups, at least for the eighteenth century, an argument that has now been extended to nineteenth- and even early twentieth-century Istanbul. Merchants occasionally constructed interest groups that amounted to a ‘community of interests’, but little more. This lack of unity against intervention from state and local authorities compromised the position of merchants in the city’s power relations, and in the conflicts between regional and local authorities. Further criteria used to define social groups in Reimer’s Alexandria, other than commerce and the relationship to the means of coercion, are lifestyle, housing, dress, property, the language used and seclusion from public life – a sign of affluence. In the case of Alexandria, the transition from one ethnic group to another is clearly identified; Maghrabis controlled the port’s trade until the nineteenth century, when Greeks ‘acted as the foremost agents of capitalist penetration into the villages of Egypt’.

The central aim of the world-systems research group was to trace the ‘presence/absence, creation/destruction of channels of communication between the economic and political spheres of action’ and thus demonstrate the political consciousness of the bourgeois group in each city. Issues central in the debate on the formation of a bourgeoisie, such as the creation of voluntary associations of communal or class character, the circulation of newspapers and the creation of a proto-civil society – now considered
crucial for the emergence of a public sphere and the bourgeoisie — are barely discussed. The concept of civil society has been put forward in the case of Izmir, even if not in an altogether convincing way; while associational activity is now part of the agenda, reflecting the interests of a new generation of historians. When municipal institutions and voluntary associations are considered (as in the case of Beirut), it appears that they eventually emerge as a result or manifestation of a bourgeois identity, and not as a means through which port bourgeoisie identities were formed. Merchants and businessmen took the initiative and established associations that promoted liberal reforms within a scheme of modernization. These reforms, and especially the municipal associations promoting them, were ‘the platform through which the merchant class could pursue social objectives’, in both Beirut and Alexandria. While this holds for many ports, Ottoman as well as non-Ottoman (such as Corfu, Odessa and British colonial Alexandria), few studies demonstrate how urban reforms were perceived by the lower as well as the upper classes. The directors of the research group were in a position to impose a hierarchy in the process of class formation in all the ports studied; apparently, ‘the attendant transformation of the class structure was most complete in Izmir’.

In the concluding section the editors of the special issue of Review note that three identifiable approaches can be followed in the study of port-cities: dependency, modernization and class. The dependency approach stresses the relations of the port-city with its hinterland as the city acquired its own small periphery and incorporated the hinterland into the world-system as well. Distinguishing themselves from modernization theory and the dependency approach, the authors reject the comprador character of the bourgeoisie and the negative role they are supposed to have played in history. The class approach is the one selected as the more promising; in this approach, the bourgeoisie can be seen as a class in their own right, rather than mere dependants of foreign capital and devoid of any historical agency. The class approach argues that the port-city has to be seen as the site of class formation par excellence, where the two antagonistic classes, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, were created, and where the class position of Ottoman officials can also be identified. The commercial bourgeoisie maintain their progressive role in history as the harbingers of modernity and social change, and fulfil their historical role, since ‘the development of capitalism and of a bourgeoisie were correlated with the evolution of port-cities’.

The issue of consciousness receives similar treatment. The port bourgeoisies come of age when they become political; by politics, the authors here mean the bourgeois claims to independence from the old Ottoman authority. In this process, the struggle with the ruling class and the bureaucratic elite is crucial, and all this culminated in a ‘shared consciousness’. This shared Levantine experience would make better sense if investigated with an approach that avoided economic determinism by not emphasizing the process of incorporation into a world-economy, and spared methodological communitarianism, and instead examined inter-communal relations, rather than merely the individual histories of respective ethnic groups (Greeks, Jews, Armenians). The second half of the nineteenth century saw an increase in communication and consequent interaction among the inhabitants of Eastern Mediterranean ports. Trade growth had already been underway since the eighteenth century, especially in Smyrna and Salonica; while at the end of the century there were already strong external linkages between some Mediterranean ports. It was, however, the expansion of steamer communication from the 1840s onwards that regulated time and distance in a completely novel way for those who could afford to travel on a steamship. This first technology-induced compression of time and space connected the wealthiest among the inhabitants of port-cities in tangible ways...
(through travelling), but also through business networks, along with the diffusion of ideas and cultural practices. Together with intermarriage, these are after all some of the markers of cosmopolitanism in Eastern Mediterranean ports. In this interpretation, the elite is denominated ‘notables’, instead of bourgeois, removing class from the analysis. Business networks and a universal culture also defined the ‘bourgeois aspirations’ of the port merchants, linking them horizontally and creating inter-communal relations between different ports.

For some world-systems historians, imperial rivalry facilitated a (primarily economic) conjuncture, and enabled indigenous groups to reformulate social relations to their advantage; this, in fact, was an anomaly of Ottoman society, when compared with other regions in the periphery during the same period of imperial expansion. The indebtedness of the Empire to, and its dependence on, foreign capital, and the ascendance of intermediate groups vis-à-vis foreign merchants, is perceived as directly benefiting indigenous groups – the commercial bourgeoisie. Wealth was the source of their social power; but this was a power that should not be overestimated, as the Ottoman state remained powerful until its last days. Aside from the transformation of the Ottoman economy during the world economic depression of the 1870s, the merchants and their social role remain firmly located in the mode of production of the Ottoman economy, and in the fluctuations that reverberated through the ports. Tabak proposes a more global or rather less Ottoman view on the ‘demise of cosmopolitanism’, which prefers to consider global developments; in this sense he is in tune with recent interpretations that aspire to a global historical perspective. In this sort of macroscopic analysis of ports, however, there is little leeway for considerations of urbanity, subjectivity and even conflicting orders, except as another result of exogenous factors.

A more balanced definition of middle-class agency and identity derives from the uses of consumption among Ottoman Greeks, an example of a different historiography. For the author, the rise of middle-class/bourgeois groups was not ‘simply the outcome of economic factors, but a complex process that was closely linked to new distributions of power, identities, and discourses’. More specifically, ‘middle-class groups in the Ottoman Empire did not nurture strong class alliances, because they were mainly involved in the politics and social life of the communities whose faith they shared’, and ‘they appropriated common cultural patterns and developed comparable business strategies’. Thus, the characteristics that led each ethnic group to business success were unable to produce class solidarity among the middle classes, and led to a particular type of communalism based on ethnic and religious affiliation.

Few historians would disagree that in Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East ports – in cities such as Salonica, Izmir, Odessa, Alexandria and Beirut – such factors as sociability, education, wealth and status became the defining characteristics of the social groups that reaped the benefits of the economic and political transformations of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Associational activities, sociability and the increasing appearance of women in the public sphere, are but a few of the novel manifestations of the cultural and educational capital that emerging groups combined with their wealth to distinguish themselves from the lower classes, and in some cases from the bureaucratic or landowning elites. It was these characteristics that lured many historians away from the commercial bourgeoisie arguments and towards the romanticizing of everyday life in Eastern Mediterranean ports.
From commerce to cosmopolitics and the rejection of class

Some of the world-system historians did examine the character of ports as cosmopolitan. Kasaba, outlining the history of Izmir, notes that ‘the population of Izmir remained cosmopolitan and over time became even more so as a growing number of people from the Archipelago and from other parts of the Mediterranean were drawn to its secure geography’. Cosmopolitanism is defined as plurality of ethnicities and religions, but this definition is no longer adequate. Some of the cities considered in this article have recently also been called ‘classic hybrid Eurasian port-cities of the nineteenth century’. Presumably, the hybridity of these cities is to be found in the social mobility of non-Muslim, Western-oriented groups and their visibility, and in the ‘contested versions of modernity’… that blur the distinctions between East and West. Among historians and social scientists, a lingering confusion exists between what is defined as cosmopolitan and what is trans-cultural, international, multicultural and diverse. More generally, the same confusion is to be found between the notions of cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism, the latter often being considered as evidence for the former. Malte Fuhrmann has recently defined cosmopolitanism by referring to four criteria: 1) a publicly visible diversity; 2) an ability of individual or collective agents to navigate between different coded spheres; 3) an active practice of sociabilities that cross community borders; and 4) a belief and a policy of enhancing cohesion without a monolithic base. To this notion and definition one could add the more radical and less encompassing definition of Will Hanley, which directly undermines previously asserted elite definitions of cosmopolitanism. Hanley introduces the concept of ‘vulgar cosmopolitanism’, following the recent criticisms of the notion of Alexandria as a product of Orientalist nostalgia. Hanley presents a different picture of Alexandria, one that does not ignore locals, does not distort the social history of Alexandria and does not misrepresent the history of Alexandria’s foreign community.

How is ‘vulgar cosmopolitanism’ defined? As ‘low, unrefined, plain, ordinary (but not obscene) cosmopolitanism’. The reassessment of Alexandria as a city full of cosmopolitan spaces becomes an opportunity to destabilize the ‘traditional categories of Mediterranean social description – sect, class, language, nationality’ from their usually fixed and universalized state. This statement of course invites the question of when these categories became traditional, and who made them so. However, deconstruction continues when Will Hanley adds new categories to the ‘classic’ list: ‘alcohol drinker, café goer, curser and accursed, walker and driver, public official, newcomer and native, foreign and local’. There is a spatial as well as a conceptual relocation of analysis, from the famous and traditionally cosmopolitan streets to the so far ignored if not altogether unknown streets of central Alexandria, with its grog shops, vulgar incidents and police interventions involving drunken seamen fighting each other. Drinking shops for example, were ‘a central feature of the community. They were places where acquaintances and strangers mixed. Drinking shop diversity challenges the categories operative in turn-of-the-century courts and twenty-first-century discourse alike. Alcohol drinking shops are typically cast as foreign spaces.’ Undoubtedly, there is a long way to go before the types/characters of people suggested by Hanley enjoy the same analytical and historiographical status as the classical categories of language, religion, class and nationality, but the experiment is certainly one worth pursuing. Above all, the exclusive focus on the cosmopolitanism of the street leaves little room for British colonial rule, posing an inversion of old historiographical trends, whereby the colonized rarely appeared in the pages of the old imperial history books.

Port-cities have also recently been identified as one of the most promising fields in the attempt to connect social history with global history. Well-researched but also
less-explored themes include trust and contract enforcement between merchants and other agents, as well as the particularities of these ports, which had to accommodate large numbers of males for long periods, and thus sustained a vibrant sex, drugs and alcohol sector. Among these themes, Pomeranz suggests ‘cultural misunderstandings’ as a topic for research – an unusual expression for urban conflict – and proposes the study of particular groups, such as sailors, merchants and prostitutes, in ‘citywide’ comparative cases, a path that may yield interesting insights. In the ports of the Eastern Mediterranean such cases of ‘cultural misunderstanding’ were not absent. For example, the spectacular population growth combined with the sustained increase of Jewish populations in Odessa and Salonica would seem to indicate a direct correlation between nationalism and the rise of anti-Semitism in these ports and others, such as Corfu.\(^{56}\) Examples of urban violence can provide an entry point into understanding how residents of these port-cities – and merchants in particular – acquired a sense of belonging to different social, religious, and ethnic groups, especially when they were forced to take sides during outbreaks of urban violence. Such eruptions include the riots of Smyrna (1870s and 1880s), Odessa (1871, 1880s, 1905), Corfu (1891), the ‘anti-European’ riots of 1876 in Salonika, and those of 1881–1882 in Alexandria, and, rather more controversially due to the sheer scale of the event, the ‘catastrophe of Smyrna in 1922’, which supposedly marks the end of the cosmopolitan era.\(^{57}\) The class dimension of these events still remains unexplored, unless anti-Semitism and nationalism can be considered adequate causal explanations.

The ports of the Eastern Mediterranean have been termed cosmopolitan because of their diversity in terms of ethnic composition and the continuous influx of migrants from other parts of the Mediterranean.\(^{58}\) In a recent definition, cosmopolitanism is situated primarily in the geographical extension of a network of people belonging to the same religious group.\(^{59}\) This definition is drawn from (Mediterranean) diaspora studies, a field where merchants have been the cosmopolitans par excellence,\(^{60}\) and which in fact identifies cosmopolitanism with the diaspora experience. In diaspora historiography, the unit of analysis is no longer the bourgeoisie or the city as a whole, but the Greeks, Jews, Armenians, port workers, bankers and, of course, merchants; a focus on specific groups within specific cities has not always addressed the large and pertinent questions of social conflict.

Despite these tensions, the history of ports and the symbiotic relationship between different ethnic and religious groups is quite remarkable, and presents us with acculturation as well as ‘cultural misunderstandings’. Still, historians should not get carried away. The ports in the period of late empire acquired ‘modes of conviviality’, not by design, as had been argued, but by default:

the social conviviality and economic buoyancy that coloured the port-cities at the turn of the twentieth century were due neither to their cosmopolitan constitution nor to their generosity of spirit which sanctioned tolerance and Bildung. Far from it. The reasons were neither cultural nor societal, but world-systemic.\(^{61}\)

In this sense, port-cities were an anomaly that inevitably was not destined to last. While economic change has always been considered independent (or for that matter linked to the world economy), the social and political developments in the cities, and the states in which they belonged, in the era of imperialist expansion also need to be contextualized and compared.

World-system historians did study the implications of the business activities of ethnic groups for the wider economy (urban, regional and imperial). In contrast, business histories within the field of diaspora studies have shifted emphasis to the importance
of business activities for the ethnic group itself (Jewish business for Jewish networks, Greek entrepreneurs for Greek diaspora networks, Armenian diaspora merchants for Armenian trade, and so on). Network analysis figures prominently in these studies and has replaced class as an analytical tool. Of the cities studied by the Port Cities research group – Trieste, Patras, Salonica, Izmir, Trabzon, Beirut and Alexandria – three of them, Trieste, Izmir and Alexandria, have figured prominently in cosmopolitan studies that emerged later on.

The literature on Greek and Jewish diaspora merchants, the citizens of the Mediterranean, proves the above points. In one definition, cosmopolitanism among Greeks derived from the international experience in the lifestyle of members of some of the most prominent Greek merchant families, such as that of Ralli. Foreign languages, the ability to calculate, knowledge of local and international markets and aspirations to a European lifestyle are some of the characteristics. This cosmopolitanism was almost exclusively a characteristic of the elite, multi-lingual, successful merchants with commercial and cultural connections to Western metropolises, and is often contrasted with the nationalism that brought an end to the golden era. The number of these ‘citizens of the Mediterranean world’ is very small and restricted to a few well-known and extremely wealthy families. On the other hand, there is no reason why cosmopolitanism should be the exclusive privilege of an elite group of merchants, since other groups, such as sailors, but also immigrant workers, were also part of a mobile population that migrated around cities in search of work. In fact, to consider cosmopolitanism as an elite privilege is already held to be one-dimensional and therefore inadequate. Most problematic is the romantic nostalgia that surrounds the portrayal of the cosmopolitanism of these cities in recent publications.

This point sheds doubt on the usefulness of the attribution of entire cities as ‘cosmopolitan’ (other than for descriptive purposes), and shifts the meaning to individuals, in the sense that only individuals can be cosmopolitan, and not whole cities. Still, merchants are nevertheless regarded as the true cosmopolitans. Emphasis on associational activity in the histories of the ports in question, however, has ignored one area of sociability, business practice, convergence of interest and space of negotiation with central authorities that was of utmost importance to merchants, namely, the intermediaries liaising between business and government – the commercial institutions of the port-cities. Merchants formed commercial associations, merchant societies and chambers of commerce, which advanced their cohesion as a group and, it could be argued, their cosmopolitan identity. These associations were, of course, part and parcel of the intense associational activity, and a manifestation of modernity as noted by many historians. In contrast to the communal associations, however, commercial ones were inter-ethnic, operated under different rules and negotiated individual and collective interests with the state authorities, as well as among the merchants who directed them. Most importantly, commercial associations were a common feature of many Mediterranean and non-Mediterranean ports, and encapsulated the modern organization of trade that required the recording of merchants in lists, with elected representatives and a meeting place. This is also where cosmopolitan merchants met, socialized, conducted business, read newspapers (local and international) in their numerous languages, and addressed municipal and national issues. Merchant cosmopolitanism could be both exclusive and inclusive, and Chambers of Commerce responded to the challenges presented to them, such as the emergence of nation-states and the expansion of strong empires. The British Chamber of Commerce in Alexandria was an openly avowed pressure group, which grew increasingly alarmed at the growth of the nationalist movement in Egypt, and predictably so.
This manifestation of cosmopolitan attitudes (even if broadly defined) is perfectly compatible with a conceptualization of merchants as a bourgeois class comprised of individuals willing to transcend (in the public sphere at least) their ethno-religious milieu. For many cosmopolitan merchants, commercial associations may have been as important as communal ones. This was the case at least in non-Ottoman ports, such as Odessa, Corfu, and in ports further west such as Livorno and Marseilles, where the status of minority communities was bound to differ significantly from that of the Ottoman non-Muslim merchants. Nevertheless, it is surprising that little attention has been paid to the Chambers of Commerce and other commercial associations as the space of negotiation between the merchants and the state authorities. Associational activity encapsulates what was modern, efficient and conducive to business. If whole cities can be termed cosmopolitan, then states and empires were central in the emergence of cosmopolitan cities and in the forging of cosmopolitan identities among the bourgeois merchants of the ports in question.

Recent historiography thus hails cosmopolitanism as a condition, but also as a product, of conviviality. As such, it co-existed with tensions and conflicts between ethnic and religious groups in several ports. Shared lived experience becomes clear in studies investigating inter-communal relations. The complex character of Greek–Jewish relations in the cities of Salonica and Odessa has allowed historians to consider inter-ethnic relations in the context of cosmopolitan cities in multicultural empires. A stratified view of these two communities in both cities reveals the whole repertoire of inter-communal relations, ranging from co-operation, indifference and tolerance to hostility and pogrom. The comparison works well, but does not acknowledge the role of the state authorities in each case. In the above study there is no ethnic/religious split, but a division of social class, as workers and bourgeois merchants and businessmen seem to have been living together without a spatial division. ‘Modernity’ is most evident in the development of a Greek and Jewish middle class, their association with foreigners and their cultural exchanges, sociability and attitudes – and perhaps worldview – which ‘challenged established cultural structures and created for many Greeks and Jews burning dilemmas over their ethnic identity’. Here is a fine balance between the ‘enthusiastic adoption of a cosmopolitan life’ that ‘was one side of the modernization coin’ and the institutional reforms of 1839 and 1856. It was the workings of these reforms and the authority maintained by the communities that cultivated national aspirations and created a space that was contested by Greek and Jewish merchants, lawyers and doctors – the bourgeois liberal reformers.

The big difference in Salonica of course was that the Jewish population represented the majority among other groups in the city. Still, this did not allow them to deviate from the ‘standard’ policy of Jewish groups – to avoid taking sides in political debates, or in confrontations over social issues. In the case of Salonica, the Jewish elite did take sides, but not before 1912, when they were forced to confront the claims of the Greek Kingdom to dominate the city. Smyrna, similarly, is often considered cosmopolitan because of the diversity and plurality of resident ethnic and religious groups, which created a complex demographic picture. The city merchants, from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, were seen as promoting a European culture including socialization in clubs and literary societies, and reading habits – a culture that easily contributes to the city’s cosmopolitan characteristics, most evident in the ethnic diversity and activity of its population. However, neither in the case of Salonica with its Jewish majority, nor in the case of Smyrna with its Greek majority, should one assume that these communities were not rife with conflict. Kasaba provides a short but convincing case for the deep rivalries and
division between the Greeks and their ‘community’ as early as 1819, while Kechriotis 
amply demonstrates the conflicts at the end of the Empire.75 Be that as it may, because 
of the success of Greek intermediaries – especially in controlling local networks – the 
non-Muslim intermediaries became ‘constitutive of a genuine bourgeois class in the 
changing Ottoman Empire’, and benefited from a ‘mercantilist policy as long as it was not 
imbued with the precepts of an exclusionary nationalism’, something that was to change 
rapidly and violently in the second decade of the twentieth century.76

On the other hand, all studies on Beirut emphasize the absence of large foreign 
communities but not the absence of a local merchant elite. The locality and subsequent 
urbanity of the merchants ensured and perpetuated a close working relationship among 
them.77 As a result, Beirut merchants appear to have had a strong sense of urban identity 
that also went unchecked by rivalries among them. This identity generated a ‘united’ front 
both against the centralizing tendencies of Istanbul’s authority, and against the challenges 
posed by the Damascus elite of notables, who sought to silence and forestall Beirut’s 
elevation to a provincial capital.78 For other historians of Beirut, however, business 
networks and exports (primarily of silk), and capital imports from Western Europe, led to 
the growth of an indigenous, Christian Arab merchant elite. The new economic structures 
and commercial dynamic of the mid- to late nineteenth century did give rise to a 
‘middle stratum’, mainly of Christian Arabs, even if not exactly a bourgeoisie; the middle 
stratum was middle in relation to workers and the unemployed below, and the government 
or army officials above them.79 The role of state authority in both Beirut and Alexandria 
can also be located in the legacy of the Egyptian administration, which promoted sanitary 
reforms such as the quarantine system, a reform first introduced in Alexandria.80

The Egyptian city’s colonial period begins in the wake of one of the most serious riots 
in the Eastern Mediterranean, the so-called ‘anti-European’ riot of 1882.81 The outlook of 
the city as cosmopolitan, with a cosmopolitanism that is limited to the wealthiest sections 
of a population, is an elitism that reproduces the self-celebrating cosmopolitanism of 
contemporaries who dismissed Egyptians as inferior and repugnant.82 While urban 
infrastructure and development are often used as examples of urban growth – road and 
street networks linking the ports with the hinterland and different areas of the cities, gas 
lighting and water-drainage systems – these improvements were not without social 
connotations. Urban infrastructure was concentrated in the wealthiest parts of the city, 
which in Alexandria, of course, were the ‘European’ parts. The work of Patrick Joyce 
on the urban environment reverberates in the case of Alexandria:83 power is exercised, 
but no one discusses by whom; class tensions exist, but the classes involved are not 
identified.

These riots and communal conflicts have been portrayed as the result of religious 
fanaticism that reflected the binary opposition of Christian-victims/Muslim-victimizers. 
It could also be argued in the world-system line of thinking that the incorporation of the 
Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean into the world economy in the nineteenth 
century fuelled the urban conflict and sectarian violence manifested in many cities.84 
The problem with the incorporation leading to communal conflict argument is that, while 
many port-cities were incorporated into the European/world economy, conflict did not 
erupt in all of them, whereas communal sectarian violence did occur in non-Ottoman 
cities, such as Corfu and Odessa. In any attempt to reconstruct and explain urban conflict, 
it is important to consider the repertoire of violence documented in the contemporary 
accounts of the events. The numbers, composition and reactions of protesters, and the acts 
of violence committed, are of as much interest as the alleged reasons behind their actions 
and explanations of the riots. The work by Masters on the Aleppo riots, and their local and
international dimension as analysed by Maoz, are examples that can be helpful in providing an analytical typology of urban riots in the Eastern Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{85} On the other hand, the rise of anti-Semitism in Europe in the late nineteenth century can clearly be associated with eruptions of anti-Semitic violence in the Eastern Mediterranean, as a means of eliciting what was particular about the process of incorporation of cities, not only into the world economy but more directly into a nation-state.\textsuperscript{86}

The question that many historians have found themselves facing is: who was responsible for these attacks? Merely putting the blame for the outbreaks on one or more groups and/or individuals fails to account for the causes of the events. Maoz has explained the Aleppo riots in a more structural way, seeing them as the reaction of the urban structures to the Tanzimat changes introduced by Ottoman authorities.\textsuperscript{87} The provision of social services on which the poor relied – water supplies and medical care being but two – was important for both Alexandria and Odessa.\textsuperscript{88} Population growth in these cities put considerable strain on the living conditions of the majority of the urban poor. On the other hand, the Europeans took care of their communities, with hospitals and educational institutions organized along religious but also national lines.\textsuperscript{89} This process of creating communal institutions was one of the most effective ways of defusing social tension and alleviating intra-communal differences. Merchants were instrumental in easing social tensions, in both their cosmopolitan and community spaces, although not always successfully curbing the friction that grew as nationalism gripped Eastern Mediterranean ports.

Conclusion

The history of the middle classes in parts of the world under direct European influence and hegemony, such as the Eastern Mediterranean, is an ongoing one. An early historiography employed class to explain the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire through the agency of the commercial bourgeoisie, while recent studies have focused on identity and community. Eastern Mediterranean ports present historians with a challenge and opportunity to explore the meaning of class, and the middle classes in particular, without resorting to patterns of European social formation, against which social formation in the Mediterranean will have to be tested. National histories tend to privilege national communities, striving to ‘prove’ continuities of nation and religion (a tendency that is out of historical fashion, but not out of power in countries like Greece). Marxist narratives of class defined the bourgeoisie as a product of economic activity (namely, of trade, for the cities in question), with specific national-political projects in mind, and a historical role to fulfil. Today research produces narratives of sociability, identity and everyday life, as well as inter-communal conflict that ‘culminated’ – but not in such a teleological way as the word may imply – in the destruction of the social fabric of Smyrna in 1922. This time, however, the challenge is how to write histories of the bourgeoisie in the Eastern Mediterranean beyond the nation, histories that are devoid of the generalizations of previous historical sociology and economic history works, and are firmly grounded in the historical and geographical space of the Eastern Mediterranean. Such an approach reclaims the history of these cities from the confines of the nation-states that came to ‘own’ them, usually if not always as a result of intense conflicts in the region, state expansion and the dissolution of centuries-old empires. The merchants of these cities have been historical and historiographical protagonists. Whether or not they formed a class is not as important as the ways in which they articulated their interests and asserted their hegemony and power over other conflicting orders. Whether class is still an appropriate analytical tool to address the issue remains to be seen; it is certainly an enduring one.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Professors Anthony Molho at the European University Institute and Efi Avdeli at the University of Crete for commenting critically on an earlier draft of the paper and the anonymous referee of the journal for the comments and corrections.

Notes
1. The literature is vast. For a very good review, see Daunton, Progress and Poverty.
4. For such treatment of the Middle East, see for example Laqueur, The Middle East in Transition, criticized for its unsystematic and vague notion of class by Bill (‘Dialectics of Modernization’), who shows up the early reliance of Middle East scholars on the concept of class.
5. Eisenstadt, ‘Convergence and Divergence’.
6. Karpat, ‘Some Historical and Methodological Considerations’; and Karpat, Social Foundations of Nationalism; his argument concerns mostly property relations and the class conflict that arise out of the unequal distribution of landed property.
8. The term ‘penetration’ is used widely by economic as well as social historians; for an example of the first, see Quataert, Social Disintegration. Some economic historians cautioned against the image of the Ottoman Empire as a static and less dynamic society than those in the West, and were acute in revising Ottoman history by taking a long-term view of the economic history of the Empire; İslamoğlu-Inan, The Ottoman Empire and the World-Economy.
12. Watenpaugh, Being Modern in the Middle East.
13. The point is particularly pertinent for ‘Greek’ communities of the Ottoman Empire. For a discussion of the subtleties of the concept, a challenge to established notions of community and its historiography, see Kechriotis, ‘The Greeks of Izmir at the End of the Empire’, especially the introduction.
14. Joyce, The Rule of Freedom; and for a critical review of the concept in historiography, Gunn, ‘From Hegemony to Governmentality’.
15. I borrow the term from Joshi, Fractured Modernity.
18. Eldem, ‘Signatures of Greek Clients of the Ottoman Bank’.
20. The concept has been applied to cities as well as to the Empire as a whole (Eldem, ‘Istanbul’).
23. Ibid., 128.
24. The attitude of the dependency theory-influenced historians of the Ottoman Empire is discussed in Kaiser, Imperialism, Racism and Development Theories.
28. Also unanswered is the question posed by Kechriotis of whether class consciousness could emerge and class formation could develop outside the commonly discussed ports, in other smaller cities; see Kechriotis, ‘The Greeks of Izmir’, 46.
29. Tabak, ‘Local Merchants in Peripheral Areas of the Empire’.
31. See the argument inherent in Exertzoglou, ‘The Cultural Uses of Consumption’.
35. For the same argument and examples of such recent literature see, Kechriotis, ‘The Greeks of Izmir’, 47. For the importance of voluntary associations, see Göçek, Rise of the Bourgeoisie, 130–3.
37. Özbek, ‘Philanthropic Activity’.
38. Özveren, ‘Beirut’.
39. Ibid., 482.
41. Ibid., 523–4.
42. For the discussion of the world-system historians and their argument on the role of the bourgeoisie in state formation, see Kechriotis, ‘The Greeks of Izmir’, 45–6.
45. Keyder et al., ‘Port-Cities in the Ottoman Empire’, 556.
46. Tabak, ‘Imperial Rivalry and Port-cities’.
49. For Corfu and the Ionian Islands, see Gekas, ‘The Commercial Bourgeoisie of the Ionian Islands’. For Alexandria and its (Greek) bourgeoisie, see Kitroeff, The Greeks in Egypt. The (early) colonial period (1882–1910s) remains relatively unexplored, especially regarding issues of class formation under British colonial rule. Also for Egypt, but for the working class, see the innovative Lockman, ‘British Policy’, 265–85.
58. Such was the case in Izmir; see Kasaba, ‘Izmir’, 387–410.
60. Baghdiantz McCabe et al., Diaspora Entrepreneurial Networks.
63. Sifneos, ‘“Cosmopolitanism” as a Feature of the Greek Commercial Diaspora’, 100.
67. For just one example, see Anastassiadou, ‘Sports d’élite’, 145–60.
68. Tignor, Modernization and British Colonial Rule, 266–77.
72. Molho, Oi Ebraioi th6 Q1ssai6nkh6.
73. Smyrnelis, Smyrne, la ville oubliée?.
74. Kasaba, ‘Izmir’, 401. For the Salonica Jews-as-compradors, see also Levene, ‘Port Jewry of Salonika’, where it is argued that the term itself is ‘harmless enough’ and it means ‘native agent of a foreign enterprise’, 135.
77. Özveren, ‘Beirut’, 467, 497; Fawaz, Merchants and Migrants; Hanssen, Fin-de-siècle Beirut.
78. Hanssen, Fin-de-siècle Beirut.
80. Özveren, ‘Beirut’, 475.
83. Joyce, The Rule of Freedom; Barak, ‘Scraping the Surface’.
86. For an example of anti-Semitic riots that were related to tensions occurring after the incorporation of Corfu to the Greek Kingdom, see Gekas, ‘The Port Jews of Corfu’.
87. For the direct impact of political reforms on urban conflict, see Brass, Riots and Pogroms.
88. Sifneos, ‘The Dark Side of the Moon’.

Notes on contributor
Sakis Gekas is Assistant Professor in Modern Greek History at York University, Toronto. He has published articles on the economic and social history of the Ionian Islands under British rule, and is currently completing a history of the Ionian State.

Bibliography


———. ‘Pvsi6 ko6t1mpo6rio kai 1Ilni6koi 1mpori6ko6 o6ko6’ [Russian grain and Greek commercial houses] Istori6k6 40 (2004): 53–96.